

HISTORY
OF THE
NATIVE STATES OF INDIA.

VOL. I.
G W A L I O R.

BY
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CALCUTTA:
THACKER SPINK & Co.
BOMBAY, THACKER & Co. LD., LONDON, W. THACKER & Co.

1888.

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PRINTED AT THE METHODIST PUBLISHING HOUSE,
6 WATERLOO STREET, CALCUTTA.

To
THE HON'BLE SIR STEUART COLVIN BAYLEY,
K.C.S.I., C.I.E., C.S.,
LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR OF BENGAL,
AND
LATE RESIDENT OF HYDERABAD,
(The first Native State of India),
WHO
BY EVEN-HANDED JUSTICE AND GENEROUS SYMPATHY WITH
THE PRINCES AND PEOPLE OF INDIA HAS CARRIED
WITH HIM THEIR ESTEEM AND AFFECTION,
THIS BOOK
IS
MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED
By the AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

THE first instalment of a History of the Native States of India is now offered to the public. The magnitude of the undertaking measures the diffidence with which this book has been planned and executed. If, however, it in any way interests the reader for whom it is intended, my labours will not have been in vain.

One word by way of *raison d'être* of this book will not, I hope, be out of place here. What with Orme, Mill, Elphinstone, Marshman, Duff, Elliot, and others whose names are legion, the history of India, and more particularly of Native India, has yet to be written. At first sight it seems as though all its pristine greatness and glory were gone; but there is ample reason to believe that the vital germs of its greatness from which time out of mind sprang up the stupendous fabric of this wonderful land of knowledge and culture are at worst latent and potential, and that they were never altogether dead, and never wanting in soul, and but "deadly fair." To this fact all its foreign historians have been blind. And unless this were well-known, there would be little chance of a true, and faithful, and impartial history of India. One must, moreover, understand the people whose history one is about to write; one must have sympathy with its past and present lives; one must know what its life-long efforts and tendencies have been. One other thing, which is the principal and distinguishing feature of Hindu character, is the spirituality

which Thomas Carlyle said; "could not be taught in words." This also is of prime consideration.

I am not presumptuous enough to aim at a consummation like the one I am advocating. I am simply trying to open the door to an intelligent appreciation of the Hindu people whose language and literature, however much misunderstood, have given to think to the most cultivated and original minds of Europe. I have in view also to let warlike nations know that among our "imbecile" princes and chiefs could yet be found brave and patriotic men who would prove matches for any warriors of ancient and modern times who could be named.

I am under deep obligations to friends who have given me their kind help. Foremost among them is Babu Mon Mohun Roy of the Subordinate Executive Service, who has rendered me very valuable aid. To the Honourable Raja Pyari Mohan Mukarji, C.S.I.; Babu Rasbihari Mukarji; Mr. F. J. Rowe, M. A., Professor of English Literature in the Presidency College of Calcutta, and Dr. McCoy, Editor of the *Indian Witness*, I am greatly indebted for kindly looking through portions of this volume and offering many good suggestions. I have in like manner to thank my friend Babu Jogendra Chandra Ghosh, M.A. B.L., very cordially for doing me many kindly turns.

I have consulted the following books and periodicals in writing this volume :—

- Sir John Malcolm's History of Central India.
- Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas.
- Aitchison's Treaties and Engagements.
- Scott's History of the Deccan.
- Mill's History of India, Edited by H. H. Wilson.

- Thornton's History of British India.
 Elphinstone's History of India.
 Marshman's History of India.
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SURENDRA NATH ROY.

NATIVE STATES OF INDIA,

VOL. I.

G WALIOR.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

INTRODUCTION.

	PAGE.
Unique character of the History of Native States ...	1
Proof of the aptitude of our race for Government ..	3
Field for the development of political genius ...	4
The favourable position of the Native States—a bar to radical and sweeping changes	5
Preservation and development of racial peculiarities ...	10
Status of the Native States and nature of their subordination ...	12
Their armies are limited	13
Power of interference by the Paramount Power in internal administration	14
No combination among the States possible ..	19
They cannot be gainer by severance from British Power ...	20
Voluntary alliance by the Princes with the British ...	20
Except by Sindia and Holkar	21
Their conduct during the mutiny is above-board ...	21
Loyalty of the Native chiefs during the mutiny ...	22
Russophobia in 1885, and the loyalty of Native Princes ...	23
Government of Native Princes	24
Illustrated by their action during famines ...	25
Emigration from British Provinces to Native States during famines	27
Administration of Land Revenue in British Provinces and Native States	28
No drain from Native States as home charges ...	31
Native States and British Provinces	31
Native administrators	33
Opinions of Anglo-Indian officials regarding Native rule quoted	33
Excellent features in Native rule	37

	PAGE.
Native Princes to be encouraged	37
Repudiation of the policy of annexation—Queen's proclamation of 1858	39
Lord Northbrook's policy towards Baroda	40
Lord Ripon's policy towards Mysore	40
Lord Dufferin's policy towards Gwalior	41
Armies of Native States	41
Their armies not a source of danger	42
Sir Lepel Griffin quoted	43
Native armies a great help to the English Government	44
Advisability of giving an Imperial status to the army of the Native States	48
Meritorious officers in the armies of Native States should be employed in the service of the British army	52
Titles should be conferred upon them	52
Education in the Native States	53
Government in Native States	60
Representative assembly in Mysore	65
Council of the Empire	67
Subjects to be discussed in the "Imperial Council"	69
Advantages to be derived from the proposed Council	71
The Native States of India give rise to patriotic feeling	74
The future of the Native States of India	75
Probable effects of the spread of a national feeling in India	77

CHAPTER I.

THE RISE OF THE MAHRATTAS.

The rise of the Mahrattas	83
Their characteristics	83
'Maharashtra' or the great kingdom	86
Sivaji, his early life	87
His first act	88
Aurangzeb, as a ruler	88
Sivaji and the Mogul Viceroy	89
Sivaji as Raja	90
Sivaji and the Emperor	90
Sivaji as a prisoner	90
Flight of Sivaji	91

	PAGE.
The Emperor, a loser in the long run	92
Attempt to seize Sivaji	93
Further conquests by Sivaji	93
His death	94
His character	94
Sambaji	95
His capture	97
Beheaded by the Emperor	97
Its effect	98
Yesoo Bye and her son betrayed and captured	99
Ram Raja on the throne	99
His death	100
Emperor's treatment of Sivaji or Shahu	100
Shahu liberated after Emperor's death and becomes Raja	100
Peshwa Balaji Viswanath	101
State of the Mogul Empire	102
The Peshwa in Delhi	102
Baji Rao	103
Mahratta officers with the Peshwa—founder of kingdoms	103
Cessions of territories to the Peshwa	104
Invasion of Nadir Shah, its effect	105
Baji Rao's ambition	105
Founders of the Mahratta States trained under his guidance	106

CHAPTER II.

THE RISE OF THE SINDIA FAMILY.

Fit time for the establishment of sovereignties	107
Ranoji Sindia, the founder of the Gwalior Royal family	107
Story of his early life	108
His career	109
His death	109
Jayapa	110
Dattaji	110
ankoji	111

CHAPTER III.

MAHADAJI SINDIA.

PART I.

	PAGE.
Gloom over the Sindia family	113
Mahadaji Sindia and the Third battle of Paniput	113
His right to the family jaghir upheld by the Peshwa	114
Mahadaji and the Peshwa	115
The Mahrattas attempt to recover their former power	116
Secret disease in the Mahratta cabinet	118
The Mahrattas vowed revenge	119
Proposal of peace	120
Influence in the Delhi Court	120
Death of Nuzeebuddaulah	121
The Mahrattas and the Emperor	121
The Mahrattas avenge themselves upon the Rohillas... ..	122
The Emperor wishes to get rid of the Mahrattas	124
The victory of the Mahrattas over the Emperor	124
Gradual increase of influence of Mahadaji after Madhu Rao's death	125
Death of Madhu Rao	127
State of the Mahratta confederacy	127
Narain Rao as Peshwa	130
Raghoba	130
Gunga Bai delivered of a son—Madhu Rao Narain	131
Raghoba defeats the forces of the Regency	132
Raghoba received with respect by Sindia and Holkar	133
Ministers at Puna conspire against the infant Peshwa	133
Raghoba negotiates with the Bombay Government	134
Desire of the English to get Salsette and Bassein	134
The English occupies Broach	135
Raghoba's negotiations with the English fall through	135
Raghoba in a fix	136
Concludes the treaty of Surat with the English	137
Keating sent to join Raghoba's army	137
Raghoba's hopes of being joined by Sindia	137
Keating defeats the army of the Regency	138
Raghoba's prospects	139
The Supreme Government condemned the policy of the Bombay Government	139
Treaty of Purandhar	140

Policy of Sindia ...	141
Bombay Government disapproves of the treaty of Purandhar ...	141
The Pretender 'Bhao' ...	142
Proceedings of the Puna Cabinet ...	143
Dissensions in the Puna Cabinet ...	144
The adventurer, St. Lubin ...	144
The Court of Directors approves of the conduct of the Bombay Government ...	145
Nana's policy ...	147
Negotiations between the Bombay Government and the Puna Ministers ...	149
The Bombay Governor determines to carry on hostilities ...	150
Enters into a new treaty with Raghoba ...	151
Nana Furnavese and Sindia make extensive military preparations	151
Mr. Hastings' despatch to the Bombay Government ...	152
Beginning of war ...	153
Conduct of the English Government ...	154
Conduct of the Court of Directors ...	160
Conduct of the Supreme Government ...	261
Remarks on the First Mahratta War ...	164
Dispute between Mr. Carnac and Col. Egerton ...	169
War preparations of the English ...	170
War preparations of the Mahrattas ...	171
Retreat of the English army to Wargaoui ...	172
Negotiations for peace ...	174
Separate negotiations by the English with Sindia ...	176
Position of the Bombay Army ...	178
March of the Bengal Army ...	178
Col. Goddard succeeds Col. Leslie ...	179
Proposal of negotiations with Sindia ...	181
Mahadaji's intention of making Raghoba his instrument ...	184
Death of Sukaram Bapu ...	185
Mahadaji's friendship with the English ...	186
Nana Furnavese and Mahadaji Sindia ...	186
Negotiations between Goddard and Nana ...	187
Commencement of hostilities and the storm of Ahmedabad ...	187
Proposals of peace sent by Mahadaji to the English ...	188
Mahadaji avoids a pitched battle with Goddard ...	189
The English army attack the north east and capture Gwalior ...	190
Goddard changes the plan of operations ...	191
Hastings resolves to carry on war within Sindia's dominions ...	192

	PAGE.
Mahadaji outwitted by the English	192
Treaty between Sindia and Muir, and Sindia's reasons for concluding the treaty	194
Delay in ratifying the treaty... ..	197

MAHADAJI SINDIA.

PART II.

Affairs at Delhi	200
Favourable opportunity of Sindia to meddle in the politics of Delhi	200
De Boigne in the service of Sindia	201
Sindia sets out for Agra	202
Agra surrenders	203
The news received with joy at Puna	204
Mahadaji becomes possessor of extensive dominions... ..	205
Mahadaji asks for chauth from the English	205
The English think of placing a resident at Puna	206
The jealousy of Nana and Tukaji Holkar at Sindia's increased power	207
Obstacles in Sindia's way	208
Mahadaji sequesters the jagheers of some Muhammedan chiefs	209
Mahadaji's demand from the Rajputs	210
Sindia in difficulty	210
Sindia harassed by the Rajputs	212
The conduct of the Rajputs	214
Ismael Beg follows his pursuit of Sindia	215
Sindia writes to Nana for help and the vindication of his character	216
Necessity of union at this time	218
Sindia not idle	220
Movements of Golam Kadir and his inhuman conduct towards the Emperor and the members of his household	221
Ismael Beg joins with Sindia	224
Delhi occupied by the Mahrattas and the just punishment upon Golam Kadir	225
Obstacles in the path of Sindia	226
Mahadaji improves his army	228
Gossains in the army of Sindia	231
Himmud Bahadur	232
Renewed hostility with Ismael Beg	233

	PAGE.
Mahadaji makes peace with the Rajputs ...	235
Nana Furnavese joins the English against Tipu ...	235
The army of Sindia ...	236
Sindia thinks of establishing his authority at Puna in the Court of the Peshwa ...	236
Prospects before Sindia ...	238
Mahadaji reaches Puna ...	239
Meeting of Nana Furnavese and Mahadaji Sindia ...	239
Sindia's visit to the Peshwa and the investiture of the latter ...	240
Sindia's show of humility on the occasion ...	242
The Peshwa's fondness for Sindia ...	243
Prospects before the young Peshwa ...	244
Mahadaji petitions for the payment of expenses of his wars ...	245
Mahadaji petitions for the recall of Holkar and Ali Bahadur from Hindusthan ...	246
Ismael Beg defeated by Sindia's Commander Perron and confined in the Fort of Agra ...	246
Mahadaji gets a complete victory over Holkar ...	247
Mahadaji becomes supreme in Hindusthan ...	248
Death of Mahadaji Sindia, 12th February, 1794 ...	249
Character of Mahadaji Sindia ...	250

CHAPTER IV.

PART I.

EARLY CAREER OF DAULAT RAO SINDIA.

Daulat Rao Sindia succeeds to the throne ...	261
Called upon to take a part at Kurdla ...	261
State of Mahratta politics at this time ...	262
Death of the young Peshwa ...	262
Nana attempts to thwart the accession of Baji Rao ...	263
Baji Rao opens negotiations with Ballaba Tatya, Sindia's Prime-minister ...	264
Sindia begins to take an active part in Mahratta politics ...	265
Nana attempts to revive the power of the Raja of Satara ...	267
Attempts to place Chimnaji Appa on the throne ...	267
He accepts the Peshwaship ...	268
Attempts to overthrow the power of Ballaba Tatya ...	268
Ballaba Tatya and Porcshram Bhao arrested ...	269

	PAGE.
Baji Rao becomes Peshwa and Nana Furnavese becomes Prime-Minister	269
Baji Rao tries to get rid of Sindia and Nana Furnavese ...	269
Nana treacherously arrested by Sindia's officer, Michael Filose at the instigation of Baji Rao and his men killed and plundered	270
Baji Rao allows Ghatkay to plunder the inhabitants of Puna ...	271
Amrut Rao advises Baji Rao to put Sindia to prison ...	272
Sindia sent for by Baji Rao	272
Baji Rao's plan of imprisoning Sindia frustrated	272
Fresh attempts to overthrow the power of Sindia	273
Sindia releases Nana and imprisons Ghatkay	274
Ballaba Tatya released by Sindia	274
Death of Nana Furnavese	274
Jeswant Rao Holkar gains a brilliant victory over Sindia ...	274
Another brilliant victory gained by Holkar over Sindia ...	275
Baji Rao hearing of further movements of Holkar concludes a treaty with the British Resident	276

PART II.

THE TREATY OF BASSEIN.

The work of successive Governors-General	277
State of the country and Lord Wellesley	277
System of subsidiary alliance	278
The Mahrattas at the beginning of the present century ...	279
Lord Wellesley tries to induce the Peshwa to enter into subsidiary alliance with the English	280
The Peshwa declines the offer of the Governor-General in 1798	280
Renewed proposals of the Governor-General to the Peshwa ...	281
The Peshwa at first refuses but eventually yields	281
Conclusion of the treaty of Bassein	282
The Governor-General tries to extend British supremacy ...	284
The British Resident renews negotiations with Sindia for concluding a similar treaty	284
Attitude of Daulat Rao Sindia considered by the British Government as menacing	285
Beginning of hostilities between Sindia and the British Government	286
The Mahratta chiefs not to blame for this war	287

PART III.

THE SECOND MAHRATTA WAR.

	PAGE.
Preparation of the English	289
Capture of the Fort of Ahmednagar	289
Battle of Assye	289
General Wellesley's letter to the Governor-General	290
Sindia becomes aware of Wellesley's plan	292
Burhanpur and Asseergurh taken by the English	292
Sindia sends an Ambassador to Wellesley to negotiate	293
Battle of Argaom	294
Fort of Gowilghur taken by the English	294
State of affairs in Hindusthan	295
The French State on the Jumna	295
General Perron	296
Battle of Alighur	297
Battle of Delhi	298
Its effect	299
Occupation of Agra	300
Battle of Laswari	301
Fighting on a smaller scale in other quarters	303
Daulat Rao thinks of making peace with the English	303
Treaty of Sirji Anjengaom	303
Enumeration of the benefits derived from this war according to the Governor-General	304

PART IV.

THE LAST DAYS OF DAULAT RAO SINDIA.

Hasty conclusion of the Treaty of Sirji Anjengaom	306
Treaty of Burhanpore	306
Cession of Gwalior and Gohud to the English by Daulat Rao Sindia	306
Daulat Rao yields	308
Effect of the defeat of Monson by Jeswant Rao Holkar	308
Unsuccessful attempt of the English to seize the fort of Deig	308
Daulat Rao's letter to the British Government	309
Daulat Rao plunders Sagore	310
Preparations for an united action by Ghatkay and Holkar	310
The Governor-General thinks of reducing the power of Sindia	311
Sindia removes Ghatkay and appoints Ambaji	311

	PAGE.
Meeting of Sindia, Holkar and Amir Khan	312
Lord Cornwallis and his pacific policy enunciated in his letter to Lord Lake	312
Lord Lake delays in transmitting the letter of the Governor-General to Sindia	314
Sir George Barlow as Governor-General and the adoption by him of a pacific policy	314
Better state of things in the Court of Sindia under Ambaji Inglia	315
Negotiations for peace between Sindia and the English	316
Conclusion of a treaty between Sindia and the English through Moonshee Kavel Nyno	317
Sindia a gainer by the treaty	318
State of the country after the conclusion of peace	318
The Kingdom of Bhopal attacked by Sindia and Bhonslay	319
Lord Hastings tries unsuccessfully to mix in the politics of Bhopal	329
The Pindarees	320
The Governor-General marched towards Gwalior and a treaty is concluded between Sindia and the English	323
The Peshwa's letter to Sindia	325
Offence given to the English by the Killadar of Asseorgurh	326
Fortress of Asseorgurh occupied by the English	326
Dissolution of the Mahratta Confederacy	326
Death of Daulat Rao Sindia on the 21st March 1827	327
Account given by the Resident of the death and character of Daulat Rao Sindia	327

CHAPTER V.

JANKOJI SINDIA.

Mugat Rao adopted by Baiza Bai	332
Baiza Bai as Regent	332
Harsh treatment of the young Maharaja by Baiza Bai	333
Lord Bentinck visits Gwalior, 1832	334
Baiza Bai's power overthrown	335
The flight of Jankoji was the signal for a general insurrection	335
Policy of non-intervention adopted at this time by the British Government	335
Baiza Bai returns to Gwalior and lives there peacefully till her death in 1862	336
Jankoji Sindia as ruler	337
Manna Sahob as prime-minister	337
The Maharaja receives a visit from Lord Auckland	338

	PAGE.
Reform in the contingent	339
Exchange of some of Sindia's districts for British territory ...	339
Death of Jankaji Sindia, 1843	340

CHAPTER VI.

JAYAJI RAO SINDIA.

Tara Bai adopts Bhagirot Rao, and the latter is installed with the title of Alija Jayaji Rao Sindia	341
Decline of Mama Saheb's power	341
Marriage of the young Maharaja with the daughter of Mama Saheb, and the dismissal of the latter by the Maharani ...	343
The inexplicable conduct of the Maharani	344
The attitude of the Governor-General	345
Violent measures adopted by Dada Khasji Walla to please the soldiery	345
The English army ordered to assemble on the banks of the Jumna	347
The Governor-General offended against the Dada for his conduct	348
The Governor-General's minute on the state of affairs in Gwalior	349
Critical state of affairs in Gwalior	351
Dada Khasji Walla seized by the conservative party, and the demand of the British Government for his surrender ...	352
The Governor-General resolves to march towards Gwalior and the surrender of the Dada by the Gwalior Durbar ...	353
Views of the Governor-General	354
The Governor-General's determination to cross the Chumbal ...	355
The people of Gwalior annoyed at the conduct of the Governor-General	556
Battles of Maharajpore and Puniar	558
Liberal policy adopted by the Governor-General	558
Treaty between the English and the Gwalior Durbar	558
Sir Dinkar Rao as prime-minister	359
The mutiny and the Maharaja	060
Treaty concluded with the British Government subsequent to the Mutiny	361
Ballaji Chimnaje and Gunput Rao Kharkay as Prime-ministers ...	362
Appointed a member to try Gwekwar	362
Sindia appointed Honorary-General	362
The restitution of the Fort of Gwalior to the Maharajah by Lord Dufferin	362
Conditions of the agreement entered into by the British Government with Sindia after the restitution of the Fort of Gwalior...	364
His death and character	364

CHAPTER VII.

MADHOJI RAO SINDIA.

	PAGE
Madhoji Rao Sindia succeeds as Maharaja	366

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION OF GWALIOR.

Form of Government	367
Administration after the death of Jayaji Rao Sindia	368
The Council of Regency	368
Training and education of the young Maharaja	369
The Administration of the State	369
Judicial	370
Police	370
State Treasure	371
Ré-payment of 50 lakhs	371
State Income and Expenditure	372
British troops in Gwalior	372
Dispensaries in Gwalior State	373
Postal Department	373
Education	373
Agriculture	374
Population	374
General Remarks	375

APPENDICES.

Appendix, A, Gwalior, its Geography and Archæology	376
Appendix, B, Treaties and Engagements	380

INTRODUCTION.

ONE of the most important subjects that can engage the attention of the Indian public is the history of the Native States of India. The novel and unique character of this history, the instructive lesson it conveys, and the very singular interest attached to it, constitute it a subject for serious and considerate study. It is true that during the palmy days of the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire there were a number of vassal kings, who owed allegiance to the "Eternal city;" but the relation that subsisted between those subject kings and the Paramount Power was not of so close, intimate, and complex a nature as that which exists between the Native States of India and the British Government. The vassal kings of Rome acknowledged her supremacy, paid her tribute, and, in times of war, contributed their respective contingents to her army, but in other matters were quite independent. Such is not the case with the Native States of India. The British Government, whose authority over these States flows through numberless different channels, have imposed upon them a multitude of restrictions, controlling not only their external relations but also, to a large extent, their internal administration. These restraints take, sometimes, the form of friendly advice, sometimes that of earnest remonstrance, and at others, of peremptory command. There is also another circumstance which gives a distinctive character

Unique
character of
the history of
native states.

to the relation between the native states and the British Government. It is this—that there is a close relationship between the subjects of the native states and the subjects of the Paramount Power. They all belong to the same race, they speak the same tongue, they profess the same religion, and are practically the same people. The native states, therefore, form organic parts of the whole British Indian Empire. Every tumult or confusion in any of the States would form a disturbing element in the neighbouring British dominions. Every movement, religious, social or political, everything in fact that would create a stir, in any of the States would produce a corresponding disturbance in all the others, Native as well as British. Such was not the case with the Roman Empire. In it, the centre had nothing to do with the extremities. It was not an organism, but a huge agglomeration of diverse races, nationalities, religions, social systems held together by the single tie of submission to the same mighty military power. Any one of the members of that mighty whole might be lopped off without loss of its own vitality or injury to the rest. But such is not the case with the Native States of India; between them and the territories under the direct sway of the Paramount Power, there is such a closely intimate connexion that to sever it means a complete upsetting of the political and social fabric. It is this circumstance which, more than all others, makes the existence of the Native States of India a political phenomenon of unparalleled interest and importance. Unless

this central and vital fact were borne in mind, we should never be able to look at the subject from the highest point of view. To understand the real nature of the subject and to grasp its true significance we must not confine our attention merely to State papers—to treaties which create or confirm the existence of the native states and prescribe the nature of their subordination to the ruling power. We must take into consideration those circumstances of common origin, history, religion, and language which constitute a bond of union between the inhabitants of the native states and the inhabitants of British India, and make the native states component parts of the British Empire in a deeper sense than is conveyed in artificial treaties and Imperial pageants.

The native states cover an area of about 600,000 square miles, and contain according to the census of 1881, a population of more than 55 millions of men. This population is not stationary, but progressive, and considering the rapid rate at which it is increasing, it is no rash forecast to conjecture that, within the next sixty or seventy years it will double itself. When we take into account the vast extent of territory, occupied by these States, and the large number of human beings who inhabit them, we cannot but admit that their existence is a highly notable political fact which is destined to exercise an abiding influence on the future destinies of the human race and of the people of India in particular.

The most striking and important fact about these States, is, that they furnish undeniable evidence of the aptitude of the Native races for Government. The

Proof of
the aptitude
of our race
for Govern-
ment.

high administrative talent displayed by a large number of native statesmen in the service of native princes, is a well-known fact. That an extent of territory, five times as large as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and with double its population, is ruled by Native administrators, and that this rule has kept touch with the march of civilization and been found compatible with social and moral progress, speaks volumes in favour of the ruling capacity of the Indo-Aryan race. It is hardly necessary to point out the bearing of this fact on the political problem of the present day—the problem, *viz.*, as to how to reconcile the existence of the British rule in India, and the many benefits which it has conferred upon us with the gradual extension of the principle of self-government and the growth and development of our internal liberties. Which question, however, as involving the reconciliation of the two opposing principles of authority and liberty will, some day or other, have to be solved. Meanwhile, a faithful narrative of the native states offers, for want of a complete and final, a partial and subsidiary solution of this problem.

It is tolerably certain that British India, for reasons not far to seek, is hardly a proper field for the display of native statesmanship. But no one can deny that the very existence of these States has hitherto served to evolve and develop what little political genius lay dormant in the native brain, and would otherwise never have come to full and active life. Need we mention the names of Salar Jung and Madhava Rao to make good our assertion. What is of far more

importance even than the rise of these eminent statesmen is a general diffusion of political training amongst the great mass of the people. In a State wherein the administration is carried on by the natives, the people cannot long remain totally ignorant of the art of Government. Where there is circulation from the heart through the body, there cannot be atrophy of the limbs. Under the direct control of the British Government the people, it is true, can boast of a better education and a higher culture than under the native states. They can soar high into the cloudy region of political speculation, they can discourse eloquently on the vague generalities and stilted abstractions of political science, but, when it is action and not speculation, practice and not theory, that is in question, they must yield the palm to the men under the native regime. Though deficient in education and culture, these men have the inestimable advantage of being free to manage their own affairs, and, thereby to acquire practical knowledge and experience which otherwise are unattainable. This one advantage is a sufficient set-off to a certain lack of intellectual ingenuity, and to the absence of some of those finer traits of character which education alone can bestow.

Another beneficial result of the existence of the native states is this—that the inhabitants, removed to a sufficient distance to allow of a comprehensive view of the effects of western education and western culture in British India, have been able to see that under these innovations a major portion of the vast edifice of Aryan civilization has well nigh crumbled

The favourable position of the Native States—a bar to radical and sweeping changes.

away, and that the changes wrought have gone deep into the roots of society, and effected a complete revolution in the national mind and in the arts, customs, manners and institutions which are the external embodiments of that mind. Other important changes too have been wrought ; and there has been much and bitter controversy over the effect of all these various changes, some having called them useful reforms, others having proscribed them as rash and ill-considered and as injuriously interfering with an ancient and almost perfect, social system. The author would wish to steer a middle course and incline neither to extravagant praise nor to indiscriminate blame. He believes a great deal of good has been done to India by the spread of English education and the action of English Government. He believes the innovations and reforms that have been introduced have been in the main beneficial. He believes in the political sagacity and justice of the British Government. But he owns to no little disappointment at the many uncalled for and exotic evils that western culture generally brings in its train. While a number of deep-seated evils and prejudices have been uprooted, an equally large, or it may be larger number of good things have been misunderstood, misinterpreted and done away with ; much that was good in the old system and much that was in perfect harmony with the genius of the race has been mercilessly eradicated.

The native states are very fortunately placed in relation to the introduction of western ideas and western institutions. By the peculiar circumstance

of their position they are able to adopt what is good and eschew what is evil in these changes. These States, if wise, would move slowly, far more slowly than the British provinces in the path of this great revolution and thus have for guidance, the invaluable experience of the result in British India of the great social changes to which I have adverted. Another great advantage in their favour is that in their experience of what is good for them and what is bad in British administration, lies the key to all future innovations. Thus, while the spread of English education and legislation according to western methods has, in British India, utterly disjointed the ancient frame-work of society and introduced a brand-new system in many respects out of harmony with the genius and the past life of the people, it is certain these agencies will not achieve such work of destruction in the native states. British India plunged into the sea of change without a helm or a compass, the wrecks of her ancient social system which lie strewn over the sea, will one day point out to the native states the dangers of the navigation and teach them to steer clear of whirlpools and sandbanks and sunken reefs. In British India the new has to a large extent done away with the old; whereas in the native states the new will engraft itself on the old, and live with it not in mortal antagonism, but in friendly co-operation. Two or three examples may serve to illustrate this point and to shew that this contention is not a mere vague possibility, but an indubitable fact. That within the last half century the vice of drunkenness has

made rapid progress in India is only too true. The cause of it is two fold,—first, the aping by inconsiderate natives of European modes of living; and, secondly, the introduction of the outstill system and other similar measures by the British Government which has given great impetus to the dissemination of this vice. If, on the contrary, we turn to the native states a quite different picture presents itself. In them we find a deep-seated hatred of drink, long since impressed on the national mind by the teachings of Hinduism and Islam. Add to this the fact that Native Governments, acting in obedience to the simple policy that has been handed down from generation to generation, prohibit unconditionally the sale of spirituous liquors. In this these Governments act in ignorance of the teachings of western political ethics which would regard all restrictions on the sale of liquor as an unwarrantable encroachment on private liberty, or of the lessons of western political economy which enjoin the taxing of alcohol up to the highest productive limit. The native states stick to the policy of olden times, and with very excellent effect. “We remember well,” says the Statesman, “that in 1870 it was found that the best of our own ryots in the Soopah Taluk of the Surat Collectorate, were emigrating into the adjoining territory of the Gaekwar, where the land revenue was three times as heavy upon the same soil as within our own borders; and that when close enquiry was made into its causes, the one answer was that respectable ryots could not live in the villages of our own taluk, because of the drunken rows which the liquor shops gave rise to

therein. Across the border, that is, in the Baroda territory, no liquor shops, or licenses to sell liquor, were permitted, and there were no grog shops to disturb village-life there."

To take another example, it may be said, without fear of contradiction, that the land-revenue policy of the British Indian Government has, in many instances, been a failure,—that it has led to the destruction of the old village communities where such existed—to the general unsettlement of relations between the various classes of the agricultural community—to the wholesale overthrow of rights, customs, and usages which had been the growth of centuries, in some provinces to the impoverishment of the masses, in others to a needless sacrifice of the revenue. All this has been the direct effect of the introduction into this country of certain western economic ideas and practice, which have been now become generally unpopular, even in the land of their birth. The native states have escaped this evil. They have avoided all needless interference with the old system which is well understood by the people, and suited to their circumstances. Only necessary reforms have been introduced, and steps have been taken cautiously and in the light of the past social history of the people. And, as a necessary consequence, we behold in most of the native states a contented and happy peasantry, and a land revenue which, though heavier in amount than in the British territories, is paid without murmur. Thus it will be seen that the native states have done well to adhere to their time-honoured policies, to the simple notions of

political economy which a long course of practice had shewn to be suited to the circumstances of the country, and to the habits and instincts of the people. It would be needless to multiply proofs of the obvious truth that western ideas, in proportion as they have conferred on the country a number of benefits, have brought in their train a considerable number of evils which the native states have, in consequence of their favourable position, been able to avoid. Arts and institutions, which in British India have become things of the past, the native states have preserved intact; because British India has moved and moves too fast in the cycle of change. And it is not gratuitous to expect that it will pass through many "varieties of untried being." In the native states, on the contrary, the transition from the old to the new will, it is just to infer, be a slow and gentle one. In the fulness of time, the dry leaves of the indigenous tree will gradually fall away, giving place to a fresh foliage. A change slow, sure, and noiseless as that of Nature will come over the face of things.

The attention of the reader may now be drawn to another important fact, in connexion with the existence of the native states, *viz.*, the preservation and development of several valuable racial peculiarities in the people of India. To some, this will appear as hardly a matter for congratulation. They will point to the blood-stained pages of the history of India and urge that all the warfare of the past was due to the prevalence of race-feeling and that the British Mission in India has always been, by rooting out this feeling, to plant, in its stead, a deep national sentiment which should

unite the different races into a common brotherhood. Without questioning the general soundness of this opinion, I may be permitted to hold that the abuse of a good thing does not lower it in value or make it the less desirable. I cannot see that because the development of racial life has ended in evil consequences in the past, it is desirable that such life should be wholly extinct. It is not quite certain that the stereotyped system of British administration does not tend to stamp too uniform a type of character upon the various races which live under its sway. Nay, does it not deprive them of their distinctive traits and prune and fashion them into a single invariable form by the two-fold agencies of English education and English bureaucratic government? One can hardly perceive any difference between an educated Bengali and an educated man of Upper India. This, in the main, is a highly beneficial change; beneficial as regards national unity. No sacrifice is too great for the sake of that all-important object. But it is an open question whether national unity requires that sacrifice, the total sacrifice, that is, of rich racial traits. At any rate, whether it is needed or not, so far as it goes, it is an evil. Against that evil the existence of the native states is a great preventive. It is because of them that the Sikh, the Rajput, the Mahratta and the Pathan are enabled to maintain the distinctive features of their character, and to develop all those virtues and excellences wherewith he has been specially gifted. While the youth of Bengal, Behar, Madras and Bombay are being gradually denationalised, and reduced to a uniform

mental length on the procrustean bed of British rule, the youth of the purely native states have largely preserved their national traits, and, with roots struck deep into their past lives, are flourishing in natural luxuriance on their native soil.

With these few general observations, let us now enquire into the status of these States as well as into the nature of their subordination to the Paramount Power. It is needless to say that they have long lost the right to make peace or war, to enter into a treaty with or send ambassadors to, each other, or to foreign States. Their relations with other States are under the control of the British Government, which guarantees to them peace and freedom from all external molestation. Their relative position and dignity are also regulated by the British Government. The Crown is in India, as in England, the fountain of honour. The number of guns the Native princes receive, in salute, is the criterion of their rank and dignity. Illustrious ancestry, extent of territorial possessions, importance in the eye of the nation—all these must yield precedence to the factitious title created by the conventional code of public honours which the Supreme Government has thought fit to set up. It is, however, but just to observe that the Government keeps as close to the natural gradation as is consistent with a due regard to the dictates of policy and interest. Those who have stood by it in the hour of darkness and trial, or of whom effectual assistance is expected in emergencies, must be treated with a consideration out of all proportion to their actual influence in the

country. While those from whom it has ever received any injury and whose fidelity it sees reason to doubt are to be paid in their own coin. But yet, be it said, to the credit of the British Government that its mode of distributing honours is characterised by a generous recognition of merit even in those whose loyalty, though no doubt sincere, would perhaps not bear the strain of any great temptation or trial.

One of the most important restrictions on the freedom of the Native chiefs is that, with a single exception, they are not permitted to maintain a military force above a certain limit specified in the treaties concluded by them with the Paramount Power. This is a most galling restriction, and one that cannot fail to keep alive in their minds a sense of their dependence. Of all the elements that constitute the pride of sovereignty, the most important is the army ; and to be shorn of it must be deeply mortifying to the pride and self-love of the Native chiefs. Here is a typical instance from Aitchison's Treaties of the strict surveillance of the British Government on the course adopted by the native states in dealing with their armies. "In 1856," Mr. Aitchison writes,—“the Maharaja Sindia being anxious to have the army under his immediate control, withdrew the troops, amounting to 1,500 infantry, 12 guns, and 4,000 cavalry, from provincial service, and proposed to entertain in their place a body of Nujeebs, 3,000 strong for police. These 3,000 men were to be formed into three police corps, one to be stationed in Malwa, another in the Chumbal istrict, and the third in Esagarh, and the Bundelcund

Their armies
are limited.

frontier. This was sanctioned by Government on the distinct understanding that the Nujeebs were to constitute a police and not a military force. In process of time these men came to be regularly drilled soldiers, and in 1866 the Maharaja urged that Nujeeb battalions should be organized on the same *quasi*-military footing as British police battalions were at the time of the enlistment of these men. He also asked that Article 9 of the treaty of 1860, might be modified, so as to admit of these men being added to the regular strength of the army. The request was negatived as being contrary to treaty and opposed to the conditions on which the Maharaja had been allowed to raise the Nujeeb battalions. He was required to break them up as soon as possible and to do away with all drill or military organization. They were accordingly broken up into small bodies of 20 to 60 men each, bodies of 100 men being only retained in the more disturbed districts. They were allowed, however, to retain their arms."

Many other instances might be cited to show the extreme caution and care with which the English Government watches every step taken by the Native princes relating to their armies. Very naturally such attitude of the Supreme Power deeply hurts the pride of the princes, compromises their dignity, and lowers them in the eye of the nation.

But, perhaps, the most important of all restrictions on the freedom of these chiefs is the power which the Supreme Government reserves to itself of interfering in the internal administration of the native states in the event of gross misgovernment. This is the

most characteristic feature in the relation between the British Government and the native states. It completely differentiates such relation from all relations that had ever subsisted between any Paramount Power in any age or country and its subject kings. Never, in the annals of the world's history, did a Supreme Power usurp the right of interfering in the internal administration of its vassal chiefs. This is a modern conception altogether unknown to the ancients. While the policy of the ancients was war and conquest, that of modern statesmen is ardent love of happiness and social order. Whether impelled by this spirit of the age or actuated by the fear that any social disturbance in the native states might create a stir in the British dominions, the English Government keeps a sharp eye on the internal administration of these States. It should, however, be said in justice to the English Government, that such control seldom degenerates into harassing meddlesomeness. What it requires of the Native chiefs is certainly not a rule of ideal perfection, but the observance of those primary principles of government without which society cannot exist. It also enjoins the introduction of all sorts of useful reforms. But its word of advice, backed as it is by the weight of its plenary authority, has sometimes the ring of command. As instances of this two-fold form of interference, the first of milder form of advice and the other of the graver form of dethronement and military occupation, we may cite the well-known cases of the occupation of Mysore in 1830, the deposition of the Gaekwar Mulhar Rao, in 1875,

the regulations for the suppression of *suttee* and infanticide, and the recent reforms in custom duties in Cashmere and Indore. In this connexion the reader may profitably read the memorable words of our late Viceroy Lord Ripon, uttered at the distribution of prizes in Mayo College, Ajmere, on the 21st of November 1881. "I am firmly convinced," His Lordship said, "that the maintenance of the native states is of no less political importance to the Government of England than it is to the people of those States themselves, and it will always be the aim of my policy, so long as I fill this office which I now occupy, to maintain the integrity and dignity of the Native States of India, and to promote to the utmost of my power their prosperity and wellbeing. But at the same time, I am specially impressed with the deep responsibility which rests upon the Government of India, in regard to the welfare of the people of those native states. The British rule in this peninsula has established throughout the length and breadth of the land an uninterrupted and unbroken peace. It is one of the greatest claims which we can put forward to the attachment of the chiefs and inhabitants of India, that peace is maintained by the power of the English name; but the very fact that we thus enforce tranquillity throws of itself the great responsibility upon the Government of India of seeing that the inhabitants of the native states do not suffer from misgovernment or from oppression; and it is undoubtedly a task of no small difficulty and delicacy to reconcile that freedom from all harassing and needless interference which we desire

to secure to the Native princes and chiefs with that protection from injustice and wrong, which we are bound to afford to the people who dwell in their territories."

Noble and wise words these, which every English official who has to deal with the native states would do well constantly to bear in mind. The task to which His Lordship refers in the passage just quoted is undoubtedly "a task of no small difficulty and peril." But if it be entered upon in the right spirit, and with a single-minded desire to act justly towards the princes and peoples of these vast dominions, it can be confidently hoped that the task, however arduous, will be successfully carried out.

Of uniformity in the way in which the diplomatic relations between the British Government and the native states are conducted, there is none. Some of these States hold direct communication with the Supreme Government, while others are placed under the immediate control of the several local Governments. British officers, styled 'Residents,' 'Agents to the Governor-General' and 'Political Agents,' are stationed at the capitals of the more important States, such as Hyderabad, Mysore, &c., and at certain centres, round which minor States are grouped. These officers represent the majesty of the Supreme Power and keep a watchful eye on the administration of the States. It is for them to check abuses in the native administration, to insist on the necessity of reforms not liked by Native princes, to uphold the dignity of the Paramount Power and to do many other acts lowering to the authority of the Native

chiefs in such a way as not to wound their pride, or give them needless offence. It is not, therefore, matter of surprise that in many instances these officers turn out utter failures. Some of them are wanting in the necessary abilities and firmness of mind, and do not maintain a vigorous control over the erratic proceedings of a bad native administrator ; others, puffed up with a sense of their own importance, make, by needless interferences, the thrones of Native princes so many beds of thorns. English residents like Charles Metcalfe, George Yule or Sir Steuart Bayley, it is not easy to find by the dozen.

In their dealings with Indian princes, English statesmen ought to bear in mind that the princes are conspicuous by their loyalty. Unless this central fact were acted upon and constantly kept in view, British policy in regard to the native states would be in danger of going radically wrong. The position which these States occupy in relation to the Paramount Power, is not one of antagonism. Indeed, they are bound to the British Government by the strongest ties of gratitude and interest. It is true, that in some of the leading newspapers, both here and in England, there has been from time to time a good deal of controversy about the disloyalty of Native princes and chiefs, and about the necessity of keeping a vigilant eye on their acts and movements. But it is all owing to a radical misconception of native character and inability to understand the significance of plain, historical facts. Many members of the ruling class have, for some reason or other, conceived

a violent prejudice against the native character as a whole, and cannot comprehend how a goodly tree, like loyalty, can thrive in Indian soil. A few others who have read in history of the unsatisfactory relations between conquerors and conquered, have jumped at the hasty generalisation that such relation can never be peaceful and happy, and that mutual good will, between rulers and ruled, is a figment. Sufficient weight has not been attached by these men to the peculiar circumstances under which British rule was established in India ; but on the contrary they have been too apt to find analogy between the history of Indian conquest and the history of other conquests, past or present. The following considerations are laid before the reader in the hope that they may dispel illusions and contribute to a right understanding of this most important subject.

The most striking fact about these States is that they are very numerous and scattered over all parts of the country, and that, with one or two exceptions, they are petty in size and power. There can be no community of interests, and for that matter no combination, among so large a number of heterogeneous elements. The idea, for a single State, of resisting unaided the British power is so wildly ridiculous that it can be confidently asserted that it will never enter the head of the most imaginative native prince. These chiefs hardly contemplate the possibility of throwing off the British yoke, and asserting their own independence. Thus it will be seen that one of their chief inducements to disloyalty, namely, the

No combination among the States possible.

hope of one day recovering their independence is absent from their hearts.

Again, the vast majority of the native states have nothing to gain but much to lose by the severance of connexion with the Paramount Power. Were the shield of British protection for a while removed, they would be sure to fall an easy prey to their stronger neighbours, or at best plunge themselves into a sea of chaos and trouble, rendered gloomier by blood-stained internecine wars and court intrigues. It is swerving no jot from the truth to aver that the Native princes and chiefs are not so unconscionably rash that, to realise a fond, but foolish dream, they will be blind to the disastrous consequences of the overthrow of British power. Nor, indeed, are they so infatuated as to hanker after a liberty which to them would be synonymous with ruin.

Again, the circumstances under which the great majority of the native states were placed in relation to the British power are not embittered by any unkindly feelings. The brand of conquest was not stamped on their brow. They entered, of their own accord, into certain relations with the Paramount Power as their only bulwark against the surging waves of anarchy and chaos. The Begum of Bhopal, for instance, has been from the first, the firm friend of the British Government. The Rajput and Sikh Cis-Sutlej States were preserved from imminent destruction by British intervention. To that government also the State of Mysore owes its origin. From the very first the Nizam of Hyderabad entered into alliance with the British Government to save his

kingdom from Mahratta incursions. Of the rendition of Cashmere to Golab Singh as the price of his services to that government during the second Sikh war, it is needless to speak. The only States which suffered from the establishment of British power, arresting their growth and development, were the Mahratta kingdoms. But even among these, one important exception must be made. From the beginning the Gaekwar of Baroda, entered into cordial relations with the British Government, and took no part in the various wars between it and the Mahratta States. Thus it appears that the only native states whose interests were prejudiced by the predominance of British power, and whose connexion with that power was associated with circumstances of defeat and shame, are the two Mahratta States of Indore and Gwalior. But the steadfast fidelity with which the rulers of these two States stood by the British Government in the dark days of the mutiny, and the magnificent efforts which they put forth on its behalf at the risk of imminent ruin to themselves, place their loyalty beyond even the shadow of a doubt. A loyalty which has borne such tremendous strain must be of too firm a texture to yield to any trial or temptation, however great. The fertile brain of biassed and narrow-minded cavillers might look for theoretical trials and temptations and twit the Native princes with the question whether or no they would prove worthy of their salt in such contingencies ; but it may be confidently asserted that under all the vicissitudes of fortune they will remain as true to their sovereign as a son to his parents. The mention above

Except by
Sindia and
Holkar;

Their conduct during
the mutiny is
above-board.

of the dark days of the Sepoy mutiny brings to mind the unswerving loyalty and unsurpassed heroism, displayed by most of the Native princes and chiefs during that troublous time. It was no ordinary crisis, that—the British power was shaken to its foundations. For a time even the stoutest and bravest hearts felt sore misgivings as to the issue of the conflict. And for the native states, no better opportunity could have been found to assert their independancee, and to throw off the British yoke. Who knows that but for the loyal fidelity of the Native chiefs the best of British blood, shed through wars of many years' duration, would have sufficed to quench the flames of revolt and to consolidate, as at present the British supermacy which is bowed to by some of the powerfulest crowned heads of the world. The rich prize of independence lay within the grasp of the princes themselves ; and the temptation was great, yet they remained true to their allegiance.

Furthermore, it was not an easy thing to be strictly loyal in those days. The soldiery in every State were eager for a conflict with the British Lion, and wished to make common cause with the mutineers. With clamorous threats they required their chiefs to break off their connexion with the British Government, and raise the standard of revolt. There were, too, in every State, many persons of rank and influence who insisted on revolt with great earnestness and vehemence. In the midst of this whirling storm of seditious excitement, the Native chiefs stood firm as rock. Is not such fidelity in the presence of

strength and resources, to a foreign conquering power without a parallel in the history of the world ?

With one more recent example we will conclude this part of our subject. Every one of us remembers the great Russophobia that seized the nation in the year 1885. A very general panic prevailed that we were on the verge of a conflict with Russia and it was believed that the question as to whether the destiny of the East would be in the hands of England, or of Russia, was approaching a final solution. We remember also the ready zeal with which the Native chiefs offered, unasked and unsolicited, to place their resources in the service of their sovereign. The fervour and earnestness with which these offers were made, leave no room for doubting that they were sincere and heartfelt professions of loyalty. They sprang out of the hearts of the loyal princes. England may rest assured that in the day of peril the native states will not fail her, but will deem it a privilege to be permitted to fight for her cause. If in the end, England win the day, they may not share in the fruits of the victory, but if she falls, their fortunes will be buried in the same grave with hers. This part of the subject may fitly close with the following extract from a long letter addressed by Sir Lepel Griffin to the London Times :—

Russophobia
in 1885, and
the loyalty
of Native
Princes.

“I affirm that the princes of India are loyal with a loyalty that would stand the severest strain. We must accept the lessons of history and it is no presumption to have full confidence in the friendship of those who have stood by us in good and evil fortune. Look at the black mutiny days with the Nizam

holding the Deccan quiet for us, Holkar maintaining order in Malwa, and the forces of Cashmere, Pattiala and Jheend, Nabha and Kapurthala marching with us to Delhi ; their gallant princes at their head. Remember the late Afghan war, when the Sikh contingents did admirable and memorable service on the frontier. See to-day when the Muhammadan States of Hyderabad and Bhopal offer their troops for service in the distant Soudan. These offers are genuine. I was discussing her impromptu and uninspired offer of service with Her Highness of Bhopal a few days ago, and I am convinced that it would give unfeigned joy to that chivalrous princess if her soldiers were allowed to fight the Mahdi side by side with the soldiers of the Queen."

As for the government of the native states, it is with a few exceptions, generally good. Occasionally, of course, there are cases of misgovernment, especially in States where the personal quality of the ruler leavens the whole body politic. There are no popular constitutions in these States : and where there are no popular constitutions, the personal character of the ruler becomes a most important factor in the government. This personal character is an extremely variable quantity ; and is not regulated by any fixed laws or principles. Consequently, in States where it plays an important part, one must be prepared to find violent fluctuations in the conduct of affairs, and important principles of State policy subordinated to individual whims. These evils are inherent in every government where autocracy is not tempered by a free constitution, where in fact, the will of the ruler is

supreme. But despite this unfavourable circumstance there is not the slightest doubt that the majority of the native states are well governed. There are some States which, though small in number, are so well-governed that they would by no means suffer by a comparison with the most civilised countries of Europe. Native India has given birth to a number of very able and enlightened administrators who have combined all that is best in the native as well as the English methods of administration, and who, by dint of courage, energy and firmness, have raised their States to the highest pitch of efficiency. Few sovereigns have been served with more transcendent ability or more devoted loyalty than the late Nizam of Hyderabad and the late Raja of Travancore.

In most of the States, old abuses have been removed, necessary and important reforms have been introduced, and new life has been imparted to an old and effete body politic. Indeed, it may be said without disparagement to the British Government that in some essential points the administration of many native states may favourably compare with that of British India. Among other things it has been very often pointedly remarked that from some cause or other there have not been such ruinous famines in the native states as in British India. During the great famine which cast such deep gloom over India during the administration of Lord Lytton, the governments of Indore and Hyderabad shewed far greater foresight and energy than the government of British India. Prompt remedial measures taken by them soon mitigated the rigours of the famine. Which, moreover,

Illustrated
by their action during
famines.

when it came, did not find them so utterly unprepared as the British Government. While Sir George Couper's unrelenting rigour in enforcing the payment of revenue, and the utter unpreparedness and tardy movements* of the British Government were paving the way for a great national catastrophe the rulers of Indore and Hyderabad were preparing themselves with tremendous energy to cope with the giant. The native rulers were too wise to leave the dearest interests of the people to the operation of the law of demand and supply or to sit down in complacent idleness in hopes of the enlightened self-interest of traders pouring a plenteous supply of corn upon the famished districts. These were not doctrinaire politicians who left all such difficulties to be solved according to politico-economical principles. They took the bull by the horns, opened up relief works, made remissions of revenue, and did their best to help their subjects to tide over the situation. Their course of action was the same as that which Lord Northbrook and Sir George Campbell had adopted with such conspicuous success in dealing with the Behar famine. They had grown too wise to adopt the half-ration system of Sir Richard Temple, which aggravated the sufferings

* Professor Caird, one of the members of the Famine Commission, says:—"The people of England can hardly realize the loss, by death, in the last Indian famine. Upwards of 5,000,000 of human beings, more in number than the population of Ireland, perished in that miserable time. If the people of this vast metropolis, with the millions in its neighbourhood, were all melted away by a lingering death, even this would not exceed in numbers the loss of India. A result so fearful in extent, and so heart-rending in its details, was brought about by want of timely preparation to meet a calamity which, though irregular in its arrival, is periodical and inevitable."

of the people, and rendered ineffectual the tardy relief operations. The result of this difference in the famine policy of the native states and the British Indian Government was that all through the famine years a continuous and ever-increasing stream of emigrants was flowing from the British provinces into the adjoining native states. According to the *Times of India* (a competent authority on the subject) about 50,000 people migrated into the Nizam's territories from the adjoining British districts up to the spring of 1877 only. The total number of immigrants is not known, but it must have been immense. They were treated with the utmost liberality.

Emigration
from British
Provinces to
Native States
during
famines.

The following extract from Mr. Digby's "India for the Indians—and for England" clearly shews the highly successful way in which the Nizam's government grappled with the famine:—"When the munificent charity of Great Britain and the colonies placed nearly £800,000 for private relief at the service of the Relief Committee in Madras and (on Lord Northbrook's suggestion) an offer was made to Sir Salar Jung of a portion of the British gifts, he was able to reply that the distress was so well in hand and so nearly at an end that he would not ask for a grant from the fund."

Similar success attended the efforts of the Indore government. "That government," to quote Mr. Digby, "finding the grain-sellers combining to force up prices, went into the market itself and bought a quantity of grain, and shops were opened for its sale. Seven shops were opened, 53,191 maunds purchased at a cost of Rs 95,069 and sold for Rs. 88,596 involving a loss to the State of Rs 6,473. In addition

to the above, in the provinces, salaries were paid in grain at the rate of 12 seers per Rupee." Moreover, the export and import duties on corn were suspended, thereby involving the sacrifice of a large revenue. These and similar other measures were so successful that Holkar was able not only to relieve the distress of his own subjects but also to give effective relief in the adjoining Bombay districts.

I have dwelt at length on the famine policy of the native states because there is nothing which puts the efficiency of a government to so severe and, for that matter, satisfactory a test as famine. We may be very sure that a government which could pass unscathed through this fiery ordeal possesses a strength and vitality which ensures the fulfilment of all the ends of government.

There is another branch of administration in which most of the native states have been highly successful: it is the "administration of the Land Revenue." As has been said before, the Land revenue policy of many of the native states is far superior to that of the British Government in as much as the former have not, like the latter, obliterated all local usages, customs, and customary rights, disjointed the framework of the village communities; and upset the relations which subsisted among the various classes of the landed interest. The native governments have pursued a uniform policy unmarked by the violent fluctuations characteristic of the British Government. By a single stroke of the pen the latter has sometimes destroyed the rights of cultivators as a body, leaving them at the mercy of Talukdars and

Zamindars, and trying, after an experience of years of the fatal error, to redeem it, and undo the legislation by measures the most revolutionary and radical. The native states, on the contrary, have pursued an even course—not one of violent advances and violent retrogressions. Their policy has been favourable alike to the fiscal interests of the government and the interests of the various classes of the agricultural community. It is a well-known fact that the native governments realise a far larger amount of land revenue than the British Government from land of the same extent and quality. I have given in a former page an extract from the *Statesman* which says that “the land revenue in the adjoining territory of the Gaekwar was three times as heavy as upon the same soil within our own borders.” While in Gwalior, Rewa, the Nizam’s territories, and many Rajput states the incidence of land taxation per head of the population is so high as three rupees or even more—the incidence in Bombay, Madras, Punjab, and other British provinces ranges between 1 rupee and 1 rupee 11 annas. In the words of Sir Richard Temple, “Let the area and population of any given state be compared with any similar area and population in British territory and it will be found that the state levies from the people a much greater amount of land revenue than does the British Government.” A sort of rude plenty prevails in the native states—famines are not so frequent, nor, when they occur, are they attended with such terrible sufferings as in British India. The peasantry there are not, like the same class of people

in the British provinces, in the hands of the *Bunnia*. Their condition is not one of general indebtedness and destitution as is the case with the rural population of many of the British provinces, who are completely at the mercy of the *Bunnia* or money-lender* and manage with difficulty to keep body and soul together. True, there is not a rich class of men in the native states as in the British provinces. There are not wealthy merchants, capitalists and money-lenders, but, what is of vital importance to a country, the condition of the masses in many of the native states is better than in British Indian provinces.†

* Mr. Crosthwaite thus says of the peasantry of the N.-W. Provinces :—" Under the most favourable circumstances, the cultivator must borrow to pay half his rent, and pay interest for one month at the rate of 75 per cent per annum. But of every Rs 100 of rent, 50 are borrowed, and Rs 3-4 paid as interest to the money lender. The revenue of the North-West Provinces is about four million pounds sterling; the rental cannot be less than seven millions. Therefore in round numbers, about three millions are borrowed every year, and one hundred thousand pounds paid as interest by the cultivators. All this burden is simply thrown on the peasantry by the system of taking the rent before the crops are harvested...It appears then that by our system of collection, in the most favourable circumstances, at least one hundred thousand pounds sterling of the produce of the land are made over annually to the money-lenders. This, however, only represents a portion of the loss actually caused to the peasantry; for it is seldom that things go so smoothly as we have supposed them, and the share of the money-lender in the produce is probably much more than the sum we have named."

"I do not hesitate to say that half our agricultural population never know from year's end to year's end what it is to have their hunger fully satisfied."—(SIR C. ELLIOTT).

Passages may be cited without number from official reports and from the speeches and Minutes of many distinguished Civilians to the above purport regarding the condition of the peasantry of the country.

† Professor Caird in his report speaks of "the self containedness and self-dependence" of the native states, and of "the greater liveliness and spirit, and general evidence of active industry, in the capitals of native states, compared with towns of equal population under our rule. The people in their cities are undoubtedly more prosperous and happy than ours," while, he continues, "the example we have afforded of impartial justice and the equality of all men before the law, is taking root in the native states where our influence extends.

In British India, the old territorial aristocracy have died away—the old yeomanry, a high spirited class of men, have been reduced from the honourable position of independent cultivators to the wretched plight of labourers upon the soil which their fathers possessed in days of yore. These classes have disappeared, and in their stead a new class of men—successful traders, merchants, pleaders, the small fry of village money-grubbers, have risen to the surface. Native India has not yet witnessed this great economic revolution. In it the old classes still thrive like plants firmly rooted to the soil. In it the mutual relations among the various classes have not suffered from any violent shock. In it the peasantry do not lie at the mercy of the *Bunnia*.

In one important respect the native states possess a great advantage over the British provinces. The administration in those States being conducted by natives there is no heavy drain on the resources of the people in the shape of what are called 'Home charges.' The revenue is spent within the state and reaches the hands of the people by a thousand channels, no portion of it is sent out of the state and thus there is absence of one of the many causes which have led to the impoverishment of the people of British India.

No drain
from Native
States as
homecharges.

I have mentioned the chief points in which the native states possess an advantage over the government of British India. It would, of course, be unfair and absurd to institute a detailed comparison between a government which is the representative of an effete political system and a government which has all the

Native
States and
British pro-
vinces.

resources of modern civilisation at its command. Education, arts, sciences, are making rapid progress in British India, while in the native states there reigns the rude primitive simplicity of ancient times. While the people of British India have, under the vivifying influence of English rule, awaked from the torpor of ages, while the dry bones in the valley have become instinct with new life, the dormant life of Native India has not yet been roused to activity. There, it is true, is to be found material well-being ; but of intellectual life and spiritual activity there is as yet none, or next to none. There is no sublime aspiration—no social enthusiasm—no striving after a higher ideal of life. In British India, there is indeed abject poverty among the masses, intense sufferings too—sufferings not the less real because they are borne in silence with true oriental fatalism ; but still a new life has there sprung up, which, though it struggles convulsively under a mountain of difficulties, is life all the same. In Native India there are comparative material comfort, quiet, and stillness—but it is the stillness of the grave. The soul is not there. It is yet to come—and come it surely will—but only under the indirect influence of the British rule. The asphyxiated body will be thrilled to animation by being charged with the electrical fluid with which the British Government has surcharged its own subjects.

And, indeed, to look more deeply into the matter, we must admit that even the material well-being of the native states is, to a large extent, the result of the British conquest. Had not England with an iron hand crushed out anarchy and disorder, all the

efforts of the native rulers to secure the welfare of their subjects would have been of no avail.

But still we should not deprive the native rulers of the credit that is justly their due. True, without British peace-lovingness and British principles of government, good and just administration would have been unheard of in India. But it is nevertheless true and undeniable that the credit of successful management of state affairs is largely due to native administrators. The galaxy of brilliant geniuses who have shed lustre on the native states within the last 30 or 40 years, Dinkar Rao, Salar Jung, Madhava Rao, Raghunath Rao, Ranga Charlu, Shashia Shastri, Gunpnt Rao Kharkay, Shashadia Iyer and Jung Bahadoor, for instance, need but to be mentioned to justify their claim to take rank with the greatest of British Indian administrators. These represent the harmonious union in them of the political wisdom of two different systems; one that of their forefathers and the other that of modern times. There is every reason to hope that the glorious line of Indian statesmen will not die with them. They point as did Banquo in Macbeth's vision to a long line of great men.

Native
adminis-
trators.

It is necessary to quote in this place extracts from the writings and speeches of high Anglo-Indian officials who from their position are admitted to have known as much about the native states as any other Englishman, and whose authority in this reference is unimpeachable. These extracts will go to shew that a very high estimate has been formed by them of the way in which Native India is administered.

Opinions of
Anglo-Indian
officials re-
garding
native rule
quoted.

The following statements are from a paper sent to the Government of India by Sir Richard Temple. The avowed object of that paper was to demonstrate the superiority of British, over native rule. We may therefore quote them with the greater security as being free from any taint of partiality towards the native states :—

- (1.) “The villages of the Pattiala and Jheend states especially were among the finest and happiest I have ever known, and seemed to be on a par with the choicest pieces of British territory.”
- (2.) “From 1863 to 1867, I have been acquainted with the British districts on the frontiers of the Native States of Bundelcund, of Sindia, and Bhopal, and have never observed that the people preferred our management over that of the Native States.”
- (3.) “In 1864, I passed through the Baroda territory and the Gaekwar’s dominions ; certainly that district the valley of the Mhye, is in external prosperity hardly surpassed by any British district, that I have ever seen.”
- (4.) “In the Deccan, of late years, the constitution, system, and principles of the Nizam’s Civil Government are really excellent.”
- (5.) “Judging from published reports, I should suppose that the native administration of Travancore must be excellent.”

(6.) "I believe that the administration of the Gwalior country when under the minister Dinkar Rao, afforded a fair example of what native rule can accomplish, and that it still continues good under the Maharaja Sindia."

(7.) "There are native states, though of limited sphere, where the practical result comes out nearly as well as in the best British districts."

This testimony, it will have been remarked, is not confined to two or three states only but travels over almost all the states from one end of the country to the other.

The following extract is from the Moral and Material Progress Report of India, issued in 1883. It deals with the administration of the Travancore and Cochin states. We omit the statement about Travancore, as the superior excellence of its administration is too well known to need justification by quotations. The remark about Cochin runs thus :—

"The Cochin state appears to be in a very satisfactory condition, financially and otherwise. The revenue was £1,47,883 against £1,44,928 in 1880-1, the expenditure £1,41,029 and there was balance of 32 lacs. £2,56,123 were spent on public works, and great progress is shewn in the advancement of education, the administration of justice and the extension of forest conservancy."

The following extracts are taken from a speech delivered in Birmingham by the Earl of Northbrook,

a few years after his return from India. Few Englishmen have had greater opportunities of judging of native rule than Lord Northbrook. As Viceroy of India, he came into frequent and close contact with native administrators and took great interest in the affairs of the native states.

“The late Maharaja of Jeypore governed his country well. He established an excellent College, which was affiliated to the Calcutta University, and a school for the education of the sons of his nobles. Female education was not neglected, and some progress had been made in inducing the daughters of the higher castes to attend his girl schools. A school of art had been for some time in existence and some of the art products of Jeypore, notably the enamel, were of great merit. The goal was in good order. The Maharaja had established hospitals and dispensaries. Public gardens adorned the city of Jeypore which, lighted with gas and well supplied with water, was one of the finest in India. There were many works of irrigation in the Jeypore state, and the Maharaja always promoted any public works likely to benefit his people. A few years ago, the customs tariff was revised and the internal transit duties were abolished.”

“The great Mahratta states of Gwalior and Indore were now governed upon enlightened principles.”

“The small Mussulman states of Central India and the Sikh principalities of the Punjab were not behind-hand either in their material progress or in their loyalty to the British Government.”

Greater authorities on this subject than Sir Richard Temple and Lord Northbrook there can hardly be, and these two personages speak in laudatory terms of the governments of native states. Many Englishmen who are utterly ignorant of the affairs of India, and who view everything connected with India through the distorted medium of prejudice and racial pride, will be surprised to learn that native rule has some very excellent features. Casting aside all biassed and pre-conceived notions, and viewing the subject with a mind open to truth, no Englishman will fail to admit the general accuracy of our observations, and to have sympathy with and respect for a race whose politicians have shewn themselves well-versed in the art of government.

Excellent
Features in
native rule.

From the admittedly true premiss that the native states are loyal and that they are well-governed, the conclusion irresistibly follows that they should not only be maintained with fostering care but also encouraged. The princes and chiefs should be treated with the utmost respect and consideration. Everything calculated to wound their susceptibilities should be sedulously avoided. Every scheme which they may have formed to further the progress and promote the welfare of their respective States, should meet with encouragement at the hands of the sovereign power. And even when these princes and chiefs are so ill-advised as to enter upon a course of action detrimental to their true interests, and hurtful to the dignity of the Paramount Power, let them be promptly checked, but not disrespectfully, nor indeed with any unnecessary harshness. The British officials at

Native
princes to be
encouraged.

the Courts of those princes, too, should be instructed to pay due regard to the honour and dignity of those princes. The British Government may rest assured that no concession on its part to the feeling of these Native princes would ever be set down to weakness or fear. There is no danger that a mild policy would compromise the British supremacy or sink its prestige in the eye of the people. The danger lies all in the opposite direction ; in the direction, among others, of the prevalence in its councils of a spirit of self-assertion. We do not say that such a spirit prevails now. It would be far truer to say that the reverse is the case at present. The illustrious statesman who now presides over the councils of the Supreme Government knows well that it is possible to be just and kind to the Native princes without sacrificing the honour and prestige of the Paramount Power. And in this wise and generous course, he has the examples of many of his great predecessors to guide him. But though the danger of a meddling and aggressive policy does not exist at present, there is no knowing what turn affairs may hereafter take.

The vice of self-assertion is ingrained in the nature of all conquering races ; and it is not impossible that this element may assert itself, some day or other, in the Councils of our Supreme Government. So that though the danger seems at present very remote, it is always safe and prudent to point it out. A reversion to the Dalhousie policy, after the bitter commentary on it furnished by the Sepoy Mutiny would be an act of such gross folly that, while not denying its

possibility, we need not take it into account as a factor in the practical politics of the present day. Moreover, the policy of annexation has been publicly and solemnly repudiated. In the great proclamation of 1st November, 1858, which has been justly regarded as the Magna Charta of the Indian princes and people, occur the following noble and gracious words: "We hereby announce to the Native Princes of India that all treaties and engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honorable East India Company are by Us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained; and We look for the like observance on their part. We desire no extension of Our present territorial possessions; and while We will permit no aggression upon our Dominions, or Our Rights to be attempted with impunity, We shall respect the Rights, Dignity and Honour of Native Princes as Our own; and We desire that they as well as Our own subjects should enjoy that property, and that social advancement which can be secured by internal peace and good Government." Promises could not be couched in more distinct and unambiguous terms; and we firmly believe with the Princes and people of India, whatever men like Sir James Fitzj Stephen may say to the contrary, that words such as these were no mere vulgar clap-trap, that by them a huge practical joke was not meant to be played upon the people of this country for the delectation of the English people;—but that they were earnest, pregnant words sincerely uttered. Such words did really and appropriately express England's future policy towards India. And this conviction, which has grown upon us, deepens into belief

Repudiation of the policy of annexation.

Queen's proclamation of 1858.

as we read the words of the proclamation by the light which subsequent events have thrown upon them. When the Earl of Northbrook brought to trial the Gaekwar Mulhar Rao and afterwards deposed him, a general panic spread through the land that all those proceedings had for ultimate object the annexation of the Baroda State. But the step finally taken by the Viceroy, *viz.*, the election of a new prince to the vacant throne—dissipated all such fears, and proved conclusively that mis-government would not be turned into a pretext for annexation. The Native princes may rest assured that a government which abstained from annexation when it had a good ground for doing so, would not commit a wanton and flagrant act of spoliation. It is, of course, quite possible that a new spirit may, in some distant future, come over the Councils of the Supreme Government, but that contingency is so remote that the Native princes should not let the thought of it disturb their peace.

Even more significant than Lord Northbrook's policy towards the Baroda State is Lord Ripon's policy towards Mysore. When, after half a century of British rule, Mysore was, in 1881, restored to its hereditary Raja, a thrill of joy passed through the hearts of the native Indian princes, for this act of the Supreme Government clearly shewed that it had completely eschewed the policy of annexation. It had long seemed that the British promise of restoration had as it were been written in water, and that the fortunes of the Royal House had been sealed for ever. But when in 1881, the pledge was finally redeemed

thus affording a clear indication of the just and wise policy of the Supreme Government, the universal joy of the people overstepped all bounds.

Of no less significance is Lord Dufferin's recent rendition of the Gwalior fort to the Maharaja Sindia. This act of generosity was quite unexpected ; and it came as an agreeable surprise upon the people of this country. We may be quite sure that the Native princes and chiefs fully appreciate the noble and unselfish spirit in which this restoration was made.

Lord Dufferin's policy towards Gwalior.

These instances of generosity and conciliatory policy on the part of the British Government cannot but remove all uncharitable doubts from the minds even of England's most hostile critics. Do they not hold out hopes that the policy pursued by Lord Dalhousie is at an end and that the noble policy inaugurated by Lord Canning will henceforth guide the actions of all Englishmen entrusted with the care of India's teeming millions ? The conviction is daily gaining ground that the splendid fabric of the British Empire in India can only rest on the firm foundation of the Indian people's love and not on the uncertain and sandy soil of physical force, territorial aggrandisement, and lip-deep affection.

In treating of the "Native States" one important subject, *viz.*, the armies of those states, we must not neglect to touch upon.

Armies of native states.

There is no topic connected with the native states which has been made the subject of such warm, and bitter controversy and on which there is such a wide difference of opinion as this one of native armies. There have been many English writers and officials

who have regarded the existence of these armies as a fruitful source of danger to the British Government. According to these alarmists, the only object which the Native princes have in view in maintaining their armies is to enable themselves to throw off the British yoke, and to assert their independence whenever an opportunity offers. Many readers will remember that at the very commencement of Lord Dufferin's rule, a series of letters appeared in the *London Times*, dealing, in a tone of the wildest exaggeration with the strength of these armies and the danger to be apprehended from them. These letters were afterwards printed in a pamphlet form, and dedicated to Lord Dufferin with an earnest exhortation to reduce materially, if not abolish entirely the armies of the native states. His Lordship was wise and just enough to turn a deaf ear to these wild and dangerous counsels of irresponsible men. Yet there are not wanting men who take a peculiar pleasure in eternally harping on the disloyalty on the part of native states. It is a matter of deep regret that these political incendiaries are backed up by the whole strength of the Tory press of London.

The contention of these writers, namely, 1st, that the native army is formidable in strength and efficiency, and 2nd, that it is a source of danger to the British power, are wholly unfounded. One of them says that it is "a grave and formidable fact that while there are only 60,000 English soldiers in India, the armies of the native states amount to a grand total of 350,000 men." We question the accuracy of this estimate. It is probable that this

writer has borrowed with a little exaggeration from Colonel Malleon who sets down the total strength of the native armies to about 320,000. But there are very good reasons to believe that Colonel Malleon's estimate is far beyond the mark. The discrepancies between his estimates and those contained in Aitchison's "Treaties and Engagements" are important. On a reference to that work it will be found that its estimates are on an average about half those of Malleon. Now, Aitchison's "Treaties" is admittedly the most authoritative work on the subject. In the capacities of both Under-secretary and Secretary in the Foreign office, Aitchison had at command the most reliable materials for forming an estimate of the strength of the native army and pronouncing an opinion on other matters connected with the native states. It must be remembered that the Native princes rule over 600,000 square miles of territory and about 60 millions of men, and surely the strength of their armies (if Aitchison's estimates is to be relied upon) is not too great in proportion to the extent of their territories or the population in them. Again, this army, formidable as it looks on paper, is utterly worthless as regards efficiency. First of all, there is no proper system of drill or discipline. The soldiers are ill-clad, ill-mounted, ill-armed. Most of them are fit only to perform police duties, and are indeed employed for that purpose. The artillery is artillery only in name. Many of the guns would burst on the first charge. Sir Lepel Griffin, who has as much knowledge of the subject as any living Englishman, and who has no reason to minimise the

Sir Lepel
Griffin quoted.

strength or under-rate the importance of the native armies, says :—

“No doubt it appears formidable enough that feudatory India should maintain armies amounting to 350,000 men and an artillery of 4,237 guns ; but those who are behind the scenes laugh at these figures. The artillery does not include a single rifled gun, and four-fifths of this imposing total are honey-combed survivors of mediæval battle-fields and would burst if fired. Feudatory India could not, from the Himalayas to Ceylon place 30,000 disciplined troops in the field. Even these would be, without really qualified officers, with smooth-bore artillery and with muzzle-loading muskets or rifles. The remainder of this vast force melts on examination into thin air. It is not to be counted as military strength. It consists of irregular troops, horse and foot, feudal and tribal levees, raised and maintained for mere purposes of Police or State, without discipline, armed with smooth-bore guns, matchlocks, blunderbusses and spears. The greater number of them have never fired a gun in their lives, and it is fortunate that they do not attempt it with the weapons they possess..... I could name 20 states, the armies of which, thrown together with horse, foot, and guns, into a crucible and melted down, would not produce a residuum of military force and efficiency equal to a single breech-loading British battery.”

It is needless in the face of such expressions of opinion of Sir Lepel Griffin to comment on the statement of the *Times*' correspondent and other writers of the same class that the military force of

the native states is a standing menace to the British Government. Such statements necessarily pre-suppose the truth of the assertion that the native states are, at heart, disloyal and disaffected. We have above stated at some length the principal grounds on which our faith in the loyalty of the native states rests, and it is needless to reiterate them here. Far from being a source of danger, these armies would be a valuable addition to the fighting strength of the British Government in the event of a war with Russia or other foreign powers. Any idea of their constituting a danger to the British crown is a pure hallucination which every Englishman, who has been seized by it ought soon try to get rid of.

Far from trying to reduce the strength, or lessen the efficiency of the native armies, it behoves the British Government to pursue a diametrically opposite course. In the military forces of the native states, the British Government has an unlimited reserve of strength to fall back upon in days of emergency. Instead of trying to minimise the efficiency of them, it should rather lend its energies to render them more effective. It should take good care that in the event of a war with Russia, these forces may form an element of strength to the British power. The sky is overcast, the air is full of disquieting rumours of an impending strife of nations; and it is agreed on all hands that a great political commotion is brewing in the atmosphere of both Europe and Asia. Under such circumstances it would be wise on the part of the British Government to utilise its military strength as best

it could, and not to throw cold water over the loyalty and gratefulness of its feudatories by the adoption of an ill-timed policy of suspicion and distrust. The armies of native states, under an efficient system of drill and discipline would, we feel sure, be a source of material help to the British power. There are races, the Rajput, the Sikh and the Goorkha for example, which, in physical strength and military prowess, are second to none in the world. There are also races, such as the Mahratta, which for endurance and activity are unsurpassed on the face of the globe. Other races there are, which can furnish regular troops of the most formidable kind, troops which can stand their ground against the finest infantry of Europe. Again, there are races which are unmatched in agility and rapidity of movements, and can furnish irregular cavalries which will not yield to the Cossack or the Turkoman horseman. Thus, it will be seen, there are in the races that people the native states, fighting qualities of the most varied and splendid kind—qualities which need but to be developed under a European system of discipline to have full and effectual play. The policy of mistrust and surveillance occasionally adopted by the British Government not only serves as a damper on these military qualities, but helps to perpetuate that time-honoured, stereotyped system of drill and discipline which is an insult to the valour of the brave Indian soldier.

The political requirements of the age, however, necessitate a new departure in policy. The soldiers of the native states should receive a most thorough

and effectual training. They should be drilled and disciplined after the European model, without being made to lose anything of the superiority which they may possess over European soldiers in any military art or tactics. They should be armed with weapons of the best and most approved patterns. The artillery should not consist of mere "honey-combed survivors of mediæval battle-fields," but of cannon with which the nations that have made the greatest advances in the art of war, fight their battles. Above all, there should be kindled in them a military ambition worthy of their steel. Let them, lastly, in all fairness, be inspired with the faith that they are destined to participate in the pride and privileges of the British soldier—that the sphere of their activity is not to be confined to the narrow limits of the petty states they defend, but that the opportunity may be given them to reap the harvest of glory on a wider and more conspicuous field. This consideration is connected with many others equally important, which merit, and shall hereafter receive, special mention. For the present, our business is to insist with great force on the necessity of improving the efficiency of the native armies. On this head we are glad to be able to quote in support of our views, the following lines from Sir Lepel Griffin. They run thus:—

"Even the regular armies of the States are far from being efficient. I wish they were more so ; and it would be a wise policy to devise some system of brigading them with British troops a few times annually, and compelling all the larger States to bear their full share of the defence of the Empire by a

perfectly drilled and equipped contingent. This would be accepted by the chiefs with satisfaction as an honourable burden. We have in native states a vast reserve of valuable strength, if we choose to utilise and develop it, and the more valuable because peace and wealth have made military service less attractive than formerly to our Native fellow-subjects on British territory."

While on this part of the subject we ought to mention with thankfulness that a liberal policy has been set on foot by Lord Dufferin and his able and considerate Foreign Secretary Mr. Durand. When the Fort of Gwalior was restored to the Maharaja Sindia, he was permitted to add to the strength of his army. Similarly, permission was granted sometime back, to the Maharaja of Ulwar, not only to increase his armies, but also to enhance their efficiency by furnishing them with the best rifles.*

We have spoken above of improving the lot of the poor soldier of native states, of enlarging the horizon of his hopes and aspirations and thus inspiring him with an ardent military enthusiasm. This and many other objects of the most vital importance may be secured by giving to the armies of native states an Imperial status. This is a most important topic involving far-reaching issues, and it should be treated at some length. If we look to the present position of the armies of the native states, what do we find? We find that they are isolated

* This latter order was passed, we think, on the recommendation of Col. Peacock—a liberal-minded and enlightened political officer, and a son of one of India's truest friends, Sir Barnes Peacock.

fragments, taking no interest in the fortunes of the Empire, and occupied only with the petty concerns of the States to which they respectively belong. They are like small inland lakes, having no communication with the vast ocean of Imperial politics. The mighty tides which keep its waters in perpetual motion affect them not. This is not as it should be. What we propose is, that the armies of the native states should constitute with the army of British India, a single organic whole—that there should be a feeling of oneness pervading the many constituent parts. They should be drilled, disciplined, armed and equipped in the same way; in all questions touching the defence of the Empire, they should have a common interest; in all wars which compromise Imperial interests they should have a common part to play. In short, they should form one single army—part thereof being maintained at the expense and under the direct control of the Paramount Power; and part at the expense and under the absolute command of the various native states. As the same vast body of water which encompasses the earth is called in various localities by various names, so this vast army should have different names given to it in the different states, such for instance as the British army, the Nizam's army, the Sindia's army, &c. We are firmly convinced that this proposal is not chimerical and impracticable, but may be easily realised. There are certainly obstacles in the way, but they are far from insurmountable. Of moral obstacles there are, we feel convinced, none; for no native prince is ever likely

to quarrel with a policy which shall seek to increase the efficiency of his army, and extend the scope of his activity. The only difficulties that there are, are of a mechanical kind. These may be got over with a little patient and intelligent effort. At the commencement, a little outlay of money would be necessary; but, I doubt not that our princes and chiefs would gladly come up with handsome contributions towards a project which is calculated to benefit their own armies. Here are a few suggestions in connexion with the realisation of this project.

One of the hopes held out to the Native princes in the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi, in 1877, was that they should be associated in an honourable way with the government of the Empire and the conduct of its army. The only thing that has been hitherto done in the way of giving effect to that assurance has been to dub some of the princes with the honorary title of 'General.' What we wish to see done, and what is urgently needed to carry out the proposal regarding the organization of the Imperial army, is, to associate Indian princes with the command of that army. They should not only be styled honorary Generals, but elected to posts of honour and responsibility in the army in times of war. They cannot of course, on all occasions, be expected to perform the duties of generals to the neglect of their own affairs; but they should be consulted on all important matters connected with the army and placed in command of divisions in wars for the defence of the Empire. That would be a glorious day for India and

a far more glorious day for England when such united Imperial army would be engaged in a desperate fight with a foreign power for the defence of the Empire : Happy the man who will live to see such a day ! And why on earth should not that day come if our humble suggestions were not thrown out as mere phantasies of the heat-oppressed brain ? Let us rather hope that there will arise great British statesmen—able to rise to the height of the question—who with a clear insight into the political requirements of the age will do away with all suspicion and distrust, and inaugurate a policy of generous confidence in the loyalty of the Native princes. History affords us example of subordinate or feudatory chiefs achieving brilliant successes. In the Franco-German war of 1870-71, many of the most important divisions of the Imperial army were commanded by the Princes and Grand-dukes, who owed allegiance to the Emperor William. May not the same system be introduced in India with prospects of similar results, though, it may be, with modifications warranted by the circumstances of the country ? The German Empire aside, did not Akbar and his successors habitually adopt the policy here recommended ? The armies of the Mogul Emperors were commanded for most part by Native princes, by Rajput chiefs, such as Man Singh, Todar Mall, Beerball and a host of others who might be named. Did not that noble and wise policy materially add to the stability and strength of the army ? And was not the pursuit of an opposite policy by the bigoted and suspicious Aurangzebe, one of the main causes of the decline and fall of the Mogul Empire ?

If the pursuit of a policy of trustful confidence on the part of the Paramount Power (the Mogul Emperors) could secure the zealous and loyal services of the Native princes in wars prompted merely by rapacity and lust of conquest, there is no knowing what tremendous energy, ardent devotion and lofty enthusiasm would be awakened in the hearts of the Native princes, when they should be summoned to fight, not for the glorification and aggrandisement of the British Government, but for the defence of the Empire, which in one word means their country, their throne, and all that is dear to them.

There is another suggestion we wish to make which, if accepted, would give consistence to the Imperial army of the future. It is this—that meritorious officers in the armies of the native states should be given opportunities of taking service in the British army. A long vista of ambition would thus open before them. But what is of far more importance than this, is, that they would come to regard the army of the Paramount Power, not with feelings of an alien, but with the feelings of men having a personal interest in its welfare.

The British Government should also confer titles and other badges of military distinction as well upon meritorious officers in its own army as upon those in the native armies. Love of such titles and badges, however contemptible they may appear in the eyes of a philosopher, is nevertheless a deep-rooted sentiment in human nature. The British Government very wisely recognises and gratifies this sentiment so far as its own army is concerned ; it would act more

wisely if it extended the same privilege to the armies of the native states. Many important purposes would be served thereby. In the first place, it would secure, at little cost, the attachment of the native armies. In the second, it would flatter the vanity of the Native princes by shewing towards their own soldiers and officers equal consideration with the soldiers and officers of the British army. But above all, it would efface all distinction between their and the British troops.

We now turn to another topic, namely, the state of education in the native states. This is the weakest point about these states. And no wonder that it should be so. Education in the native states as well as in British India, is now, and will, for long be conducted after the English model ; in fact, it is, and will be purely English education. It is, therefore, naturally to be expected that in this sort of training the native states will lag far behind the British provinces. As for Sanskrit learning, many causes have hitherto combined to well-nigh stamp it out of the country. The dark ages of Muhammedan misrule and Mahratta rapine which succeeded the Augustan age of Sanskrit learning, brought in their train such mighty forces against indigenous literature and science as almost totally to impede the progress and cultivation of them. In some hidden nooks, safe from the squalls of tyranny, Sanskrit literature, it is true, still lived ; want of light and necessary cultivation stunted its growth and ultimately dwarfed it into a sterile tree. When under the ægis of British power peace was again restored to the country,

Education
in the native
states.

education, by which is meant literary education, was in a very backward state. There was a perfect *tabula rasa*, on which any sort of education, suited to the existing circumstances of the country, could be written. As might have been expected, English education found a genial soil in India and in time produced results never before attained by the benighted and priest-ridden people. Western culture was in fact just in time. British India, where every facility was afforded for the easy importation of western ideas, launched boldly forth on its new career. But with the native states the case was altogether different. There the need for English education may well have been felt by the government, but it was not easy after all to forget or eschew the past. Many a longing lingering look of affection was cast on the ancient literature and science of the people, and the cause of English education did not triumph until after a severe and protracted struggle, it had dethroned the Eastern Minerva. It is for this reason that English education is still in its infancy in the native states. British India is in this respect in advance of them by about a quarter of a century. The consequence, as it has been so often pointed out in these pages, is, that there is a total want of spiritual activity, and of all nobler aspirations in these states. This evil, however, will soon pass away. With British India in a ferment of intellectual activity, the native states cannot long remain in a state of dullness and mental lethargy. The awakening will soon come, or rather it is already coming. It is quite certain that

English education and western culture—and all lofty hopes and sublime aspirations of which they are the parents—will soon flood Native India as they have already flooded British India. This is the spirit of the age. Nothing can withstand it.

The rulers of native states are doing their best to keep pace with the progress of the times. The Jeypore and Hyderabad Colleges have been recently put on better footing and their efficiency considerably improved. A large number of Entrance and other minor schools have also been established, which are yearly turning out gradually increasing numbers of educated men. It is true that education has not yet penetrated into the interior, or permeated the lower strata of society—nay, even the majority of the high and middle classes have not yet come under its influence. But considering the great impediments that lay in the way of the native rulers, one cannot but admire the zeal and energy which they have brought to bear on the cause of education generally.

The most satisfactory point in connexion with education in these states is the establishment of Raj Kumar Colleges at Ajmere and other places for the education of the Native princes.

The importance of such institutions can hardly be over-rated. The good which they do is simply incalculable. In them the Native princes are from boyhood thrown into each other's company; and instead of accustoming themselves to the deceitful flatteries and intriguing counsels of menials and sycophants, they listen to the noble words of wisdom

from the lips of men who are guided by a spiritual power that owes obedience to neither rank nor wealth. The rivalry of pomp and luxury gives place to a rivalry of knowledge and intelligence. With English education, also, the princes imbibe a love of those high principles of government which the literature and history of England proclaim with impressive and proud eloquence. Thanks to the benign influence of education, they learn that their subjects do not exist for ministering to their enjoyments, but that they have a higher end to serve, a nobler mission to fulfil, and a sacred duty to perform in all which it is for their rulers to assist them. A morbid and insatiable craving for personal enjoyment thus gives place to a healthy love of duty. A powerful and independent sovereign, even when not actuated by a sense of duty, has other motives to keep him always alert and active. There is, in all such cases, present the necessity of saving one's territories from the inroads of other sovereigns, and in many other cases there is also present the ambition of conquering the territories of other sovereigns. These two powerful motives—fear and ambition—as well as a multitude of other motives, in the absence of a love of duty and of all noble unselfish enthusiasm preserve the energy, activity, and manliness of these rulers, and prevent the vices of sensuality and sloth from ruining their character. But in the case of the Native princes these motives are absent. They live under British protection and consequently, have no mortal power to fear. Thus one very powerful stimulant—the apprehension of

danger—does not operate on them. There is also wanting all incentive to activity. The peculiar position in which they are placed drives all ambitious motives from their minds. It will be sheer lunacy on the part of any Native prince to entertain a desire of aggrandisement. There is a power which steps in and says in a tone of peremptory command, “thus far shalt thou go and no further. I have settled the limits of thy dominion: Work well, rule wisely within it—but do not venture to go beyond it.” Why, then, should not they sink into a state of sensuality and inertness and live in a capua of pleasures and enjoyments? What ought to actuate them is an enthusiastic love of duty and a desire to realise it in practice. There is yet another motive left now scarcely perceptible in its dim and visionary outlines, but which is destined to get clear as years roll on and play an important part in the drama of the future. It is a vivid consciousness in the minds of the Native princes, that the sphere of their activities is not confined within their own petty states but that, like the members of a living organism, they have to deal with a great country and a great empire, in whose fortunes they participate and which it behoves them to serve. Such principles of conduct are of a high and lofty nature; they require the most careful and assiduous culture. And this culture they are sure to receive from educational institutions like the Rajkumar Colleges. A feeling of brotherhood and affection grows up among the young princes which, in good time, will bear rich fruit as they grow to manhood and become rulers of

extensive dominions. The enmity which existed of old among their forefathers, and which was the parent of endless strife and bloodshed will give place to a sentiment of sympathy and affection which is so potent to further the interests and promote the welfare of each other's dominions. We do not say that these institutions have already borne good fruit, but we think its tendency lies in the direction indicated.

The beneficial results arising therefrom will, it is true, be long of coming, but come they will. On the other hand, there are obstacles in the way of the accomplishment of these ends, which are well-nigh insuperable. The hard shell of pride and prejudice which has been formed in course of ages round the Native princes, it will not be a light task for them to break open. Centuries of mortal antipathy, of interminable warfare, and of glorious victories alternating with shameful defeats have created a wide breach among them, which, no doubt, educational institutions like the Rajkumar Colleges will be able to bridge over. We are quite sure that by their means the present state of isolation will give place to a state of union and friendship. That this was one of the main object of its illustrious founder, the Earl of Mayo, will become at once clear from the drift of the speech delivered by him on the occasion of the opening of the College. The following extract from his speech will not, it is hoped, be out of place :—

“It (the Rajkumar College at Ajmere) should be an institution suited to the position and rank of the boys for whose instruction it is intended, and such a

system of teaching should be founded as will be best calculated to fit them for the important duties which in after life they will be called upon to discharge..... Be assured that we ask you to do all this for no other object but your own benefit. If we wished you to remain weak we would say—be poor and ignorant and disorderly. It is because we wish you to be strong that we desire to see you rich, instructed and well governed. It is for such object as these, that the servants of the Queen rule in India, and Providence will ever sustain the Rulers who govern for the people's good."

Noble sentiments these—which bear on the face of them the stamp of sincerity. We fervently hope that such sentiments may long continue to inspire the hearts of all British Rulers !

We conclude this part of the subject, with the earnest hope, that the Native princes and chiefs will spare no pains to promote the cause of education in the territories under their sway. They should be deeply imbued with the conviction that the chief means of securing strength and respect lies in a wide diffusion of English education among their subjects. Let not the advocacy of English education, however, be construed into a disregard of all institutions for the cultivation of Oriental learning. To our thinking, the cultivation of one does not necessarily mean the destruction of the other. Both may and must exist side by side, and both must work in harmonious union together. What we wish deeply to impress on the minds of the Native princes is the necessity of giving every encouragement to English

education in their territories. It forms no part of our duty to advocate the abolition of Oriental learning.

We offer next, in this introduction, a few suggestions regarding the form of Government in the native states, and indicate a plan for associating them in an honourable way with the conduct of Imperial affairs.

It has been generally observed that the Oriental mind is by nature incapable of appreciating the importance of the popular forms of government. The theory of the Divine Right of Kings which found in the *English mind* a soil perfectly uncongenial struck, times out of mind, very deep roots in India and held sway on the mind of its people amidst all the vicissitudes of fortune and changes of dynasty. In the native states, for example, is to be found a despotism not tempered by even a semblance of popular liberty, and the people living in abject submission and regarding the mandates of authority, either as the beneficent dispensations of Providence, or as the stern decrees of an inexorable fate. They have not the faintest idea that they have, or ought to have, a voice in any matter at all concerning the affairs of the State. They regard the ruler as the representative of God upon earth. Indeed, the European mind is utterly incapable of appreciating the depth of Oriental loyalty. The Orientals do not consider their sovereigns as servants of the people, whom they might cashier if the work done appeared to them to be not worth the wages. In their eyes, the rulers have a sacred, inviolable trust, ruling by Divine

authority and possessing an unconditional claim on their obedience and loyalty. However absurd this sentiment may appear to us, if we think well on it we will find even in this case the truth of the observation, that there is a soul of truth in everything that has existed, or will exist on this earth. For there lies at the heart of this sentiment a religious love of social order and a profound reverence for the person who is, for the time being, its representative. That is to say the Orientals are conservatives in the highest sense of the word. Now, the plain and obvious truth is that conservatism, of itself, is not sufficient to guide a nation. It does not look forward—it always looks behind. And that is the reason why Indian society is almost stationary. There has been no progress—no realization of a higher ideal of life. What the present age demands is the inculcation in India of those principles of liberty and progress which have done so splendid work in Europe and America. Liberal principles of Government should be introduced in India and a popular constitution granted in every State. We may assure the British Government and the Native princes that an experiment of popular government would, by no manner of means, be the parent of anarchy and revolt. The strong conservative instincts of the nation would soften and temper it at every step, and we should think that the experiment would be attended with far greater success in India than in Europe or America. There is also reason to believe in the goodness and judgment of the Native princes. It is to be hoped that they may not be unwilling to

exchange the position of a despotic autocrat for that of a constitutional sovereign of a free people. Many Native princes, thanks to western culture, would imbibe an enthusiastic love of liberal principles and grant to the peoples under them, a constitutional form of Government. They will have before their eyes the brilliant example of the August Sovereign—the Queen-Empress—who far from being an autocrat, is the constitutional head of a proverbially free people, and she is the ideal constitutional ruler. She is perfectly conscious of the dignity of her position, of the sacred solemn character of her functions. There is no position on earth superior to hers. She represents the Majesty of a free people.

Despotic forms of government, which have been tried in all countries, have invariably failed. They leave the dearest and most vital interests of a nation at the mercy of a single individual, there lies the prime defect of them. I have in previous pages pointed out the existence in the native states of this great evil. A long line of able and virtuous sovereigns is a rare phenomenon in the world, and there is, therefore, so to speak, no permanent guarantee for the continued good government of a native state. It is true that during the last 30 or 40 years the rulers of these states have, for most part, been good and able men. But this is a fortunate occurrence at best. What security is there that a bad prince may not succeed to the throne and undo all the good work of his predecessor. True, also, that the power of interference, reserved by the Paramount Power, offers adequate security against gross misrule and oppression.

But there is no guarantee whatever against want of good government, againts *laissez faire* which is so loath to carry out necessary or useful reforms. A government which takes its colour from the personal quality of the sovereign, who presides over it, is like a chameleon, whose hues so often change that you cannot tell what colour it was of a moment before, or what colour it will assume a moment after.

To obviate such or like evils, to make the course of government run parallel to popular needs and desires, to educate the people in principles of liberty and thereby strike at the root of all social evils, seem to us to call for a popular form of constitution. Many persons will, perhaps, deem this idea as quite visionary and chimerical. They will say that a government is not an arbitrary thing, it cannot be made or unmade at pleasure ; it is an organism which grows by its own laws and derives its sustenance from the past life of a nation. All this is quite true in the abstract—that is to say, on the supposition that the nation under a certain form of government has been left free to develop itself according to the laws of its being. In such a case, the assertion that the government cannot be an arbitrary thing but must be the natural product of its past life, its instincts and traditions—is an obvious truth. But if those laws have been interfered with by external force and if the nation has been conquered and compelled by foreign pressure to leave its own line of development and adapt itself to the manners and ideas of its conquerors, then the assertion proves false.

Leave a child of strong inclinations and vicious propensities to develop itself freely, and ten to one it will turn out a Catiline or a Borgia, but place it under the ferula of a teacher, apply a moral pressure to his mind and what will be the result ? it will be something altogether better than nature meant it to be. The people of India are in the same predicament. Their past life and traditions have made habits of obedience natural to them, and a despotic form of government is the natural outcome of such habits. But who will deny that this submissiveness of spirit, this habitual conservatism may be greatly tempered by imparting to the people practical training in the principles of freedom ? As an individual man may profit by education, so also may a nation, a collection of men. This seems to us as indeed too obvious to need any proof. We have dwelt on it at some length, because of late a cry has been raised in some quarters to the effect that popular institutions as being unsuited to the tastes and aptitudes of the people, should not be granted in India. Let there first spring up, it is contended, in the Oriental mind, a love of freedom and then popular institutions will follow as a necessary consequence. We do not deny that there is a grain of truth in this contention, though, alas ! a half-truth sometimes proves more fatal than a whole falsehood. We admit that the spirit of freedom is an all-important thing, and that where this is wanting, mere dead forms of free Government are of no avail. We have no wish to exaggerate the importance of this proposal ; we claim for it, and we hope with good reason the power

to help the people in appreciating the benefits of freedom.

But the question here occurs as to whether or no the Native princes will value free institutions. They may be averse to surrendering a scintilla of their authority. Such we hope will not be the case with their youthful minds saturated with the spirit of English literature; many of them will prefer the position of a constitutional sovereign to that of a despot. The examples of these princes will be followed by others, and thus great progress will be made towards the planting of free institutions in the country. The British Government, if it chooses, may also do much in the same direction. By its earnest advice it may persuade the Native princes to confer upon their subjects the inestimable boon of a free constitution. But of one thing the British Government must be aware. It must not be carried away by a headlong zeal in favour of free constitutions to put any pressure upon the Native princes. In the friendliest spirit it should persuade the Native princes and chiefs to embrace, in the best of grace, those principles of free and liberal government which make the difference daily so wider between European and Eastern Governments.

This reform in the constitution of the government of native states should, however, be tentative. The successive steps of the process should not come upon the people as so many surprises. They should be gradually trained to this new mode of government.

Fortunately there are unmistakable signs of the fact that the native rulers are being daily permeated

Represent-
ative Assem-
bly in Mysore.

with the spirit of the age. They are fast becoming alive to the necessity and importance of associating themselves with the people in the government of affairs. When, last year, Lord Dufferin visited southern India, His Lordship received from many public bodies and associations, numerous addresses expressive of their loyalty to the Queen-Empress. Among these was one which must have occasioned His Lordship much agreeable surprise and given him food for reflection. This address came from a newly constituted public assembly of popular representatives, summoned by the Maharaja of Mysore to assist him in the government of the State. The credit of this reform is chiefly due to the prime minister of Mysore, a man of great ability, thoroughly saturated with European ideas who felt the need of making this new departure in the public policy. We earnestly hope that this tiny seed of reform will vegetate into a mighty umbrageous forest, affording shade and shelter to generations yet in the womb of time. This first attempt at popular government will, of course, be attended with many imperfections, it may even end in partial and temporary failure and furnish a new theme to the critics who always harp on the natural unfitness of the native races for free government. Nevertheless, there is not the least doubt that the seed has been sown in the right season ; that it is a living seed containing within it the vital principle, and that all the external conditions requisite for its growth exist already in abundance. We have every reason to hope that the example of Mysore will be followed by

other native states and that the enlightened prime minister of Mysore will live in the memory of a grateful prosperity as the originator of a great movement, big with rich harvest of freedom and prosperity.

I now come to a most important suggestion regarding the way in which Native princes should be allowed a voice in the councils of the Empire. The reader may remember that on the 1st January 1877, on the occasion of Her Majesty's assumption of the title of Empress of India, a "Council of the Empire" was created on the historic plain of Delhi. It was to consist of twenty Princes, Governors, Lieutenant-Governors, Members of the Viceroy's Executive Council and a few other persons of note. It was stated on that memorable occasion that the object of establishing this Imperial council was to associate the Native princes with the Government of the Empire, in a manner honourable to themselves and advantageous to the public interests. The council has remained a mere paper council ever since ; it has shared the fate of that other proposal which had for its object the entrusting of Native princes with military commands. No Imperial council has ever held its sittings, no new nominations have been made to fill the vacancies caused by the death or retirement of the original members, and Imperial affairs have been managed in the old stereo-typed way without any help or hindrance from any council. This is not as it should be. An Imperial council of the proposed nature is urgently needed at this moment to place the relations between the Paramount

Council of
the Empire.

Power and its great feudatories on an altogether, new, and superior, and better footing. It is both the duty and the interest of the British Government to satisfy the honorable and patriotic ambition of the Native princes, to have a voice in the councils of the Empire. There is an impression prevailing in some quarters, that this Imperial council or any other proposal of a like nature, would be tantamount to a transfer of the ruling power from the British Government to the Native princes ; that such a measure would be the thin end of the wedge, which, the thick end whereof being driven in time, would rend the Empire in pieces. This impression has its source in a distrust of the loyalty of the princes and in an unreasonable and exaggerated estimate of the power of the sword. These critics always aver, that India was conquered by the sword and must be maintained by the sword ; all talk about loyalty, they think, is mere sentimental bosh. To persons who labour under this radical misconception of the real nature and significance of the British Conquest of India, and of the real basis of the British Empire, we have nothing more to say than that they have read history to little purpose, and that they have not correctly gauged the nature and depth of those invisible spiritual forces which alone give cohesion to an Empire. They only swim over the surface of a question instead of diving deep. Red-coated soldiers—steel-clad men of war—arsenals—fortresses—all these material objects arrest their imagination. They cannot conceive how any empire, which has the support of such buttresses as these, can ever stand in danger of destruction. These

shallow observers do not perceive that there are mighty invisible forces, social and political, at work, which can mould the destinies of a nation, and before which armies—fleets—and all that constitute the pomp and pride of an empire pass away,

“And, like the baseless fabric of this vision,

.....

“Leave not a rack behind—”

To counteract these forces when they are harmful, and to help in their action when they are beneficial, something more is needed than a constant display of material pomp and power. Invisible forces must be confronted with cognate forces. They must be met on their own ground. It is necessary for the government to adopt a policy which will appeal to the hearts and consciences of the people; array on its side the opinions and sentiments of the majority; and establish its empire on the rocky foundation of a nation's loyalty and love.

We have dwelt at great length, and, perhaps, with wearisome iteration, upon the necessity on the part of the British Government to adopt a liberal policy in its dealings with the native states. Our sole and sufficient excuse is that this is the most important subject for consideration in connexion with these States. One of the most urgent demands at this moment of this liberal policy, is the establishment of an Imperial Council in which the Native princes shall have a potent voice. It is quite immaterial whether the princes themselves, or their chosen ministers, are nominated to the Council. The former plan would, perhaps, be the better—as it would

Subjects to be discussed in the “Imperial Council.”

afford the princes a thorough knowledge of imperial affairs. The following topics should be ventilated in the Council :—

- (1) The formation of an Imperial army, and the means of giving it increased strength and cohesion, and perfecting its organization.
- (2) All matters in which the general interests of the Empire—as contra-distinguished from the interests of particular provinces or states—are concerned. These matters may regard both the internal administration and the external relations of the Empire—for example—the introduction of any important, social or economical reform affecting the whole Empire, or the policy to be pursued towards a foreign state or sovereign power.
- (3) The adjustment of the relations and the settlement of any difference between the Paramount Power and a particular Native State. The circumstances which led to the deposition of the Gaekwar of Baroda during the viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook, may serve as a typical example of this.

It is, however, needless to give in detail the various functions to be assigned to this Imperial Council. Let such a Council be established and let a truly liberal policy be adopted by the British Government in this matter, and it will soon clearly appear what powers will have to be conferred and what duties imposed upon it. Moreover, it is by no means necessary that all the powers to be vested in it should be conferred

all at once at the very commencement. A gradual enlargement of its scope of work and activity is all that is necessary.

To enumerate the various benefits that would result to the British Government and to the general interests of the Empire from the establishment of such Council, would be superfluous. They are too obvious to need any specification here. In the first place; as I have more than once remarked above, it would fill up with the cement of human concord the splendid fabric of the British Indian Empire. It would plant the British rule firmly in the heart and affections of the Native princes. It would call forth a genuine spirit of loyalty throughout the length and breadth of the land and enable England to walk fearlessly attired in the completest armour of a nation's love. In the second place, it would enable the Paramount Power to stamp out misrule or disaffection from an unruly native state with the consent and co-operation of the other States ; and thus extricate itself from the highly invidious position it now occupies. In the third place, it would be freed from the necessity of maintaining a large body of troops necessary for no other purpose than watching the movements of the armies of the native states. For this purpose about 40 batteries of artillery, 30 regiments of cavalry, and 80 regiments of infantry are now employed. With the constitution of an Imperial Council, the establishment of an Imperial army, and the association of the Native princes in the government of the Empire, the policy of suspicion would no longer be necessary—the very initiation of these reforms would, in fact,

Advantages
to be derived
from the pro-
posed Council

be obviously inconsistent with such a policy. Thus, both the British Government and the Indian taxpayers would be relieved from this heavy military burden ; or at least this large body of troops would be diverted from its present useless vocation, to do the more important work of defending the Empire against the attacks of foreign foes. In the last place, this participation of Native Statesmen in the government of the Empire would help materially to improve its working. There is no doubt that Native statesmanship has its strong points—points in which it has an advantage over its western rival. On the whole, of course, it must be admitted by every candid native that European statesmanship is by far superior to native statesmanship. But it is equally certain that in some respects the advantage is on the side of the latter. There can, we think, be no harm but rather unmixed good, in modifying and tempering the iron rigidity of British rule by a few fine elements of native softness and pliancy. Were we asked, wherein lies the broad distinction between British and Native statesmanship, we would answer that in the former there are uniformity, method, and firm adherence to established principles. In the latter, there is not much of system or regularity, but a policy of endless new contrivances for grappling with social and political needs as they arise. The good feature in the former is *firmness*, the good feature in the latter is *adaptability*.

In its reluctance to chalk out a new path for itself when the old one is no longer practicable, thus neglecting to provide means for meeting exigencies, lies

the weakness of the former. The weak point about the latter is its changeableness which makes all forecast of the future, all dependance upon its action, impossible. It is like a war of discordant atoms in perpetual motion wherein there is neither order nor system. Such, in broad outlines, are the relative advantages and disadvantages of British and Native rule. If possible, an attempt should be made to unite all the good elements of one with the good elements of the other, and make them work in harmonious union. An Imperial Council, composed of chosen Native statesmen and English officials, would greatly contribute to the fusion of these elements in the two systems, and produce a government unrivalled for its combination of firmness with flexibility, of scientific method with practical mobility. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged even by the most strenuous supporters of British statesmanship, that many native politicians are, naturally, in a better position to judge of the wants and interests of their own States, and also it may be of the Empire, than English officials of the highest ability. And, indeed, for a thorough understanding of these wants and interests, it is necessary for the British officials to forget in a manner their own personality and transport themselves in imagination to the stand-point of the Native rulers. A knowledge of the internal affairs of the country—of the details of its condition—of the manners, customs, usages prevalent therein—of its economical features—of the way in which any given measure would affect those social and economical circumstances—of what domestic or foreign

policy would meet with public sympathy and support—of the shape an unpopular but necessary measure should be presented in so as to give the least possible shock to the public feeling—of the most effectual means of rousing and utilising the warlike zeal of the people : such knowledge, we think, is more easily attainable by a Native than by an English statesman.

Our remarks on the subject of 'Native States' have been allowed to run too far already. The importance of it, coupled with the feeling which a sense of this importance naturally creates in the mind of a native of India, will, I hope, justify this length. In our minds the spectacle of these States excites not only historic curiosity but patriotic feeling. Some of them carry our imagination back to those glorious days when fair Aryavarta was free, and enjoyed a proud eminence among the nations of the earth. Of those days there are still some genuine living relics. Udaipore, Jeypore, Jodhpore, and many other Rajput states are some of the fragments of this dead and buried past of this romantic land of Ancient India. Though shorn of their pristine grandeur, and bearing upon them hideous scars of many a cruel wound, inflicted by ruthless invaders, these remnants of the Past still survive full of vigour and life.

There are some other States which though not old enough to rouse in us those sentiments of religious reverence and pious affection which the classic ground of Rajputana alone can excite, are also deeply interesting from many points of view. They are

monuments of the political genius of our race which bring back to us the memory of the days of prosperity and power.

When we think of these various groups of native states, the question naturally arises—what are the future destinies of these States, and have they any part to play in the future history of the country. Some persons hold that the graves of these States have long been dug—that they have fallen to rise no more, and that they shew no sign of resuscitation. There are others who hold that Native India is awakening to a new life; and that a glorious career awaits her in the future. The writer of these pages belongs to the latter class of thinkers. It is an unquestioned fact that within the last 30 or 40 years, a new life has been imported to Native India, and that the ferment of a great movement is already visible there.

The future
of the Native
States of
India.

And, indeed, if we look to the present circumstances of the country, we do not find in it the operation of any force hostile to the progress and prosperity of the native states. Besides the Native princes, there are now two other protagonists in the arena of India, *viz.*, the British Government and the people of India. Are the interests of these two latter actors in natural antagonism to those of the Native princes? Is there anything in the attitude of these two political factors which is inconsistent with the honour and existence of the native states? What is there to create alarm? The policy of England laid down in the great proclamation of 1858 and generally acted upon by the two great

political parties which rule the destinies of both England and India, is, in the highest degree, favourable to the interests of the Native princes and chiefs. It is improbable that England will ever turn her back upon this honourable policy. The spirit of the age is in favour of the Native princes, and is greatly averse to the perpetration of wanton acts of spoliation on the part of powerful nations. It is undeniable that this spirit has not as yet thoroughly permeated the national consciousness of the powerful peoples of Europe, as is evidenced by the long roll of petty wars of aggression which even the most civilized among them have of late years waged on the weaker races of the different quarters of the globe. But it is much to be hoped that with the lapse of time those nations are imbibing this spirit in larger and larger measure, so that except under a temporary obscuration of the popular judgment under the influence of some unusual panic or passion, the occupation of any native state by the British, being sanctioned by the morality and intelligence of the English people, is now, or will henceforth be, an impossibility. On the other hand we vouch for the statement so repeatedly made in the foregoing pages, that the Native princes are eminently loyal and obedient. Does not the testimony of Sir Lepel Griffin, an official of high rank and ability, substantiate our assertion? Though he goes out of his way to write article after article in Newspapers and Periodicals, denouncing in terms of fierce invective the political sentiments and aspirations of the educated classes of India, more especially of Bengal, he at the same time passes a

glowing eulogy on the loyalty of the Native princes and chiefs.

It is now necessary to speak a few words regarding the wave of national sentiment now passing over this country. The idea of nationality has caught hold of the educated mind in this country and will soon naturally permeate the masses. Now this question of nationality naturally gives rise to a good deal of speculation regarding its probable effect on the Native States of India and the British Government. According to some it is fraught with danger, both to the existence of the native states and the preservation of British rule. We do not incline to this view. In our opinion, this view is the result of shallow observation, and narrow-minded jealousy, and suspicion. May we ask, what has the question of nationality to do with the existence of native states? The preservation of those States is quite compatible with the creation of a nationality in this country. Nationality is not synonymous with democracy. It has been justly observed that one of the greatest political achievements of this century is the creation of the German nationality. Indeed, at this moment, the idea of nationality has struck deeper roots in Germany than in any other country in Europe. The name of Fatherland calls up a feeling of the deepest love and enthusiasm in the breast of every German. Indeed, it may be said, that the German people is the high priest of nationality in this century. We ask, has nationality in Germany proved itself incompatible with the existence of separate principalities? Do the separate interests of each German state ever come in

Probable effects of the spread of a national feeling in India.

conflict with the national and Imperial interests of the entire German people, represented by the Emperor Wilhelm and his great minister? Assuredly not. The truth is, that the question of nationality has very little connexion with the existence of separate principalities and states, independent of each other so far only as their internal administration is concerned. Those who think that nationality in India will ring the death-knell of the native states labour under a confusion of ideas. They erroneously consider "nationality" and "democracy" as convertible terms. Among a people saturated with the democratic spirit—the French or Americans for example—nationality is incompatible with the existence of separate principalities. But if we find that such compatibility exists among the Germans—a people in whom the conservative spirit is only a little stronger than the democratic one—is it unreasonable to expect such a compatibility in India, a country where the spirit of conservatism and the sentiment of reverence is the dominant characteristic of the popular mind?

Thus, there is hardly any chance near or remote, of a collision. Only let our princes prove true to themselves, their duties and responsibilities—and all will be well in due time. There is no spectre moving in the darkness—all is light and life—the dawn of a new and better era full of sunshine and joy is breaking. Let them work with the spirit of the age—work in a noble and useful way—casting aside all sloth, indifference, sensuality, and selfishness. The age in which their lot is cast is big with the germs of mighty events. It is an age in which it is a glory

to live and work. A new life, material as well as spiritual, is dawning upon their country. A vast movement for uniting the various races and nationalities of this country is slowly but surely going on. English education and Western culture have proved themselves stronger than the bloody strife of centuries and will exercise a far more potent influence on the destinies of the country than the violent convulsive struggles of the past.

The work which the mild, silent, agency of English education and the spirit of the age is accomplishing in this country is vast and contains within itself the promise of untold blessings. The Native princes and chiefs should do their best to further this work. They should consider, that, by their utmost opposition, they cannot prevent—they can only delay its fulfilment for a short time. The stream of progress will flow on carrying them and all their works with it. What we wish to impress on the Native princes, is, that instead of being merely borne on the crest of this movement, they should try to give it depth and volume. Let the Native princes wake up to a sense of their duties and responsibilities. The time for selfish isolation has gone by. They should no longer be absorbed in the contemplation of their petty interests, but should turn their attention to the larger interests of the Empire. They should not be like petty inland streams losing their way in sandy solitudes, but like large navigable rivers bearing on their bosom fleets of traffickers and pearl-fishermen, and at last merging themselves into the vast ocean of Imperial politics.

All the various Native princes and chiefs should freely mix with each other, should fraternize with each other, promote by the utmost efforts of each, the general welfare of all. They should not be, as they have hitherto been, like numerous drops of quicksilver, glittering, running, flying together or asunder without unity or continuance. They should rather be like the chords of a harp, producing out of their various sounds the harmony of nationality.

And, certainly, there is nothing in this prospect alarming to the British Government or inconsistent with the existence of the British Supremacy. In the first place, this movement of a national unity will require centuries to ripen and bear fruit. Than this a grander and vaster political drama has never before been enacted in the world's history. The forces arrayed against it are many and great and seem at first sight all but irresistible. A thousand years of strife and bloodshed, of anarchy and chaos, have placed an almost insuperable barrier in the way of political unity. Then, again, India is no longer as it was seven or eight centuries ago, peopled by a homogeneous race. It now contains various races, religions and languages. The work of establishing national unity in such a country as this must then be beset with difficulties which will have to be overcome by the most wise and far-seeing efforts of the British Government and the princes and people of India together.

And, in fact, is any danger however small to British Supremacy necessarily involved in the establishment of nationality in India? We think not. Is it

unreasonable to suppose United India desiring to remain a component part of the British Empire? Why indeed will she foolishly and needlessly sever a connexion which has been of such inestimable benefit to her? Her attachment and loyalty to England stand on a firm basis which nationality cannot shake. Indeed, the national sentiment will serve only to give force to this feeling of loyalty, will purify it of the dross of self-interestedness and give it an almost religious fervour and sublimity.

Let England, the august mother of Freedom prove true to her glorious traditions. She has nothing to fear in India. She is destined here to reap a harvest of glory such as has fallen to the lot of no other nation of whom history bears record. Empires have risen and fallen: the British Empire, too, will one day like other earthly things vanish away like a dream. But the memory of the noble work she has done in India and of the still greater and nobler work of regeneration which we hope she may see her way to do yet, will live till the end of time. It has been England's proud privilege to be the chosen instrument of God for raising a great nation from the lowest depths of misery and degradation up to the level of a civilized and progressive people, for creating out of a boundless and formless chaos of social and moral anarchy a realm of freedom, science, learning and art—and above all for wedding the genius of the west with the genius of the east—knowledge with reverence—science with faith—strength with humility—justice with mercy, and out of this auspicious union bringing

forth a new civilization combining the best and finest elements of all past civilizations—a civilization in which the highest ideals of the age will be realised and the present discord between heaven and earth will be hushed into the silence of peace and the repose of reconciliation. We fervently pray that in the accomplishment of this glorious and arduous task England may meet with hearty and effectual assistance at the hands of the Native princes.



CHAPTER I.

THE RISE OF THE MAHRATTAS.

I PURPOSE to give in this chapter a brief account of the rise of the Mahrattas from the time they were formed out of a few village accountants and lawless banditti having no fixed course of life, but possessed of all the natural parts and natural advantages of soil and climate which go to make a nation, vigorous, hardy, and great, down to the period of their highest glory and utmost power. When the Mogul power was in the zenith of its glory, the Mahrattas formed themselves into a confederacy, baffled the life-long attempts of the most crafty and energetic of the Mogul emperors, kept at bay, during more than a century, the numberless well-disciplined armies of the Moguls and Rajputs, and succeeded at last in shaking the mighty and colossal fabric of the Mogul empire to its very foundation.

The rise of
the Mahrattas

Short in stature, nimble and active, the Mahrattas rode miles, scantily clad and without a saddle, across plains and deserts and through glades and forests. Hardy and simple, they could bear hunger and thirst alike, and could ascend rugged steeps and penetrate dense forests with ease. Adroit and courageous, they were ready at a moment's notice for the most valian

Their char-
acteristics.

and desperate acts. 'The Mahratta is the most formidable enemy, for he will not fail in boldness and enterprise when they are indispensable, or he will supply their place by stratagem, activity, and perseverance.' They were, however, never inspired by the sentiment of true honour or of nationality. Unlike the Rajputs and the Sikhs, they never made any self-sacrifice. Of religious zeal in the true sense of the word, they had none. It could not, therefore, have been expected that they should be the worthy champions of the cause of a nation's freedom. History informs us how the just, and noble and enthusiastic Puritans, to all seeming a set of fanatics, void of all vulgar passions and prejudices, formed the finest armies the world has ever seen, made the English name terrible to every nation of the civilised world, crushed a tyrant and put down for a time the strong, ancient aristocracy of the land. It is well known that had Muhammad tried to set himself up as a mere conqueror and incendiary, his success would never have been so great and so easy, but religious enthusiasm produced such fruitful and lasting impressions on the mind of his followers that in the course of but a quarter of a century after his death, nearly a sixth part of Asia was within the grasp of the Caliph. Such, too, was the case with the Sikh soldiery. With the words—"*Wah ! Guruji ka khalsa ! Wah Guruji ka futteh !*" (Hurrah! for the unity of the *Guru*: Hurrah! for the victory of the *Guru*) they entered the field with an enthusiasm that laughed at death, not only against the Emperors Bahadur Shah and Furrukh Shah, but also against the mighty armies of the British Government, and

made the invincible British army feel the brunt of their sword in the battlefield of Chillianwallah, of Mudki, of Aliwal, of Subraon, and of Ferozepore.

Want of true religious feeling and of love of country rendered the Mahrattas deficient in the burning zeal and warlike spirit of the Sikhs or of the Puritans. In the third battle of Paniput the faint cry of *Hara! Hara! Mahadeo!* of the Mahrattas was drowned by the *Din! Din!* of the Muhammedans. It is plain that the metal of which the Mahrattas were made was of quite a different nature from that of the Rajputs. They partook more of the nature of the Highlanders than that of any other nation on the face of the earth. With the Mahrattas, as with the Highlanders, the end justified the means. Like them, also, they had no strong attachment to a common sovereign. Love of plunder predominated in the minds of both, and both considered it honourable to follow such vocation. Laying waste village after village, carrying on predatory excursions over flourishing provinces—these were the objects of their life. After ultimate success they did not hanker; theirs was “the wild life in tumult still to range from toil to rest, and joy in every change.” In triumph or in defeat, they preserved the same equanimity of temper. Assiduously and patiently, bravely and perseveringly they worked in the living present. Armed with swords and spears, and, sometimes, with arrows and matchlocks, the light cavalry of the Mahrattas proved very formidable enemies and carried all before them. It was seldom that they could be induced to give a battle or form a large standing army. Theirs was the guerilla

method of warfare for which their country and their soil so eminently fitted them. And they were more fitted to destroy than to build up a great empire.

The country which they inhabit is that part of the Deccan which is called by the Hindus Mahârâshtra or the great Kingdom, which, at the time of the death of Sivaji, the architect of Mahratta power, comprised an area of 400 miles in length and 120 miles in breadth. It extended from the Satpura hills in the north to a line drawn east-ward from Goa in the south, and from the ocean in the west to the Waingunga in the east. This tract of country is interspersed with hills and dense jungles and narrow defiles which afforded the Mahrattas rare opportunities of strengthening their forts. It is watered by the Nerbudda, the Tapti, the Krishna, the Bhima, the Godavari, and their numerous tributaries. It was originally inhabited by numerous tribes who cultivated their own fields and were often employed as village officers and called occasionally to the field by Native princes. All of them stirred up as they were by the same spirit of independence which subsequently distinguished the Mahrattas, often took part in some marauding excursion or other. All they wanted was some master-spirit that should guide them and unite them into a homogeneous whole, that should instil into their minds a love of freedom and inspire them with a hatred of the Muhammedans and their faith. Such a leader was at last found in the person of the great Sivaji. We propose to give a brief description of the leading features of his character and of

the events in his career that it may help the reader clearly to understand the true character of the Mahrattas.

Sivaji was born of the royal family of Udaipur, the first Rajput family in India. His father Shaji married the daughter of a Mahratta chief, in whose service he was employed. But having afterwards taken a second wife he sent Sivaji with his mother to live at Puna under the guardianship of Dadaji Pant. At Puna, the boy Sivaji began to cultivate and foster those qualities which made him the typical Mahratta chief. He did not take to his books ; for in common with other Mahrattas, he considered reading and writing the business of persons of inferior position. Whilst he neglected to learn his alphabet, his zeal in all manly sports and exercises was ardent and keen. Strong and robust as he was, he learnt to wield the sword with uncommon dexterty. He grew to be an expert bowman and a skilled rider. From his early boyhood he was taught to respect the Brahmin and the cow. He listened with delight and enthusiasm to the legendary and mythological tales of his country recited by the Maharatta bards. His youthful heart leaped with joy on hearing of the heroic and marvellous exploits so charmingly described in the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyana. He became a devoted Hindu and a confirmed hater of the Muhammedans. With a glowing zeal and an uncommon earnestness of purpose, worthy only of the greatest, he began life in "the world's broad field of battle." He gathered round him a few Mawalee youths well-trained in

Sivaji, his
early life.

the art of wielding the sabre and spear and of drawing the bow. With them he commenced a series of daring and hazardous excursions which soon established his reputation as a valiant and skilful leader.

Sivaji's first act was the conquest of the hill fort of Tornea. He followed up this success with indefatigable zeal and perseverance, and, in the course of a few years became master of Raygurh, Singhar, Supa, Purandhar and ultimately of the whole of Concan. By these audacious acts he gave great displeasure to the King of Bijapur, who, to check him, threw his old father Shaji in dungeon and threatened to put him to death if his son did not desist from aggressions. Sivaji's craft and presence of mind never forsook him. He forthwith offered his services to the Mogul Emperor Shah Jehan. The emperor, much pleased with the offer, exerted his influence with the King of Bijapur for the release of Shaji. Sivaji acted with caution for sometime, and as soon as his father was set free, betook himself to his old depredations. He now fixed his capital at Rajgurh. When Aurangzeb was engaged in fighting against the Kings of Bijapur and Golkonda, he stood upon terms of the closest intimacy with the great Mogul and made shift to wrest from Bijapur the places he had ceded before. But no sooner had Aurangzeb turned his back than Sivaji entered the Mogul territories and in concert with the King of Bijapur laid them waste.

Aurangzeb was unquestionably a man of more than ordinary ability. Indomitable energy, unflagging perseverance and steady industry among other

sovereign virtues, were his characteristics in an eminent degree. But, unfortunately, he was not a good statesman like his illustrious ancestor. Akbar conciliated the Hindus, appointed them to important posts in his service, and did his best to deal out even-handed justice alike to Hindus and Musulmans. Whenever any minor Hindu or Muhammedan principality acknowledged his suzerainty Akbar was more than content. He never wished to deprive the Rajas or Newabs of their Kingdom, but thought that if they remained independent, they would, in case of foreign invasion or domestic quarrel, prove wholesome auxiliaries to him. But Aurangzeb thought and acted otherwise. His hatred of the Hindus was boundless. Unfortunately for himself and for the empire over which he ruled, he viewed with a jealous eye the independent spirit of even the small Muhammedan kingdoms of the Deccan. Instead of making peace with them or bringing them over to his side, he, most foolishly, made war upon them and tried to subvert their independence at a time when the greater part of the Deccan was being either ravaged or conquered by the intriguing, brave Sivaji and his hardy and wily Mahrattas. The imposition of the *Jezzia* or poll tax, though sullenly submitted to, set the whole Hindu world in a blaze and made Sivaji direct all his energies to the overthrow of the Muhammedan empire in India.

To this end, like a true statesman, Sivaji made peace with the government of Bijapur. To crush his rising spirit, Saista Khan, the Viceroy of Aurangzeb, fixed his head-quarters at Puna in the very house

Sivaji and
the Mogul
Viceroy.

in which Sivaji had been brought up. It was the dead of night; the Pro-consul of the Great Mogul was wrapped in sleep, when suddenly his slumbers were disturbed and he found himself surprised in his bed-chamber by the arch-enemy of his master. Thus all Saista Khan's plans for Sivaji's capture and destruction were foiled in a night! But, fortunately for himself, he escaped with his life, with the loss of two fingers only to his person and of his son and followers who were massacred to a man.

In the year 1664 Sivaji proclaimed himself Raja and began to strike coin in his own name. Not content with predatory excursions on land, he got together a large fleet consisting of 85 ships, began to cruise round the coast, plunder the adjacent country, and capture Mogul vessels carrying Muhammedan pilgrims to Mecca.

Aurangzeb, who was an intense bigot, became indignant, and having his eyes at last opened, determined to crush the power of the "wily mountain rat" as he called him. He sent one Mirza Raja to nip the Mahratta power in the bud. Sivaji, finding the Mogul army too strong to cope with, entered into a treaty. With the craftiness natural to his countrymen he enlisted himself in the Mogul army, and marched against Bijapur. His success in that campaign found favour in the eyes of Aurangzeb, who invited him to Delhi.

This was a rare opportunity for the Emperor of converting the greatest enemy of his dynasty and of his faith into a firm ally and a faithful feudatory. Foolishly enough, however, he let slip this

opportunity and allowed the Mahratta chief to return to his country more intractable than ever. Confiding in the faith of a host and relying on the words of an emperor he proceeded to Delhi, whither his son accompanied him. Sivaji found himself treated with gross insult. He indignantly told the emperor that he had come thither on his invitation, that he was ready to help him in every possible way and that it was the duty of the emperor to honour him as became his rank and position. His words, however, had a directly contrary effect. The proud Mahratta found himself a closely guarded prisoner of the treacherous Mogul.

But the wily Mahratta was more than a match for the intriguing Musalman. For the latter, it was no easy thing to hold the former in a trap and get the better of him. Cunning, artifice, and dissimulation, Sivaji had made his own. He requested the Emperor to allow his men who had come with him from the Deccan to go back to their respective homes and himself to return to his *jaygir*. Aurangzeb thought it prudent and safe to let Sivaji's men go, but retained Sivaji and his son Sambaji as prisoners in the capital.

Having thus sent away his men safe out of Delhi and removed all manner of suspicion from the Emperor's mind, he feigned sickness and lay in bed for some days. In a few days he made a show of recovery and began to distribute alms to the poor, and sent valuable presents in large baskets to Brahmins and *fakirs*. In this way, when the suspicion of the Emperor's guards had been warded off, and

Flight of
Sivaji.

the practice of sending presents had gone on for some days, one evening Sivaji put his son Sambaji in one basket and himself in another and caused themselves to be conveyed away unsuspected and unperceived from the capital of the Moguls. According to a previous secret arrangement, a horse ready—saddled for them on the outskirts of the city, carried the father and son in post-haste to Mathura. Thence they reached Raygurh in disguise of pilgrims.

Aurangjeb was sorely mortified to find that the 'wily mountain rat' had given him the slip in this way. With the escape of Sivaji vanished all his fond dreams of subjugating with ease the whole of the Deccan and of passing the rest of his days in peace. Now, more than ever, he realised the critical position in which he stood. If he had left Sivaji in his work of predatory inroads, that would have been quite a different thing. But he had added fuel to the fire; he had roused the lion, and this his mean and inhuman conduct towards Sivaji turned the whole Mahratta race into his bitterest and most inveterate enemies.

Sivaji's confinement at Delhi proved more than an incentive to further and bolder acts. While at Delhi, he not only ruminated over the plans of escape and carried on love intrigues with the Emperor's sister, but matured plans for future operations. On his return to Raygurh, he was hailed with enthusiasm by his followers. He captured one fort after another and soon recovered all the places that had been taken by the Emperor in his absence. He forced the Kings of Golkondah and Bijapur to pay him

tribute, and next directed his attention to making arrangements for the internal administration of his kingdom.

The Emperor sent his son and his able general Jeswant Singh to the Deccan, with strict injunctions to seize Sivaji. The latter, however, only deceived Prince Muazzim by showing signs of friendship and sham loyalty to the Emperor. To give higher political importance to his position and in order to acquire greater influence over the ignorant multitude he caused himself to be solemnly enthroned at Raygurh and assumed the insignia of royalty. In accordance with Oriental custom, he was weighed against gold, and the money was distributed among the Brahmins and the poor. This gave greater publicity to the event. He also declared the beginning of a new era from the date of his assuming royalty.

Attempt to
seize Sivaji.

The events of the next few years of his life are not of importance enough to be related here, nor do they give any insight into the true character of the man. Suffice it to say that he successively captured Vellore, Carnatic, Jalna, Ginjee, some provinces lying between Madras and Seringapatam and a few other places of importance. He attacked a Muhammedan prince returning from Mecca, and plundered all his treasures and jewels.

Further
conquests by
Sivaji.

He also gave a signal defeat to the Mogul army, in which some of the principal officers were killed and many were wounded and taken prisoners. He, however, treated them all with marked consideration, tended the sick and wounded, and at last discharged them after their recovery.

Incessant marching by day and by night, fatigues undergone through an active and busy life, and last, not least, anxiety caused by the disloyal conduct of his son Sambaji brought on illness and soon put an end to his existence. He died on the 5th of April 1680, at the age of fifty-three.

When he died, scarcely half his life's work was done. He was not only a great and valiant soldier but a consummate statesman. Bold in his plans, wise in his judgment, ready in action and firm in resolve, he was beyond a doubt one of the most extraordinary figures that have ever appeared in the arena of the world. If he was an implacable enemy, he was a kind master. He was a resolute and strict ruler, but to those who fought and bled for him and took his side he was liberal, nay, prodigal. His character, however, was not beyond reproach. Treacherous, unscrupulous and superstitious beyond measure, he cared little for the means of attaining his end. Craft and dissimulation formed the warp and woof of his constitution. Like his illustrious enemy Aurangzeb, he did many things and played many parts under the garb of piety and religion which cannot but be regretted. Like Aurangzeb too, he could never be trusted. However much one might admire his genius and be surprised at his rise from a comparatively humble station in life to the sovereignty of a powerful kingdom, and at his being able to cope successfully with one of the most able and powerful of the Mogul emperors, one cannot but look with aversion to among other things, his murder of Afzal Khan. "To form an estimate of his character, let us

consider him assembling and conducting a band of half naked Mawallees through the wild tracts where he first established himself, unmindful of obstruction from the elements, turning the most inclement seasons to advantage and inspiring the minds of such followers with undaunted enthusiasm.”* Let us also consider that he lived at a time when the mighty Aurangzeb was marching at the head of his grand army, now to crush the chivalrous spirit of the Rajput princes, at other times to blot out the principalities of Deccan from the face of India.

Sivaji thought that it was useless opposing an emperor whose armies were innumerable and whose resources were boundless, by fighting with him face to face. If Aurangzeb had on his side the force of numbers, Sivaji had a better knowledge of and hold on the important strategical points of the country. The nature of the country, with its caverns, rocks, hills, precipices, and valleys was a source of strength to him. He knew well that there was no spot in the Deccan with which he and his soldiers were not familiar. He was thus able with his army which was not like Aurangzeb's, a standing army, but one composed of the Mahratta peasants of the Deccan and of those who lived solely by plunder, by means of guerilla warfare, easily keep the Mogul army at bay, even as in the present century the Italians did the Austrians in the war of Italian independence.

The death of Sivaji was as crushing a loss to the Mahrattas as it was a relief to the Mogul Emperor. The founder of the Mahratta kingdom and

Sambaji.

* Marshman

supremacy, Sivaji was born to lead and command. However bold and hazardous the undertaking, his followers would, at his command, face it with pleasure and loyalty. For him they did not fear to meet death. The case, however, was quite different when Sambaji, his son, ascended the throne. He signalised his elevation to the throne by a series of cruel and barbarous acts, and gave full license to his sensual appetites. He was, no doubt, a brave man, but he could only be made to exert himself and display his courage on rare occasions. His brave conduct in the action against Hassan Ali Khan—the Mogul General,—in which the latter was attacked on all sides and forced to flee from the Deccan, and in his war by land and sea with the Portuguese Viceroy, which lasted for sometime, and in which the latter eventually begged for peace, are certainly worthy of the son of the mighty Sivaji. But it must be borne in mind that he was a drunkard and a libertine, and people had not, therefore, for him the respect and the enthusiastic loyalty which his father commanded. Of discipline there was none either in the army or the state. The artful Aurangzeb seized this golden opportunity to devote his mind to the subjugation of the Maharattas, who had always defied him and given him no respite since the beginning of his reign. So after the subjugation and destruction of the leading Muhammedan powers of the Deccan, such as Bijapur and Golkondah, the Emperor directed his attention to the capture of Sambaji. The latter was revelling at Sangameshawr when information reached Aurangzeb of his unguarded position. Some of the

trusted followers of Sambaji informed him of the approach of the Mogul army but the listless Mahratta turned a deaf ear to all such warnings.

He paid the penalty of his imprudence and debauchery by being captured. The royal captive was brought before the imperial Mogul captor amidst flourish of trumpets and was ordered to be kept under strict surveillance. The emperor, now that he got his prey within his clutches, thought of wreaking his vengeance in the most cruel and barbarous manner.

The Mogul nobility entreated him to spare his life, but Aurangzeb was inexorable. At last the Emperor made up his mind to spare Sambaji's life on condition of his becoming a convert to the Muhammedan faith. However degraded in habits Sambaji may have been, he was a Mahratta to the backbone and was not utterly unworthy of his illustrious father. Life in the prison cell of a Muhammedan was worse than any fate that might befall a Mahratta: how much more galling and repulsive to the son of Sivaji must have seemed life at the sacrifice of religion. Such life appeared to him loathsome and unbearable. He longed for, he courted, death. He cursed the Prophet and indignantly said to the Emperor's messenger: "Tell the Emperor that if he will give me his daughter in marriage I will become a Mussulman." The stern and relentless Mogul, a stranger to either pity or compunction, gave the brutal order of putting out his eyes with red hot iron, cutting out his tongue, and beheading him in public. In the beginning of August 1689, the King of the Mahrattas was beheaded

His capture.

Beheaded by the Emperor.

to satisfy the insatiable cruelty of an intolerant and proud tyrant. Foolishly did he then think that by the execution of this unfortunate Prince he should exterminate the Mahratta kingdom and restore peace to his own dominions. Sambaji's tragic end was, as Mr. Marshman justly says, the sowing of the dragon's teeth for which the Emperor paid too dearly. Blood shed on this memorable occasion cried out for blood and found an earnest response in the heart of every true-born Mahratta. Little did the Emperor then dream that within half a century of this sad event the Mahrattas would lord it over all India, and that his own descendants would have to bear the indignity of being suppliant at their feet for their very life and liberty. Little did he foresee that the Mahrattas would, in the long run, prove to be the veritable power to destroy the colossal and magnificent empire which he had been at so much pains to extend and consolidate.

The execution of Sambaji brought the leading Mahrattas together. They assembled at Raygurh, and in consultation with Jesoo Bye, Sambaji's widow, appointed Ram Raja Regent during the minority of her infant son Sivaji. All the forts were sufficiently garrisoned and adequately supplied with provisions for men and horses. It is in point to notice here, in passing, that the elder Sivaji's policy of granting the lands surrounding the forts to the soldiers manning, and garrisoning them, was of very great use to the Mahrattas at this time of an empty treasury. Having taken these timely precautions, the Mahrattas set about watching the movements of the Moguls.

The Moguls were for a long time baffled in their efforts to capture the Mahratta strong-hold of Raygnrh. At last, a traitor of the name of Suryajee Peesal betrayed the fort and with it the unfortunate queen and her infant son. Yesoo Bye and her son were first conveyed to the camp of the Mogul commander and then brought before the emperor.

Yesoo Bye
and her son
betrayed and
captured.

The Mahrattas were not frightened by this mishap. Nothing daunted, they carried on their depredations with unabated ardour. The Moguls moved about from place to place in search of Ram Raja, but their attempts were unavailing. Ram Raja went to Ginjee, and in consultation with eight of the leading Mahrattas, seated himself with great pomp on the throne of his illustrious father. The Mahrattas under Ram Chundra Trimback Panday, Santajee and Dhunnajee kept the Mogul army at bay, foiled all their plans and defeated them at Menich and Wall respectively. Zulfikar Khan who had hitherto been in command was superseded by the Emperor's son Prince Kaum Buksh; but the activity of the Mahratta horse was now greater than ever: now they cut off all supplies of the Mogul army, now they routed it. At last, they spread the rumour that the emperor was dead, and threw this nice bait to the emperor's son that they were willing to assist him in his elevation to the Imperial throne. It had the effect of spreading consternation in the ranks of the Mogul army and giving false hopes to a weak Prince. Meanwhile, the able and faithful commander Santajee fell a victim to treachery. While he was bathing in a rivulet, alone and defenceless, a

Ram Raja
on the throne.

traitor of the name of Nagojee Manay seized him and cut him in twain. Information soon reached the Emperor, and the traitor was rewarded for his highly valued service. Not long after, Ram Raja, who had escaped with his family to Visalger, died in the fort of Singhur. Traitors, who infested the Mahratta camp, betrayed their countrymen one by one. But still the cause of the Mahrattas did not suffer. Many of the provinces in the Deccan acknowledged their right of levying the *chouth* and *surdeshmukhi*. The Mahrattas crossed the Nerbudda ; overran Malwa, Berar and Khandesh ; and with fire and sword, molested a considerable part of Guzerat. All attempts on the part of the Moguls to stay the operations of the Mahrattas came to nothing.

In the meantime, Sivaji, known in history as Shahu, and his mother had been living as inmates of the Emperor's household from the year 1690. Having nothing to fear from an orphan boy and a helpless widow, the emperor and his daughter naturally treated them with kindness. Aurangzeb gave Shahu in marriage to the daughter of a Mahratta of rank, granted to him the districts of Akalkote, Indapore, Sopa and Neywassa as *jaygir* and gave him the sword *Bhavaní* of his grand-father. But he was for all that, a prisoner at Delhi to the day of the Emperor's death.

After the death of Aurangzeb, Shahu was set free by Prince Azam Shah. He sent intimation of his liberation to the chief Mahratta nobles, who to a man, welcomed him with open arms. Tara Bye, who had been Regent since the death of Ram Raja, and

who also had an infant son, having once tasted the sweets of power, did not feel inclined to part with it. She affected to consider Shahu an impostor. All the places, however, that had been in her possession surrendered one after another to Shahu, who in March 1708, assumed the style and titles of king of the Mahrattas at Satara.

Tranquil life in the pompons palace of an oriental monarch made Shahu a slave to luxurious habits and vicious pleasures and rendered him more fitted to pass his time in idle vanity and frivolous pursuits than to hold the helm of a kingdom. From such weak, ease-loving, and voluptuous prince no real benefit to the Mahratta confederacy could have been expected. To him it was not given to lead the hardy and gallant sons of Maharastra over steep mountains and precipitous rocks. But happily for him and for the cause of his countrymen the kingly power dwindled away, and the Peshwa or Prime Minister gradually came to power. Had it not been for the Peshwa, the Mahratta power would have been at its lowest ebb. The first Peshwa, Balaji Vishwanath, was a Brahmin of ability and note. He was at this time the motive power of the Mahratta confederation, and laid the foundation of an authority which became hereditary in his family. The office of the Peshwa, now superseded that of the king, and the administration of the state was entirely in his hands. Be it said to his credit that when the Mahratta power was threatened with annihilation by the all-powerful Mogul army as well as by internal dissensions, it was Balaji Vishwanath who came forward to save it.

Peshwa
Balaji Vishwanath.

The Moguls were now tottering to their fall, and the dismemberment of the empire seemed imminent. That mighty empire was in the hands of a few adventurers, who, each of them, strove to gain ascendancy over the other and to place on the throne persons of their own choice. The Sayayad brothers Hassan Ali and Abdulla Khan, known in history as 'king makers', on account of their disposing of the throne of Delhi in favour of five successive emperors from Jehandar Shah to Muhammad Shah, and Nizam-mul-mulk (a Brahmin by birth but sold as a slave to a Muhammedan general and by him converted to the religion of the prophet) were the prominent figures in that bear garden of a state. The Emperor Firukh Shiar was in secret dread of Hussan Ali, whom, to get rid of his presence, he appointed Subadar of the Deccan. Hussan Ali, on the other hand, justly considering Delhi to be the seat of real power, thought of establishing himself near the capital of the empire. The Sayayad determined to cultivate peace with the Mahrattas and actually entered into negotiations with Balaji Vishwanath. The latter was a man of great subtlety and foresight: he looked upon this as the fittest opportunity for mixing with the affairs of Delhi, and readily complied with his request. With an army of 10,000 men he accompanied him to the Court of Delhi. Balaji Vishwanath managed the matter with such consummate skill that the Emperor of Delhi was induced to sign the convention of 1717 by which Shahu was recognized as independent sovereign of the districts comprised in the *jaygir*, and the Mahrattas obtained

the right to collect the *chouth*, or fourth part of the revenue of the whole of the Deccan and the *surdeshmukhi* as well as the *swarji* or absolute control of the districts of Puna and Satara. This convention secured to the Mahrattas a fixed and permanent revenue, calculated to have reached a few crores of rupees, and proved a deadly blow to the Mogul cause. The Peshwa died soon after his return, and was succeeded in office by his son Baji Rao in 1721.

From the very beginning of his administration, the second Peshwa shewed the highest degree of ability, boldness, and vigour. He advised Shahu to strike at the root of the then withering Mogul power, that so Islam might be banished from India and the Hindu faith restored in its stead. "Now is our time", he said to Shahu, "to drive strangers from the land of the Hindus, and to acquire immortal renown. By directing our efforts to Hindustan, the Mahratta flag in your reign shall fly from the Krishna to the Attock. Let us strike at the root of the withering tree, the branches must fall of themselves." "You shall plant," replied Shahu, "my flag on the Himalaya. You are the noble son of a worthy father."

Baji Rao.

About this time, several Mahratta officers rose into eminence who in after days founded independent kingdoms. Among whom Sindia, Holkar, Bhonslay, and the Gaekwar were the chief. Baji Rao took advantage of the discord between the Emperor and the Nizam, and began to extend the Mahratta empire at the expense of both. Sindia and Holkar nobly supported their chief in his schemes. It was fortunate

Mahratta
officers with
the Peshwa—
founder of
kingdoms.

for the Peshwa to have got the services of such able men at such a time. They levied cesses from Malwa and the neighbouring provinces. The Peshwa himself marched to Seringapatam, whence he exacted contributions. The Nizam, alarmed by the increasing encroachments and depredations of the Mahrattas, instigated the rival branch of the Mahratta Raj at Kolapur to fall out with the house of Satara. The former demanded their share of the revenues of the six subas which Balaji had obtained from the emperor. The Nizam interceded and called both parties to produce their title deeds. Baji Rao, indignant at this officiousness and insolence on the part of the Nizam, marched against him and forced him to cede a fourth of the revenue of Guzerat. In the convention which took place in 1731 between Baji Rao and the Nizam, it was agreed that the former should be free to plunder the Mogul territories in the north. The name of Baji Rao spread consternation wherever he went. The Mogul governor Mahammad Bargash, who had been engaged in besieging the Raja of Bundelkund, fled before the Mahrattas. The Raja out of gratitude bequeathed him a third of Jhansi.

The rapid advance of the Peshwa towards Delhi filled the emperor with alarm. The concessions already made in favour of the Mahrattas added fuel to the fire of Baji Rao's ambition. He demanded from the emperor the cession of the holy cities of Benares, Gaya, Mathura and Allahabad, and of the provinces south of the Chambal. When the emperor was elated with a trifling success, obtained by the Mogul army in a skirmish with Holkar, Baji Rao

wrote, "I was compelled to tell the Emperor the truth, and to prove to him that I was still in Hindustan, to show him flames and the Mahrattas at the gates of his capital." Malwa and the territories between the Nerbudda and the Chambal were granted to him.

Just at this juncture a foreign character appeared on the scene. The invasion of Nadir Shah from beyond the Hindu-Kush weakened to a considerable extent the Mogul empire, which had been already much exhausted by constant irruptions. The whole empire was thrown into confusion. All at once, the Mogul deputies, shook off their allegiance to the Imperial throne. The extensive province of the Deccan was shared between the Nizam and the Mahrattas. The Rajput chiefs declared their independence. In fine, all the places outside the capital were at this time hoisting the flag of independence.

Invasion of
Nadir Shah,
its effect.

Baji Rao found the emperor in a wretched plight. One well-planted blow, one thrust driven home, and the banner of the Hindus would have waved over the whole of Hindustan. But that was not to be; Baji Rao would not strike the dead: therein consisted his real greatness. He made it a point to crush the fierce, to humble the proud, and to help the helpless. To seat himself on the Peacock Throne was not his ambition; it was the object of his life, through evil and good report, to emancipate the sons of Aryans from the shackles of Muhammedan despots and from the hands of those unsparing plunderers to whom mountains and seas were no barriers in the way of their enriching themselves with Indian gold.

Baji Rao's
ambition.

Through the imaginative haze of heroic aspiration he saw in his mind's eye India delivered of foreign yoke; Muhammedan potentates bowing down in awe before the Hindu throne; and Mother India glorying in her greatness as the land *par excellence* of Aryan culture. So absorbed was he in thoughts such as these that like wise Soerates of old, he was sometimes found oblivious of all the world around him, when the vast territories of his sovereign were trembling in the balance. Patient and persevering, Baji Rao was never seen to be thrown off his balance by the vicissitudes of fortune. To him, as to all practical men, present defeat was the surest harbinger of future victory. From early boyhood up to the very day of his death, Baji Rao displayed that unsurpassing courage, that irrepressible energy, that unflinching resolution, and that perfect serenity of temper which marked him out as one of the greatest of the great, and which made him second only to Sivaji. His dauntless spirit and passionate enthusiasm were the prime movers of his life. India lost a real hero when on an inauspicious day in 1740, the illustrious career of Baji Rao came to an end on the banks of the Nerbudda.

Such was the man under whose strong and masterly guidance and superior training, the future stars of the Mahratta confederacy were brought up. They were destined not only to play an important part in the politics of India, but also to found kingdoms which have survived the momentous revolutions of the last two centuries, and which still stand out as models of states that have thriven under native rule.

CHAPTER II.

THE RISE OF THE SINDIA FAMILY.

OF the splendid opportunities for genius and ambition which presented themselves for the establishment of monarchy in India in the last century, there is hardly a parallel in any other age or country. The sceptre of sovereignty had slipped from the feeble grasp of the successors of Aurangzeb. The British power, which afterwards got into the shoes of the Great Mogul, had not yet entered upon its glorious career. The path, between the grave of the old and the cradle of the new power, was the scene of interminable conflict among a number of petty sovereigns, to whom war was more a matter of necessity than of choice. It was a period of transition, characterized by anarchy and confusion. The inevitable consequence was the sudden rise of numerous petty sovereignties, most of whom ephemeral, but some containing germs of long life. Of these, one of the longest-lived was Gwalior, whose history forms the subject of the present notice. It still continues its existence, shorn though it be of its pristine grandeur.

Fit time for
the establish-
ment of sov-
ereignties.

The founder of the Gwalior Royal Family was Ranoji Sindia. Of his parentage and early life there is unfortunately no trustworthy account. According to Sir John Malcolm, he was a Sudra of the tribe of

Ranoji Sin-
dia, the foun-
der of the
Gwalior royal
family.

Kumbi or cultivators. He held the hereditary office of Headman, or Patel of Kumerkerrah, in the district Wye.

He was then taken into the service of the Peshwa Balaji Vishwanath, after whose death he continued to serve his son Baji Rao. His occupation was the humble one of carrying the Peshwa's slippers. He owed his rise to an accident. Baji Rao, on coming out of the hall after a long audience with Raja Sahu, found his servant lying on his back and fast asleep with his master's slippers firmly clasped to his breast. Struck by this instance of fidelity, he promoted him to a station in the *pagah* or bodyguard. This laid the foundation of his fortunes.

But this story, which was current at the time of Sir John Malcolm and which he sees no reason to disbelieve, is perhaps not true. For, in the first place, such anecdotes originate with the vulgar, and are by them offered for public credence. Though often destroyed by historical criticism, now and then they crop up in every age and country. Human imagination loves to invest the origin of distinguished men with the charms of romance.

Again, according to Grant Duff, (than whom there is no higher authority on the subject) of the Sindia family of Kumerkerrah, there was a Munsif under Aurangzeb who gave Sindia's daughter in marriage to Shao who died in captivity. It cannot be believed that Ranoji Sindia, who was a relation of Raja Shao, should be a menial servant of the Peshwa, who was himself the minister or servant of Sahu. Moreover, as Grant Duff says, the Sindias had been distinguished

Sillidars (cavaliers) since the time of the Bahminy dynasty. It is difficult to see why Ranoji Sindia should prefer a degrading, menial service to the military profession, which, at that time, promised to every youthful and aspiring spirit a rich harvest of wealth and glory.

The notices of the career of Ranoji Sindia which are met with in the writings of historians, are very meagre. In 1726, Baji Rao granted deeds to Puar, Holkar and Sindia, empowering them to levy *chauth* and *sirdeshmuki* and to retain half the booty for the payment of their troops. In 1736, Ranoji Sindia accompanied Baji Rao to Delhi where he and Mulhar Rao Holkar performed a daring exploit.

His career.

They fell upon and defeated with great slaughter a body of 8000 men, who, under the command of Mozuffar Khan, Meer Hossein Khan Kokah, Raja Sew Sing and other nobles of the Delhi Court, had marched out of the city to attack the Peshwa. In 1738, he was one of the commanding officers of the Mahratta army in the campaign against Nizamulmulk, and highly distinguished himself in the battle of Bhopal, which was a Maharatta victory. In 1743, he had acquired such high reputation that he was brought forward by the Peshwa as one of the securities for the treaty concluded between him and Muhammad Shah. This is the last notice we have of Ranoji's life. He died at Shingahalpore, about the year 1750, but the exact date of his death is uncertain. Ranoji had three legitimate and two illegitimate sons. Of the former were Jayapa, Dattaji

His death.

and Jatabah, of the latter Tukaji and Mahadaji, all of whom except Tukaji, survived their father. He bequeathed a splendid inheritance to his descendants. The whole of Malwa, whose annual revenue was about 150 lacs, had been divided in nearly equal shares between Mulhar Rao Holkar and Ranoji Sindia;—the former getting 74 lacs and a half, and the latter 64 and a half. Jayapa's life was cut short by the sword of an assassin. A dispute arose between Ram Sing and Bejee Sing, the sons of Abhu Sing, Raja of Jodhpur, regarding the division of their father's dominions. Ram Sing asked the aid of the Peshwa, who, thereupon ordered Jayapa to take the field, as supporter of his interests. Jayapa besieged Bejee Sing in Nagour, and success was about to crown his arms, when Bejee Sing engaged two assassins whom he sent to the camp of Jayapa on pretence of opening negotiations, and who, having thus gained access to the person of Jayapa, accomplished their black purpose. Jayapa left behind him a son named Jankoji.

By the death of Jayapa, Dattaji became the head of the Sindia Family. Incited by the infamous Ghaziuddin, the nominal vizir and the real master and oppressor of the Emperor Alamgir II, Dattaji invaded the territory of the Rohillas and carried fire and sword through it. Nuzeebuddaulah, the gallant leader of the Rohillas, was unable with his small forces, to withstand the overwhelming force of the Mahrattas. Shujauddaulah, Nabob of Oudh, though he hated the Rohillas and coveted their territory, was induced, through fear of Mahratta invasion,

to take part with them. The reunited forces of Nuzeebuddaulah and Shujauddaulah fell upon the forces of Sindia, commanded by Govind Punt Bundelay, defeated them with great slaughter and drove them across the Ganges. Soon after this, Ahmad Shah Abdali, the terrible foe of the Mahrattas made his fourth invasion, and Dattaji was obliged to discontinue his operations against the Rohillas and the Nabob, and patch up a peace with them. Having done this, he and Holkar advanced by forced marches to the assistance of the Mahratta commander in the Punjab, who had been defeated by the Abdali. Ahmad Shah's vanguard crossed the Jumna, and Dattaji, believing it to be the main body, fell back before it. Holkar and Sindia had together only about 30,000 soldiers. Instead of remaining together and offering a combined resistance to Ahmad Shah, they imprudently divided their forces, and thus fell an easy prey to their enemy. Ahmad Shah, being guided by the local knowledge of Nuzeebuddaulah who had joined him, pursued the forces of Dattaji Sindia with his main body, completely surprised them and slaughtered two-thirds of their number. Dattaji and Joteeba were among the slain. By the death of Dattaji, the sovereignty of the Sindia State devolved upon Jankoji, the son of Jayapa, but Mahadaji who had greatly distinguished himself by his valour and conduct in the war of 1751, waged against Salabut Jung and the French, and also in the wars carried on by his brothers was the leading spirit of the Sindia cabinet, although debarred from the sovereignty by the illegitimacy of his birth.

Jankoji.

Of Jankoji Sindia it is unnecessary to say anything further than that he displayed great gallantry in the disastrous battle of Paniput on January 6, 1761, was captured and put to death in cold blood by the inexorable Abdali. Thus ended the legitimate line of Ranoji Sindia.



CHAPTER III.

MAHADAJI SINDIA.

PART I.

A DARK cloud now hung over the destinies of the Sindia Family. Of the large family left by Ranoji not a single legitimate descendant survived to perpetuate the grandeur of his family. Within a few years of his death, almost all his descendants perished, either on the battle-field or by the hand of the assassin. It was to be apprehended that illegitimacy would prove an insuperable obstacle to the succession of Mahadaji and that the Peshwa would lay hold of this pretext to resume his fief. But Providence had ordained otherwise. Mahadaji was destined to found one of the most powerful and lasting Hindu monarchies, and to leave behind him a reputation second only to that of Sivaji.

Gloom over
the Sindia
family.

From the fatal field of Paniput*—the grave of Mahratta greatness—Mahadaji Sindia narrowly escaped with his life. But a severe wound, inflicted on his person during the flight by a young Afghan, rendered him lame for life. The following account given by Mahadaji himself of this painful occurrence

Mahadaji
Sindia and
the Third
battle of
Paniput.

* A full account of the Third battle of Paniput will be given in the history of the House of Holkar.

will interest the reader. "When fate is unpropitious the wisest plans are unsuccessful. I had purchased a Bhunrathali mare for the sum of Rs. 12,000, which outstripped the cold winter's blast in speed, and I was mounted on her back. At the time when Bhao and Viswas Rao met with their deaths, I got separated to a distance from Jhanku, the chief of my adherents, and was fleeing away alone, when a young Mogul, riding a Turki charger, set out in pursuit of me. However much, I pressed my steed, whenever I looked behind, there I saw his horse shaking his ears, and coming straight on; till at last the mare being incapable of further exertion, he overtook me. He then took away my steed and accoutrements, and gave me a wound in the leg, saying: "This shall give you a mark to remember for years to come." From that day to the present I have continued suffering from this painful wound, insomuch, that I remember it well."

In spite of the illegitimacy of Mahadaji's birth, both policy and justice required that his claims to the family jaghir should be confirmed by the Peshwa, especially as there was no legitimate descendant of Ranoji. Madhu Rao, the Peshwa, with his usual good sense and judgment upheld Mahadaji's right in spite of the strong opposition of his uncle Raghoba, who, without even the shadow of a reason, wished to supersede Mahadaji in favour of Kedarji Sindia, the eldest son of Tukaji, who, as we have stated before, was the other illegitimate son of Ranoji. As the reader will see in the sequel, Raghoba had afterwards bitterly to rue this display of caprice.

Mahadaji had come personally to Puna to urge his claims, and to pay his respects to the Peshwa. He was ordered to join in the expedition which the Peshwa, at this time, sent to Malwa to regain the footing which had been lost by the fatal battle of Paniput. This was in 1764. Mahadaji somewhat unaccountably tarried in the neighbourhood of Puna, and did not shew any alacrity to obey the orders of his chief. Madhu Rao, who always exacted prompt obedience to his commands, severely reprimanded him and threatened to sequester his jaghir. Mahadaji took his departure without any more delay. It seems difficult to account for this ill-timed delay in a man who was distinguished by tremendous energy of character. What a contrast, too, does this humble submission present to the grandeur and pomp, the shouts and plaudits of the whole Mahratta world, amidst which he, a future day, entered the Mahratta capital. In the course of this expedition Mahadaji availed himself of many opportunities to extend and consolidate his power. He extended his dominions to the regions north of the Nerbudda. He placed on a secure foundation his hereditary authority. By his valour and conduct, and the wisdom of his counsels he acquired great influence over the Peshwa—so much so, that his opinion was asked about the succession to the Holkar state. He supported the claims of Ahalya Bai, the daughter-in-law of the great Mulhar Rao Holkar. His advocacy of the claims of this great princess, who for 30 years shed lustre on the throne of Indore, and by her transcendent virtues and abilities raised the

Mahadaji and
the Peshwa.

Holkar state to the zenith of prosperity and power, conclusively proves that he was not actuated by any mean jealousy towards the family of Mulhar Rao Holkar. Sir John Malcolm calls him, "The designing rival of the House of Holkar." But it is difficult to substantiate the charge. Mahadaji's nominal employment at Puna was that of the commander of the *pagah* or household troops of the Peshwa.

Since the fatal battle of Paniput, the Peshwa had made no attempt on a grand scale to recover the Mahratta prestige in the north of India. Mulhar Rao Holkar had, it is true, in 1764 besieged Delhi in conjunction with the Jhauts, but he had soon given up his enterprise and returned to the Deccan. By the year 1769, the Mahrattas under the prudent and vigorous administration of the Peshwa Madhu Rao, had recovered from the ill-effects of the battle of Paniput. They had recruited their shattered forces; and the Peshwa being no longer occupied with domestic dissensions or wars in the Deccan and burning to avenge the disgrace of Paniput, to wipe out the stain which it had cast over the Mahratta arms—planned an expedition on a gigantic scale to the north of Hindustan. He determined to carry fire and sword throughout those regions—to proclaim to the insolent Rohillas and the Nabob of Oudh by the blaze of their villages and the desolation of their towns that the Mahratta power, though it had suffered a temporary eclipse by the battle of Paniput, still shone as brilliantly as ever. After that battle, Shujaudaulah had expelled all the Mahratta carcoons from the Doab. He had

become the Vizir of the Emperor Shah Alum, while Nuzeebuddaulah, chief of the Rohillas, managed, as Amirul-umra, the affairs of the Emperor and governed the few districts that still remained to the throne of Delhi with remarkable wisdom and success. The Mahratta officer at Agra had for sometime remained there under the powerful protection of Surajmul, the famous Jhaut Chieftain, the only ally of the Mahrattas in those parts. But Surajmul had since perished in a battle against Nuzeebuddaulah, his army had been defeated and dissensions were raging among his sons for their father's dominions. The Mahrattas had been driven out ignominiously from the north, not a vestige of their ancient power was left, their prestige was utterly destroyed and their mortal enemies, Nuzeebuddaulah and Shujauddaulah were glorying in their share of the victory of Paniput and triumphing in the enjoyment of undisputed supremacy. To chastise these foes, to retrieve the tarnished glory of the Mahratta name, and to extend the Mahratta power to the north, were the grand objects of the expedition of 1769, which was fitted out on a scale commensurate with the greatness of the end which it was destined to achieve. On the most moderate computation it exceeded 2,00,000 men. It consisted of 50,000 horse, a large body of infantry with a numerous artillery and an immense host of Pindarees. Mahadaji commanded 15,000 horse. He was the soul of the expedition. Ballaji Kishen was the Commander-in-chief, but Mahadaji was its leading spirit. As we shall see hereafter, the whole character of the campaign bore the impress of his genius.

The first operations of the expedition disclosed the secret disease which had seized the heart of the Mahratta nation. The magnificent dream of Sivaji and his early successors—the establishment of Hindu supremacy, had ceased to animate the Mahratta councils. The grand drama of which the prologue had been uttered by Sivaji amidst the music of cannon-volleys and the death-dance of embattled hosts, the ambition and greed of Mahratta chiefs had turned into a sorry farce played for their own benefit. The idea of a great Hindu empire had imperceptibly faded from the Mahratta mind. They regarded both Hindus and Muhammedans as equally proper objects of their rapacity. Booty they would have—it mattered not whether it came from the coffers of the *Mlechhas* or of their co-religionists. And so the grand Mahratta army under Visaji Kishen, burst like a flood on Rajputana, the centre of Hindu religion. To their eternal disgrace they fleeced these Rujputs—their brothers in religion—to the extent of ten lacs. Even more infamously, for in this case they snapped asunder not only the ties of religion, but of former friendship—they committed great depredation in the territories of the Jhauts. Under pretence of composing the difference sthat had arisen between the sons of Surajmul, they entered the territory of the Jhauts, defeated them in an engagement near Bhurtpore, laid waste the country and did not desist from the ravages until the Jhauts bought them off with sixty-five lacs—ten in ready money and the rest by instalments. During the monsoons they encamped at Deig. They had vowed a terrible vengeance upon the Rohillas,

They always talked of sons and brothers slain in the battle of Paniput and threatened to sacrifice to the manes of their slain kinsmen and friends—holocausts of Rohillas. Nuzeebuddaulah, the able leader of the Rohillas, was anxious to avert the impending calamities. It was out of question to try to stem the torrent of Mahratta invasion by force—that destructive flood could not be checked by the feeble exertions of his people. There was now no Ahmad Shah Abdali whose assistance he could invoke. He had therefore recourse to negotiations with the Mahrattas.

The Mahrattas vowed revenge.

And now a difference took place in the councils of the Mahratta army as to their mode of treating the Rohillas. Visaji Kishen inclined to peaceful counsels—and listened with complacency to the overtures of the Rohillas. But Mahadaji Sindia and Ram Chundra Ganesh were in favour of violent counsels. They talked of the battle of Paniput and called for a terrible reckoning. Would the Mahrattas disgrace their name by sacrificing the sacred duty of revenge at the altar of shameful lucre? Lo! the spirits of those who had fallen at Paniput—their departed sires—cast reproachful looks upon their degenerate sons who could forget their duty to the dead by the wiles of base interest. Mahadaji had special reason to lament that terrible day and cherish violent resentment against Nuzeebuddaulah. For, in that battle, the flower of his adherents had been cut off. He himself had received a dreadful wound which embittered his existence. And Jankoji, his nephew, the head of his house, who had been captured in the battle, might

have been spared, but for the malignity of Nuzeebuddaulah, who, urged on by the inflexible enmity which he bore to the name of Sindia procured the rejection of the merciful counsels of Shujauddaulah who tried to save Jankoji. There was, therefore, no one on earth for whom Mahadaji entertained such an intense hatred and inveterate animosity as the chief of the Rohillas. He, therefore, urged on an invasion of the Rohilla territories with the utmost vehemence and persistence. But his counsels were, for once, rejected. On a reference made by Visaji Kishen to the authorities at Puna it was decided to close with the proposals of peace offered by Nuzeebuddaulah. The reason of this policy was, that the Mahrattas were endeavouring to induce Shah Alum to withdraw from the protection of the English, and therefore it was thought necessary to secure the good offices of the Rohilla chief who possessed great influence over the titular Emperor. The Mahrattas, however, as will be seen hereafter, eventually succeeded in accomplishing the object of their own unaided exertion. In conformity with this treaty, Zabita Khan, the son of Nuzeebuddaulah, was sent to join Visaji Kishen. This bold stroke of statesmanship—of acquiring preponderating power in the Delhi court by being the instrument of seating Shah Alum on the throne of his ancestors and under the name of the Emperor who was still the nominal Sovereign of Hindustan preferring enormous pretensions to the dominions of every state, and executing far-reaching projects of conquest, was most probably suggested by the daring genius of Mahadaji

Sindia. At least he was the chief instrument in carrying it out on this occasion—and as we shall see hereafter, it was the favourite scheme of his future policy, and with it his reputation as a statesman and general is indissolubly associated.

To resume the thread of our narrative. Shortly after the conclusion of the treaty between the Rohillas and Mahrattas and the advance of Zabita Khan to the Mahratta camp in pursuance of it, Nuzeebuddaulah died in October 1770, on his way to Nuzeebgurh. Immediately after this event, Zabita Khan assumed his father's situation in the capital and the Rohillas were overturned. Happy had it been for Zabita Khan and the Rohillas, if instead of being swayed by the ambition of renewing the lustre of his father's splendid administration of Delhi affairs, he had clung closely to the alliance which his father, with his wonted wisdom and foresight, had formed with the Mahrattas, if instead of trying to emulate the glory which a conjuncture of favourable circumstances and superior talents had enabled his father to attain, he had been content to follow the humble but safe policy which he had adopted in the evening of his days and bequeathed as a valuable legacy to his successor.

Death
Nuzeebud-
daulah.

The Mahrattas could do without the assistance of the son of Nuzeebuddaulah. They opened negotiations with the Emperor, who was residing at Allahabad, in the enjoyment of a stipend allotted to him by the English. The natural desire to mount the throne of his ancestors induced him to listen with complacency to the proposals of the Mahrattas.

The Mahrattas and the Emperor.

He was weary of his privacy. The heir of illustrious ancestors, it was the wish of his heart to renew the ancient grandeur of his house. The Mahrattas, too, made him the most splendid and flattering promises, addressed him with the respect due to the Lord Paramount of India. The Emperor was simple enough to believe in their sincerity—he completely swallowed the bait. Happy had it been for him, if, instead of listening to the voice of ambition, he had followed the advice of the English, who earnestly tried to dissuade him from his rash design. Unfortunately for himself he left his quiet haven and launched on the troublous sea of Delhi politics.

So in the month of December, 1771, the Emperor left Allahabad and was conducted by Mahadaji Sindia with great pomp to the camp of Visaji Kishen. With his Mahratta allies he entered his capital, after a long absence, and mounted his ancestral throne.

The rage of the Mahrattas against Zabita Khan, the son of their mortal enemy, Nuzeebuddaulah, now burst with the rush of a long pent-up torrent, on the devoted territory of the unfortunate Rohillas and spread desolation far and wide. They overran the entire Doab with the exception of Furrackabad. The blaze of villages reddened the sky. Wails of distress, shrieks of death, rent the air. The Rohillas under Zabita Khan and Hafiz Rahmat offered an ineffectual resistance. Mahadaji Sindia crossed the ford of the Ganges in their teeth, and this daring exploit spread panic and consternation throughout the Rohilla army. All thoughts of resistance were laid aside, and the whole country was left to the tender mercies of

the Mahrattas. Their predatory instinct, whetted by the remembrance of Paniput, inflicted untold miseries on the ill-fated province. Havoc and ruin followed their track. The whole territory of Zabita Khan was overrun and laid waste with fire and sword. Some members of his family were made prisoners. The fortress of Pertabgurrh, where was deposited the immense wealth, amassed by Nuzeebuddaulah, fell into their hands. The Rohillas, unable single-handed to check their ravages, had recourse to the assistance of the Nabob Vizir of Oudh, though fully aware that nothing lay nearer to his heart than the seizure and appropriation of their territories. Shujauddaulah had all along kept a correspondence with the Mahrattas. He now opened negotiations with them on behalf of the Rohillas. He justly deemed the neighbourhood of the Mahrattas to be highly dangerous to the peace and future security of his dominions. And though he was highly pleased to see the power of the Rohillas, whose subjugation he had been meditating since the death of Nuzeebuddaulah, weakened by their reverses at the hands of the Mahrattas, the presence of those daring marauders in his neighbourhood could not but fill him with uneasiness and fear. He, therefore, gladly accepted the task of mediating between the Rohillas and the Mahrattas. He persuaded them to cease from their ravages for a sum of 40 laes, for which the Vizir became surety. He, in his turn, insisted on the guarantee of Hafiz Rahmat who required the other chiefs to contribute their quota. Of this sum not a farthing reached the hands of the Mahrattas. All the chiefs, with the

exception of Hafiz Rahmat, pleaded poverty to escape their obligations, while the sum of five lacs, which Hafiz Rahmat, honestly adhering to his engagement had paid to the Vizir for delivery to the Mahrattas, never reached its destination, but was appropriated by the Vizir himself, all whose dealings with the Rohillas, both then and in future, were characterized by unmitigated baseness.

In the meantime, the arrogance and greed of the Mahrattas had given great umbrage to Shah Alum. The constant demand for money on the part of the Mahratta Commander, the greed, and extreme venality of the Mahratta carcoons, who infested the Delhi Court, and like locusts consumed the substance of the Delhi monarchy, had utterly disgusted the Emperor. He determined to get rid of his troublesome allies at all hazards. His exertions were ardently seconded by Nuzeeb Khan, his General, a man of splendid talents who claimed descent from the illustrious Safavi house which formerly ruled Persia. The Mahratta-General, unwilling to drive matters to extremities against the Emperor, referred for orders to the Court at Puna, but in the meantime, Madhu Rao had died at Puna, and affairs had fallen into great confusion, so that, for the present, no answer to the reference of Visaji Kishen could be returned, and he was left at liberty to consult his judgment unassisted or unfettered by directions from the Peshwa.

Mahadaji Sindia, whose hatred against the Rohillas blazed as fiercely as ever, not quenched by the terrible vengeance which had already been wreaked on them

or by their abject submission, and who strongly disapproved of the recent alliance with them, was sent to the West to collect tribute from the Jhauts and Rajputs. Visaji Kishen remained encamped in the territories of the Rohillas, now, not as enemy but as a friend, and tried every means to soothe or intimidate the Emperor. He would have succeeded, but for the firm counsels of Nuzeeb Khan. A battle took place. Notwithstanding his valour and skill, Nuzeeb Khan was defeated by the superior force of the Mahrattas. The Emperor was obliged to sue for peace. The terms dictated by the Mahrattas were not at all rigorous. He was required to nominate the Peshwa his *Bukshee* (Commander-in-chief) and to appoint Zabita Khan as the Peshwa's deputy. They also required him to cede the two districts of Kora and Allahabad which the English had taken from Nabob Shujaudaulah and assigned for Shah Alum's support during his abode at Allahabad. But the English deeming that the Emperor by throwing himself into the arms of the Mahrattas had absolved them from their engagements, refused to give up the two districts and thus give these free-booters a footing in the heart of the Gangetic provinces.

The treaty which Visaji Kishen had concluded with the titular Emperor, being highly favourable to the son of Nuzeebuddaulah, was viewed by Mahadaji Sindia with strong disapprobation. But no one paid any heed to his remonstrances. His influence at this time, in the councils of his nation, was by no means proportionate to the extent of his

Gradual increase of influence of Mahadaji after Madhu Rao's death.

abilities. But events at Puna were rapidly paving the way to his future greatness. So long as a Prince of great talents and energy remained at the head of the Mahratta nation, it was evident that none of the inferior chieftains could aspire to a very commanding position. In every state where the central authority is strong only a shadow of power can be possessed by a subordinate chief. He cannot reap alone the glory of his victories. A share—perhaps the lion's share—will be awarded to the head of the Government, who, though not present in the scene of action, will be considered by all men to have contributed to the result by the wisdom of his directions. The death of Madhu Rao was therefore highly favourable to Mahadaji Sindia. By the constraining power of his intellect and energy, Madhu Rao had kept the Princes of the Mahratta confederacy in subordination to the central authority. He had repressed their ambition by the wisdom and vigour of his measures. So long as he lived, no one among them could hope for personal aggrandisement at the expense of the Commonwealth. But his death removed the only obstacle to the path of selfish ambition. The great Mahratta Empire, losing its consistency, was resolving again into the primeval elements out of which the plastic genius of Sivaji and his successors had found it and given it strength and beauty. Of the various kingdoms that thus sprung into existence that of the Sindia was at this time the most powerful. Mahadaji Sindia was the most heroic of Maharatta chiefs of his time and was the central figure of the Maharatta history of the period.

Let us now turn for a moment to the course of events at Puna.

Madhu Rao, the young Peshwa, died in 1772 of consumption at the early age of eighteen. He was one of the best and greatest of his race. Had he lived long, the history of the Mahratta nation would have worn an appearance very different from the sad reality. With Madhu Rao expired the last hope of a Mahratta Empire. Let us drop a tear over the early grave of Madhu Rao, for, it is the grave of the Mahratta Empire, it is the grave of the grand idea, the splendid vision, which had once fired the heart of Sivaji.

Death of
Madhu Rao.

An account of the Mahratta confederacy and an estimate of the resources of the Mahratta State at this time will perhaps interest the reader.

The Peshwa was the head of the Mahratta confederacy, for Raja Sahu the descendant of Sivaji, was merely the nominal sovereign. He enjoyed the pageant, not the substantial power of sovereignty. His Prime Minister, the Peshwa, was the virtual ruler.

State of the
Mahratta
confederacy.

Janoji Bhonslay ruled over Berar and the adjoining districts. He was a man of an ambitious and turbulent character. He had tried to overturn the Peshwa's Government. And though the severe chastisement inflicted on him by Madhu Rao extorted from him a reluctant obedience, it had not quenched his ambitious and intriguing spirit and he was watching for fresh opportunities to introduce dissensions into the heart of the state, and pursue his schemes of self-aggrandisement to the prejudice of the Commonwealth. It is unnecessary to state that this family was founded by the celebrated Raghooji

Bhonslay, who being appointed as *Sen Sahib Suba* by Baji Rao or Shahu (which of them is uncertain) had taken advantage of his position to make many important conquests, especially that of Orissa, for his family.

The Gwekwar family ruled in Guzerat. Damaji Gwekwar, a Mahratta Sirdar, had captured Ahmedabad, the capital of that province in 1755, and put an end to the Emperor's authority. After a successful rule, he died in 1768, when one of his sons, Govind Rao, taking advantage of his presence at Puna, obtained the investiture of his father's *jaghir* from the Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao, on payment of the enormous sum of fifty lacs. But in 1771, his brother Futteh Sing proceeded to Puna, set forth his claims to the Peshwa's Court, and succeeded in supplanting Govind Rao. The affairs of Gwekwar were therefore in very unsettled state. Futteh Sing was the actual ruler, but the intrigues and machinations of his brother kept him in continual alarm, and greatly weakened his authority.

Mahadaji Sindia and Ahalya Bai ruled over Malwa. The capital of the former was Gwalior, of the latter, Indore. Ahalya Bai had joined with herself in the Government, Tukaji Holkar.

These were the principal members of the confederacy. Besides these, there were many other minor chiefs of whom we need only mention the name of Puars of Dhar. The founder of the principality of Dhar was Anund Rao. On his death in 1749, he was succeeded by his son Jeswant Rao Puar, who enjoyed high consideration among the Mahrattas and

was one of the most distinguished leaders. He fell in the fatal battle of Paniput, and after his death the Dhar principality rapidly declined. At the time of Madhu Rao's death, Khunde Rao, the son of Jeswant Rao, ruled over the Dhar State.

The nominal revenue of the whole Mahratta Empire was 10 crores of rupees, but the revenue actually realised was little more than 7 crores. Of this sum, the revenue under the direct control of the Peshwa, was about 3 crores—the rest was portioned out among Sindia, Holkar and other feudatories. When we consider that the purchasing power of money in those days was many times greater than it is now, the revenue of the Mahratta Empire seems to have been equal to its great power and grandeur.

The military resources of the Mahratta Empire were considerable. When it was free from domestic dissensions, it could bring an army into the field, formidable alike for its number and valour. Though before the creation by Mahadaji Sindia, of an army on the European model, the discipline of the Mahratta forces was not equal to their valour, yet it was fully equal to the discipline of the forces of the Native powers with whom they had to contend. There can be no doubt, that the Mahratta power was more than a match for all the other Native powers of India, and had it not been involved in continual internal dissensions, and had not its star grown pale before the rising sun of British power which was now a little above the horizon, there is not the slightest doubt that the increasing extent of the Mahratta Empire would

soon have swallowed up all the other Native States—both Hindu and Muhammedan. The ordinary army of the Peshwa, exclusive of the contingents which the feudatories were bound to furnish, consisted of 50,000 horse and 10,000 foot. . On the lowest calculation, the contingent consisted of about 65,000 soldiers—15,000 each from Gwekwar, Bhonslay, Holkar and Sindia and 5,000 from the Puars of Dhar. So that the Peshwa had constantly in readiness about 100,000 efficient Cavalry besides Infantry and the Pindarees. But, if the Peshwa chose to make an extraordinary effort and if his authority was firm and strong in his empire, it is certain that the forces which he would collect by his own exertions and out of his vassals, including the Pindarees, did not fall short of a grand total of 400,000 men—an army large enough to give law to all the Native powers, both Hindu and Muhammedan.

On the death of Madhu Rao, his brother Narain Rao succeeded him as Peshwa, but his career was soon cut short by the hand of an assassin. Raghoba, impelled by guilty ambition and the persuasions of his infamous wife, procured the assassination of his nephew. Having thus by treacherous murder gained the Peshwaship, the object of his ambition, as he was exceedingly fond of war and possessed considerable military genius, he plunged into hostilities with the Nizam and Hyder Ali. His operations against the Nizam were so vigorous that the latter, being reduced to great straits was obliged to conclude a treaty with Raghoba by ceding a territory valued at twenty lacs a year. Instead of dividing this territory

among his adherents and thus attaching them to his standard by the sure ties of interest and gratitude, this ill-starred man, in a fit of misplaced and inopportune generosity, voluntarily relinquished his own conquests. Nizam Aly paid him a visit and by unbounded professions of friendship and respect, cajoled him into a voluntary surrender of the territories he had won. He then advanced to the Carnatic, for the two-fold object of expelling Hyder from some Mahratta territories he had won in those parts and punishing the English and Muhammad Aly, Nabob of Carnatic, for having reduced Tanjore. In the meantime, a formidable confederacy had been formed against him among the ministers at Puna. The principal members of the ministry were Sukaram Bapoo, Trimbuk Rao Mama, Nana Furnavese, Moraba Furnavese, Bujaba Purun dharee, Anund Rao Jewaji and Hurry Punt Pharkay. To their great joy they found that Gunga Bai, the widow of the murdered Peshwa, was pregnant. She was sent to Purandhar, and the ministers took care to send with her a large number of pregnant females that, if she did not give birth to a son, a male child might be substituted. The ministers were not however obliged to have recourse to this deception. Gunga Bai gave birth to a son, who was named Madhu Rao Narain. In the meantime, Raghoba got information of the revolutionary designs of the ministers. In order to nip their objects in the bud by his sudden presence at Puna he soon concluded a treaty with Hyder Ali. Hyder was confirmed in the territories he had usurped, while, on his part, he recognised Raghoba's

Gunga Bai
delivered of a
son—Madhu
Rao Narain.

right of succession as Peshwa and consented to pay him an annual tribute of 6 lacs of rupees. After concluding this treaty with Hyder, Raghoba advanced by forced marches to Puna. On the way many of his Generals deserted him and joined the forces of the Regency which had been established at Puna with Sukaram Bapu at its head. Raghoba vindicated his reputation as a General. He attacked the forces of the Regency under Trimbuk Rao Mama near Punderpoor, 4th March, 1774, and utterly routed them. Trimbuk Rao was mortally wounded and taken prisoner. This defeat spread consternation in Puna. The ministers seemed paralysed by this tremendous reverse. All the projects which they had formed and which gave such promises of success seemed to be entirely shipwrecked. Had Raghoba improved the splendid opportunity, had he followed up with his accustomed energy the success which had visited his arms, it is certain that he could have triumphed over his enemies. But he had no friends to support his troops, he feared treachery in his camp, and thought that he could get efficient assistance from Sindia, Holkar and the English. Actuated by these considerations he turned off towards Burhanpore, instead of marching to Puna, which had, at first, been his destination. This was the crisis of his fate. A bold stroke might have crowned him with laurels. But he had not the daring genius which could conceive and execute such a scheme. He thought it too perilous. He feared it would crown him not with laurels but with cypress. And so he took the road to Burhanpore. He provided for personal safety

but his chance of success was gone. Soon after, the birth of Madhu Rao Narain on the 18th April gave the finishing blow to his hopes.

After a short stay at Burhanpore, Raghoba crossed the Nerbudda and advanced to Indore. When he arrived at that place his once splendid army had dwindled, by desertion, to seven thousand followers. He was, however, received by Mahadaji Sindia and Tukaji Holkar with great respect and pomp, and it seemed as if these two chiefs would zealously espouse his cause. It was also stated that the two brothers.

Raghoba
received with
respect by
Sindia and
Holkar.

by their generals—especially Hurry Punt Pharkay. They breathed a spirit of union—they adopted a lofty tone in their negotiations with Raghoba—insisting on his unconditional submission.

In the meantime, Raghoba with a force of thirty thousand men, chiefly composed of the troops of Sindia and Holkar marched from Indore to the bank of the Taptee, expecting to be joined by Moodaji Bhonslay and Govind Rao Gwekwar. On his arrival, he renewed his negotiations with the English Government of Bombay.

As early as 1768 the Court of Directors had sent instructions to the Bombay Government directing them to take hold of every opportunity to obtain from the Peshwa the cession of the port of Bassein and the island of Salsette near Bombay. The possession of these places was highly coveted by the English on account of their advantageous situation. Accordingly in 1772, in a despatch to the Presidency of Bombay they directed that a resident should be appointed to the Court of Puna, on the ostensible ground of maintaining friendship and alliance with the Mahratta authorities, but really to watch any favourable opportunity that might occur to urge upon them the cession of Salsette and Bassein. Mr. Mostyn formerly of the Bombay Civil Service was deputed to the Court of Puna. But all his efforts to carry out the object which his masters had so much at heart had hitherto been of no avail, as the Peshwa having conquered both those places from the Portuguese, ascribed an undue importance to them and regarding them as trophies of victory of the Mahrattas

over the invincible white race, was very loath to part with them even on highly advantageous terms.

The English, however, gradually contrived to take possession of Broach on extremely frivolous pretexts. Being informed that the Portuguese were fitting out an expedition to recover possession of Salsette and Bassein—they seized these two places—professing, however, that they did not mean to occupy them permanently, but only temporarily. And that they would restore them to their rightful owners as soon as the danger of Portuguese invasion would be blown over. No exception can be taken to this step as they had good reasons to fear that the Portuguese would prove very dangerous and troublesome neighbours and, being deeply imbued with the spirit of commercial rivalry, would avail themselves of their favourable position to cripple the Bombay Commerce. This temporary occupation, however, could not satisfy their ambition. And, therefore, it was with a joyful heart that they looked on the dissensions in which the Mahratta power was involved after the assassination of the Peshwa Narain Rao. They hoped they would be able, in the midst of the anarchy and confusion to take, by force or by stratagem, these two much-coveted places. Nor had they to wait long for an opportunity.

The English occupies Broach.

About September 1774, Raghoba, after he had discontinued his march to Puna and turned off towards the north, solicited the assistance of the Bombay Government. He made many handsome offers to the English, signified his willingness to make considerable cessions to them as well as to defray all

Raghoba's negotiations with the English falls through.

their expenses. But with the English the cession of Salsette was a *sine qua non*. But Raghoba, who had counted upon the assistance of Sindia and Holkar, and who therefore, did not as yet think his affairs so desperate as to make it necessary for him to alienate what he, in common with all men of his race, regarded as the brightest jewels in the Mahratta crown, refused on this occasion to accede to the exorbitant terms demanded by the English, and thus the negotiations fell to the ground.

But soon after Raghoba's arrival from Indore on the banks of the Taptee he was informed that Mahadaji Sindia and Tukaji Holkar had been gained over to the side of the ministers—nay, an attempt was made by his perfidious allies to seize his person and surrender him to his enemies. Then, deserted on all sides, finding almost all the princes of the Mahratta confederacy banded against him, and Boroda and Nagpore, the only quarters from which he expected a few rays of comfort, clouded by domestic dissensions, expecting from the Nizam, at best a dubious neutrality if not active hostility, he had no other friends to turn to save Hyder Ali and the English. But Hyder Ali, though he might, by invading the Mahratta dominions on the south, create a powerful diversion in his favour, and though he might afford him a small pecuniary assistance, was, utterly powerless to restore him to power. He was, therefore, obliged to have recourse to the assistance of the English. He was obliged to drink the cup of humiliation to the bitterest dregs. He had to concede everything which they demanded. Moreover, on the

17th February 1775, he had been entirely defeated by the forces of the Regency at Wassad and he had no other alternative but to give his ready consent to every condition proposed by his English allies. And so, on the 6th March 1775, he affixed his signature to a treaty known as the treaty of Surat. It consisted of sixteen articles. But if he yielded up Salsette and Bassein, with the Mahratta share of the revenues of Broach and other places in the district of Surat, to the amount, upon the whole of an annual revenue of nineteen lacs and twenty-five thousand Rupees, the English on their part agreed to assist him with about 3,000 men, whose charges were to be defrayed by Raghoba. The Bombay Government naturally exulted in this highly advantageous treaty which they concluded, but their conduct, if judged by the laws of justice and international morality, is open to grave censure. We reserve our criticism until we shall have an opportunity to review the whole of the transactions between the English and the Mahrattas.

Concludes
the treaty of
Surat with
the English.

In accordance with the treaty, Colonel Keating was sent to join the ex-Peshwa's army. An envoy was sent to the court of Futeh Sing Gwekwar to ask for his assistance. But the envoy was treated by Futeh Sing with great contempt and returned covered with ridicule. Raghoba, however, entertained sanguine hopes of being joined by Mahadaji Sindia who had been highly disgusted with Sukaram Bapu. The latter had demanded from Mahadaji the arrears due from him to the Puna Court. Moreover the Brahmin ministers at Puna habitually treated Sindia

Keating sent
to join Ragho-
ba's army.

Raghoba's
hopes of being
joined by
Sindia.

and Holkar with great haughtiness. Mahadaji had till very recently professed great zeal for the interests of Raghoba but he had not yet committed himself openly to any party and maintained an appearance of neutrality. But Raghoba was disappointed in this. All the hopes which he had built on the attachment of the Mahratta chieftains turned out to be houses built on sand. But notwithstanding the defection of so many of his former adherents, a new source of hope had opened to him in the friendship and existence of the English. The invincible valour and discipline of British soldiers had been proved on many a hard-fought field. They had invariably come out victorious from every encounter with the vast but undisciplined masses of native soldiers. Though the Mahrattas themselves had not yet measured swords with these antagonists, yet the fame of their prowess had made a deep impression on their minds. And it must have been with some misgivings that they entered into a war with these formidable enemies, for whom to fight had always been to conquer. The English maintained their reputation in their first battle with the Mahrattas. On May 18th 1775, on the field of Arras, the first passage of arms took place between the army of Colonel Keating and the army of the Regency, and though the latter far out-numbered the former, they were defeated with great loss. Futeh Sing now lost no time to enter into an alliance with Raghoba. He promised to pay twenty-six lacs of rupees in two months, to assist him with a large body of troops, and also to secure to the Bombay

Government a share in the revenues of Broach to the amount of two lacs. In addition to this heavy disaster the Regency had suffered a severe loss by sea. Their navy had been completely crippled by the English. The campaign, both by sea and land, had been highly disastrous to them. Their prestige had been severely shaken. Moreover, the cabals and factions which had constantly split their body had seriously undermined their authority. In short, they seemed on the brink of ruin.

On the other hand, Raghoba's affairs wore a smiling aspect. He was about to attain the object of his ambition. His English allies, he confidently hoped, would soon conduct him to the *guddi* of the Peshwas.

Raghoba's
prospects.

And though an honourable spirit would have shrunk from the dignity, which would be the symbol of national humiliation when so purchased, Raghoba who had sacrificed his nephew at the altar of interest was the last man to allow such sentimental considerations to stand in the way of the splendid prize of ambition. Raghoba was therefore in high spirits and confident of success. But at this time a storm burst from a quarter whence he least expected it and tore up by the roots all his designs and hopes. No sooner was the Supreme Government at Calcutta informed of these transactions, than they unanimously condemned the policy of the Bombay Government. The Governor took the lead, denouncing their proceedings as "unseasonable, impolitic, unjust and unauthorized."

The Supreme
Government
condemned
the policy of
the Bombay
Government.

Sir Philip Francis and the other members even went beyond him in their condemnation. Well

might the members feel amazed at the audacity of these measures, and at their utter defiance of international morality. Without consulting the Supreme Government, the Bombay authorities had thought fit to embark on an extremely hazardous enterprise. They had attempted to force on a powerful nation, with whom they had hitherto lived in profound peace, and with whom they had not the shadow of a quarrel,—a sovereign stained with the blood of his nephew and whose right to the throne was admitted by none, save a few interested partisans. Warren Hastings, however, thinking that any public disavowal of their measures would compromise the reputation of British statesmanship and shake all faith in the constancy of British alliance, that they had gone too far to recede with honour, was averse to any violent step, any sudden change of policy. But the impetuosity of Francis and his friends bore down all opposition and an envoy, Colonel Upton, was sent to Puna to conclude a treaty with the ministers. They now assumed a lofty tone. When asked to give up Salsette, they peremptorily rejected the proposal. But afterwards they thought fit to concede most of the demands of the English. By the treaty of Purandhar they gave up Salsette. They likewise ceded their claims on the revenue of Broach to the English company, and paid twelve lacs of rupees as indemnity for the expenses incurred by the British Government. Raghoba's interests were utterly neglected by his allies. The English agreed not to assist him. But if he disbanded his forces, the minister consented to afford him an

establishment of 1,000 horse and to pay 3 lacs of rupees a year for his other expenses.

The policy pursued by Mahadaji Sindia at this time was to maintain a strict neutrality between the contending parties. He had at first openly supported Raghoba. Afterwards he had veered round to the side of the Regency ; then disgusted with Sukaram Bapu, who managed matters with a high hand and treated him with great haughtiness, he had again shewn a leaning towards Raghoba. And now when Raghoba's affairs had sunk to the lowest ebb, he sent to him the most friendly assurances. He commenced an intercourse with him, which, though not avowed, was suspected by the ministers and caused great alarm. From his subsequent actions it is abundantly clear that Mahadaji was not serious in these negotiations. His only intention was to mortify Sukaram Bapu and to preserve his consequence in the eyes of the ministers, which might have been damaged by a too ready compliance with their measures.

Policy of
Sindia.

The Bombay Government had, as was naturally to be expected, expressed strong disapprobation of the treaty of Purandhar. They had declared it to be "highly injurious to the reputation and interests of the Company." They entered in strong language their dissent against almost every article of the treaty. They made every effort to fan the dying embers of the war into a flame. They even presumed to infringe some of the articles of the treaty of Purandhar. They gave Raghoba an asylum at Surat, in direct contravention of the terms of the

Bombay
Government
disapproves
of the treaty
of Purandhar.

treaty. In violation, though not of the letter, yet of the spirit of another solemn stipulation, they threw their field-army into Surat and Broach, thus making it a standing menace to the Mahratta dominions which lay in the vicinity. In spite of the remonstrances of the Mahratta ministers and Colonel Upton, they persisted in these measures.

The Mahratta ministers were not at present in a position actively to resent these infractions of the treaty of Purandhar. And so, for the present, peace prevailed. The first act of the drama of the first Mahratta war was closed. Though Mahadaji Sindia did not act a prominent part in it—nay, little better than a passive spectator, we have thought it expedient to dwell upon it at some length, as without a thorough comprehension of it, the second act would not be clearly understood. In the second act, Mahadaji Sindia was the leading figure, and it was chiefly owing to him that it did not terminate tragically for the Mahratta Empire.

This is perhaps the proper place for the episode of the pretender Bhao. As amidst the corpses which strewed the battle-field of Paniput, Sadaseo Rao Bhao's dead body was not clearly recognised, several impostors tried to personate him. One of these had brought himself into notoriety during the rule of Madhu Rao who had imprisoned him and after removing him from fort to fort had finally confined him in a stronghold that lay contiguous to the sea on the island of Kolaba, which is a dependency of the Kokan territory. During the confusion that prevailed after the death of Narain

Rao, this ill-fated impostor contrived to escape from his prison, and persuaded many vagabond and lawless characters to join him to take possession of some of the forts and districts of that country. But his career was speedily cut short by the prompt advance of Mahadaji Sindia. On Mahadaji's advance the associates of the pretender Bhao took to flight. He himself fell into the hands of a party of Mahadaji's soldiers, carried to Puna and being bound to a camel's foot and paraded round the city, was at length put to death. The Bombay Government had afforded the Puna ministers a new cause of complaint by the countenance which they had given to this impostor. They had likewise invited Raghoba to Bombay, where an allowance of Rs. 10,000 a month was settled upon him.

Let us now turn to the proceedings of the Puna cabinet. They took advantage of the respite afforded to them by the treaty of Purandhar to establish their authority and educe order out of the chaos and confusion into which the Mahratta affairs had fallen in consequence of domestic broils. They found two very able and zealous commanders in Mahadaji and Hurry Punt Phurkay to execute their plans. The suppression of the insurrection of the pretender Bhao had greatly served to confirm the authority of the ministers. Mahadaji also quelled some serious disturbances, which had broken out in the principality of Kolapore during the minority of the ruler Sivaji. Mahadaji and Hurry Punt Phurkay then joined their forces at Meerut and advanced to chastise Hyder Ali, who taking advantage of the late troubles of the

Proceedings
of the Puna
cabinet.

Mahratta empire, had extended his conquests to the banks of the Kistna. They were on the point of commencing vigorous operations against Hyder to compel him to disgorge his plunder when they were summoned to Puna by Nana Farnavese. We now proceed to mention the occasion of this sudden recall.

Dissensions had broken out with fresh violence in the Puna cabinet. It was split up into two cabals. At first Sukaram Bapu and Nana Farnavese had acted in cordial union. But Sukaram was gradually estranged from his younger colleague by jealousy of his commanding genius and inclined to the party of which Moraba Farnavese was the head. On account of these internal dissensions the councils of the Puna ministers had lost all steadiness and everything had fallen into disorder. Nana Farnavese hated the English and their protégé Raghoba, while the opposite faction, either from a spirit of opposition or from interested motives secretly favoured the ex-Peshwa. To heighten the confusion, a French adventurer named St. Lubin came to Puna pretending that he was empowered by the French Government to conclude a treaty with the ministers. He offered to bring two thousand five hundred French soldiers to their assistance and to furnish them with officers sufficient to organise an army of 10,000 men on the European model. He affected the utmost horror at the atrocity committed by Raghoba and at the conduct of the English Government espousing the cause of an assassin, stained with the blood of his nephew. With a burst of grief he exhibited a

picture of the cruel murder of Narain Rao which made a great impression on the spectators. Nana Furnavese, who was a man of acute discernment, doubtless saw through this flimsy veil by which the cheat tried to obscure his true character. But intending to mortify the English Government, he affected to believe his mission, treated him with the consideration due to the envoy of the French King, and made over to him the Port of Chout, a few miles from Bombay.

In the meantime, the Court of Directors had sent a despatch to the Bombay Government, highly approving of their conduct in concluding the treaty of Surat, which, as they said, was highly advantageous to the Company. That honourable body, unlike their successors who threw every obstacle in the way of the imperial projects of Wellesley and the Marquis of Hastings, at this time cherished schemes of political aggrandisement. Their approbation of the ambitious, though hare-brained policy of the Bombay Government, was full and unqualified, and soon after hearing of the manner in which the Supreme Government had upset their project, they passed unmeasured censure upon the conduct of that body. But as the mischief had been done, it was necessary to have a little patience. They, therefore, instructed the Governments of Calcutta and Bombay to seize hold of every colourable pretext to evade the treaty. To break the treaty all on a sudden was indecent, and therefore a pretext, although a flimsy one, was necessary. The zeal of the Bombay Government, as a matter of course, outstripped that

The court of Directors approve of the conduct of the Bombay Government,

their masters. Moreover, a sense of the contumacious treatment they had met with at the hands of the Calcutta Government rankled in their mind and gave them no rest until they had kindled a war.

It was also obvious to every one that Nana Furnavese did not lack any inclination to gratify the warlike zeal of the Bombay Government. They had offered his nation an unparalleled insult, and he was too ardent a patriot not to resent it. Imperceptibly they had come in and amidst the universal confusion taken the brightest jewel from the Mahratta crown. The only reason why he had not yet accepted the all but open challenge of the Bombay Government, was, that he was hampered by his colleagues. By this time their conduct had grown simply outrageous. They thwarted Nana at every step. They had won over Tukaji Holkar to their party. They had entered into a treasonable correspondence with Raghoba and the English Government. The first symptom which Nana perceived of Holkar's insubordination was his refusal to join the forces of Mahadaji Sindia and Hurry Punt Phurkay and to co-operate with them against Hyder Ali. Soon after, he advanced to Puna at the head of an army. And Moraba Furnavese, taking advantage of his presence, supplanted Nana and gained complete ascendancy in the Government. Nana was obliged to bend to the storm, and retreated to Purandhar. The new ministers, on their accession to power, sent an invitation to Raghoba to come and assume the sovereignty at Puna. But though the Bombay Government looked with favour on the scheme of Moraba, they required

an express declaration from Sukaram Bapu to the effect that this project had his entire concurrence. But either shame or irresolution withheld Sukaram Bapu from thus openly committing himself to Moraba's plan. The project was consequently dropped for the time. Within a short time the project was renewed. But this time it was baffled by the consummate artifice of Nana. He affected to acquiesce in the project of Moraba. He pretended to entertain the highest regard and deference for Sukaram Bapu. He was every day present in the councils held for deliberating as to the propriety and best means of restoring Raghoba to power. He entered into all their projects with insidious zeal. At the same time he took hold of every opportunity for sowing in the mind of Moraba the seeds of distrust for Raghoba. He reminded him that during the rule of Madhu Rao the conduct of Raghoba had invariably brought about domestic broils, and defeat, and dishonour. Moraba was struck with the force and cogency of Nana's objections, and while professing the utmost zeal for Raghoba, did not take any step for his speedy restoration.

Soon after, the new fabric of Government was overturned. Nana had succeeded in detaching Holkar from the confederacy of Moraba and in enlisting him on his side by a bribe of nine lacs of rupees. He had also summoned his active partizans Mahadaji Sindia and Hurry Punt Phurkay from the scene of their operations against Hyder Ali. These commanders conceived, and executed with complete success, a well-concerted plan for deceiving both Hyder Ali and

Nana's policy.

Moraba. They concealed from every one their intention to march against Puna. It was given out that they would carry on the ensuing campaign against Hyder Ali with the utmost vigour. Hyder Ali, who had a great dread for Mahratta prowess on account of the crushing defeats which he had sustained at their hands during the Peshwaship of Madhu Rao, made every effort to bring about an armistice. But the Mahratta commanders pretended to be inflexible. They grew high in their demands and extorted a large sum from Hyder as the price of their return to the Mahratta capital which had, in the meantime, become absolutely necessary for them and which they would have done, even if Hyder had not yielded to their threats. By this stroke of policy they outwitted both Hyder Ali and Moraba.

Hyder Ali was bullied into the payment of a large sum, while Moraba, thinking that the Mahratta Generals did not intend to interfere in the affairs of Puna, failed to take any steps to counteract the machinations of Nana and lived in fancied security. He was roused from his sleep only by the clap of ruin. Hurry Punt and Mahadaji Sindia arrived at Purandhar by different routes and formed a junction there. Nana immediately reassumed the reins of power. With his troops he occupied the passes. So that, not only was the power of Moraba and Sukaram subverted, but they were left entirely at the mercy of their rival. Moraba, waking too late from his dream of security, was at a loss how to proceed. Ruin stared him in the face. The only wise course left for him was to make complete submission and

show repentance for his intrigues with the enemies of the Empire. But instead of taking this step which prudence directed, he resorted to negotiations with the English. On the 11th July 1778, he was seized by a party of Sindia's horse, made over to Nana, who confined him in the strong fortress of Ahmednuggur. All the members of his faction were seized with the exception of Sukaram Bapu, whose name which carried great weight, was made use of, to strengthen the new administration. He had, moreover, been the representative of the Mahratta nation in the treaty of Purandhar, and the removal of his name from the Government would give the English a plausible pretext to evade that treaty. Bajupa Purandhar was thrown in the fort of Wrendun. Some even were put to death, of which the most celebrated was Sukaram Hurry. He was so ardently attached to Raghoba that when, on the point of death, he exclaimed, "my strength is gone and my life is going, but when voice and breath fail, my fleshless bone shall still spout 'Raghunath Rao ! Raghunath Rao !'" His unshaken fidelity to his master merited a better treatment than torture and death.

It would be tedious to dwell at length upon the negotiations between the Bombay Government and the Puna ministers. There was an air of hollowness on the face of them. Fortified by the instructions of the Court of Directors and a despatch of the Supreme Government, in which Mr. Hastings, after commenting on the conduct of Nana Furnavese, had authorized them "to assist in tranquilizing the dissensions of the Mahratta state," they were seeking

Negotiations
between the
Bombay Go-
vernment and
the Puna Mi-
nisters.

for a pretext to renew hostilities. On receiving this despatch they demanded from the Puna Regency explicit answers on some disputed points and a categorical answer to this direct question, whether the Puna ministers meant to observe the treaty of Purandhar. They also instructed their envoy to remonstrate on Lubin's being still kept at Puna. They likewise demanded a free passage across the heart of the country for a detachment of British troops under Colonel Leslie which Hastings had determined to send from Bengal to the Malabar Coasts ostensibly to counteract French intrigues but really to form alliance with Moodaji Bhonslay of Berar and other chiefs of Central India. The ministers, so far complied with these demands, that they dismissed St. Lubin early in the month of July. They, at the same time, justly remarked to Mr. Mostyn that as Leslie's detachment was professedly sent to oppose the movements of the French, the dismissal of St. Lubin made it no longer necessary. To the questions of the Bombay Government they sent out replies in the month of July. They denied having concluded any treaty with the French and supported by elaborate arguments the interpretation they had put on the treaty of Purandhar. To the point-blank question whether they intended to observe the treaty of Purandhar they tartly replied, "the English should keep that treaty faithfully when they should do the same."

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nor
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108- The Bombay Governor, regarding these answers as evasive and unsatisfactory and violation of the treaty of Purandhar and relying upon the authority

granted them by the despatch of the Governor-General, determined on a vigorous prosecution of hostilities. Their resolution was hastened by the intelligence they had received from England of rupture with France. They judged it necessary, independently of other grounds, to extinguish a party in the Mahratta state inimical to their interests and extremely dangerous on the eve of a war with the French, whom they were so well able to give material assistance in any attempt against the English possessions on the Malabar coast.

They, therefore, entered into a new treaty with Raghoba which differed from the treaty of Surat only in a single particular. The right of Madhu Rao Narain was recognised. Raghoba was not to be made Peshwa but only to be vested with the powers of regent until Madhu Rao should attain majority. The Government, in the meantime, was to be carried on in the minor's name. They directed Colonel Leslie, who had been before ordered to proceed to Surat, to change his destination and march on Joonere.

Enters into
a new treaty
with Ragho-
bá.

Soon after, they received news of the overthrow of Moraba, and his faction and the complete ascendancy of Nana Furnavese. This did not make any alteration in their policy. Nay, as Nana Farnavese was extremely odious to them, this revolution at Puna served only to redouble their zeal and confirm them in their resolution.

Nana Furnavese perceived the threatening danger and took care not to be taken unawares. He and Mahadaji Sindia set on foot vigorous and extensive military preparations. All over the country *sillidars*

Nana
Furnavese &
Sindia make
extensive
Military
preparations.

were recruited, vessels were refitted, fortresses were repaired and manned with strong garrisons. Magazines were furnished with provisions and military stores. All the country around rang with the din of preparations. The daring genius and energetic character of Nana and Mahadaji were strongly impressed upon every operation of the Mahrattas. The right men were in the right place. The astute minister and the skilful general were fit pilots to steer the vessel of state safely through the storm which it was soon to encounter.

Nana and Mahadaji likewise sent instructions to the Mahratta feudatories in Central India to harrass the troops of Leslie in their march.

ings' to mbay ment, Towards the end of August, the Bombay Government received a despatch from Mr. Hastings, informing them of his intention to form an alliance with Mudaji Bhonslay, and directing them not to take any step hostile to the Puna Government, but to remain entirely on the defensive. But the Bombay Government did not pay any heed to these instructions.

They did not understand how any alliance with Mudaji could serve the cause of Raghoba. They had taken up the cause of Raghoba with almost romantic ardour. They regarded themselves as valiant knights, doing battle in the cause of a fair and injured princess, while they were, in reality, disgracing their arms in the service of a foul sorceress. They, therefore, set at nought the orders of Mr. Hastings. Nothing could alter their resolve to conduct Raghoba in triumph to Puna. At the same time, with a strange inconsistency, they did not make adequate preparations

to carry out their resolution. While Mahadaji Sindia and Nana Farnavese were preparing themselves for a life and death struggle, the statesmen of Bombay were spending their time in idle talk. Even so late as the 2nd October, they had not begun their preparations. "On that day John Carnac, a member of the Council submitted a Minute, urging the necessity of vigorous exertions. Notwithstanding the opposition of Mr. Draper, who, with sound judgment advised the members to await the result of the negotiations between Mr. Hastings and Mudaji, or at least to postpone the declaration of hostilities for about two months, Carnac's proposal was carried by a large majority. The members "resolved to display their zeal for Raghoba without any more delay. As Mr. Hastings truly observed, their passions were enlisted in his cause, it was in effect their own." Their opinions were, however, extremely dilatory. At length, towards the end of November 1778, an army, numbering about 4,000 men, was sent to Puna under Colonel Egerton, a man who had seen some service in Europe but who was extremely weak and irresolute, and a stranger to the tactics of Indian warfare. A Committee composed of the Commanding Officer, Mr. Carnac, and Mr. Mostyn were appointed to superintend the expedition and settle the Government at Puna, so that, not only the political authority, but also a large share of the military authority resided in the Committee. As will be seen hereafter, this divided authority was the source of great calamities.

The army, according to Grant Duff, consisted of 591 Europeans, 2,278 Native infantry and 500 gun

Beginning
of war.

lascars, the whole, officers included, amounting to 3,900 men. James Mill, however, estimates the army at 4,500 men. On the 22nd November an advanced party composed of six companies of Native grenadiers with a sprinkling of light artillery, under the command of Captain James Stuart, a very energetic and skilful officer, embarked from Bombay, landed at Aptee, took possession of Boreghat without meeting with any resistance and encamped at the village of Kundulla. The main body left Bombay on the 23rd, captured the small fort of Ballapore and landed at Panwell on the 25th November. There a manifesto was issued in Raghoba's name, setting forth the objects of the expedition. This paper was disseminated through the villages, but produced little effect. Nay, so unpopular was Raghoba's cause, that on his advance to Panwell it was deserted by the inhabitants. The English had expected that Raghoba would be received with open arms by the Mahrattas, that the Mahrattas would be highly satisfied with the change of Government, and they were surprised to see the wholesale exodus of the inhabitants. Leaving these champions of Raghoba at Panwell, let us make a few general remarks on the conduct of the parties.

It is a matter of just surprise that the conduct of the English Government in bringing about this war has not been subjected to criticism. Even the celebrated historian of British India, whose great merit it is that he is never blinded by what Herbert Spencer calls the bias of patriotism, to the faults of his countrymen, has not passed upon it, the censure which it justly merits. Not a single reason, no, not the shadow of

a reason, can be adduced in favour of the conduct of the English Government which brought about the first Mahratta war. Earth-hunger, pure and simple, was their sole motive in meddling with Mahratta politics. The Mahrattas had given them no offence—they had made no incursions on their territories. Their only crime was that they possessed some places which were eagerly coveted by the English. In order to get Salsette and Bassein, they took advantage of the dissensions of the Mahratta state. They allied themselves with a wretch who had procured the assassination of his nephew—whose name had become a by-word of reproach and shame. History tells of many instances where a powerful nation has generously espoused the cause of a lawful ruler whose rights have been usurped by a powerful kinsman. Such conduct is worthy of all praise. Such conduct does indeed exalt a nation. It has been urged in extenuation of the conduct of the Bombay Government that they were perhaps ignorant of Raghoba's crime. But how could they be ignorant of a deed which had become the common talk of all India, which was believed and asserted by all men competent to form an opinion on the subject? Was the Bombay Government at great pains to collect a body of evidence on the subject, or did they give a ready and easy credence to Raghoba's professions of innocence? Had they taken any pains to arrive at the truth, they could easily have collected a mass of evidence, which, though it might not have conclusively established his guilt, would yet have furnished a proof sufficient for all practical purposes. But the Bombay

Government did not trouble their heads at all about these things. All their thoughts were bent upon Salsette and Bassein. Again, they had no reason to believe the posthumous child of Narain Rao as supposititious. It is true, that there was a suspicious circumstance, *viz.* the introduction of a number of pregnant women in the fort of Purandhar. It may be conceded, for the sake of argument, though it is more than doubtful, that the ministers had it in contemplation to substitute a male child for the child of Narain Rao if it did not prove a son. But in fact, the contemplated substitution never took place, and the Bombay Government, had they wished to learn the truth on this subject, might easily have been able to do so. The daughter of Raghoba, whose testimony on the subject should have been deemed conclusive, and her husband, were present at the birth of the child. The child too, bore a striking likeness to his father. In short, there was no reason to believe that the child was a supposititious one. Yet James Mill makes the following strange remarks :—

“ By withdrawing the pretended mother from the perception of disinterested witnesses, and by shutting up with her, as was generally affirmed and believed, a number of pregnant women in the same fort, they rendered it impossible that evidence of the reality of the pretended birth could ever be obtained ; and for that reason it ought never to have been believed.”

Perhaps so many errors of fact and argument have never been crammed into so small a space. The commentator on Mill's history, H. H. Wilson, has,

however, supplied the antidote to the bane. His remarks are sufficient to remove the erroneous impression which the passage cited is calculated to produce. . He remarks:—

“ This is a very extraordinary argument: it is admitted that the birth of a child was probable, and yet it is asserted that the fact ought never to have been believed, because it was impossible to prove its occurrence by actual testimony. Even if this were true it would not be a reasonable ground of disbelief; but it was not true, for there was abundant evidence, and although an interest in making out a case may be a reason for receiving such testimony with caution, it is not a valid plea for its utter rejection. Such fastidiousness would render almost any doubtful matter incapable of proof. The present case, however, is wholly misstated. There was not only evidence, but unimpeachable evidence. From information furnished by General Briggs, it appears that Raghoha had two vakeels at Purandhar immediately after the young Peshwa's birth, and his own daughter Durga Bai was in the room at the moment of the infant's birth. She and her husband with several other persons, had been brought to Purandhar and were detained there by Nana Furnavese that there might be no doubt about the birth. Captain Duff remarks that the only circumstance that shed any suspicion upon the event was the assemblage of pregnant women in the fortress, with the intention, as it was sometimes reported, that if Gunga Bai should be delivered of a girl, a male child might be substituted for it. An equally plausible

report, however, states that these women were assembled that a wet nurse might be selected from among them. Whatever was the cause of this arrangement, General Briggs affirms, that neither Raghoba nor his party ever disputed the authenticity of the young Peshwa's birth, and Captain Duff also states, that no doubt prevails among the Mahrattas that the infant was the child of Narain Rao. The parentage is also confirmed, it is said, by his striking resemblance to his cousin, the ex-Peshwa Baji Rao."

It is not difficult to see how Mr. Mill was betrayed into these errors. He drew the materials of his history from the papers in the India Office, and it is more than probable that the Bombay Government tried to lead their masters in England astray by a false report regarding the authenticity of the birth of the young Peshwa. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, which the remarks of Mr. Wilson force upon us, that the Bombay Government were guilty of conscious dishonesty in denying the authenticity of the infant's birth and upholding the claims of Raghoba. The only other explanation of their conduct is that the wish is father to the thought. They wished Madhu Rao Narain were supposititious child, and hence they cherished that thought, heroically shutting their eyes to the truth which stared them in the face. In this, they might be supposed to imitate the conduct of their ancestors in the seventeenth century, who declared the son of James II to be a supposititious child. But even this sorry excuse can scarcely be urged in defence of the Bombay Government. For, as has been said above, in their second treaty with Raghoba,

they plainly acknowledged the authenticity of the Peshwa's birth. Was this not stultifying themselves? They waged the first war for the avowed object of placing Raghoba on the throne. In justification of themselves, they asserted that they had no reason to believe in the reality of the pretended birth, and that in their opinion, Raghoba's right to the Peshwaship was unimpeachable. But, after the lapse of a short time, they declared that they fully believed in the authenticity of the young Peshwa's birth and that they wished merely to elevate to the Regency, Raghoba, the natural guardian of the infant. It is scarcely to be entertained that they had obtained conclusive proof of the authenticity of Madhu Rao Narain's birth in the interval between the treaty of Purandhar and the second treaty with Raghoba. How can we believe it! Nothing new had transpired bearing on that event. No new evidence had seen the light. The evidence was the same on the second occasion as on the first—neither more nor less. The conclusion, therefore, which irresistibly forces itself on the mind, is this: The Bombay Government was, from the first, aware of the invalid nature of Raghoba's claims. But in order to avoid the charge of a gross violation of international morality and to conceal the purely selfish nature of their aims, they allowed a fine gossamer of "vindication of lawful rights," "deception practised by the unscrupulous Puna ministry," and such like fine but misleading phrases to float over the repulsive nakedness of a self-aggrandising policy. But, subsequently, finding that the restoration of Raghoba was

extremely repugnant to the Mahratta sentiments, and that they were unequal to the Herculean task of forcing an unpopular sovereign upon a powerful nation, they declared that they wished merely to elevate Raghoba to the Regency and not to make him Peshwa. The conduct of the Bombay Government is utterly incapable of any defence. It must be condemned by every honest mind.

The conduct of the Bombay Government was highly reprehensible. As for their masters, the Honourable the Court of Directors, there is danger that any censure we may pass upon their conduct will be either too high or too low. Let us cite the following passage from the despatch which they sent to the Bombay Government, highly approving of the treaty of Surat and condemning the treaty of Purandhar. "We approved," said the Directors, "under every circumstance, of keeping all territories and possessions ceded to the company by Raghoba. We are extremely concerned to find, from the terms of the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton at Puna, that so great a sacrifice has unprovidently been made, and especially that the important cession of Bassein to the company by Raghoba has been rendered of no effect." This passage breathes land-hunger pure and simple. But it is probable that the Court of Directors had been misled by the Bombay Government into the belief that Raghoba was the rightful sovereign. For, say they, "we are of opinion, that an alliance originally with Raghoba would have been more for the "honour and advantage of the Company, and more likely to be lasting than that concluded at Puna. His

"pretensions to the Supreme authority appear to us to be better founded than those of his competitors." From this passage it appears that the Court of Directors entertained the erroneous notion that Raghoba was an innocent, helpless Prince kept out of his heritage by a clique at Puna. As we have said, it is highly probable that the Bombay Government had sent a garbled report of the real facts of the case, presenting in the most favourable light the case for Raghoba, and suppressing or mutilating the evidence in favour of the opposite view. And this suspicion is strengthened by the fact that so judicious, clear-headed, and impartial a writer as Mr. James Mill entertained such a gross misconception of the case. He had ransacked all the records of the India Office to obtain the materials of his history, and he would certainly not have laboured under a great delusion nor endeavoured to spread it, had the records of the transaction, especially the reports of the Bombay Government, been such as to put him in possession of the data for forming a correct opinion on the subject.

The attitude which the Supreme Government at first assumed towards the policy of the Government of Bombay, though condemned by every English historian who has written on the subject, appears to us highly laudable. The policy was clearly unjust and fraught with extreme peril, and we cannot, therefore, blame the Supreme Government for trying to reverse it. The measures which they adopted for thwarting the plans of the Bombay Government have been censured as rash and precipitate, as calculated to wound the feelings of the Bombay Government as

Conduct of
the Supreme
Government.

a reflection upon their wisdom and sense of justice and as sure to bring British policy and authority into contempt. But we must not lose sight of the following very obvious considerations. They believed, and rightly, that the policy of the Surat treaty was highly unjust and perilous. It was also clear that to obviate its dangerous consequences, prompt measures were necessary, as both the English and Mahratta armies had taken the field. In such circumstances would it have been prudent for the Supreme Government to have the course of negotiation in the hands of the Bombay Government, who had of their own accord, brought about the war, and who so ardently desired its continuation? Nay, how could the Bombay Government, with decency open negotiations with the ministers at Puna whom they had denounced as usurpers and against whom they were, without the slightest provocation, waging an aggressive warfare. Moreover, this would not have been politic, for the Puna ministers would have attributed this sudden inexplicable change to fear and a perception of weakness, and assumed a lofty tone. Moreover, the emergency was very pressing. A rose-coloured despatch to the Bombay Government would certainly not have sufficed. It was necessary to take more active measures even at the cost of some sentimental misery to the sensitive gentlemen of Bombay. By taking the negotiations into their own hands and condemning the policy of their subordinates in a public way, they made it evident to the Mahratta ministers that in asking for the cessation of hostilities they were moved by a

sense of justice and not by fear. We think, therefore, that the conduct of the Supreme Government or rather of Sir Philip Francis and his friends, for the Governor-General did not concur in their opinion, was worthy of praise, though the patriotic English historians, highly sensitive about everything touching the "prestige" of the British Government have condemned it in unmeasured terms. But to every calm and unprejudiced thinker the truth of the following assertions will be apparent. The policy of the treaty of Surat was an injustice and outrage upon a nation, that it was necessary to undo this measure of wrong, and an euphemistic despatch to the Bombay Government, dealing soft rebuke to the authors of the wrong, would not have sufficed for the purpose. The Supreme Government was right therefore in taking negotiations in their own hands. By doing so, they only evinced their desire to remedy the injustice perpetrated by their subordinates without their authority, while if the Bombay Government had been allowed to open the negotiations, the Puna ministers would have construed it into a confession of weakness, and moreover, the negotiation being entrusted to unwilling hands, would not have made a satisfactory progress, achieved no definite result and ended only in mutual exasperation.

But here our praise of the Supreme Government must cease. Though they put a stop to the hostilities brought about by the ambition of the Bombay Government, they extorted from the weakness of the Puna cabinet the cession of Salsette and other

advantages. To take advantage of the weakness and domestic dissensions of a nation in order to extort cessions of territories, as the price of our forbearance to interfere in its affairs is a policy which must be condemned by every right-minded man as utterly repugnant to justice and morality. And yet; Mr. Marshman regards as a "display of arrogance," the conduct of the Puna ministers in at first spurning the conditions proposed by Colonel Upton that Salsette and Bassein and the assigned revenues of Broach should be retained by the Company. The English in reality had no right to these territories. The conduct of the Puna ministers was not at all a "display of arrogance," but simply a discharge of their duty as guardians of the Mahratta Empire,—neither more nor less. It is, however, useless to expect fairness from historians who view everything connected with British India through a distorted medium of prejudices and prepossessions. It is not light that they want but what Bacon calls 'dry light.'

The subsequent conduct of the Supreme Government was little better than that of the Bombay Government. They drifted by and by into the policy of their subordinates.

Let us now examine the transactions which were the prelude to the second act of the first Mahratta War. To us it seems that the Bombay Government were chiefly to blame for the violation of the treaty of Purandhar. At least a strong suspicion against the good faith of that Government will arise in the mind of every one who ponders over the following

significant passage from the above quoted despatch of the Court of Directors. The passage runs thus:—"If the conditions of the treaty of Puna have not been strictly fulfilled on the part of the Mahrattas, and if, from any circumstance our Governor-General and Council shall deem it expedient, we have no objection to an alliance with Raghoba, on the terms agreed upon him and you." This passage, stripped of its verbiage and read between the lines evidently contains a plain direction to the Bombay Government to lay hold of every pretext to evade the treaty of Purandhar. When we find the Bombay Government thus incited by their superiors to a course of policy which they had so much at heart, a strong presumption arises in the mind in favour of the supposition that they and not the much-abused Puna ministers, were guilty of infringing the treaty of Purandhar. Moreover, though that treaty was highly prejudicial to the interests of the Mahrattas, and though the Puna ministry highly and with good reason resented the conduct of the English Government in extorting it, yet, it is certain that peace was absolutely necessary to them at that juncture in order to give them time and opportunity to heal the wounds inflicted on the Empire by domestic dissensions and foreign war. Nana Furnavese was too astute a statesman to desire war at a time when the Empire was in a state of utter disorganization. He wanted rest from foreign conflicts, to establish on a solid foundation his newly acquired power, and to recruit the shattered resources of the State. We have, therefore, every *a priori* argument in favour of the supposition that the English

were the real aggressors on this occasion. And the facts bear out this hypothesis. As mentioned above, it was the Bombay Government which infringed the treaty of Purandhar in two important points. They gave to Raghoba an asylum at Surat and settled on him a princely pension.

They threw their forces into the forts of Surat and Broach and thereby menaced the safety of the adjacent Mahratta dominions. They engaged in constant intrigues with the factions at Puna in order to procure the restoration of Raghoba by force or stratagem. Why could they not let alone the Mahratta factions to fight out their own quarrels, contenting themselves with demanding a strict observance of the treaty of Purandhar from the party that should have happened to prevail? At first, they had indeed one ground of complaint, *viz.*, the countenance given by Nana Farnavese to the cheat St. Lubin. But on their requisition Nana at length dismissed St. Lubin. So that, it is difficult to see what reason they had to inveigh against the conduct of Nana and to enter into a war against him. Mr. Hastings' defence of the conduct of the Bombay Government is very curious. According to him, the "resolution of the President and Council of Bombay" was not unjust, as Sir Philip Francis asserted it to be, "since the principal party, (*i.e.*, Sukaram Bapu) with whom the treaty was formed now applied for the interference of the company." In order to shew the utter frivolity of this specious argument, let us take an imaginary case. Suppose that the French Government enters into a treaty with the English Government.

Suppose that the treaty is signed on the part of England by Earls Granville and Kimberley. Suppose then, that by a general election, the liberal ministry gives place to a conservative. If then, the aforesaid Earls Granville and Kimberley, smarting under a sense of defeat and disgrace, absolve the French Government from their engagements. What shall we think of the honour and fairness of that Government if it takes hold of this pretext to evade the treaty? It is evident that the supposed case is exactly parallel to the present one. It is surprising to find such a clear-headed politician (one of the greatest statesmen England has produced) as Mr. Hastings, resorting to such frivolous argument. The principle, moreover, which underlies the argument is a highly dangerous one—it is subversive of all public faith. Did not Mr. Hastings know that treaties are not mere personal affairs—that those who sign treaties do not enter into them in their individual characters, but as representatives of their respective Governments? Consequently, if they at length prove traitors to their country and incite the enemy to infringe the treaty they have negotiated—this does not at all lessen the binding force of the treaty. It is true that Sukaram Bapu, the representative of the Mahratta Government in the treaty of Purandhar, out of jealousy to Nana, wished to play the traitor to his country. But this did not at all justify the English Government in evading the fulfilment of the treaty which he had negotiated. The personality of Sukaram Bapu, however, grand and imposing, was completely overshadowed by the great entity—the Mahratta political society.

The party to the treaty of Purandhar was not Sukaram Bapu, but the Mahratta Government, and so long as the latter subsisted and scrupulously observed the treaty, the English Government was bound to observe it on their part, although Sukaram Bapu might take it into his head to play the rôle of a traitor and incite them to infringe the treaty. Sukaram Bapu could not exclaim like Louis XIV, "*que l'état, c'est moi*".....What is the State, I am the State. Sukaram Bapu and the Mahratta state were not the same as the Governor-General, Mr. Hastings was not synonymous with the British Indian Government. He might be dismissed or he might be hanged but the British Indian Government might last till Doom's Day and the sanctity of the treaties he had concluded as representative of his Government would remain inviolable as long as the Government endured. It is curious that Hastings did not see all this—that he did not discern the pernicious nature of the doctrine he propounded. It is clear as the noon-day sun, that if this doctrine were acted upon on a large scale, almost all the solemn treaties which regulate the transactions of nations would be reduced to wastepaper and the peace of the world would depend upon the caprice of a few individuals.

Another remark and we have done. The reader already knows that by the second treaty with Raghoba, the English Government engaged to make him Regent, for, was he not the natural guardian of his grand-nephew? Yes, he was the *natural* protector, but whether he would have been a *real* protector that is the question. Be not the slave of words.

Was not Richard III the natural protector of his nephews ? And yet, did he not contrive to immure them in a dungeon and ultimately put them to death. And yet Richard, when he was invested with the office of the Regent, had every antecedent in his favour, at least, nothing against him. But Raghoba had already proved himself a Richard III. And he was certainly the most proper person to be made the protector of his grand nephew whose father he had caused to be assassinated. For, was he not the natural protector ? Surely, it was very ungenerous for the English Government to force on the young Prince a guardian who would certainly have spared no pains to make away with his charge. Surely, it was not noble to make the murderer of the father, the guardian of the son. It would have been far kinder on their part to elevate Raghoba to the Peshwaship, for then at least the life of the innocent young Prince would have been preserved. Is it not better to tear the diadem of sovereignty than the jewel of life ? We are very much grieved to see that those at the head of the Government showed such a barbarous indifference to the safety of a young Prince as is sufficient to cover their memory with everlasting infamy.

Let us now resume the thread of the narrative. We left Raghoba and his English friends at Panwell, devising plans of future operations and very mortified to find that the inhabitants had not shewn any enthusiasm for their protege. Here for the first time, disputes, petty and frivolous, but charged with grave consequences, broke out between Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton regarding the military honours

Dispute
between Mr.
Carnac and
Col. Egerton.

to be paid to the former. Mr. Mostyn, unluckily, was taken ill, returned to Bombay and there died, leaving a void which no one else could fill, for his knowledge of Mahratta politics and of the character of the leading Mahratta statesmen was far greater than that of any other Englishman of his age. Colonel Egerton now declared that one of the members being taken ill, the powers of the Committee were suspended, but the Bombay Government decided otherwise, and as there were now only two members and Mr. Carnac was the president and had the casting vote, he became virtually the head of the expedition, Colonel Egerton having to rest satisfied with an empty title. It was a very strange and anomalous spectacle to see a civilian over-riding the authority of a military man, and himself directing a great expedition. He had, however, ultimately to pay heavy penalty for his presumption.

The English army ascended the Ghauts on the 23rd December. Thence the army advanced in three divisions. The vanguard commanded by Captain Stewart, the other two divisions commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cay and Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn. Their movements were so slow that they marched at the rate of only two miles a day. During the march the army obtained a severe loss, and, as the event proved, irreparable loss by the death of two excellent officers. Lieutenant-Colonel Cay was mortally wounded by a rocket on the 31st December, while Captain Stewart was killed by a cannon-ball at the village of Karlee on the 4th January, 1779. The value and conduct of the latter officer

had made such a deep impression on the minds of the Mahrattas that long after his death his name was familiar in the Mahratta country by the appellation of Stewart Phakray, which means Stewart the Gallant.

The dilatory operations of the English gave sufficient time to the Mahrattas for making adequate preparations. In order to evince their desire to abide by the terms of the treaty of Purandhar they released Sukaram Bapu from the restraint which he had justly deserved by his teachery and associating him with themselves in the government. This furnishes a perfectly satisfactory proof of the fact, which I have already proved above that the infraction of the treaty of Purandhar must be laid at the door of the Bombay Government and not of Nana Furnavese. The military operations of the Mahrattas were conducted by Mahadaji Sindia, Hurry Punt Pharkay and Tukaji Holkar. But as the fidelity of the last named chieftain was very doubtful, he was artfully placed by Nana in a situation where he ran the risk of being cut off by his colleagues if he tried to go over to the side of the enemy. An advanced guard under Bhew Rao Jeswant Phansay consisting in all of 9,000 men with seven guns was despatched to harass the English army, and at length the mainbody of the Mahratta army advanced and took post at Tullygaom. Mahadaji Sindia was the leading spirit of the army. In the operations which followed he took the most prominent part.

War preparations of the Mahrattas.

In the meantime, by the sickness of Colonel Eger-ton the command of the army had devolved upon

Cockburn. Egerton, however, continued a member of the Committee as it was highly dangerous for him to return to Bombay, the road being infested by Mahratta horsemen.

On the 9th January the British army reached Tullygaom which was 18 miles distant from Puna, the place of their destination. On their approach the Mahratta army retired. The village, however, had been destroyed by the order of Nana Furnavese and the Committee heard with amazement that the Mahratta authorities had also determined to destroy Chinchore and Puna rather than allow them to fall into the hands of the enemy. The determined spirit of the enemy alarmed the members of the Committee. They feared that after having penetrated into the heart of a hostile country they would perish for want of provisions as the enemy would completely devastate it. Their fear was increased by Raghoba's assertion that no person of weight would declare for them until they had achieved something. This assertion which Raghoba made to animate them to exertion served only to unnerve them. Terrified by the bugbear of starvation they refused to advance, in spite of the earnest exhortations and remonstrances of Raghoba. Though they had eighteen days' provisions in the camp, they made up their mind to retreat. So, on the night of the 11th of January, the heavy guns were thrown into a large tank, a quantity of stores burnt and the English army commenced a precipitate retreat. They hoped that they would be able to effect their retreat without being discovered by the enemy. But they were doomed to a bitter

disappointment. Both the vanguard which was commanded by Captain Gordon and the rear-guard which was commanded by Captain Hartley were assailed by the enemy. The Mahrattas soon desisted from their attack on the van after having plundered a part of the baggage. The strength of the attack was made on the rear. Though repulsed in their first attempt, the Mahrattas renewed their attack on the following morning with tenfold fury and impetuosity.

It was a fortunate thing for the English army that the command of the rear had been entrusted to Captain Hartley. He was an officer of great skill and gallantry and he knew how to infuse his own enthusiasm into the hearts of his soldiers. His valour and conduct at this critical emergency proved the salvation of the whole army. Being reinforced by five companies of Europeans and two companies of Sepoys, he held his ground against over-whelming odds. His ranks were, however, enfiladed by the guns of the enemy and a dreadful carnage was inflicted upon his little force. The army notwithstanding heavy losses effected their retreat in a creditable manner to Wargaom. There the army fell into complete disorganization. The baggage, bazar, equipage, camp-followers were blended in inextricable confusion with the soldiers. The enemy's horse took advantage of this confusion and made a tremendous onslaught upon the retreating army. They were not repulsed until they had inflicted a severe loss upon the enemies. Desertion also thinned the ranks of the English army. Panic and consternation spread like wild fire throughout the entire army. Both the commanders and soldiers were

unmanned. Hartley alone preserved his presence of mind. By an earnest and eloquent exhortation to his men he stopped the desertion. Amidst the surrounding mass of weakness and imbecility, his energy and conduct stood out in bold relief. It was, however, impossible for him to save the army by his unassisted exertions. Despondency had crept in among the soldiers and the commanding officers, instead of checking its fatal growth, seemed to be themselves carried away by the contagion. It was evident that the unassisted exertions of Hartley could only put off, not avert the destruction of the army. On the 12th of January the loss of fighting men alone amounted to 352. It was true that the enemy had been repulsed, that the English had ultimately obtained a victory. But it was a Pyrrhic victory. A few more such victories, and the British army would dwindle into nothing. A further retreat was, therefore, deemed impracticable and Mr. Farmer, the Secretary of the Committee, was sent to negotiate with the ministers. They, at first, assumed a lofty tone and peremptorily demanded the surrender of Raghoba. The Committee would have complied with this demand, they would have incurred the infamy of surrendering their ally into the hands of his implacable enemies had they not been saved this ignominy by Raghoba's having already entered into a separate agreement with Mahadaji Sindia, to whom he afterwards gave himself up.

On Mr. Farmer's coming to Poona to open negotiations, Nana and Sindia insisted on the Committee's entering into an engagement for the surrender of all conquests which the British Government had made

since the death of Madhu Rao, and also of the Company's share of the revenues of Surat and Broach. Mr. Farmer informed the Committee of these demands. In reply to Mr. Farmer's communication they directed him to tell the ministers that they had no power to conclude any treaty unless authorized by the Supreme Government. "Show us then," said Mahadaji Sindia, when the reply of the Committee was laid before him, "show us the power by which you have taken upon you to break the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton."

The conduct of the Committee, that is to say, of Mr. Carnac, who was all in all, had up to this time been characterized by fair dealing, but the next step he took was marked by consummate hypocrisy. Though fully aware that he had no power, without the express sanction of the Supreme Government to enter into a treaty, and though the Supreme Government would surely disavow any disgraceful engagements he might form, he sent Mr. Holmes to Mahadaji Sindia, invested with full powers to conclude a treaty. In order to extricate his troops from a perilous position, Mr. Carnac practised this deception on the enemy. Mahadaji Sindia, for once, was deceived. Moreover, of the elaborate and complicated machinery of the Company's Government, with its Governors and Councils, its hierarchy of powers, descending by soft gradation from the Leaden Hall Street to the Council chamber of Bombay, the natives had a very hazy and indistinct idea. Besides, Mahadaji could not conceive how the Bombay Government which had infringed the

treaty of Purandhar could not conclude a treaty. He was ignorant of the despatches which the court of Directors and Mr. Hastings had sent to the Bombay Government, giving them a *carte blanche* to meddle in any way they pleased, in the Mahratta affairs. Mahadaji Sindia was therefore duped and he placed full reliance on the good faith of Carnac. Mr. Carnac, on his part, was not behind-hand in applying salve to his conscience. He affected to believe that he had tried, by means of the former message through MFarmer, to disabuse Mahadaji Sindia of the impression that he was utterly powerless to conclude a treaty, and if Mahadaji still persisted in his former belief and submitted to be duped, it must be his fault. The small lingering remains of conscientious scruples he successfully destroyed by the consciousness that, though he had granted the powers to Mr. Holmes, it was under a *mental reservation* that they were of no validity. Armed with such jesuitical casuistry he gained a complete victory over the internal monitor. Surely, it is very curious to see the fantastic tricks which a man sometimes plays with his conscience.

Sindia was highly gratified by the separate negotiations which the English had opened with him. The Committee likewise purchased his favour by a private promise to make over to him the English share of Broach, and also by distributing in presents the sum of forty one thousand rupees among his servants. But Mahadaji, though flattered by these marks of regard which the English shewed him, was not the man to be cajoled into granting too liberal terms. He failed not to take every advantage of the

distressed condition of the English. The terms of the convention of Wargaom, by which Carnac purchased the safety of his army, were sufficiently humiliating, but certainly not unreasonable. Mahadaji could not exact less severe conditions without shewing the most blameable indifference to the cause of his nation. The English were not required to give up any dominions which they rightfully possessed; they had only to surrender the conquests, which, taking advantage of the internal dissensions of the Mahrattas, they had recently made and to which they had not the shadow of a right. Mr. Holmes agreed to the following conditions:—

- (1.) Restitution should be made to the Peshwa of all the Mahratta territories which the English had conquered since the death of Madhu Rao.
- (2.) An order should be sent countermanding the advance of the Bengal troops.
- (3.) The English should give two hostages, Mr. William Gamnet Farmer and Lieutenant Charles Stewart, as security for the fulfilment of the engagements.

The conduct of the Committee soon shewed that they had acted in bad faith, for immediately on descending the Ghauts they suspended the countermand they had addressed to the Officer commanding the Bengal detachment.

It is needless to say that Egerton, Carnac and Cockburn were soon afterwards dismissed from the Company's service for their gross misconduct.

By the disgraceful defeat of their only army, the Bombay Government were placed in a sufficiently humiliating and perilous position. Such then was the end of the loud vauntings with which they had opened the campaign. Where now was their confidence of approaching triumph? They had made themselves the laughing stock of the natives by their impolitic conduct. Nay, their very existence depended upon the movements of the Bengal army. They had been at the end of their resources in equipping the late expedition, and its failure left them destitute of all the means of carrying on warfare, either offensive or defensive. We now turn to the operations of the Bengal army which was advancing by forced marches to the scene of warfare. The interest of the war henceforth centres in its movements.

Colonel Leslie, the Commander of the Bengal army crossed the Jumna in May 1778. He now met with a strong opposition from the local chiefs who had been incited by the Mahratta cabinet to throw every obstacle in the way of the English army. Instead of steadily pursuing his route and hastening to the scene of action, he embroiled himself in a petty war with these chiefs. He formed alliance with some, took part in their feuds, and in short, acted as if the main object of his expedition were nothing better than to wage an interminable warfare with these chiefs. By this injudicious course of action, he played himself into the hands of the Mahrattas, who were well pleased to find him unnecessarily delaying his march and frittering away his resources in an unprofitable and inglorious warfare. His movements

were so slow that in five months he had not advanced more than one hundred and twenty miles.

The patience of the Supreme Government was, at length exhausted, and Colonel Leslie was recalled. He was succeeded in the command by Colonel Goddard, an officer whose talents and energy were equal and more than equal to the arduous task imposed upon him. Colonel Leslie did not long survive his disgrace. He was carried off by a fever on the 3rd October, 1778. Colonel Goddard pushed on his march with great rapidity. Commencing his march from Rajgar in Bundelkund, he advanced southwards and crossed the Narbadda on the 2nd December. In the way, Ballaji Punt, a Mahratta officer tried to arrest his progress, and, on one occasion, fell upon his baggage, but was completely foiled in his attempts. General Goddard received material assistance from the Nabob of Bhopal whose friendly and generous conduct on that occasion has not been forgotten by the English Government.

Col. Goddard succeeds Col. Leslie.

General Goddard now halted on the right bank of the Narbadda to carry on a highly interesting negotiation with Moodaji Bhonslay, Raja of Berar. Warren Hastings, whose genius was by nature an erratic one, and who had not yet been sobered by time and experience, had entered into a negotiation with the Raja of Berar whose object and scope was nothing less than the installation of the Raja on the Guddi of the Mahratta empire. But the Raja was not to be easily won over to his purpose. Though his ambition was highly flattered by the splendid prospect which Hastings held up before him, yet

his fears were roused also. He was not dazzled by the project and blinded to the almost insuperable difficulties which surrounded it. Hastings sent Mr. Elliott, as ambassador to the Raja's Court. After the death of Elliott which shortly took place, the negotiation languished, for now the Raja shewed signs of reluctance. But Hastings, loath to give up his favourite project, ordered Goddard to carry on the negotiations. Goddard forced to inactivity which was foreign to his nature, remained encamped on the bank of the Narbadda to try what he could do to overcome the reluctance of the Raja of Berar.

Mahadaji however declined the splendid offers of Goddard. And about the same time the latter received an urgent application from the Bombay Government to hasten to the support of their army which had taken the field in the cause of Raghoba.

Though Goddard was not bound to obey the orders of the Bombay Government, as Mr. Hastings had, in the meantime, withdrawn from him the authority of that Government, and though he would not have incurred any blame by remaining in his old encampment awaiting the directions of the Governor-General, yet, judging that the Company's interests were at stake, and that his presence in the south was absolutely necessary, he commenced his march in compliance with the request of the Bombay Government. He arrived at Burhanpore on the 30th January 1779. After refreshing his army there, he resumed his march with a rapidity quickened by some doubtful

intelligence he had received. He reached Surat on the 26th February, marching 300 miles in 20 days and by this astonishing rapidity avoided a large body of horse that had been sent from Puna to intercept him.

In the meantime, the Supreme Government had received intelligence of the disgrace of Wargaom. Mr. Hastings, on receipt of this intelligence, displayed the great qualities of his mind. He took in the political situation at a glance. He clearly perceived that Mahadaji could no longer be trusted as an ally, that the most he could expect from him was a neutrality. General Goddard was, therefore, instructed to require from him an explicit avowal of his intentions, and then declare a negotiation, which, as Hastings now clearly saw, the Raja wished to spin out to an indefinite length without any result, to be at an end.

Proposal of negotiations with Sindia.

An alliance was formed with Futteh Sing Gwekwar, the acknowledged head of the Baroda state. The English Government however wisely refused to give a pledge for supporting him against the pretensions of his brother Govind Rao.

Mr. Hastings, however, did not entirely rely on his diplomacy. He set on foot vast military preparations in Bengal and held Sir Eyre Coote ready to march without delay to the defence of the North-Western Province which, in case of the continuation of hostilities, Hastings thought would be attacked by the forces of Holkar and Sindia.

Mr. Hastings was disposed to concur in the opinion of Mr. Hornby the Governor of Bombay that an alliance with Mahadaji was possible, that the

latter had some secret design of connecting himself with the English. It was therefore thought proper that in case Mahadaji discovered any leaning to an English alliance, Broach should be offered to him to confirm his inclination. Goddard (who had in the meantime been raised to the rank of Brigadier-General) was also empowered to treat separately with Mahadaji, should he find him disposed to form an alliance with the Company. But Mahadaji thought that his interests would be best secured, and his ascendancy in Puna Cabinet best confirmed by war. He had many strong reasons for arriving at this conclusion. In case of a conclusion of peace with the English he should be nothing better than one of the many Princes of the Mahratta confederacy. He would have to descend from his proud position as the mainstay of the Mahratta empire and the virtual protector of the Peshwa. His hold over Nana Furnavese would be gone, that ambitious minister would no longer show him any deference, consult him about any public affairs, but treat him with neglect and perhaps positive haughtiness. We cannot much blame Mahadaji for looking at these questions, affecting the general weal of the Mahratta empire, from the low stand-point of personal interest. That was the disease of the age he lived in. We must not judge him by a standard applicable to a better age and a better state of political society. It would have been quite miraculous for a public man in India in that age to survey the wide welter of chaos and confusion spread around him from the sublime and calm height of disinterested patriotism. And in truth, it would be

difficult to blame Mahadaji, even though we judge his conduct by the criterion of public good. It will pass unscathed even through this fiery ordeal. It is true that the English now offered to abandon the cause of Raghoba. They made proposals of peace on the basis of the treaty of Purandhar. But when we consider that by the treaty of Purandhar the Mahratta cabinet had been obliged to make to the English cessions of territories to which the latter had not a shadow of right, we cannot blame them for spurning these hard conditions to which a sense of stern necessity had wrung their reluctant consent at a time when they might not unreasonably think that they had inflicted a decisive defeat on the English Army. Surely it was not unreasonable for Nana and Mahadaji to assert that they would not treat with the English save on the basis of the status anti 1778. They did not wish to desire any improper and undue advantage from the success which had recently crowned their arms. They did not wish to encroach upon the lawful territories of the Company. They merely demanded the restoration of Salsette which had so recently formed a part of the Mahratta dominions and to which the English had no right in the world. Moreover, the English could not urge that their possession of Salsette had been so hallowed by prescription that the Mahrattas would be guilty of a political sacrilege in demanding it back. Though, therefore, it is certain that Mahadaji looked at these questions from a personal point of view, in this case at least, the dictates of self-interest coincided with that of public good.

In order to tighten his hold upon Nana, Mahadaji caused a jaghir in Bundelkund of 12 lacs of rupees to be settled upon Raghoba. By this means he retained Raghoba in his power as an instrument to govern Nana by fear. He thought that he would only have to threaten to support the pretensions of Raghoba, and Nana would be obliged to make an unconditional submission to his will. In this, Mahadaji had judged wrongly, Raghoba had become an object of such universal hatred among the Mahrattas that the possession of his person could very little serve the purpose of aggrandisement, and any attempt to dally with him would have the effect of lowering Mahadaji in the estimation of his countrymen, and increasing the popularity and confirming the authority of Nana. Raghoba was a pest. Disgrace and ruin were his constant attendants. He was to be shunned, not followed. As a friend, he was dangerous, as an enemy, harmless. Nana was therefore secretly pleased to find Mahadaji thus coqueting with Raghoba. Before long, Mahadaji discovered his error, and, by a stroke of policy not only redeemed it but evolved good out of it. He sent Raghoba towards his jaghir of Bundelkund purposely under a slender escort. On the way, he caused it to be intimated to Raghoba that he intended to confine him in Jhansi, on which Raghoba watching an opportunity overpowered his slender guard as his own followers outnumbered them and fled towards Broach to seek the protection of the English.

By this stratagem Sindia excited Nana's fear and jealousy against the English. Nana, who was not

in the secret, thought that Raghoba having received assurances of support from the English had gone over to them. He was, therefore, highly exasperated against them. He thought that the English were not sincere in proposing the treaty of Purandhar as the basis of the future peace, but that they were playing with him, amusing him with negotiations, and, in the meantime, secretly making vigorous preparations to restore their protégé Raghoba to the Mahratta throne by force of arms. This made him more dependent upon Mahadaji, more ready to court his assistance as in the event of war, which he now thought would evidently ensue, he had no where else to turn for support. He was, perhaps, disposed, at this time, to conclude a peace, as peace would certainly free him from the odious thralldom of Mahadaji Sindia and increase his consequence in the Mahratta State. But this artifice of Mahadaji, in letting Raghoba escape and fly to the English quarters, confirmed Nana's suspicions in the sincerity of the English, and roused his anger against them.

Mahadaji, at the same time, did not neglect to humour Nana. With an appearance of ready zeal, he gratified Nana in those points in which he could do so, without any prejudice to his own interests. He sacrificed Sukaram Bapu to the jealousy and rivalry of Nana. And that once powerful minister was kept in close confinement in the fort of Pertabgurh. He was not, however, kept long in one place. He was removed from one place to another until he perished miserably in Raigur. Such was the end of the once great Sukaram Bapu. Chintu Witul,

Death of
S u k a r a m
Bapu.

once the minister of Raghoba, also shared the same fate.

Mahadaji, at the same time, dropped vague and inexplicable hints of friendship in his conversations with the English envoy. The following is a typical example of these random, indefinite expressions of friendship. Just after the convention of Wargaom, in the presence of the envoys, Mahadaji was extolling the conduct of the English rear-guard. "I hope," said Mahadaji whispering in Mr. Sibbald's ear, "to see these fine fellows co-operating with my own troops by-and-by." Now, it may be asked, what was the object of Mahadaji in thus using words of friendship to men with whom he had determined to wage a sanguinary warfare. His object in this singular behaviour was to make it appear to the English that Nana Furnavese was the prime mover in the war and that he was imbued with feelings of friendship for the English, but, as a vassal of the Mahratta Empire he could not choose but follow the lead of the Nana. By thus inspiring the English with a belief in his friendliness, Mahadaji perhaps hoped to secure advantageous terms for himself, in case the Mahratta arms sustained a signal reverse.

The conduct of Mahadaji in these his dealings with the Nana and the English was characterized by consummate—perhaps a little unwarrantable artfulness. It is sincerely to be regretted that a feeling of friendship, of mutual trustfulness, never subsisted between Mahadaji and Nana. Even while co-operating in the same undertaking they never zealously supported each other, rather did their best to thwart

each other. Hollow words of trust on the one hand and respect on the other were all that ever passed between them. It is very mournful to see the two greatest Indian statesmen of the age, whose united counsels and exertions might have raised the Mahratta nation to the greatness and glory it had lost, trying to foil each other's plans, to deceive and overreach each other, and ruin the cause that was so dear to them.

Ah! this has been the bane of Indian politics from time immemorial! Pursuit of separate interests by the leading politicians, instead of conjoined exertions for the common weal, has brought about the political degradation of India. And of all the grand political lessons which England has in past times taught—still teaches—and will for a long time to come teach us, the importance of unity is one of the chiefest.

Negotiations
between God-
dard and
Nana.

The negotiation between General Goddard and Nana which had commenced in April 1779, dragged its slow length to the October of the same year, when the General demanded explicit answers from Nana. Nana declared that the surrender of Salsette and the person of Raghoba were preliminaries to any treaty the English might form with him. This round assertion brought the negotiations to an abrupt termination, and war being inevitable, both parties carried on their preparations with redoubled vigour and energy.

The English were the first to take the field and Guzerat was the scene of the early operations of the war. On February 15th, 1780, the English carried by storm the strong fortress of Ahmedabad, the capital

Commence-
ment of hos-
tilities and
the storms of
Ahmedabad.

of Guzerat. Immediately after the reduction of Ahmedabad, General Goddard heard of the approach of Mahadaji Sindia and Tukaji Holkar at the head of about twenty-thousand horse, and advanced to meet them. Sindia was encamped at Baroda, but on the approach of the English he skilfully drew off his forces to Pawangar. With consummate hypocrisy Sindia professed the most friendly sentiments for the English. He treated the two English hostages, Farmer and Stewart with great hospitality and set them at liberty. He went so far as to send a vakil to Goddard's camp, who carried from his master professions of ardent attachment to the English and enmity to Nana Furnavese. The object of Mahadaji was to induce Goddard to remain inactive during the fair season. Whether Goddard saw through this device or whether the natural impetuosity of his temper would not allow him to sit quiet in inglorious inactivity, he limited the negotiations to a certain time and allowed Sindia only three days, from the time the vakil left the English camp, to consider his proposals.

The proposals which Mahadaji sent to Goddard through his vakil were that Raghoba should retire to Jhansi on the receipt of an annual allowance of 12 lacs of rupees, that young Baji Rao, the son of Raghoba should be appointed Dewan, but that as he was too young, being only four years of age, the practical exercise of the power should be entrusted to Sindia. Nothing was said about the English. To these proposals Goddard replied that as Raghoba had sought the protection of the English voluntarily, no force should be put upon him, but that he must be

left free to go wheresoever he liked. That he might retire to Jhansi if he liked, but that if he did not wish to do so, the English could not undertake to make it compulsory on his part.

Goddard also asked for certain conditions favourable to British interests in consideration of the benefit he was to receive at their hands as well as compensation for the expenses they had incurred in the Mahratta wars, in which, according to Goddard, they had been compelled to engage. This surely was the height of impudence to say that the English had been compelled to engage in the Mahratta war, when every one knew that they were the aggressive party, that the war was of their own seeking.

Mahadaji wished to protract the negotiations, but Goddard demanded an immediate and explicit answer, and thus finding that the English General was not to be gulled into inactivity, Mahadaji opened negotiations with Govind Rao Gwekwar the brother and rival of Futteh Singh, the ally of the English. It was now the ardent desire of General Goddard to force Mahadaji into a battle and terminate the war by a decisive victory. Although Mahadaji's forces far out-numbered those of the English, yet, knowing that his army was nothing but an undisciplined horde of half soldiers, half marauders and must go down before the highly disciplined and well-appointed English army, he ardently desired to avoid a pitched battle and to waste the strength of the enemy by skirmishes and petty indecisive encounters. By a series of brilliant manoeuvres which very often require greater talents in the General than the gaining of the most splendid

Mahadaji
avoids a pitched
battle with
Goddard.

men was despatched with this object under Captain William Popham. This force was destined to achieve the most brilliant success—success surpassing the most sanguine expectations of Hastings. At the instance of the Raja of Gohud, the ally of the English, this force attacked Lahar, a fortified place fifty miles west of Kalpee, in possession of the Mahrattas. After a short siege the place was carried by storm, though at a loss of one hundred and twenty-five men.

But the most brilliant exploit of this force was the capture of the Hill Fort of Gwalior, in the possession of Sindia, reputed to be one of the strongest forts in Hindustan. The preparations for capturing it were made with great secrecy. On the 3rd August at the head of a select party, Popham advanced silently against the Fort. Silently the scaling ladders were applied to the foot of the rock, the party ascended without either effort or obstruction. The dawn of the 4th August found the British flag triumphantly flaunting in the air on the celebrated fortress of Gwalior.

About this time the difficulty of the English was greatly increased by the formidable irruption of Hyder Ali into Carnatic.

General Goddard, unable to draw Mahadaji into an engagement, changed his plan of operations and besieged Bassein on the 13th November.

Goddard
changes the
plan of opera-
tions.

A Mahratta army, which was sent to relieve it, was defeated on the 10th August, and on the 11th it surrendered. For sometime the interest of the war centres in the operations in Concan. Mahadaji Sindia

took advantage of this respite to establish himself in Central India. He did not make any exertion to defend the Peshwa's possessions in Concan, but employed the interval during which he was free from the presence of the English army in strengthening and extending his own power in Central India. He was content to remain a passive spectator of the great fight that was waging in Concan so long as the tide of battle did not beat against his own territories.

The English at length found that by confining the war within the limits of Concan they were playing the game of Sindia who cared nothing at all for the Peshwa's dominions so long as his own were safe. A resolution was therefore taken by Hastings' to attack Sindia in the heart of his own territories—that he, the principal promoter of the war, should be a great sufferer by it. The resolution was no sooner formed than carried into execution with that promptitude which distinguished all Hastings' measures.

Lieutenant-Colonel Carnac invaded Malwa, but with a force ludicrously inadequate to the performance of such a gigantic task as the subversion of Sindia's power. Mahadaji, who, as we have seen, had studiously avoided an engagement with Goddard, now entirely changed his tactics. Learning that the force of Carnac was very small, he determined to overwhelm it before it could be strengthened by reinforcements. Carnac had reduced Sipree and advanced to Teronji on the 16th February 1780. Mahadaji Sindia came thither and surrounded the English force. Carnac soon found himself highly incommodated for want of

provisions and forage. Perceiving this highly dangerous position, he wrote to Colonel Morgan urgently requesting him to send reinforcements to his assistance. Lieutenant-Colonel Muir was accordingly despatched with a small detachment. But, in the meantime, Carnach had been reduced to such straits by famine and so greatly harassed by the Mahratta forces that he determined to risk a retreat. At dead of night, on the 7th March, he commenced his retreat in great secrecy. His movements were not discovered till day-break. He was pursued by Sindia and greatly harassed until his arrival at Mahantpore, where having forcibly taken provisions from the inhabitants, he stopped and stood at bay. Mahadaji Sindia was now, for the first and the last time in his life, completely outwitted. He was thrown off his guard by Concan's seeming want of daring and by the studied neglect and *abandon* of his movements. Apprehending no danger from the English commander, of whose talents he had conceived a mean opinion, he had relaxed his watch. Colonel Carnae took advantage of this carelessness. On the 24th March, under cover of the night, he surprised Sindia in his camp, and routed his force with great slaughter. Sindia, however, succeeded in promptly retrieving it, and Carnae was not able to derive any great advantage from his victory.

Carnae was soon afterwards joined by Muir, who took the command of the united forces. But their conjoint exertions were not sufficient to effect anything against Mahadaji, and a series of petty encounters and ineffectual skirmishes were the result. The

Governor-General tried to array the Rajput Princes against Sindia. In this he failed. The Rajput chiefs had not yet received much provocation from Sindia, and they were unwilling to embroil themselves in a war without any better ground than the apprehension of a remote and uncertain danger from his ambition. The only staunch ally of the English was the Rana of Gohud, whose friendship had been recently confirmed by the grant to him of Gwalior, which, as we have seen, was wrested from Sindia's possession. But the Rana of Gohud was a petty chief with slender resources; he could not furnish any material assistance to the English, who were rather embarrassed than helped by his alliance. So the war in that part languished.

Early in November, the Bombay Government received the welcome intelligence that a treaty had been concluded between Mahadaji Sindia and Colonel Muir on the 13th October. By this, Sindia agreed to return to Ojein, and Muir to recross the Jumna. The *status ante bellum* was restored with the single exception of Gwalior, which was to be continued in the possession of the Rana of Gohud, so long as he conducted himself properly. Sindia further agreed to try to mediate a treaty between the British Government and the other belligerents. The reasons which induced Mahadaji to conclude the treaty are not far to seek. They lie on the surface. He found that he had nothing to gain and everything to lose by the continuation of a war which raged within his own dominions. So long as the tide of war rolled at a distance from his own frontier, he had nothing

to lose by its continuance. But when the destructive flood forced its way into his own territories, he experienced its evil effects and longed for peace. He found the war attaining the formidable proportions of a struggle for existence. He was not yet the possessor of extensive dominions, his power was not so great that he could expect to make a protracted resistance against the efforts of the mighty English, with their vast territories, the discipline of their forces, their grand appliances of war, for which modern science had been laid under contribution. He was not so much as the limb of a powerful body politic, for alas ! the Mahratta body politic had already ceased to exist. He had not the whole force of a great empire to back him. The several Princes of the Mahratta confederacy were now merely the *disjecta membra* of the once great Mahratta body politic. In his warfare with foreign powers none of those Princes could expect any assistance from his so-called confederates, not even so much as sympathy only, at best, a dubious neutrality. Far from affording any effectual assistance, no one would even weep over his fall. They would rather clap their hands over it and hasten to snatch a share of his lost territories in the general scramble. Notwithstanding his league with Holkar and the Nana, he clearly saw that in the event of any heavy disaster befalling his arms, rather than affording him any relief, they would hasten to make peace with the victor. The most conclusive proof of this he could find in his own consciousness. He could not conceal from himself that if Nana were utterly defeated by the

British Government he would not suffer any heavy affliction. That would certainly not break his heart. If then he could not sympathise with Nana in his hour of adversity, how could he expect that Nana would sympathise with him. Would it not be the height of folly on his part to build a large edifice of political projects on the fragile foundation of his friendship, sympathy, and gratitude. Like a palace of sand it would topple down and involve him in utter ruin. Moreover, he had known by experience the nature of the power he had to deal with. Only an insignificant fraction of the British power had been brought to bear upon him and behold the result.

With the whole extent of his power, he had with the utmost difficulty, barely stood his ground. What, if Nana were to conclude a treaty on the basis of the treaty of Purandhar, and the British Government were at liberty to turn their whole force against him? What would be the result? Why, he would find himself within a short time quietly stripped of his territories. Part given to the Rana of Gohud on condition of good behaviour, part of the conquest retained by the British Government, and the remainder, if that Government so pleased, perhaps restored to him. We think, therefore, that he did wisely, in making peace at a time when the British Government, having too many wars on their hands, were disposed not to be exacting in their demands, nay, rather ready to grant favourable terms. He clearly foresaw with the intuition of genius, that it would soon be necessary to contend with the British power for existence, that either it must

be destroyed or that it would destroy all. A mortal struggle with it was inevitable. But the hour was not yet come. And Mahadaji was not the man to enter rashly upon a premature war and incur the risk of ruin. He waited patiently for the hour, but in his lifetime the hour never came.

Soon after, the treaty of Salbye restored peace to every part of India with the exception of Carnatic where a terrible fight between Hyder Ali and the British Government still continued to rage with undiminished fury. By this treaty, the valuable district of Broach was bestowed on Mahadaji Sindia as a mark of the regard in which he was held by the British Government for his humane conduct to the Bombay army at the time of the convention of Wargaum and his generous treatment and release of the two English hostages, Mr. Farmer and Lieutenant Stewart.

A long time, however, elapsed between the conclusion and ratification of this treaty. We need not concern ourselves with the motives which actuated Nana to delay the ratification of the treaty. But Mahadaji Sindia had, from a long time, entertained a favourite project of attacking the English in Bengal. With this purpose, he had, just after the outbreak of war, requested Nana to send Tukaji Holkar to co-operate with him in the enterprise. The project was hare-brained enough. It was about as feasible as Hastings' project of making Mudaji Bhonslay the head of the Mahratta Empire. But great men have their pet schemes for which they feel an attachment as unreasonable as that which ordinary people feel for

Delay in
ratifying the
treaty.

their pets. Nana had at first, for many reasons, thrown cold water on this scheme. But at this time he consented to lend it his support, though in a half-hearted manner. Hyder Ali entered zealously into the project. And there is no knowing what would have been the upshot of all this, had Hyder's life been prolonged. But the sudden death of the ruler of Mysore nipped the project in the bud, and the treaty was without any delay ratified on February 24th, 1783.

The treaty was, obviously, a highly favourable one for Sindia, perhaps more favourable than he had reason to expect. It is true that he lost Gwalior, but this loss was more than compensated for by the acquisition of the valuable district of Broach. The English, too, had treated him as an independent sovereign. His pride and ambition were flattered by this recognition of his independence of the Peshwa by the greatest power in India. Mahadaji therefore was a great gainer by the war. He had gained an accession both of territory and dignity. And, what was more, he had gained prestige and a splendid reputation among his countrymen, and in no country do prestige and reputation carry greater weight than in India. The laurels which he had gained by his conduct in the campaign which led to the convention of Wargaum still adorned his brow. The utmost efforts of one of the greatest English Generals had not been able to foil his military tactics. He had successfully stood his ground against two of the greatest and most efficient English armies, and it must be borne in mind that in those days it was

considered as little short of a miracle to fight with an English army without defeat. Thus, the conclusion of the First Mahratta War found Mahadaji in the possession of extensive territories, vast power, great prestige and splendid reputation as a warrior and statesman. Considering his daring ambition and the distracted state of India which rendered it a most fitting stage for ambition to play its part, it might easily be foreseen that he was ready to pursue grand schemes of aggrandisement and that he would not have to wait long for an opportunity. And an opportunity, and that a most splendid one, soon presented itself, and was eagerly seized by him.

Here we close our very imperfect and unsatisfactory survey of what may be called the first part of Mahadaji's career. This part, highly striking as it is, is much inferior in interest and importance to the succeeding one on which we are now about to enter. We have as yet seen Mahadaji, as one only of a group of splendid figures. We are now to look at him in a new light—as the most prominent figure in India, the highest embodiment of Indian genius and daring—indeed the representative Indian of the epoch. We shall find him in the full tide of conquest, sweeping away every obstacle irresistible in his onward course, founding a kingdom, the most extensive and powerful of all Native States, defended by an army which was unrivalled for its discipline and valour. But we must not anticipate what will find its proper place in the sequel of our narrative, and so, without any more preliminary remarks, we will begin to tell this most interesting story.

MAHADAJI SINDIA.

PART II.

For helping towards a clear understanding of what is to follow, it is necessary to take a brief retrospect of the affairs at Delhi. Since the retreat in 1773 of the great Mahratta force under Visaji Kishen, whose operations we have described, the affairs of the Delhi Court had been managed by Nujeeb Khan who was a great and good man. Under his able management the Delhi Empire recovered some of its pristine lustre and signs of prosperity were visible in all directions. But this was only a momentary gleam of sunshine which only served to make the succeeding darkness more terrible. The grim coppery clouds soon rolled in, and the sun of the great Moghul became invisible in the darkness of everlasting night. Nujeeb Khan died in April 1782, and his death was the signal for the breaking out of anarchy in all its horrors. His adopted son, Afrasiab Khan, succeeded him, but was soon obliged to give place to one of his relations Mirza Shafi. The latter was in his turn opposed by Mahommed Beg Hamadane, Governor of the Province of Agra, and assassinated by Ismail, the nephew of Mahommed. So that, Afrasiab Khan and Ismail alone remained to contest the supremacy.

Mahadaji cast his eager eye to this scene of anarchy and intrigue which opened up to his view a splendid prospect of aggrandisement. Mr. Hastings who was then desirous to secure Sindia's interest in hastening

the ratification of the treaty of Salbye, gave him to understand that provided he exerted his influence with Nana in obtaining the ratification of that treaty, and himself left off scheming with Nana and Hyder against the English, the British Government would not interfere in any project he might form of gaining ascendancy in the Delhi Court. This greatly smoothed his way. The most formidable difficulty was removed from his path. He had no longer to fear anything from the British Government. Thus freed from all apprehensions from that quarter, he lay ready watching for a pretext to interfere in the affairs of Delhi. But in the meantime he was not idle. He picked a quarrel with the Rana of Gohud and compelled him to restore the fortress of Gwalior. The English, who were at this time engaged in a dangerous war with Tipu, son of Hyder, were not disposed to interpose in favour of their former ally. Perhaps too, they had learned by experience that an alliance with such a petty and powerless Prince as the Rana of Gohud was a source of weakness and not of strength. Sindia also sent a body of troops under Appa Khundeh Rao to Bundelkhund to attempt the reduction of that province. It is important to notice that this army was accompanied by the celebrated adventurer DeBoigne, who was destined to distinguish himself so much in the service of Sindia and indeed to be his chief instrument in the prosecution of his grand plans of aggrandisement. DeBoigne had recently joined the service of Sindia with a few battalions which he had raised and disciplined in the European fashion. This was the nucleus of that

DeBoigne in
the service of
Sindia.

army which was to make the name of Sindia terrible in the land, and which led by the genius of DeBoigne triumphed in every battle in which it engaged. The terms on which DeBoigne entered the service of Sindia are very curious. No advance of money was granted to him. He was allowed Rs. 1,000 a month for himself and Rs. 5 a month indiscriminately for every soldier he raised. To the private soldiers he paid Rs. 5 and a half monthly, and the surplus provided a fund for payment to the officers on a larger scale.

Soon after the despatch of the expedition under Khunde Rao to Bundelkhund, Sindia himself set out for Agra. He had been invited to interfere in the affairs of Delhi both by Afrasiab Khan and by Mahommed Beg. He accepted the former invitation as it was sent ostensibly in the name of the Emperor. He tried to veil his ambitious projects under the profession of maintaining the lawful authority of the Emperor against the rebellion of Mahommed Beg. An interview took place between him and the Emperor on the 22nd October. Soon after, Afrasiab Khan was assassinated by the brother of his late rival Mirza Suffee. After this atrocious deed Mirza Suffee fled to Sindia's camp for protection and found an asylum. This fact coupled with the great advantage which Sindia derived from Afrasiab's murder led many to suspect that Sindia was guilty of complicity in the crime. But the whole tenour of Mahadaji's career belies this supposition. In the absence of strong proofs we must not lay this guilt at his door. Mahadaji, however, greatly profited by

this guilt of another person. By the sudden and unexpected death of Afrasiab Khan he found himself possessed of a power which he could not have otherwise attained but after a long time and great exertions. He stepped into Afrasiab's place. He posed as the champion and protector of the Emperor. With his usual sagacity he refused the invidious title of prime minister. He kept for himself the substance of power, leaving the shadow of an empty title to the Peshwa. He obtained for the Peshwa the office of Wukeel-i-Mutluk—a dignity first conferred on the great Nizamul Mulk by Mahommed Shah. He contented himself with the modest title of Deputy of the Peshwa, but exercised the supreme power in the State. Nominally second to the Peshwa, he was first in power. In this he imitated the policy of Ballaji Vishawnath who had contrived to acquire supreme power in the Mahratta Empire, though professing himself as the humble servant of the Raja of Satara. The command of the Imperial army and the Government of the provinces of Delhi and Agra were also entrusted to him. In return for so many benefits and concessions the Emperor asked for nothing more than a modest allowance of sixty-five thousand rupees a month to defray the expenses of his household.

This Mahadaji promised to pay him. It was also stipulated that this allowance should be raised by gradual accessions according to the increase in the financial resources of the provinces.

In 1785, Sindia appeared at the head of a powerful army to assert his authority and quell the

Agra surrenders.

rebellion of Mahommed Beg Hamadanee. The latter being weakened by the defection of many of his adherents, who preferred to pay court to the rising fortunes of Sindia rather than persist in the fruitless support of a hopeless cause, acknowledged Sindia's authority and accepted a command in his army. He was sent to reduce Raghugur in the province of Kichwara. He succeeded in it, and remained for a long time in that province. The Imperial districts in the Doab were also reduced, and Ryaji Patell was sent to besiege Agra, where the opponents of Sindia made their last stand. Agra surrendered on the 27th March. The Emperor's second son Akbar was made the nominal governor of the place, but all real power remained in the hands of the officer of Sindia who had the command of the fort. The widow and son of Afrasiab Khan who resided at Aligur, refused to admit Sindia's garrison in that fort. They were accordingly besieged and finally obliged to surrender about the middle of November.

This uninterrupted series of triumphs spread the fame of Mahadaji throughout the length and breadth of India. The news of this splendid success of the Mahratta arms was hailed by the inhabitants of Puna with an outburst of admiration and joy. Mahadaji had at length realised the political dream of successive generations of Mahratta statesmen—that of obtaining supreme power in the Delhi Court. Even in its decrepitude the power of the great Moghul was regarded by the Indians with a certain degree of awe and reverence. It was regarded as the fountain of all authority, dignity, and

honour. The memory of two centuries of possession of absolute power and sovereign sway invested the name of the great Moghul with a certain spell which acted with irresistible effect on the popular imagination. It was, therefore, no light thing to acquire supreme power in such a court. We find accordingly that Mahadaji was from this time regarded by the Mahrattas as their national hero. His praise was on every one's lips. The lustre of his fame threw into shade the reputation of Nana Furnavese and of Holkar.

Nor did he acquire a barren reputation. He became the virtual possessor of extensive dominions. He exercised absolute sway over the provinces of Agra, Delhi, the Doab and many other rich territories. As the Great Moghul was still the nominal sovereign of Hindusthan, Mahadaji held by authority the executive power in Hindusthan. Moreover, as Deputy of the Peshwa, he was possessed of rank, which was superior to that of all the Peshwa's other ministers.

Mahadaji becomes possessor of extensive dominions.

It is no matter of surprise that such unvarying and brilliant successes should for a moment have turned the head of even the sober Mahadaji. Drunk with prosperity and glory, he so far forgot his usual prudence as to demand under the Emperor's authority the chauth of the British provinces of Bengal. The audacity of the demand was indeed startling. It seems incredible that he should have had the presumption to ask tribute from a power which had become the terror of all India and which was deemed well-nigh invincible. Perhaps Mahadaji was emboldened to make this display of arrogance by the departure

Mahadaji asks for chauth from the English.

of Mr Hastings. As was to be expected, he met with a rude rebuff from Mr. Macpherson, the successor of Hastings. Mr. Macpherson not only spurned the claim with disdain, but peremptorily insisted on its disavowal. Mahadaji, perceiving that the Governor-General would not be trifled with, acknowledged the impropriety of the claim he had set up. Mr. Macpherson perceiving the ambitious nature of Mahadaji, tried to thwart his projects by rousing the jealousy of the Mahratta princes against him. Extraordinary attention was paid by the British Government to Moodaji Bhonslay, which had the effect of flattering his vanity and exciting the alarm of Sindia. It was also resolved to keep a British Resident in the Court of Puna, in accordance with the frequently expressed wish of Nana Furnavese. Although, not bound by any provision of the treaty of Salbye, the British Government out of a delicate civility to the man to whose mediation that treaty was in a great measure owing, tried at first to obtain Mahadaji's assent to this plan. Mahadaji clearly saw through the intention of the British Government—which was to undermine his influence in the Peshwa's Court. He was too sagacious to give his consent to such a proposal. He, therefore, urged many pretexts for withholding his assent. He remarked that this action on the part of the British Government would impress the chiefs of the Deccan with the idea that that Government had revoked the confidence which it had at first placed in him—that he had for three years managed English affairs at Puna—that he always looked to their interests—that so long as he lived, it was quite

unnecessary for them to appoint a political agent of their own. These observations of Mahadaji carried little weight with the British Government, and Mr. Charles Malet was sent as envoy to the Peshwa's Court.

Nana Furnavese and Tukaji Holkar, though they outwardly praised Sindia's conduct and professed great admiration for him, were deeply jealous of his elevation and anxiously waited for an opportunity to foil all his projects. A small body of troops was however despatched to Mahadaji's assistance in order to keep up the appearance of the Peshwa's co-operation and supremacy. Mahadaji was not at all deceived by the policy of Nana, of embarrassing him by unnecessary assistance. He saw through Nana's intentions, but felt it quite unnecessary for him to try to thwart them. He knew that the Peshwa's assumption of supremacy would not at all be prejudicial to his own interests, that he might make professions of unlimited attachment and obedience to the Peshwa without in the slightest degree compromising his virtual independence and supremacy in the Delhi Court. The Peshwa was a child of 5 or 6 years; during his youth he had not to fear any practical assertion of supremacy. A considerable time would elapse before he could come of age and attain sufficient maturity of understanding to be able to assume personal sway. Mahadaji doubted not, that during that long interval he would be able to place his power beyond the reach of disturbance. He was certain that after a short time his power would strike such deep roots into the ground that it could

The jealousy of Nana and Tukaji Holkar at Sindia's increased power.

brave the storm of Peshwa's hostility. Confident in this well-grounded belief, he did not apprehend any danger from the presence of the small detachment which Nana had sent to him. Nay, the assistance, though small and not well-meant, was quite welcome to him, for it went a little way to increasing the strength of his army. It seems, therefore, that far from outwitting Mahadaji, by, as he fondly imagined, encumbering him with help, he rather played into Mahadaji's hands, and afforded him real assistance, though small.

Mahadaji's path to greatness was not however strewn with flowers. He gained power enough easily, it is true, but had to fight hard and sorely to keep himself in it. The position he had acquired in the Delhi Court was brilliant, but not lucrative, pregnant, it is true, with the future possibilities of power and prosperity, but it was not a source of immediate gain. He might think that he had after all obtained merely the stewardship of a beggar, for the great Moghul was little better than an Imperial beggar. His exchequer was empty, the resources of his provinces were utterly exhausted, the pay of his soldiers was in arrears and everything was in a state of anarchy and chaos. To educe order out of this confusion, to increase the resources of the empire, to curb the innumerable local insurrections by which the provinces were distracted, such was the Herculean task which Sindia found himself forced to undertake. The labour was heavy, the reward remote and uncertain. Visions of future power and grandeur floated before his

mind's eye, but they were only visions, their rainbow tints accorded ill with the sombre hue of the stern reality which stared him in the face. Like a hero, however, he girded up his loins to grapple with the gigantic task, and victory ultimately crowned his efforts.

Pressed by pecuniary embarrassments, he was led to sequester the jagheers of many Muhammedan chiefs. On the justice of this measure it would be hazardous to pass any opinion. Probably many of these jagheerdars had got possession of their jagheers during the late period of anarchy and misrule, and that their rights to these jagheers were more than doubtful, that it was for the public good that these men, who, like locusts devoured the substance of the people, should be deprived of their possessions. Perhaps there were some innocent sufferers, whose right to their jagheers was undoubted, and whose forcible dispossession was an unwarrantable stretch of power. But though opinions may differ as to the justice of the measure, there is no doubt that it was, in the highest degree, impolitic and injudicious. By his invasion of the rights of these petty jagheerdars, he roused a hornet's nest and their sting proved well-nigh fatal to him. His power was newly acquired, not confirmed by long and undisputed enjoyment, and by exciting the bitter hostility of these petty chieftains, he incurred the risk of having it slip out of his grasp. A formidable conspiracy was formed by these dispossessed jagheerdars, and joined by many whose jagheers had not been confiscated. These latter entertained well-grounded

Mahadaji
sequestrates
the jagheers
of some
Muhammedan
chiefs.

apprehensions that they might have to share the fate of their dispossessed brethren, unless they maintained their rights by force of arms. The most powerful member of the conspiracy was Muhammed Beg Hamadane, who has already figured in our history. Mahadaji had recalled him from Raghoogur to Delhi, and had vainly tried to induce him to disband a portion of his troops. He was, therefore, at the head of a strong body of forces, and ready to declare hostilities as soon as his plans were mature.

This was not the only quarter from which Sindia had to expect hostilities. By his unreasonable assertion of the Emperor's rights he had incurred the formidable enmity of the Rajputs. Under the authority of the Emperor's name he had claimed tribute from that warlike people, and in order to enforce his claim, advanced at the head of an army up to the gates of Jeypore. He had fixed the first payment of that city at sixty-five lacs of rupees. The time fixed for payment had expired, and part of the sum was still due. Ryajee Patell was accordingly sent by Sindia to Jeypore to recover by force the balance due. But the Rajputs having, in the meantime, made preparations for resistance and received assurances of support from the disaffected Muhammedan jagheerdars, set Sindia's authority at nought, attacked Ryajee Patell, and utterly routed his forces.

This defeat reduced Sindia to great straits. Utmost efforts on his part were needful to quell the powerful faction of Muhammedan nobles, who had

large forces at their command, and whom a community of interest had united against a common foe. They had been highly elated by the victory of the Rajputs over Sindia's forces, and they waited only for a pretext to declare open hostilities. By their intrigues they had alienated the Emperor from Mahadaji. The Emperor who was a poor imbecile creature, listened with credulity to the insinuations of those wily nobles. He began to complain that his allowance was not regularly paid, that Mahadaji and his Mahratta officers did not treat him with the respect due to his Imperial station. It, therefore, became increasingly difficult for Mahadaji to maintain his hold on the Emperor, and his authority in the province. And yet it was necessary for the recovery of his prestige to chastise the Rajputs. Although, therefore, his presence at Delhi was absolutely necessary to counteract the machinations of the Muhammedan nobles and to curb their seditious spirit, Mahadaji felt himself obliged to take the field against the Rajputs. He could repose little faith in the fidelity of the army which he led into the field. Part of it was comprised of the forces of Muhammed Beg Hamadancee and the other disaffected nobles ; and they would, of course, take the earliest opportunity to go over to the side of the Rajputs. Part consisted of the Emperor's own army, the command of which had, as has been said above, been conferred upon Sindia. But these soldiers were not bound to Sindia by any tie of attachment, and he knew that their fidelity would not bear a severe strain. Their pay had, also, considerably fallen

into arrears and they had broken out into loud murmurs which are alone the sure precursor of a mutiny. The only part of the army in whose fidelity he could repose implicit reliance were his own Mahratta troops, but their number was large enough to enable them to overcome by their unaided exertions the resistance of the Rajputs.

His difficulties were greatly increased by an incursion of the Sikhs, to repel which he was obliged to send towards the north of Delhi, two separate detachments under two of his officers, Hybat Rao Phalkay and Ambaji Inglija.

Sindia, at the head of his motley troops, advanced to Jeypore by forced marches. On approaching the city he tried to open negotiations with the Raja, but his overtures were treated with scorn. A formidable league had been formed by the chiefs of the Rajputs ; it embraced the Rajas of Jeypore and Jodhpore and many minor princes, and their united army was highly formidable alike for its number and valour. Instead of encountering Sindia's army in a pitched battle, the Rajput princes adopted the tactics which Sindia himself had pursued with such signal success against General Goddard during the first Mahratta war. They continually harassed his army by petty skirmishes, cut off its supplies and reduced it to a state of great privation. Loud complaints broke out among Sindia's soldiers, who were on the verge of mutiny. Muhammed Beg Hamadane and his nephew Ismail Beg took this opportunity to go over to the Rajput side. Mahadaji faring that these wholesale desertions would have

an injurious influence upon the *morale* of his soldiers, redoubled his exertions to force the enemy to fight, and at length he succeeded. At first, fortune seemed to declare in his favour. Muhammed Beg Hamadane was killed by a cannon shot and a panic seized his troops. They were on the point of flying, when, by a display of great energy, Ismail Khan, the nephew of Muhammed Beg Hamadane, retrieved the day, and forced the Mahrattas to retreat within their own lines. Sindia, though thus susuccessful in his first assault, was preparing to renew it with redoubted vigour, when, on the third day after the fight, the Emperor's regular infantry with eighty pieces of cannon, deserted, *en masse*, to the side of Ismail Beg.

By the desertion of the greater part of his troops, Mahadaji was placed in a highly perilous position. Before him were overwhelming odds, with whom it would be sheer folly on his part to risk a fight. He was in a hostile country from which it was highly difficult to effect his retreat. Never did Sindia's great qualities shine with greater lustre than at this juncture. His genius and energy were fully equal to the grave crisis. Without any loss of time he sent his heavy baggage and many of his followers to Gwalior by the way of Kushalgar. He retreated with great rapidity to Deig, recalled all his detachments, and restored Deig and several other places to the Jhauts, with a view to secure their alliance. He deposited his heavy guns in their strong fort of Bhurtpore. He greatly increased the strength of the garrisons of Agra and Alygur, which were, next to

Delhi, the most important cities in the province, and against which he expected that Ismail's first attempts would be directed.

While Sindia was thus trying with great energy and promptitude to retrieve his affairs, the Rajputs instead of helping Ismail Beg and prosecuting hostilities with the invader of their rights until an honorable and advantageous peace should secure them from further molestation, seemed entirely satisfied with the success they had achieved, and refused to stir out of their dominions even at the urgent entreaties of Ismail. By this injudicious course they let slip a golden opportunity of confining the Mahratta power to the southern bank of the Chumbal.

They were, however, not desirous to see the Mahratta supremacy in Hindusthan overthrown. They only wished to repel Sindia's encroachments on their rights. They did not perceive that their safety lay in the utter annihilation of Mahratta supremacy in the north, that, in refusing to help Ismail, they were in fact, laying the axe at the root of their own rights. But if this was an error, it was an error which merited praise rather than censure. It was the offspring of a generous delusion, of confidence reposed in the friendliness of men who were of the same religion with themselves. The idea of a great Hindu Confederacy had indeed faded from the minds of the Hindus. But the Rajputs cherished the memory of this dream with great fondness. They watched the corpse of the grand idea with pious affection. Everything that offered any hopes, however deceitful, of realizing this vision, they welcomed with great joy—

though half-conscious of the delusion. The establishment of the Mahratta supremacy in the north was highly welcome to them, for they fondly regarded it as a triumph of Hinduism. They had a natural predilection for the Mahrattas, their co-religionists. Repeated and unwarrantable aggressions of that people had failed to open their eyes. In spite of those acts of rapine and plunder, they cherished an affection for them. They were, therefore, loath to drive matters to extremes against Sindia. They were half-ashamed of their alliance with a Muhammedan chieftain. In their opinion, only a hard necessity could justify it, and that the necessity had gone with the retreat of Sindia from their territories. They had to learn by bitter experience that they had sacrificed their interests at the altar of their sentiments.

Ismail Beg, though thus abandoned by his allies, did not lose heart, but proceeded to recover the provinces belonging to the Emperor by his own unaided exertions. He marched towards Agra, in the neighbourhood of which Sindia was hovering. The latter was determined to avoid a pitched battle, and so for eight days continual skirmishes took place without leading to any decisive engagement. At this time, a report reached Sindia that Golam Kadir, son of the great Rohilla Zabita Khan, was in full march to join Ismail with considerable forces. Immediately on hearing this report, Sindia made a precipitate retreat to Gwalior. In the retreat, many of his men lost their way in the ravines near the Jumna and miserably perished.

Ismail Beg
follows his
pursuit of
Sindia.

It now seemed that all hopes of preserving Mahratta supremacy were gone. Sindia himself had, as it were, left the field to his adversaries and retired to his own dominions. That he could recover the footing he had lost, even the most sanguine of his followers, scarcely ventured to hope. Every one thought that it was quite impossible for Sindia to recover the Mahratta prestige in the north by his own unaided exertions. Rumours, too, were rife that the English were about to form an alliance with the Emperor and the Rajputs, and it was certain that if the English could once plant their footing firmly in that part of India, all hopes of re-establishing Mahratta supremacy there would entirely vanish. Moved by these various considerations, Sindia had already made repeated applications for assistance to Nana Furnavese. He now wrote a letter, containing an urgent appeal for help and an indignant and eloquent vindication of his own conduct from the charge of selfish ambition that had been cast upon it. He drew pointed attention to the danger that might ensue if the English were allowed to obtain a footing in the north. He disavowed any feeling of jealousy for Nana, and entreated him not to entertain any such feeling for him, but to repose implicit confidence in his loyalty and friendship. He said, that, to the best of his belief, he had never tried to thwart the views of Hari Pant, Paresh Ram Bhow and Holkar, that his policy had for its object not the promotion of his own exclusive interests, but the good of the Mahratta Empire. Did not the whole tenour of his career belie the

charge of selfishness that had been laid at his door ? Had he not given signal proofs of his friendship for Nana, and his concern for the common weal ? Had he not suppressed the faction of the traitor Moraba and put Sukaram Bapu in the hands of Nana ? Had he not quelled the insurrection of the pretender Bhao ? Had he not beaten the English at Tulligaon and forced them to conclude the convention of Wargaum ? Had he not maintained a large army for the sake of the commonwealth ? And was it not chiefly through his instrumentality that the Mahrattas got very great advantages by the treaty of Salbye ? And who was there that dared impute to him unworthy motives in trying to establish Mahratta supremacy in the north ? He was pursuing no exclusive interests. His sole object was the aggrandisement of the Mahratta Empire. He wished to see the Mahratta National flag carried in triumph from the bank of the Chumbal to that of the Sutlej. It was his honorable ambition to realize the splendid dream of the founder of the Mahratta power. And it surely behoved the Peshwa and all other Mahratta princes to support him in this great project. They should not stand as idle spectators while the Mahratta supremacy in the north was menaced by a formidable confederacy. Let them disabuse their minds of all suspicions in his sincerity and good faith, and stand by him in the dark days of his adversity, for his defeat was tantamount to the overthrow of the Mahratta supremacy in Hindusthan. Let them not hearken to the sly insinuations of calumniators who bore no good will towards his nation. Let them all put forth

their might to uphold the common cause of the Mahratta nation in Hindusthan, and not leave him to bear the whole burden which was already becoming too heavy for his unassisted strength. Let them beware of disunion, that sure precursor of ruin, especially at a time when a great danger was looming on the horizon, when the invincible might and insatiable ambition of the English were threatening them with ruin.

This highly characteristic epistle contained a mass of truth blended with falsehood. Mahadaji's professions of disinterestedness could deceive only a child, but it was none the less true that the dangers to which he drew attention were not imaginary, but quite real. He did right in insisting upon unity in the camp of the Mahrattas. Nana Furnavese, too, had perceived the urgent necessity of union. He had clearly discerned that the times were full of danger to the Mahratta cause, that the gigantic power and vast ambition of the English exposed it to great peril, that the cordial and zealous co-operation of all the Mahratta princes was needed to avert the impending doom, that it was highly necessary to make a grand and final effort for the preservation of the Mahratta supremacy in Hindusthan, that the relinquishment of that supremacy would be the first link in the chain of causes that would drag the Mahratta empire down to ruin, for the British power would at once step into the vacant place, and by joining to their irresistible power the weight and influence of the Imperial name, would soon bring the whole of India under their sway. Mahadaji Sindia and Nana

Furnavese had both foreseen the danger and perceived the necessity of a Mahratta union. Both of them agreed as to the end, but were at variance as to the means. Their opinion as to this latter point bore the taint of selfishness. Both of them could feel a high but selfish enthusiasm in a great cause. The gorgeous day-dreams of Mahratta supremacy fired the heart of both, but alas, the thought of self mingled with it. Nana desired a union, of which the Peshwa, or rather himself, for the Peshwa was a minor and completely under his control, should be the head. Mahadaji desired a union in which he himself should virtually, though not nominally, be the head, or at least, the most important member. In justice to both, it must be said that they did not intend to obtain absolute power, to wield a despotic sway, to establish their Sovereign power over the ruins of the rights of the other Mahratta princess. In their natures, there was a curious mixture of patriotism and ambition. But though they must not be confounded with the vulgar herd of ambitious personages, whose heart does not make any music, unless the chord of self be struck, yet their selfish patriotism is not certainly the quality which is to be desired in a public man, and it was destined to entail great calamities upon the Mahratta empire.

On receipt of Sindia's letter, Nana was at a loss as to what course of actions to adopt. He was unwilling to relinquish Mahratta claims in Hindusthan, and at the same time had no confidence in Mahadaji, the champion of those claims. He had long held a considerable body of troops in readiness to be

employed in the north, if the course of events should render it necessary. But Nana strongly disapproved of Mahadaji's course in waging war with the Rajputs. He was of opinion that the Rajputs should be made friends, not subjects, and that the two great Hindu powers should not waste their strength in internecine warfare. And he was certainly right in this. It is supposed by many that he had already made offers of friendship to the Rajputs, and that it was owing to this that the Rajputs had not molested the retreat of Mahadaji from Jeypore, and had refused to help Ismail in his attempt to overthrow the Mahratta supremacy in the north. So long as Sindia had been engaged in warfare with the Rajputs, Nana had naturally abstained from giving any help to Mahadaji. But now the question had assumed quite a different complexion. Mahratta prestige and supremacy were in jeopardy, and Nana clearly perceived that it was necessary to strengthen the hands of Sindia, and to send an army to his assistance. But at this time, acts of hostility on the part of Tipu rendered Nana averse to detach troops from the Deccan. He thought it injudicious to denude the Deccan of troops at a time when he might be on the eve of a war with the Sultan of Mysore. And thus the project of sending army to the north was for the present dropped.

ot Mahadaji Sindia in the meantime had not remained idle. He had been silently gathering his resources for making a grand effort for the recovery of his supremacy. He was well aware that the tide of feeling among the Mahratta princes ran strongly against him, that he was an object of great jealousy

and dislike to them, that it would be supreme folly on his part to build an edifice of hopes on their cheap professions of friendship and good will. If any ray of comfort came from that quarter, it would be welcome, but he knew that there were thick clouds of jealousy and mistrust, and that the sunshine should not break through them. He, therefore, relied mainly upon his own resources, on his own great genius and energy. And never was the truth of the proverb, "Heaven helps those who help themselves", shewn in a more striking manner than in Mahadaji's case on this occasion.

Mahadaji's principal enemy was Ismail Beg. This able adventurer, after the retreat of Mahadaji, laid siege to Agra, which was defended with gallantry by Luckwa Dada, a Brahman. Golam Kadir, son of the Rohilla Zabita Khan now appeared on the scene. This chieftain, whose name was soon to be branded with everlasting infamy, had succeeded to the ample possessions of his father, on the latter's death in 1785. His blood-thirsty and restless disposition had not hitherto found an opportunity to display itself owing to the predominance of Sindia. But when reverses became the fate of that chief, when he lost his supremacy in the north, Golam Kadir, like an unchained hound, rushed forth in quest of blood and prey. The anarchy and chaos which reigned in the provinces subject to the Emperor of Delhi offered to his enraptured gaze, brilliant prospects of unbridled license, blood-shed and rapine. He hastened to the assistance of Ismail, but instead of immediately joining him, he, in the first instance, expelled the

Movements
of Golam
Kadir and his
inhuman con-
duct towards
the Emperor
and the mem-
bers of his
household

Mahratta garrison from Delhi and occupied it with his own troops. The Emperor, however, was allowed to remain unmolested in the citadel. He next besieged and took the important city of Alygur and then marched to join Ismail Beg. The latter was still engaged in the siege of Agra. He was continually harassed by the Jauts, who never missed any opportunity to baffle the operations of the besiegers, to throw succours in the beleagured city, and by their presence, and the example of their gallantry, to confirm the resistance of the garrison. Sindia at last determined to support the Jauts, and with this view sent Raunay Khan and Appa Khande Rao, with a body of horse and a detachment of infantry, which included the two battalions of DeBoigne. Raunay Khan united his forces with those of the Jauts at Bhurtpore; and the combined army marched towards Agra. They had not proceeded 16 miles, when they encountered Ismail Beg and Golam Kadir, who had raised the siege of Agra and advanced to give them battle. The battle which took place on the 24th April, 1788, was a severely contested one. The Jauts occupied the left wing of Sindia's army and were opposed to Golam Kadir; the Mahrattas occupied the right wing and were opposed to Ismail Beg. The Jauts were soon put to flight by the fury of Golam Kadir's attack, but the regular infantry of DeBoigne received the impetuous charge of Ismail Beg's forces with remarkable steadiness without swerving an inch from their position. DeBoigne was not, however, supported by the cavalry, and his small forces could not long withstand the repeated shocks

of the enemy's attack. Under cover of night, the Jauts and the Mahrattas retreated to Bhurtpur without serious molestation from the enemy. Ismail Beg and Golam Kadir now called upon Runjeet Sing, the Jaut chieftain, to desert the cause of Mahadaji Sindia, threatening that otherwise they would besiege him in his capital, after the reduction of Agra. But their triumph was short-lived. Dissensions soon broke out in their camps. The leaders felt distrust and jealousy towards each other. Raunay Khan, Sindia's General, hearing of an incursion of the Sikhs, astutely turned the occasion to advantage by courting their alliance, by sending a body of Mahrattas and Jauts to their assistance and inciting them to commit ravages on Golam Kadir's Jagheer. This diversion was of infinite advantage to Sindia. Golam Kadir was obliged to separate his forces from those of Ismail, and to march to the defence of his own possessions. Ismail was thus left alone to cope with the allied Mahrattas and Jauts. Sindia seized this golden opportunity to crush his antagonist. He sent large reinforcements to Raunay Khan and ordered him to attack Ismail Beg. The Mahrattas and Jauts once more marched towards Agra, near which a hard fought battle took place on the 18th June. DeBoigne and his battalions highly distinguished themselves in this battle. Ismail Beg's army, after performing prodigies of valour, was utterly routed, and fled from the field of battle in confusion. Ismail Beg himself, after receiving two severe wounds, narrowly escaped from the field. He owed his safety to the swiftness of his horse. Having plunged into the Jumna, and

reached the opposite bank, he arrived at the camp of Golam Kadir with a few followers, who still clung to his falling fortunes. He was welcomed by Golam Kadir with great courtesy. He soon repaired to Delhi to collect the scattered remnants of his forces, which, after their disastrous defeat had fled to that city. Golam Kadir also directed his march towards the capital. The two chieftains, however, were refused admittance into the city. But Golam Kadir, having bribed one of the Emperor's confidential servants, not only gained admittance, but became complete master of the palace and citadel. He now perpetrated horrible atrocities on the family and friends of the unfortunate Emperor. A scene of rapine and bloodshed ensued, almost without a parallel in the history of the world. The Emperor was dethroned in the midst of insults and his eyes were put out by Golam Kadir's own hands. Gross outrages were inflicted on his relatives and the male and female members of his family. Some of them were starved to death. But the avenger was at hand.

The Mahratta army at length marched to the relief of the unhappy monarch. It may excite surprise that the Mahratta army instead of following at the heels of Ismail Khan made such great delay in advancing to the capital. But Mahadaji perhaps thought, and the event justified his expectation, that Ismail Khan and Golam Kadir, whose natures were cast in entirely different mould, and between whom there existed a conflict of interests, would, unless drawn towards each other by the presence of a common danger, soon separate, and he would gain

a bloodless victory. There was another good reason for Mahadaji's delay. He was assured that reinforcements from Puna under Ali Bahadur were on their way to join him, and that Ali Bahadur would soon be followed by Tukaji Holkar.

What he probably foresaw did actually come to pass. Ismail Khan, who was a soldier and not a butcher, and in whom all the feelings of humanity had not been destroyed, even by the stern camp-life which he had led for so many years, turned with horror from the barbarities of his colleague. He had gone so far with Golam Kadir as to take a part in the plunder of the Imperial palace, since he was sadly in want of money. But further he could not go. His nature revolted at the sickening spectacle of cruelty and bloodshed which he saw around him. He became unwilling to sink his destiny with that of a fiend in human shape, and straightway made peace with Sindia, and joined him against his former ally on the promise of a jagheer.

The Mahratta army advanced from Agra to Delhi under the command of Runnay Khan, Ali Bahadur and Appa Khande Rao, supported by the two regular battalions of DeBoigne. On the approach of the Mahratta army, the infamous Golam Kadir fled from Delhi, taking with him Prince Jewan Bukht, the son of Ahmad Ali, whom he had proclaimed Emperor after the deposition of Shah Alum. On October 11th, Delhi was occupied by the Mahrattas. Their arrival was hailed by the unhappy monarch and the citizens with transports of joy. The Mahratta commander did everything in his power to relieve

Delhi occupied by the Mahrattas and the just punishment upon Golam Kadir.

the sufferings of the unhappy monarch, and to wipe off from his memory the bitter experience of the last few months. As for the inhuman Golam Kadir, he expiated by a shocking fate his inhuman cruelty. Being pursued by a large Mahratta force, he took refuge in the fort of Meerut, which was immediately besieged by the Mahrattas. Golam Kadir defended himself with desperate courage and energy, but at length finding himself, from lack of provisions, unable to protract his defence, he mounted a swift horse and fled without an attendant. But fate was unpropitious to the man. After he had proceeded some distance, his horse fell, and he, stunned by the fall, lay senseless on the ground. The day-light discovered him lying in this woful situation. He was recognised by some peasants, who carried him to the Mahratta camp, and, there, after being subjected to the most exquisite tortures, he expired. Some say that he was loaded with irons and exposed in a cage, and afterwards, deprived of his eyes, ears, nose, hands and feet, he was sent forward to Delhi, but that he never reached that scene of his cruelties, death putting an end to his sufferings on the way.

Soon after success had crowned his arms, Mahadaji arrived at Delhi. Shah Alum was reseatd on his throne with great pomp, and he conferred afresh on the Peshwa, the exalted office of Weekeel-i-Mootluq, and on Sindia, that of his deputy.

The jagheer of Golam Kadir was reduced, and the greater part of the Doab, together with the provinces of Delhi and Agra, were annexed to the Mahratta dominions. But though Sindia everywhere met with

success, the prospect before him was not altogether bright. Timur Khan, the Abdalli King, a descendant of the terrible Ahmed Shah Abdalli, had assumed a hostile attitude. Fears were entertained that he would follow the example of his great ancestor and invade India, and the memory of Paniput, even after the lapse of so many years, was still too fresh and vivid for Sindia to view this contingency without dismay and alarm. He was sure, that, in the event of the Abdalli invasion, Ismail Khan, though he had received the stipulated jagheer and manifested the most friendly intentions, would support the Abdalli with all his might, and that a formidable confederacy would be formed by all the Muhammedan chieftains, as was the case at the time of the battle of Paniput. He had also powerful enemies in the Rajputs, whom he had not treated well. His so-called friends and co-adjutors, Holkar and Ali Bahadur, were rather drags on the wheel of his ambition. Instead of giving him any efficient assistance, they were anxious only to share his conquests. Coming at the eleventh hour, they did not scruple to participate in the fruits of the labour of the man, who had borne the heat and burden of the day. Nay, they often tried to foil his scheme by throwing petty obstacles in his way. He knew that they had come to share in his prosperity, but that they would desert him on the approach of danger or at least exact such exorbitant terms as the price of their assistance that success would not bring him much profit. Moreover, the danger of British interference was looming in the distance, though they had promised him that

they would not interfere with his views, but an experienced politician like him well knew what such promises were worth, and that it was as easy to revoke those promises as to make them. And Sindia's fears were certainly well-grounded. That the British power showed for some years a desire to rest upon its laurels, and ceased from pursuing far reaching projects of conquest, was due to a mere accident,—the succession of a number of peace-loving Governors-General. Had the Marquis of Wellesley taken up the helm of government a few years before, all the worst apprehensions of Mahadaji would surely have been realized.

These present and prospective obstacles did not deter Mahadaji from advancing on the path he had chalked out for himself. With unerring insight, he clearly perceived that the army which he had commanded was not the best instrument to carry out his political projects, that it was absolutely necessary to effect radical and sweeping changes in its constitution, to organize it on a new model, and by these means to improve its discipline, and increase its efficiency. He had learned by experience that the troops of the Native princes, however numerous, were utterly unable to withstand the charge of a small British army, that they were mere unwieldy masses utterly unfit for any purpose, either for attack or for defence. He had been convinced that discipline was more important than number, a small but well-disciplined and well-appointed army was more efficient than large masses who are more ready to use their heels than their arms. At the same time, he

knew that he had excellent materials out of which to create an army. He found that the sepoy, who were of the same race and nationality as his own soldiers, were little inferior to the Europeans. His men had then excellent soldierly capacities, and that it was only necessary to give them a European discipline. Fortunately there was no lack of European officers for carrying out his plans. India at this time swarmed with military adventurers, who came from Europe to seek their fortune there. Many of them had taken service with the Native Rajahs and Chiefs, but these princes did not know properly to utilize their services. A Frenchman who afterwards rose to great celebrity, had, as has been said before, taken service in the army of Sindia. He had not to pine in obscurity like his fellow adventurers. He found a master who knew how to appreciate and utilise his services. Down to this time, however, only two battalions had been organized under DeBoigne. But these battalions had displayed such splendid valour in every battle they had fought, their discipline and efficiency were so strikingly superior to those of the other soldiers, that Sindia now determined to make a large addition to their number. The two battalions of DeBoigne were, at this time, augmented to a brigade, and subsequently by gradual addition, to three brigades. The constitution of a brigade was as follows: It was composed of eight battalions of seven hundred men each. Each battalion was furnished with five pieces of artillery, two six-pounders, two three-pounders, and a howitzer. Five hundred horse were attached to every brigade. The battalions were

officered entirely by Europeans, many of whom were of highly respectable birth and character. There was also a body of irregular infantry, attached to DeBoigne's force, whose efficiency he greatly increased by adding a bayonet to their matchlocks.

In order to provide payments for these troops Mahadaji made assignments of land and entrusted them to the management of DeBoigne, who received a commission of two per cent. on the net revenue, in addition to his handsome salary of Rs. 10,000 a month. Sindia also made many minor innovations in the constitution of his army, of which we may notice the following: He increased the proportion of the Rajputs and Muhammedans in his army. Perhaps, his reason for thus substituting Rajputs and Muhammedans for Mahrattas, was the superior strength and stature of the former. He knew that in a regular battle, the latter would be no match for the former. The Mahratta soldier, though more hardy, persevering, and highly fit for irregular warfare, could not withstand the shock of a Rajput or a Muhammedan warrior, to whom he was greatly inferior in strength. This may almost excite surprise. It may be objected that the whole history of the Mahrattas contradict this assertion. That for a century and a half, no adversaries whether Hindu or Muhammedan had been able to check their career of conquest. But the explanation is simple. As a regular soldier, the Mahratta was inferior to the Rajput or the Muhammedan. But the martial enthusiasm, the spirit of lofty ambition with which Sivaji had electrified the hearts of the Mahratta people had enabled them so

long to prevail over the greater physical strength and stature of their adversaries. But the electric shock had its force by this time well nigh spent, and so the superiority of a Mahratta soldier vanished away. The Mahratta soldier had hitherto stood on the stilts of enthusiasm and appeared taller than a Rajput or a Muhammedan, but now those stilts being taken off from his feet, his inherent inferiority in size showed itself. The reason which induced Mahadaji to put Rajputs and Muhammedans in the place of men of his own nation, was, therefore, we think, nothing but this—that the Rajput and Muhammedan being superior in strength and stature to the Mahratta, and not inferior to him in courage, were better soldiers than the Mahrattas. Some say that the motive which actuated Mahadaji, was the dislike he felt for the Mahrattas, who despised him for the illegitimacy of his birth. But this opinion is too absurd to require refutation.

Mahadaji likewise changed the dress of his horsemen from the short breeches worn by the Mahrattas to the long trousers covering the heels. It is needless to say that it required great strength of mind on Sindia's part to venture to make any alteration in dress in a country where a factitious and almost superstitious value was attached to the existing mode of dress and indeed to all existing manners and usages, a country where the spirit of conservatism was carried to a ridiculous extent to all concerns of life, however trivial and unimportant.

Mahadaji also introduced large bodies of Gossains in his army. Before this time, they had rarely appeared as soldiers in the Mahratta armies. They

Gossains in
the army of
Sindia.

united religious zeal with martial enthusiasm. But the enthusiasm was of the rose-pink order, not fervid and glowing, and, therefore, they never attained the eminence to which the Sikhs, like them a half-religious, half-military order, subsequently rose. These Gossains were kept distinct from Sindia's other troops, and were a sort of irregular infantry.

One fact may be mentioned about these Gossains which show, in a striking manner, the jealousy and enmity entertained for Sindia by Holkar and Ali Bahadur, jealousy and enmity, which, though they tried to veil under professions of friendly zeal, broke out from time to time in a manner not to be mistaken by the most superficial observer.

Himmut Bahadur, the military and spiritual leader of the Gossains, had accompanied Sindia to Delhi in 1784, and been left in charge of Mathura on Sindia's retreat to Gwalior. Thinking the tide of Sindia's fortunes was ebbing, he had engaged in secret intrigues with Ismail Beg and Golam Kadir, and had thus incurred the bitter displeasure of Sindia. Sindia's displeasure was afterwards increased by finding that Himmut Bahadur was carrying on intrigues with Holkar and Ali Bahadur.

Sindia sent a party of horse to seize Himmut Bahadur and bring him to his presence. Himmut Bahadur, however, contrived to elude his guard and take refuge in Ali Bahadur's camp. Sindia, on this, called upon Ali Bahadur to surrender Himmut. Ali Bahadur, however, refused to give him up, in spite of repeated and violent remonstrances of Sindia. He declared he could not do so until he had received

an order from Puna to that effect, and before an order could arrive from Puna, he connived at, if not actively assisted in, the escape of Himmut to the Court of the Nabob of Oudh.

Though Himmut Bahadur departed, the great body of the Gossains did not leave the service of Sindia, and they did not show any inclination to follow the fortunes of their late leader.

The year 1790 saw Sindia's power firmly established in Delhi. His immediate political objects were to check the incursions of the Sikhs, whom the memory of ancient wrongs always incited to ravage the dominions of the Moghul Emperor; to humble the Rajputs who continued to oppose his authority, and to break the refractory spirit of Ismail who, chafing under the supremacy of Sindia, began to manifest serious intentions of joining the Rajputs. The renewal of Ismail Beg's enmity to Sindia was, in a great measure, owing to the artifice of Holkar, who invaded and plundered part of Ismail Beg's new jagheer contrary to the express wishes of Sindia, and thus filled that chieftain, who was not aware of the true state of relations between Holkar and Sindia, and who thought everything done by the former to be dictated by the latter, with deep distrust of Sindia and a desire to overthrow his supremacy. Holkar was actuated to take this step by his jealousy and hatred for Sindia, and his desire to add to the difficulties of his situation. Mahadaji saw through the secret intentions of Holkar—his covert spirit of enmity. These proceedings of Holkar and Ali Bahadur highly incensed him. But as he was not now in

Renewed
hostility with
Ismail Beg.

a position to display his wrath and as he thought that intestine discord and warfare would be utterly ruinous to his own and the nation's interests, he swallowed up his indignation and tried all means to conciliate Holkar and Ali Bahadur.

The covert enmity of Ismail Beg soon broke out into open hostilities. He declared war against Sindia, and was soon joined by the Rajput Rajahs of Jeypur and Jodhpur. Mahadaji made extensive preparations to crush this formidable confederacy. Holkar promised his aid. But it soon appeared that these promises were made with a rather sinister motive in order to deceive Sindia, and make him relax his own preparations. Before risking battle, Mahadaji tried with partial success the arts of corruption. A body of Ismail's troops were secured to his own interest, and through a point which they left undefended, Sindia's troops under Gopal Rao Bhao, Luckwa Dada, and De Boigne, poured into the camp of the confederates near Patun—June 20, 1790 A.D. But notwithstanding this advantage, Sindia's troops had to fight hard for victory, as Holkar's troops stood aloof from the engagement, and did not give them the slightest assistance. Mahadaji had placed great reliance on Holkar's honeyed assurance of support and had not made provisions against the contingency of his failing to make good his promises. His troops had, therefore, to fight with their utmost valour and energy, and his officers had to put forth their best exertions to gain a victory, which Mahadaji, believing the professions of Holkar, had thought would be an easy and bloodless one. Ismail Beg and his Pathans,

too, fought with their usual valour, and made brilliant charges with their usual impetuosity on three occasions, cutting down the Mahratta artillery men at their guns. For a long time the battle raged furiously and was attended with great carnage. The victory hung long in the balance. The day at last declared itself for the Mahrattas, chiefly owing to the great energy and gallantry of De Boigne, and the disciplined valour of his forces. The victory was a decisive one. Ismail Beg's army was utterly routed and dispersed, ten battalions of his infantry surrendered, and he himself with a small retinue, fled to seek refuge at the Court of Jeypur.

The war was brought to a speedy close by a second victory which De Boigne gained over Ismael Beg's allies, the Rajputs, at Mairta on the 12th September 1791. Sindia however did not attempt the complete subjugation of the Rajputs. Perhaps he feared to drive a valiant people to desperation, perhaps he laboured under the odium of a war with the Hindus, or perhaps his so-called colleagues Holkar and Ali Bahadur threatened an open rupture if he persisted in his war with the Rajputs. Whatever might be his motive, he granted peace to the Rajputs on easy terms—namely, a promise on their part to pay him a moderate annual tribute.

Mahadaji
makes peace
with the
Rajputs.

Mahadaji had refused to take part in the first war with Tipu, 1790-1792. He was strongly averse to the policy of subverting the power of the Mysore prince, from whom the Mahrattas had nothing to fear, and who would hereafter be a valuable ally in the war with the British power, which he clearly saw

Nana Fer-
nandez joins
the British
against Tipu.

to be inevitable. Nana Furnavese, however, allied himself with the English in their war against Tipu. Mahadaji however did not join the confederacy against Tipu. He strongly condemned the policy of Nana Furnavese in aiding the British on that occasion. His remonstrances however were of no avail. The Mahrattas were rushing to their doom.

The force of De Boigne had now by gradual accession been increased to 18,000 regular infantry, 6,000 irregulars, 2,000 regular horse, and 600 Persian cavalry. For the support of this vast army, assignments of land were made, yielding a net annual revenue of 22 lacs of rupees a year. The fortress of Agra was employed as a depôt of small arms and cannon, of which latter De Boigne had more than 200 pieces. In order to disarm jealousy, Sindia affected to regard the formidable army as not his own but as a part of the Imperial army, that he was only for the time being the generalissimo of these forces by commission from the Emperor.

But these professions could not deceive his rivals, specially Holkar. Holkar, prompted by jealousy, retired across the Chumbal, entertained in his service a French officer named Dudrenec and raised 4 battalions disciplined after the European fashion. But these forces did not reach the pitch of efficiency that De Boigne's forces had attained. This was soon shewn in a signal manner.

Sindia now took one of the most important steps in his life. Finding himself thwarted at every step by his colleagues and the vast power of the Peshwa wielded by a minister who entertained a rancorous

jealousy for him, and whose predominant influence was exercised entirely to his prejudice, he determined to proceed directly to Puna, and there try to establish his own authority at the Peshwa's Court. The step was attended with great peril. His dominions in the north, the stronghold of his power, would be exposed to the attack of his innumerable enemies with the open or secret support of his late colleagues. There was danger that the magnificent empire he had built up, might in his absence, crumble to pieces. There was the irrepressible Ismail Khan, smarting under a sense of defeat, his daring and haughty spirit not at all tamed into submission by his recent misfortunes. There were the indomitable Rajputs, not at all terrified by the might of Sindia, ready to seize any opportunity to efface the stain of their recent defeat. There were the Sikhs whom the memory of ancient wrongs goaded every year to make destructive inroads into the Moghul dominions which Sindia was bound to protect. There was moreover the gigantic shadow of Abdalli invasion looming in the distance. There were Holkar and Ali Bahadur, whose robes of friendship and amity were won very loosely—soon, as everybody saw, to be cast aside. Their flimsy veil of friendly professions could be seen through by every one. Mahadaji knew that the step from hollow professions of friendship to the declaration of open hostility was a very short one, and that his colleagues were ready and eager to take that step on the earliest opportunity. Beset as his empire in the north was by so many dangers, was it not extremely bold and highly perilous step for

Sindia to weaken it by his absence? Nay, at the first view it might be regarded as an act of sheer madness and folly. Moreover, by venturing into the seat of his rival's power, was he not exposing his own personal safety to jeopardy? Was he not putting his hand into the lion's mouth?

The prospect of these terrible dangers might have appalled an ordinary mind, but it failed to cow down the daring spirit of Sindia. He had great confidence in the disciplined valour of his soldiers and the generalship of DeBoigne. He had placed his powers in Hindusthan on a footing of tolerable security, and he thought that even his absence would not for a short time at least seriously imperil it. Moreover, by the lustre of his victories and conquests he had dazzled the eyes of the Mahrattas; he had made a deep impression on their hearts. He was regarded by them as their national hero. Such being the case, Sindia might not unreasonably hope that Nana would not be able to pursue any schemes against his personal safety and thus rouse the bitter resentment of the Mahratta people.

But, indeed, it was worth while braving so many dangers, as the prospect was so vast, so magnificent. Mahadaji knew that the alternative was success or ruin, but the success was no ordinary one. It meant, primarily, absolute command of the entire resources of the Mahratta nation which would certainly enable him to secure the establishment of the Mahratta supremacy in the north. It meant sovereign sway over the greatest part of India. It meant the establishment of a power such as neither Aurangzeb

nor Sivaji had ever wielded. Visions of splendour, grander far than ever poets conceived, arose in the Mahratta breast. His aim was not entirely a selfish one. He thought that unless he had at his command the entire resources of United India, it was a hopeless task to check the onward career of British conquest. His keen glance penetrated through deceitful shows into the real heart of the political question. He saw clearly that a number of petty states, constantly at war with one another, would soon be swallowed up by the ever growing and all-absorbing British power, and that unless a combined resistance was organized under the auspices of a man of great energy and genius, the British flag would soon float triumphant over the length and breadth of India. And such a combined and organized resistance was hopeless unless the strong man, the man of energy and genius, obtained a predominant power, an overshadowing supremacy over those petty states.

Such were the motives which actuated Mahadaji to commence his celebrated march to Puna. His march was very slow, as if he was still apprehensive of the effects of the step he had taken. He declared that the object of his march to Puna was to invest the Peshwa with the insignia of his great office of *Wakeel-i-Mootlug*. In order to allay Nana's jealousy of his regular infantry he had brought with him only one battalion. He reached Puna on the 11th June, 1793.

Mahadaji
reaches Puna.

Nana Furnavese tried his best to prevent the Peshwa's acceptance of the title and insignia of the office of *Wakeel-i-Mootlug* but without any

Meeting of
Nana Furna-
vese and
Mahadaji
Sindia.

success. The young Peshwa's boyish vanity was flattered by the magnificent presents which Sindia had brought with him, and by a glowing description of the gorgeous state ceremony in which he was to cut so conspicuous a figure. Nine days after Mahadaji's arrival at Puna, Nana paid him a visit. Sindia received his illustrious visitor with marked cordiality, refused to sit on the musnud in the minister's presence, and professed great friendship and respect for him. We may well imagine how the two great men—the greatest statesmen of their country, the two pillars of the Mahratta Empire, brought together again after the lapse of so many years—recounted the stirring events of the First Mahratta War—related their strange experience since, and discussed schemes for the aggrandisement of the Mahratta power, for the moment surprised, in spite of themselves, into temporary oblivion of their separate interests. Alas ! if such lofty unselfish thoughts arose at that time in their minds, they were but momentary. The noon-day glare of hard actualities of clashing interests soon dispelled those dreams.

The next day Mahadaji paid his visit to the Peshwa, carrying with him, by way of presents, numberless choice rarities which he had brought from the north. The following day was fixed for the grand state ceremony which was performed with great *eclat*. The Mahratta people had never seen such a gorgeous pageant. The clang of musical instruments, the shouts of the delighted multitude, the salvos of artillery rent the sky. The magnificence displayed was beyond description. All Puna became a "field of cloth of

gold." The principal particulars of the ceremony told in the words of Grant Duff will interest the reader.

"A grand suite of tents was pitched at a distance from Sindia's camp. The Peshwa proceeded towards them with the most pompous form. At the further end of these splendid apartments, a throne, meant to represent that of the Emperor of the Moghuls, was erected, on which was displayed the Imperial firman, the khillut, or dresses of investiture, and all the principal insignia. The Peshwa, on approaching the throne, made his obeisance thrice, placed 101 gold mohurs upon it as a *nuzzur* or offering, and took his seat on its left. Sindia's Persian Secretary then read the Imperial firmans, and amongst others, the edict (issued at the request of Sindia) which prevented the slaughter of bullocks and cows. The Peshwa then received the khillut, consisting of nine articles of dress, five superb ornaments of jewels and feathers, a sword and shield, a pen case, a seal and inkstand and two royal Morchuts or fans of peacock's tails, accompanied by a Nalkee (a sort of Sedan chair without a top, having four poles, two behind and two before), a palkee, a horse and an elephant; besides six elephants bearing the Imperial standard, two crescents, two stars, and the orders of the fish and the sun. The Peshwa retired to an adjoining tent and returned clothed in the Imperial khillut, when he resumed his seat; and Sindia followed by Nana Furnavese and such of the Peshwa's officers as were present, offered *nuzzurs* of congratulation. When the Peshwa arose to return to his palace he was followed by Sindia and Hurry Punt,

carrying the Morchuts and fanning him. He entered Puna seated in the Nalkee."

Indeed, all went merry as a marriage bell. Who, that stood on that day on the streets of Puna, as a spectator of the grand pageant, the grandest he had ever seen or hoped to see, could have foreseen that within a few years a sad change would come upon the city and on the face of the Mahratta world? Who, that saw Puna on that day, the greatest gala day of its existence, could have pierced the veil of dim futurity and observed the gloom of foreign dominion darken the face of the unhappy city. Who could have foreseen that smiles would so soon be followed by tears? We know all this, and for us this grand pageant has a mournful interest.

The investiture of Sindia with the insignia of the office of deputy to the Wakeel-i-Mootluq occurred soon after Peshwa's return to the palace. Perhaps with a view to disarm jealousy, Sindia behaved with great humility on that day. But he overacted his part; and his humility appeared as a mock humility, as a studied insult to the Mahratta chiefs. He insisted on his being regarded as the hereditary servant of the Peshwa, whose office it was to carry his master's slippers, and who was not entitled to any higher title than that of Patel. Such humility in the most powerful prince of the age savoured a little of affectation. It failed in its effect, and only served to disgust those whom it was intended to conciliate. Moreover, they were offended by Sindia's assumption of the appellation of patel—the hereditary distinction of the Sindia family to which he had no right.

Mahadaji's chief object was to gain the heart of the young Peshwa. It was no easy task to shake the Peshwa's confidence in and affection for the minister to whom he was chiefly indebted for his throne and under whose care and superintendence he had grown up. But Mahadaji had one thing in his favour. The austere Nana had imposed too many restraints upon the Peshwa under which his youthful spirit, naturally fond of freedom and pleasures, chafed. The lynx-eyed Mahadaji observed this error of Nana, and made the most of it. He encouraged the young Peshwa in his love of pleasures, and never failed to point out to him the galling tutelage under which Nana kept him. The spirit of the young man inclined every day more and more to the genial warrior whose warmth and freedom presented a striking contrast to the cold austerity of Nana. The stirring pleasures of the chase and sports of the field in which the young man indulged with the hearty approval of Mahadaji increased his disgust for the dull humdrum way of life which he had hitherto led. Moreover, the great power of Mahadaji, the brilliant exploits which he had performed, his great renown, highly impressed the imagination of the young Peshwa. Indeed, Mahadaji had every external and internal requirements for dazzling the imagination of man, especially of a young man. No one could converse with him or remain in his company without feeling that unaccountable and indefinable charm which a mighty mind exerts over every mind with which it comes in contact. His great deeds, his immense fame, the stirring incidents of his chequered career, "the

The Peshwa's
fondness for
Hindia.

careless magnificence with which he wore the ornament of strange experience," all exerted a powerful spell on the young mind. Moreover, Mahadaji might say with plausibility that if the service done by Nana to the cause of the Peshwa had been great, that done by him was greater. Was it not mainly owing to his support that Nana succeeded in establishing himself in power and securing the throne for the young Peshwa. Had he not but recently procured such honours and dignities for the Peshwa as none of his predecessors had ever enjoyed? And Mahadaji knew how to clench his argument, by bringing into the young Peshwa's mind the recent grand state ceremony in which he so conspicuously shone and which highly gratified his vanity.

The ambition of the young Peshwa was flattered by the prospect of the brilliant conquests which he would effect with the help of such lieutenants as Mahadaji Sindia. What could Nana Furnavese do for him? He could only manage his affairs, keep his finances in order; but for helping him to perform glorious deeds, achieve magnificent conquests, and carve his name deep in the history of his country, Nana was as good as useless. It was on Mahadaji he must rely, it was his counsels that he must follow, it was his good and true sword that he must employ if he wished to prove himself a worthy descendant of illustrious fathers, if he wished to carry the Mahratta flag in triumph over regions it had never seen before. Let him no longer submit to the galling tutelage of Nana, let him be his own master, let him discard such servants as aspired to domineer

over him, and trusting to his own talents and the powerful support of such lieutenants as Mahadaji, let him march in the onward career of conquest.

It is no wonder that the young Peshwa listened to this voice which was sweet like a siren's, although perhaps not so treacherous. Nana Furnavese had not the qualities necessary to secure the affection or strike the imagination of a young man. His cold austerity served only to damp the generous ardour of youth. Far from securing affection it could gain at best a sort of distant respect. Moreover, he was a man of solid but not brilliant parts. Mahadaji's temperament, on the contrary, accorded well with the genial spirit of youth, and his parts were not only solid but also showy and sparkling.

It is almost certain, therefore, that had Mahadaji's life been prolonged, he would have succeeded in gaining over the young Peshwa.

With an effrontery which is simply amazing, Mahadaji petitioned for the payment of the expenses he had incurred in his attempts to extend the Mahratta empire, as if the wars he had waged in Hindusthan had not for their object his own personal aggrandisement, but the promotion of the joint interests of the Mahrattas. In this he met with a rude rebuff from Nana, who, in reply to his petition, demanded, in the first place, an account of the revenues of the districts he had subdued. This circumstance served to embitter the mutual jealousy of Sindia and of Nana. Many other incidents occurred which contributed to the same result, but it is unnecessary to mention them here.

Mahadaji
petitions for
the payment
of expenses of
his wars.

Mahadaji likewise petitioned for the recall of Holkar and Ali Bahadur from Hindusthan and for being entrusted with the sole management of affairs there. To this petition, too, no answer was returned, the submission by Madahaji of the account of the revenues of Hindusthan being declared by Nana to be the indispensable preliminary to the issue of any orders on Peshwa's part touching the affairs of Hindusthan.

In the meantime, events of great importance had taken place in Hindusthan. The restless spirit of Ismail Beg again longed to disturb the peace of Hindusthan. His enmity to Sindia burned as fiercely as ever, and he determined to avail himself of the opportunity presented to him by the absence of his enemy to recover his power, and avenge himself for the defeat and disgrace he had sustained at Sindia's hands. In this resolution he was encouraged by Holkar, that precious ally of Mahadaji. He assembled a large army, but his career was arrested at the very commencement. A detachment of Sindia's forces under Perron, the officer second in command to De-Boigne, was advancing against the fort of Canoond, where the widow of Nujeef Khan, with a spirit which cannot be sufficiently admired, was maintaining a stout resistance against the Mahrattas. Ismail Beg flew to her rescue, and a battle was fought between the two armies under the walls of the city. Ismail was utterly routed and threw himself into the fort. He there assisted in the defence which was gallantly maintained for a long time. But the widow having after sometime been killed by a shell, the garrison lost heart and thought of betraying Ismail into the

hands of the enemy to procure for themselves favourable terms. Ismail saw through their treacherous design, and prevented its execution, by surrendering himself to Perron, who promised him, on the faith of his superior officer DeBoigne, that he should not be killed. Ismail Beg was ever afterwards confined in the fort of Agra where he died in 1799.

But this great success of Mahadaji was completely thrown into shade by another splendid success, which made him the supreme arbiter of the destinies of the north. Holkar's and Sindia's forces were together levying tribute in Rajputana. It seems that the jealousy, which the two chieftains felt for each other, had descended to their officers and soldiers. Holkar's and Sindia's armies quarrelled about the distribution of the spoils, and from altercations, from mutual criminations and recriminations, fell to fighting. Gopal Lall Rao and Bhao, Luckwa Dada and DeBoigne, with twenty thousand horse and nine thousand infantry, fell upon Holkar's army, which was far superior in number, consisting of 30,000 horse and the four battalions of Dudrenec. The battle raged for a long time with great fury. It was the most obstinate and hard contested fight in which DeBoigne had ever engaged. At the beginning of the day, DeBoigne's battalions were thrown into great confusion by the bursting of twelve tumbrils of ammunition. But, as they were advantageously posted in a wood, Holkar's cavalry could not take advantage of their confusion. Dudrenec and his battalions made heroic efforts, but their valour was at length quenched in their own blood. They were well-nigh annihilated.

Mahadaji
gets a com-
plete victory
over Holkar.

The rest of Holkar's army fared little better. They were routed with great slaughter. The guns were all taken. The shattered remains of the once splendid and well-appointed army retired in pall-mall confusion to Muttra, when Holkar, in great rage, sacked Oojein, the defenceless capital of Sindia.

This 'great victory rendered Mahadaji Sindia supreme in Hindusthan. He became by far the most powerful prince of the Mahrattas, there was no one who could even be called his second, and it was evident from his great genius and the irresistible power he had acquired, that he would soon be the virtual, if not the nominal, head of the Mahratta people and the ruler of the greatest part of India. What a grand vista was now open to him ! A prospect of unparalleled power, and glory, and grandeur lay before him ! The gorgeous dreams of his youth and later years were now about to be realised ! The high hopes and lofty aspirations which, in earlier years he had perhaps thought it presumptuous to entertain, were now, he was assured, in a fair way to fulfillment. We may well imagine the almost delirious joy with which he now saw, in his mind's eye, the glorious future which he thought, was awaiting him. Nay, we have good grounds for believing, that in his mind there was an aspiration, higher, nobler far than all others, which mingled itself with these more selfish hopes and shed over them its celestial radiance. He would be the Captain-General of the united forces of the Indian princes against the foreign intruders who threatened to absorb all India in their ever-growing empire. He would, to quote the words of Colonel

Malleson, "bring under one standard, though in different parts of India, the horsemen and French contingent of Tipu, the powerful artillery of the Nizam, the whole force of the Rajputs, and every spear which Mahratta influence could have collected from Puna, from Indore, from Baroda, and from Nagpore," and, at the head of these combined forces, fight the great battle of Indian independence. We may well imagine how the wild Mahratta hero, revolving in his soul these grand schemes and warmed by these high hopes—the product partly of selfish enthusiasm, partly of something higher than that—must have remained these few months at Puna, in a state of almost frenzied delight and delirious expectancy. Visions of glory and empire floated before his mind's eye, his fancy painted the future with rainbow tints, with orient colours. Dreams ! dreams ! dreams ! such things were not to be. Providence had ordained otherwise. To quote again the words of Colonel Malleson, "the great problem, in the terms in which it had presented itself to the mind of the greatest of the Mahratta leaders—the problem of a contest between an United India and the English—was not destined to be fairly fought out." While Mahadaji was indulging in his ambitious hopes, in his visions of glory, the spectre of death stood mocking at them. He was suddenly seized with a violent fever which in a few days put a period to his existence, on the 12th February 1794. Thus perished, in the midst of his ambitious schemes, and at a time when success seemed within his grasp, the greatest Indian of the eighteenth century. It must have been hard enough

Death of
Mahadaji
Sindia, 12th
February
1794.

to die at a time when the buds of ambitious hopes gave promise of speedy flowering, and yet Mahadaji must have died in greater peace of mind than his rival, Nana Furnavese, who expired at a time when the sun of Mahratta greatness was on the eve of setting, bidding a mournful farewell to its last rays as they illumined the face of the Mahratta Empire with an indistinct glimmer, soon to be swallowed up in the long night of ages. Mahadaji, at his death, had to mourn only the loss of his own hopes and not his nation's fall. He perhaps died hoping that men like him would rise to sustain the fabric of Mahratta greatness, and that a long lease of life still awaited it.

From the preceding sketch of Mahadaji's life, the chief features of his character and policy have perhaps appeared with sufficient vividness. As a statesman and soldier, he can challenge comparison with any that India has ever produced. He had, indeed, not that noble enthusiasm, that stern unshaken faith in a divine mission, that almost God-like power of firing a whole nation with patriotic zeal and spirit of self-sacrifice, which characterized the founder of the Mahratta Empire. To the ranks of these giant souls—the creators of national life—he had no pretensions of being admitted. But, in the rank of great statesmen and great soldiers of any age or country, he is entitled to a very high place. We shall err greatly in judging him only by the positive work he did. For arriving at a correct view of his character, we must take into sufficient account the limited means at his disposal and the difficulties he had to contend

with throughout his whole life. At the time when he succeeded to the hereditary jagheers of Malwa, he was certainly the weakest among all the principal members of the Mahratta confederacy. He was entirely dependent upon the will of the Peshwa. He occupied a very low place in the estimation of his countrymen on account of illegitimacy. Nay, his title to the jagheer was not acknowledged by many—some of them, persons in high places. He was very often threatened with sequestration. His petty jagheer was, as it were, held in good behaviour. The difficulties he had to contend against throughout his entire career were well-nigh insuperable. Look, for instance, at the obstacles which stood in his way, and over which he ultimately triumphed during the course of the establishment of his power in Hindusthan. The powerful Muhammedan nobles, the Rohillas, all banded against him, the Rajputs up in arms against him, the great Mahratta chiefs throwing all manner of petty and harassing obstacles in his way, mocking with their useless presence his urgent entreaties for help when he stood sadly in need of it, encumbering him with assistance when he needed it not, giving him not the smallest aid to gain his victories, but never foregoing their share in the spoils of those victories, dropping at length the mask of friendship, and breaking out into open hostilities with him. These terrible obstacles which would have effectually stopped the career of ambitious mediocrity—he grappled with and successfully overcame. When he launched forth in his career of conquest in Hindusthan, he had but very slender resources at his command, and he had

no hope of obtaining any assistance from the other Mahratta princes. It is almost surprising that he did so much with means seemingly so inadequate.

Mahadaji possessed great military talents. His generalship was of a very high order. It was no light thing to keep, with a host of undisciplined rabble, the field for a long time against a great English General, at the head of a large and well-appointed army. We must not blame Mahadaji because he could not defeat General Goddard. With the soldiers which Mahadaji had at his command, Napoleon Bonaparte himself could not have done so. Generalship can go very far, but it cannot of itself gain a victory. Instead of cavilling at Mahadaji for not gaining brilliant victories, we should rather admire his generalship, which, with worthless soldiers, could stand its ground against an able English General at the head of one of the finest armies that the British Government had ever brought into the field in India, baffle his utmost efforts, and reduce him to a state of inaction.

But he did not always follow this cautious defensive policy. He was not always a *Fabius Cunctator*. When opportunity for attacking and attacking with success occurred he would not let it slip by ill-timed over-caution. When he found himself opposed by Colonel Carnac, who had only a very small force at his command, he hastened to overwhelm it before it could be reinforced. His movements in Hindusthan were marked by great daring. He did not stop to receive the blows of his enemies but tried to confound them by the rapidity and boldness of his operations. This quality of adapting military tactics to the nature

of the circumstances, varying them as those circumstances varied, is the characteristic of a great military genius. Mahadaji possessed it in a great degree. He was certainly, as Malleon says, a military genius of no common order. Had he brave English armies at his command, he could have established his absolute sway over India within a very short time.

The promptitude with which he retrieved his affairs after what might be considered a crushing and irretrievable defeat, was one of the most remarkable features in Mahadaji's character. His career was not a succession of brilliant victories, but of victories alternating with defeats. His career was a chequered one. And it is a striking proof of the greatness of his mind that he was never paralysed by the disasters which very often befell him. Even when ruin almost stared him in the face, when every one thought, and apparently with good reason, that it was all over with him, he never lost heart, but stood calm and collected, devising expedients for retrieving his affairs. The most signal example of this is his conduct after his defeat in the heart of Rajputana, owing to the desertion of a great part of his army. Every one gave him up for lost. Every one thought that his fortunes were ship-wrecked. But he did not lose time in vain lament, but prepared to get himself out of his perilous situation and recover his lost power by dint of a tremendous energy, with ~~what~~ success we have seen. Such is the attitude of a great mind contending with adversity—no whining sorrow—no useless lamentations—but a calm unblenching confronting of perils and

calamities and a stern preparation for a death-struggle with them.

Mahadaji's power of perception was very acute. He was a statesman of great ability. He had the seeing eye. His glance penetrated, with unerring sweep, into the heart of a political question. His clearness of vision was signally manifested in two things. He saw that European discipline was far superior to the discipline which the native armies could boast of. He saw that a small English army was more than a match for a large native army, and that, not in virtue of any inherent superiority in fighting qualities, but owing to superior discipline and possession of more efficient apparatus of war. As soon as he discerned this important fact, he set on foot the creation of a corps, disciplined and armed on the European model. And it is certain that most of his later victories were chiefly due to the presence of this corps in his army. He likewise saw that the Native States would soon have to fight for their existence with the British power, and unless they united for mutual defence, the struggle was hopeless. This apprehension made him averse to the Mahratta war with Tipu. It was for this that he severely censured Nana's suicidal policy of supporting the English in their war with Tipu.

Grant Duff says of Mahadaji, "He was a man of great political sagacity, and of considerable genius; of deep artifice, of restless ambition, and of implacable revenge." The charge of restless ambition is to some extent true. Sometimes this ambition led him into unwarrantable courses—as, for example, his making

war on the Rajputs, with whom he should have lived in amity and concord. But it is certain that his designs were not inconsistent with the preservation of the Mahratta confederacy. He was as Grant Duff himself admits, "desirous of preserving a coalition, such as would unite the chieftains of the Empire against all foreign enemies." He aspired to the position of Nana Furnavese—that of being the chief minister of the Peshwa—and he likewise wished to pursue his ambitious schemes in the north, without any opposition from the other princes of the Mahratta confederacy. But there is no doubt that he was sincere in his declarations of loyalty to the Peshwa. He did not wish to trample on the freedom of the Mahratta princes, he only desired to be the most powerful member of the confederacy, and to have, subject to the Peshwa, the chief share in the direction of Mahratta politics. In short, the position to which he aspired among Mahratta princes was in many respects similar to that to which Prince Bismarck aspires in Europe. He aspired to be a moral influence among them. He did not wish that they should be his vassals, but rather colleagues, paying a free respect to him, following, with a free and intelligent consent, his direction, as he was far superior to them in genius and sagacity, and knew far better than they what measures would be really conducive to the security and grandeur of the Commonwealth. He was no incarnation of merely selfish ambition. Of course there was in his character the taint of self. It would have been simply miraculous for any Indian hero of that time so completely to shake off the

influence of the base surroundings of his age as to be able to discard all selfish thoughts and to view things from the lofty stand-point of public interest. Mahadaji was certainly not free from selfishness, but it is certain that selfishness did not swallow up his whole being. There were redeeming points in his ambitious policy.

It would be interesting to trace, step by step, the gradual growth of his ambition. At first, his wish was entirely directed towards independence. This desire was ultimately gratified by the recognition of his independence by the British Government. Even before this recognition, he had taken up another object, namely, the subversion of the overgrown ascendancy of the Brahmins. With this view he tried, just before the commencement of the First Marhatta War, to play off the different Brahmin factions, the faction of Sukaram Bapu, the faction of Maraba, the faction of Nana against one another. He, at length, raised to power Nana whom he tried to overawe and control. Favourable circumstances enabled Nana to restore the Brahmin supremacy, and it was the overthrow of this supremacy, which was one of the chief objects of Mahadaji in going to Puna in the last year of his life. Had his life been prolonged he would undoubtedly have accomplished this object. Towards the end of his life his ambition had undoubtedly taken a larger sweep. A series of brilliant successes had enlarged its scope. Hopes, which he would have in former days regarded as utterly chimerical, had now attained the fixed certainty of fulfilment. He now aspired to the sole sovereignty

in the north of India, to a commanding influence in the Mahratta cabinet. He was also fired by the loftier, nobler, far more landable ambition of being the leader of united India in the struggle with the British power, which he thought was impending. But all these ambitious projects were cut short by death. In the passage above quoted from Grant Duff's book, the reader has seen that the historian brings against Mahadaji an indictment of "implacable revenge." But we fail to see how this charge can be substantiated. Surely, Mahadaji cannot be accused of "implacable revenge" for putting the infamous Golam Kadir to death. Even the barbarous and excruciating tortures which were inflicted on Golam Kadir, though they certainly cannot be justified, ought not to expose Sindia to the charge of "implacable revenge." It is certain that if Golam Kadir had only attempted to overthrow Sindia's authority, if he had not inflicted on the unfortunate Imperial family those horrible barbarities at which humanity shudders, he would not have been put to death. In putting him to a cruel death Sindia was not so much actuated by a feeling of revenge as by a generous indignation for the wrongs of the family of the Emperor. I am not aware that Sindia ever put any other political opponent to death. The only thing that can lend a sort of colour to this charge is the vehement persistency with which, during the Mahratta invasion of Hindusthan under Visaji Kishen, he urged vengeance on the Rohillas for "sons and brothers slain." But then we must take into account the grievous injury which the Mahratta people generally, and the Sindia family in

particular, had sustained at the hands of the Rohillas and their chief Nuzeebuddaulah.

With all his faults, Mahadaji Sindia was a great man—a hero. He was the greatest that his age and country could then produce. Unselfish patriotism, religious enthusiasm, intense love of humanity,—thoughts “brooding over the abysses of being, wandering through infinitude”—all these were far beyond the intellectual scope of India during the last century. Denizens of heaven, they would not visit a land, sunk to the lowest depth of degradation by many centuries of slavery, shut off from the rays of learning, torn by continual dissensions, and stained with the blood of her sons. India could not, in that age, have produced a great patriot, a great teacher of religion, a great lover of humanity. She could, at best, produce a great statesman and general with a seeing mind which could soar above the petty unprofitable details of battles and intrigues into the region of general views, large and luminous conception of some of the immediate pressing political needs of the day, a disposition to pursue those views whenever they did not cross but ran parallel to his own interests, and considerable genius, sagacity, and energy to carry them into execution. Such a hero was the best that India could produce in the last century, and such a one she produced in Mahadaji Sindia.

In person, Mahadaji Sindia was of the average stature. “His countenance,” says Grant Duff, “was expressive of good sense and good humour, but his complexion was dark, his person inclining to corpulency, and he limped from the effects of his wound

at Paniput. He could write, was a good accountant, and understood revenue affairs well." He died without issue.

We cannot conclude this chapter without expressing our deep regret for a fact which cannot have failed to strike the attention of many earnest readers of the history of India. It is this—that so many great men—men of splendid genius and great energy,—men like Sivaji, Mulhar Rao, Hyder Ali, Mahadaji, Runjeet Singh, should have flourished in a country without at all perceptibly raising its level in the scale of nations—should have died without achieving any positive result—without at all furthering the cause of their own country or the cause of man. What, for example, was the net result of Mahadaji's work. Apparently the result is zero. The vast fabric of power which he built up was an edifice built on sand, which within the short space of ten years crumbled into dust. The great cause of man gained no furtherance from it. Neither his country nor humanity gained anything from it. His life, indeed, like that of all great men, teaches this trite truth, that success in this world waits upon energy and perseverance. But alas, was thirty years' continual fighting, so much blood-shedding, such uproar, such blaring, needed to convince us of so little? And there is also a dark side of the picture. We cannot shut our eyes to it. That so many able men, whose names are legion that India has produced during the last part of last century and the first part of the present century, should have lived to little or no purpose, is sufficient to fill us with deep sadness, with

something like despair for the destiny of this country. Seldom has such mournful tragedy been enacted under the sun. That so many men of great genius of lofty daring, of unsurpassed energy, should have lived only to brawl and fight, and to die without achieving any positive permanent good for their country, is a thing that fills us with melancholy thoughts.

The transient glory and success of these latter day heroes was like the flickering rays of the setting sun in the struggle of death, which seemed for a moment the strength of reviving life, of the old order of things of martial glory and independence. Indians call it destiny. But nevertheless is true what Carlyle has said:—

“It has ever been held the highest wisdom for man to know that this great God’s world has verily though deep beyond his soundings, a just law, that the soul of it is Good.”



CHAPTER IV.

PART I.

EARLY CAREER OF DAULAT RAO SINDIA.

MAHADAJI SINDIA left no son or male heir to succeed him. In his life-time he expressed the intention that Daulat Rao, grandson of his brother Tukaji, should inherit his kingdom. Lakshmi Bai, his widow, however, opposed the succession, and set up another prince, but her efforts were unavailing. The chief Mahratta leaders espoused Daulat's cause, and Nana Furnavese, the virtual leader of the confederacy, gave his assent to the arrangement.

Daulat Rao
Sindia suc-
ceeds to the
throne.

Daulat Rao was hardly 15 years of age, when his grand uncle died. He was called upon to discharge not only the onerous duties of the ruler of a great state comprising the major portion of Malwa, and all that portion of the country which lies between the Sutlej and Allahabad, as well as a number of the rich provinces in the Deccan, but to play an important part in the Mahratta confederacy during a momentous revolution in the Mahratta cabinet, and to take an active and zealous interest in a series of intrigues and plots which continued through a long succession of years.

Within a short time of his accession to the throne he was called upon by the Peshwa to take an active part in a contest with Nizam Aly, in which the latter was

Called upon
to take a part
at Kurdla.

totally defeated at Kurdla—the last of the great battles won by the Mahrattas.

Before entering into the details of Daulat Rao's reign, it is necessary to give in a short sketch an account of the state of Mahratta politics at this time.

Nana Furnavese had been for some time past at the head of the Mahratta confederacy. Possessed of rare ability, remarkable business habits, uncommon veracity, extraordinary political foresight and genuine patriotism, he was a true statesman of the Pericles type and was the last prop and support of the Mahratta cabinet. But, unhappily, his lofty ambition proved itself at this time a fruitful source of great commotion and strife, and the cause of the unfortunate death of Madhu Rao Narayan, the young Peshwa.

The sons of Raghunath Rao (Raghoba), Baji Rao and Chimnaji Appa, were now closely confined at Sewanari. However intensely the Mahrattas may have hated Raghoba, now that he was no more, the condition of his young sons naturally roused the sympathy of the Mahratta people. Gradually and naturally the young Peshwa felt a sort of likeness for his near relatives, who were pining away the best years of their lives in a dungeon, and was agitated by the wish to release them. Apprised of this, Nana Furnavese became rigorous in his dealings with the sons of Raghoba, and began to be watchful of the conduct of the young Peshwa. On the other hand, the astute Baji Rao, hearing that Madhu Rao was favourably disposed towards him, began secretly to open correspondence with him. He wrote to him to

say that he was in confinement at Sewanari, and that the Peshwa was under the control of his minister, "that their condition as prisoners was nearly similar, but that their minds and affections were free, and should be devoted to each other, that their ancestors had distinguished themselves, and that the time would arrive, when his cousin and himself might hope to emulate their deeds, and raise for themselves a lasting and honourable name." * Nana hearing of this correspondence, reprimanded the Peshwa and put severe restraints upon the poor prisoners, little dreaming that these acts of his would in the end prove to be the sowing of the dragon's teeth which would result in that long contested civil war which shattered the already weakened power of the Mahratta confederacy.

Though *de jure* master of the Mahrattas, Madhu Rao had yet sense enough to feel that he was a mere cipher in the kingdom ; that Nana was the *de facto* ruler ; and that although he had the wish he had neither the influence nor the ability, to throw off the galling yoke of his real master. At last in a fit of melancholy he threw himself down from the terrace of his palace and got severely wounded. He survived two days and expressed his last wish that Baji Rao (the eye sore of Nana) might be elevated to the *guddi*.

Nana Furnavese had long enjoyed the sweets of power. In fact, he was, as has been stated, the arbiter of Mahratta destiny. He thought that if the last wish of Madhu Rao were fulfilled, *i.e.* if Baji Rao were elevated to the *musnud*, the latter would be

Nana at-
tempts to
thwart the
accession of
Baji Rao.

sure to deprive him of all power, especially as his treatment of Baji Rao in prison had been anything but honourable. He accordingly invited the leading Mahratta chiefs Poreshram Bhao, Raghuji Bhonslay, Tukaji Holkar and Daulat Rao Sindia, who forthwith assembled at his call. The consummate politician Nana Furnavese tried to influence their feelings by fomenting their prejudice against the name of the infamous Raghoba, and was successful. It was resolved that Jasoda Bai, the widow of Madhu Rao, should adopt a son and elevate him to the Peshwaship. Ballaba Tatya, the prime minister of the young Daulat Rao, however, opposed this resolution of the majority of the Mahratta chiefs, but to no effect.

Meanwhile, the astute Baji Rao, from his prison cell at Sewanari, had been keeping himself acquainted with all necessary information regarding the proceedings of Nana Furnavese—how he was about to be deprived of his lawful heritage, how Ballaba Tatya's pleadings on his behalf proved unavailing. He thought it advisable, and with that view began to negotiate with Ballaba Tatya, to obtain for him his kingdom and his throne. Sindia was offered territories, yielding an annual income of 4 lacs of rupees and also all the expenses he would incur on his behalf. Sindia accepted the proposal and was about to commence operations on behalf of Baji Rao when everything came to the knowledge of Nana Furnavese, who became very much alarmed and instantly sent for Poreshram Bhao. The latter, a man of great intelligence and sagacity, advised Nana

to anticipate Sindia in his doings, and went himself straight to Baji Rao to accompany him to Puna. Baji Rao did not at first confide in the sincerity of Bhao's proposals, but caused him to be sworn by the tail of a cow and the water of the holy Godaveri, and then started for the capital. Nana and Baji Rao met each other, and, after an exchange of solemn declarations by words and by writing, Baji Rao promised to keep Nana Furnavese at the head of the administration.

Daulat Rao Sindia, who was still very young and had not till then taken any prominent part in Mahratta politics, was, by force of circumstances, constrained henceforth to take an active part in the intrigues and quarrels which soon followed. His minister Ballaba Tatya was incensed beyond measure at the conduct of Baji Rao, and advised Daulat Rao to march towards the capital. Whereupon, the latter advanced with his whole force. Nana got terrified; but Poreshrum Bhao told him to take courage and try the chance of battle. Timid enough to face the danger, he, for the time, gave up all hopes and retired to Purandhur and thence to Satara. But Baji Rao was quite equal to the occasion. He knew, and could lay under contribution Mahratta tactics thoroughly well. He welcomed Sindia to his capital. But Ballaba Tatya was not a man easily to forget and forgive. He took Poreshrum Bhao into his confidence, and consulted with him about the advisability of placing Chimnaji Appa on the *musnud* and him (meaning Bhao) at the head of the administration.

Sindia begins to take an active part in Mahratta politics.

Poreshram Bhao asked the opinion of Nana about the proposed arrangement; to which he gave his assent. Ballaba, on the other hand, fearing lest Nana should again obtain a preponderating influence in the Mahratta cabinet, tried to become reconciled to him.

The fertile head of Nana Furnavese, however, was, in the meantime, devising fresh schemes for the re-establishment of his power and influence.

The Raja of Satara, it must be known to all readers of Mahratta history, was the lineal descendant of the great Sivaji. It is also known that the Peshwas were the Prime-ministers of the Raja of Satara. The power of the Peshwa rose gradually to such height that before its splendour, the glory of the real monarch faded away. The Raja was scarcely ever taken notice of in the affairs of the Mahratta cabinet, where he was not so much as an insignificant factor, but no factor at all. The Brahmin influence overshadowed all and was supreme in the Mahratta empire.

In India such anomalies are not unfrequent, however. She has seen the rise and fall of many an empire and many a kingdom. The successor of the Great Moghul, for instance, who founded such a gigantic empire, is now but a poor exile in a distant land, while the Nizam—his satrap—is at this hour in the enjoyment of luxurious ease and immense power. Not a vestige remains to this day to shew to the world the grandeur and magnificence of the Peshwas, excepting only the satellites who thronged round their cabinet. And, behold! Sindia and Holkar are

lording it over many millions of subjects ! While the son and heir of the Lion of the Punjab is now a pensioner of the British Government, his lieutenant is master of the Happy valley ! Such is the wheel of fortune, and such is the destiny of man !

To resume the thread of our narrative. There were still many who clung firmly to the illustrious house, and paid the respect due to the family of Sivaji. Nana Furnavese thought to act on the feelings and sentiments of these persons by nominally restoring the power and influence of the Raja of Satara, to strike at the root of the Peshwa's power and wield the absolute power himself. Finding on mature consideration such a scheme impracticable, he retired for the time being to Wace.

Nana attempts to revive the power of the Raja of Satara

Machinations were going on in the meantime for dethroning Baji Rao and placing Chimnaji Appa on the throne. Sindia tried to pick a quarrel with Baji Rao on the pretext of demanding the arrears of the expenses incurred on his behalf; but the latter was shrewd enough to keep him in good spirits by expostulations and entreaties. Baji Rao learnt, however, that Poreshram Bhao had already taken Chimnaji with him. Baji Rao entreated Sindia to follow him, but the latter made many lame excuses. The night passed in this way. Early next morning, when solicitations to march were renewed, Baji Rao was told that it was unsafe for him at that time to go anywhere. The latter had sense enough to see through the whole plot. At last, to his utter surprise he found himself nothing better than a prisoner.

Attempts to place Chimnaji Appa on the throne.

Chimnaji Appa was forced to accept the Peshwaship, though utterly against his wish. Poreshram Bhao who was still attached to the cause of Nana, asked the latter to return and place himself, as before, at the head of the administration. But for the present he refused the offer, at the same time devising other means of regaining his lost power and influence.

Baji Rao and Nana were now, both of them, deprived of power, but both were anxious to regain it. They knew that Ballaba Tatya was hostile to their interests; and that unless he was put down, there was no chance of their success. Common interest united them in bonds of close friendship; and through the instrumentality of Ranoji Patell by the offer of the jagheer of Poreshram Bhao, and of the fort of Ahmednuggar and a territory yielding 10 lacs of Rupees, Sindia who had been so long under the control of Ballaba Tatya, was soon brought to their side.

Ballaba was not aware of these plots for ruining him. He simply thought that Baji Rao was making attempts to regain his lost power and office, and thus sent Baji Rao as prisoner to Hindusthan. Baji Rao, on the other hand, considering Sindia the only person who by the strength of the large army at his command could place him on the *guddi*, tried every art to please him and win his good graces. He learnt that Subharam Ghatkay (well-known by the name of Sirji Rao Ghatkay) had a beautiful daughter, and that Daulat Rao was desirous to marry her, but as the family of Sindia was inferior in rank to that of Ghatkay, the latter was unwilling to make the alliance. Baji Rao, after much effort, succeeded

in his attempt. Ghatkay promised to marry his daughter to Sindia, provided the latter paid him two crores of rupees in ready money, gave him the village of Kugul and made him his Dewan.

Nana Furnavese, in the meantime, was not idle. Treaties were concluded between himself, Nizam Aly and Raghuji Bhonslay in which it was agreed that they would assist in placing Baji Rao on the throne as Peshwa, and installing Nana as his Prime-Minister. The English, the great friends and patrons of Raghoba, expressed their approbation of the elevation of Baji Rao.

Having secured the assistance of the leading powers, troops were despatched by Sindia for the arrest of Ballaba Tatya and Poreshrām Bhao, and they were arrested without much effort.

Ballaba
Tatya and
Poreshrām
Bhao arrested

Baji Rao, who, as has been stated before, had been despatched to Hindusthan by order of Ballaba Tatya, was brought back to Korygaon, near Puna. On the 4th December 1796, Baji Rao was invested with the insignia of office and seated on the *musnud*, and Nana Furnavese as had been agreed, became his Prime-minister. Chimnaji Appa, who had been true to his brother was appointed Governor of Guzerat. Thus after a great deal of intrigues and machinations, Baji Rao succeeded to the throne of his ancestors, to which he was so justly entitled. And thus closed the first act of the drama of Baji Rao's life.

Baji Rao be-
comes Peshwa
and Nana
Furnavese
become
Prime-minis-
ter.

Baji Rao, in pursuance of his engagements, made over to Sindia the fort of Ahmednuggar and the surrounding districts, and gave him permission to take possession of the jagheer of Poreshrām Bhao.

Baji Rao
tries to get rid
of Sindia and
Nana Furna-
vese.

But he saw that Nana Furnavese and Sindia were really the heads of the Mahratta confederacy and that he was only to be a tool in their hands. But now that he was secure on the *guddi*, he could and did really think of getting rid of these personages. He knew that he carried with him the sympathy of the people, and that the Mahratta people would not raise their voice if he gradually assumed the legitimate functions of his office. But it was not easy at once to get rid of them both. The ruin of Nana, he thought, must be first effected and then gradually Sindia should be humbled. A fitting instrument was found in the person of Ghatkay to carry out the former plan. Daulat Rao Sindia had not yet married his daughter. Baji Rao told him that so long as Nana Furnavese remained in power, he would throw obstacles in the way of his gaining ascendancy over Sindia, and that Nana Furnavese should, therefore, be thrown into prison. This infamous character in the history of the Mahrattas, who henceforth proved himself the evil genius of Daulat Rao, gladly promised to carry out the plan. At the request of Michael Filose, an officer of Sindia, and on the pledge of his word of honour, Nana Furnavese returned a visit of Sindia. Nana and his officers were all arrested and made prisoners, and sent to Ahmednuggar ; his retinue were "stripped, maimed, some of them killed, and the whole dispersed." Ghatkay seized this opportunity to send soldiers to plunder the houses of Nana and his adherents. In the words of the historian of the Mahrattas, "The city of Puna was like a town taken by storm, the

firing continued the whole of the night and the ensuing day." The roads in every direction stopped, all was uproar, plunder and bloodshed ; the alarm was universal, and in the words of a spectator, " friends marched together in groups, with their shields on their arms, and their swords in their hand."

Having thus got rid of Nana Furnavese, Baji Rao began to devise means for the overthrow of Sindia. But he knew that so long as he did not fulfil all his engagements with Ghatkay and Sindia, it would not be easy to send them away from Puna. Sindia, who had recently married the daughter of Ghatkay and put himself to great expense both on account of the marriage and the large army he had kept in Puna, was clamorous for money. Baji Rao who was now shewing himself in his true colours, advised Sindia to appoint Ghatkay as his chief minister, and told him to levy money from the inhabitants of his own capital. The acts of horror and oppression committed on this occasion by Sirji Rao Ghatkay have handed down to posterity, the name not only of Sirji Rao Ghatkay with everlasting infamy, but also those of Daulat Rao Sindia and Baji Rao as passive lookers-on of the cruel atrocities done in their name and on their behalf. Says the historian of the Mahrattas, " To obtain the object of his mission, Ghatkay first proceeded to the palace of Baji Rao, where the ex-ministers, late of the party of Nana Furnavese were confined. Those respectable persons were dragged forth, and scourged until they gave up their property. Merchants, bankers, and all persons

Baji Rao
allows Ghat-
kay to plun-
der the in-
habitants of
Puna.

in the city supposed to possess wealth were next seized and tortured, several of them died of the consequence, and Gungadhar Punt Bhadoo, one of the relations of Nana Furnavese expired whilst tied on a heated gun."

Amrut Rao, brother of Baji Rao, who was placed by the latter at the head of the administration in the place of Nana Furnavese was roused by these acts of cruelty of the agent of Sindia and advised his brother to put Sindia in confinement.

Thinking this the best opportunity of carrying out his plans and gratifying his wishes, he readily assented to the advice of Amrut Rao. It was concerted that Sindia would be invited by the Peshwa to his palace, and Appa Kally one of the commanders when beckoned would seize him. At the first invitation Daulat Rao not coming, peremptory orders were sent him to obey the mandate of his master, and he duly came. He paid to the Peshwa the respect due to him, but the latter with a tone of authority reprimanded him for his want of respect towards him and for the cruel treatment of his subjects, and told him that "the contempt and disrespect thus shewn towards his person and authority he could bear no longer. Daulat Rao's reply to this was respectful, but firm and determinate. He at once told him that he had large debts incurred by placing his Highness on the musnud which it was incumbent on his Highness to discharge: when that was effected he would immediately quit Puna." Amrut asked his brother to carry out the plan, but Baji Rao had not the courage to give the order. The long

concerted plan of putting Sindia in prison was thus frustrated, not, however, without leaving a suspicion on the mind of Daulat Rao, as well as giving him a true idea of the character of the ungrateful Peshwa.

Dangers of an unexpected nature seemed to threaten Sindia at this moment. He promised, at the time of his being acknowledged heir of his grand uncle to make sufficient provision for his wives. The non-fulfillment of this promise coupled with the rumour that Daulat Rao had illicit connection with the youngest widow greatly exasperated the other widows. Add to this, the most cruel and barbarous treatment of these two ladies by Ghatkay brought down upon Daulat Rao the odium of the entire Mahratta community. It was at last given out that these ladies would be comfortably lodged at Burhanpur. But, instead of that, it appeared they were being taken to Ahmednagar to be there kept as prisoners. The faithful Mozuffur Khan, one of their followers, coming to know of this fact, escaped with them to the camp of Amrut Rao, who gave them shelter. Acting under the evil advice of Ghatkay, Daulat Rao found that his very existence was now threatened. Twice Ghatkay pursued the ladies to Amrut Rao's camp, and in the second attempt surprised the latter. This was considered an insult to the dignity of the Peshwa, and measures were accordingly taken for his subversion. An alliance was formed between Kasi Rao Holkar, Nizam Aly, Raghuji Bhonslay and the Peshwa for the purpose.

Fresh attempts to overthrow the power of Sindia.

Sindia heard all this and got frightened. He at first asked the advice of Colonel Palmer, and afterwards thought of releasing Nana Furnavese and taking him over to his side. Nana was set at liberty on payment of 10 lacs of rupees, but was won over by Baji Rao by his sweet and flattering words and placed at the head of the administration. Daulat Rao, who had acted prudently in putting Ghatkay in prison, made another attempt to gain over Nana to his side, while Baji Rao tried to keep both Sindia and Nana in good humour.

It was at this time that Jeswant Rao Holkar, who at the request of Sindia had been kept a prisoner by the Nagpur chief, effected his escape, and began to plunder Malwa, while the ladies of Mahadaji Sindia, who had still been unprovided for, began to make fresh attempts for the restoration of their power and influence. Under these circumstances Daulat Rao acted wisely in liberating Ballaba Tatya. The latter conciliated the ladies and brought matters to an amicable settlement.

About this time, Nana Furnavese, the last of the great Mahratta leaders, died. He was reputed to have stored up great wealth. The Peshwa and Sindia both tried to obtain possession of it, and so fell out. The Peshwa, however, had not much to fear from his opponent. Jeswant Rao Holkar had been laying waste his provinces in the Deccan and exacting contributions therefrom. Sindia sent four battalions of troops under Colonel Hessings and 11 European officers for chastising Jeswant Rao; but the latter got a brilliant victory over them, in which four-fifths

of the army including 7 European officers are said to have been killed, and 3 European officers were taken prisoners. The next attempt of Holkar was not, however, so successful. The grand park of the artillery of Sindia entrenched themselves strongly, and Holkar could not make any great impression on them.

Jeswant Rao Holkar being defeated in a battle at Indore by Sindia's men, now marched at the head of his army to Deccan to avenge the insults and wrongs he had received at the hands of the Peshwa. Shadasheo Bhao Bhaskar, a lieutenant of Sindia, joined the Peshwa, and their united forces tried to oppose the army of Holkar. The Peshwa at first asked for an explanation of this menacing attitude, and ordered Holkar to withdraw from the capital. But the latter said in reply that he was ready "to obey every order from the Peshwa when he was not under the control of Sindia, but that Sindia had disobeyed the Peshwa's orders, had rendered the confinement of Khunde Rao doubly severe, and had sent his army to prevent that mediation which the Peshwa had promised; that Sindia, therefore, was the real rebel, and he would soon oblige him to submit to the sovereign authority of the Peshwa."

It is needless to state that a fight on a large scale between the two contending armies was the result. The indomitable courage and untiring perseverance of Holkar won for him the day. "The whole of Sindia's guns, baggage and stores," Mr. Grant Duff says, "fell into his hands, and the army of his rival was driven off the field."

Another brilliant victory gained by Holkar over Sindia.

Baji Rao, who was sanguine of success, heard of the result of the fight. He fled in all haste to the fortress of Singurh, and sent words to Colonel Close for a preliminary engagement for a few days at Mhar and Raigurh. Hearing of further movements of Holkar's troops in pursuit of him, Baji Rao arrived at Bassien on the 6th December, and signed the draft of a treaty with the British Resident, known in history as the celebrated "Treaty of Bassein."



PART II.

THE TREATY OF BASSEIN.

CLIVE, Hastings, and Wellesley are the Governors-General to whom England owes most for the acquisition of this richest jewel in her diadem. Clive laid the foundation of this mighty and stupendous fabric, Hastings built the superstructure, and Wellesley fortified it with strongholds so that it might remain unshaken for all time to come. The successive rulers after them have done only the work of out-ward embellishment and nothing more.

The work
of successive
Governors-
General.

Wellesley was a man of ability and foresight, but at the same time of great ambition. He found the country full of commotions; civil war was raging all around; adventurers were setting themselves up in every provinces; legitimate authority was disregarded; the sovereign of the all powerful Mahrattas was existing only in name; even the Emperor of Delhi—the lord paramount of this vast Indian continent—was a prisoner in the hands of one of his own subalterns. The Company had indeed acquired a large area of Indian land, covering about 220,000 square miles; but still they could not be said to have had a sure or firm footing in the country. What had been said of them by Sheridan about a little more than a decade before the time we are speaking of “that they united the mock majesty of a bloody sceptre and the little traffic of a merchant’s counting house,”..... was still but too true. A more propitious time, the

State of the
country and
Lord Welles-
ley.

Governor-General thought, would not in future arrive for the practical realisation of his schemes of ambition as well as for laying the foundation of a comprehensive plan of policy. He, therefore, thought of developing a system of subsidiary alliance, and of thus bringing together the principal sovereign chiefs of the Indian continent under British supremacy.

When a Prince enters into subsidiary alliance with the English Government he acknowledges the latter as his virtual suzerain ; promises to abide in all disputes with a foreign power or any other prince by its decisions ; holds no intercourse with any State except through its intervention ; resigns to it all military power, and acknowledges it to be the only military power in the realm. He also sometimes cedes a part of his dominions for the maintenance of a permanent force in his State for his protection. There also resides a British political officer whose duty it is to see that none of the provisions of the treaty are broken. The English Government, on the other hand, binds itself at all hazards to protect its ally from all enemies whatsoever. It was, as Lord Wellesley said, an "intimate alliance" founded on principles which rendered the British influence and British military power their main prop and support. "It was," to use the eloquent words of Mr. Torrens, "obviously meant and felt, if not in public words declared, to be a guarantee against the development of schemes hostile to English interests and the growth of English ascendancy. Under the direction of an intelligent Resident at the Native Court, a compact force, well-armed, well-paid, and well in hand, would render sudden

tumult abortive, and cause secret intrigue to waver continually, and to look back ere committing itself too far; and in the last event of open secession (or, it soon as came to be termed, revolt,) it would form a rallying point for any friends it had, and an outpost capable of defence till succour should arrive. There was about the subsidiary force, at the same time, a specious affectation of regard for the severalty and nominal independence of the State to which it belonged, which soothed the outward vanity, if it stung the inward pride of the Durbar and the bazar. Scrupulous care was taken to keep up the distinction between Native service and the service of the Company. A subsidiary force in time of peace was never moved out of the State to which it belonged, and even in time of war only with the assent of the Prince at whose expense it was equipped and maintained."

The Mah-
rattas at the
beginning of
the present
century.

The Mahrattas were in the beginning of this century the most powerful nation in India. They had nearly subverted the Muhammedan power. Except Bengal, Behar, and the Punjab, and some parts of the Deccan, nearly the whole of India was within their grasp. They had for their sovereign chiefs men who on the gradual decline of the power of the descendants of Sivaji, and latterly of their Prime ministers—the Peshwas—became virtually independent. Nearly all of them held lands of the Peshwa, whose sovereignty they still, each of them, acknowledged and whom they considered as the leader of their confederacy. In all the vicissitudes of fortune they turned towards him, and it was the chief object of their ambition to

be either his Prime minister or a member of his Council.

Lord Wellesley thought, and not without reason, that if he could induce the Peshwa to enter with the Company into a treaty of general defensive alliance and mutual guarantee, as the Subsidiary alliance was styled, he would have gained a great thing. With this view, he set himself with "extreme eagerness" to accomplish the cherished object of his ambition.

In 1798, however, the Peshwa declined the offer of the Governor-General. The Nizam, it is true, had already entered into the alliance, but the Peshwa, though much weakened, still retained a tincture of manly pride. But the Governor-General was importunate. He had, as is clearly manifest from his letters and despatches, no sleep or peace of mind. The authority of the Peshwa, it is true, was wholly usurped by Daulat Rao Sindia; but, when the former deliberately pondered how much he should risk by entering into this treaty of defensive alliance, all selfish motives vanished from his mind. In the interest of the Mahratta confederacy which now existed only in name, and as the Governor-General himself said, "in the midst of personal peril," he "deliberately preferred a situation of degradation and danger, with nominal independence to a more intimate connexion with the British power which could not be formed on principles calculated to secure to the Peshwa the constant protection of our arms, without at the same time establishing our ascendancy in the Mahratta empire."*

* Despatches.

Failing of success, the Governor-General made use of other means for the attainment of his object. He renewed his proposals with the Peshwa, and offered to admit him to a participation in the conquered territory of Mysore. But even this bait so tempting to a Mahratta chieftain had not the desired effect, and the Peshwa again rejected it.

Renewed proposals of the Governor-General to the Peshwa.

The Governor-General at last came to the conclusion, "that until irresistibly compelled by the exigency of his affairs to have recourse to the assistance of the Company, Baji Rao would never be induced to enter into engagements which in his apprehension, would afford to the British Government the means of acquiring an ascendancy in the Mahratta empire, and, that his object was to avoid that degree of control and ascendancy which it was our interest to establish."

The state of affairs, meanwhile, was assuming a decidedly gloomier aspect every day. To the importunities of the Governor-General were added the oppressive control of Sindia and the ravages of Jaswant Rao Holkar, and the Peshwa was at a loss to decide what to do. The wise and statesman-like counsel of the adriot Nana Furnavese the council of the Peshwa now stood sorely in need of. Nana, while he lived, outwardly kept up a relation of amity with the English, but studously "shrunk from their political embrace," and refused their offers of permanent armed assistance. Now that he was no more, and the aspect of affairs looked gloomy and sad, the Peshwa consented to retain the subsidiary force on the express condition that it should remain within the

The Peshwa at first refuses but eventually yields.

Company's territories except when he actually required their services. But this did not satisfy the ambitious Satrap. He was fully aware that alliance with the Peshwa, even with the limitations proposed by the latter "must immediately place him, in some degree in a state of dependence upon the British power." But he wanted to have his proposal carried out to the very letter and spirit of it, and with this view he began negotiations with the court of Puna. Unfortunately for the Mahratta cause, the irresistible Jaswant Rao Holkar just at this moment invested the capital of the Peshwa with his Arab cavalry. Poor Baji Rao fled, leaving a draft of the treaty in the hands of his minister to be submitted to the British Resident. In it he stipulated to subsidize six battalions of infantry and proportionate artillery, and to cede a part of his territory in the Carnatic or Guzerat yielding an annual income of nearly twenty-five lacs of rupees.

Hope deferred had almost made the heart of the Governor-General sick. The long-wished-for day came at last. His joy knew no bounds. He drew up with his own hand from beginning to end the original draft of the treaty.

At Bassein, on the last day of the year 1802, the Peshwa Baji Rao II, concluded the memorable treaty with the British Resident, and it was ratified by the Governor-General on the 11th of February 1803. By it the Peshwa agreed to abide by the arbitration of the Company in all its unsettled disputes with the Nizam as well as with the other powers ; to dismiss from his service any Europeans who were either hostile

to the English or were discovered meditating injury or carrying on intrigues against their interests; to hold no intercourse with other States except in concert with the English, and to cede a territory yielding annually 26 lacs of rupees for the maintenance of a permanent subsidiary force to be stationed in his dominions; while the Company's Government bound itself to furnish the Peshwa with a subsidiary force consisting of six battalions of Native infantry with a complement of guns and European artillery,—men to be permanently located within his dominions and to be at all times ready for such services as the due correction of His Highness' subjects and dependents and the overawing and chastising of rebels or excitors of disturbance. The Company's Government further declared that they should have no manner of concern with any of His Highness' children, relatives, subjects or servants, with respect to whom His Highness was absolute.

The Governor-General was impressed with the idea that if the Peshwa submitted to the system of defensive alliance and mutual guarantee, it would be the interest of the other *quasi* independent Mahratta chiefs to follow the example, and that a man like Sindia who had refused to seek British assistance would eventually find it to his benefit to submit to the alliance. But in February 1802, the British negotiator failed to persuade Sindia to conclude a treaty. The idle hope of the Governor-General that Sindia would be defeated by Holkar and then induced to solicit British alliance received a rude shock by Sindia sternly refusing to have anything to do with it. All this was before the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein.

It has been said before that it was the intention of the Governor-General not only to force the Peshwa to join his favourite defensive alliance, but to extend the British supremacy over the whole of the Mahratta empire and to acquire suzerainty over all the Mahratta dynasties. He also hoped to appropriate to himself the power of preventing them all from doing anything that might interfere with the interests of the Company, or be distasteful to the British Government. But this was no easy task for him to accomplish. The Mahratta chieftains after due deliberation threw away the proposals of the Governor-General and of the British Resident.

But the Governor-General was inexorable ; he set his heart for the accomplishment of his favourite schemes. For thought he, and justly too, "those defensive engagements which he was desirous of concluding with the Mahratta States, were essential to the complete consolidation of the British Empire in India."

After the treaty of Bassein, the British Resident renewed negotiations with Sindia for entering into a similar treaty with him. But the latter did not commit himself by any direct reply. He expressed his strong and sincere attachment to the English ; and the Governor-General in his turn believed in the sincerity of his attachment. But Sindia could not give positive expression to his approval of the treaty of Bassein or hold out a promise to enter into a similar alliance unless he was apprised of the details of it. The Resident having informed him that the treaty in no way interfered with his rights

and interests, Sindia in reply assured him of his attachment to the English, and said that he had no mind to invade the territories of either the Peshwa or the Nizaim. He also added that he could not say anything as to whether the negotiations with Raghuji Bhonslay and Jaswant Rao Holkar would end in peace or war, until he had actually an interview with them.

Such out-spokenness on the part of Daulat Rao Sindia, it is surprising to see, was taken by the Governor-General in the light of "an unprovoked menace of hostility," and an insult offered to the British Government. He, therefore, thought it due to the honour and interests of his Government to adopt "without delay the most effectual measures for the vindication of its dignity and for the security of its rights and interests and those of its allies."

Attitude of
Daulat Rao
Sindia consi-
dered by the
British Go-
vernment as
menacing.

But this was not the only *casus belli*. Daulat Rao Sindia and Raghuji Bhonslay of Berar who had both been invited by the Peshwa after the latter's return to Puna, were marching thither. This was construed in a most suspicious manner by the Governor-General, who asked them to withdraw their armies from the Nerbudda. Sindia gave the Resident to understand that their armies were within their own territories; that they would not march to Puna, "that they had already given to the Governor-General assurances in writing that they had never any intention of subverting the treaty of Bassein, (which assurances by the way, he said, were unequivocal proofs of their amicable intentions), and lastly, that the treaty then contemplated between

himself and Holkar was not yet final. He also said that until it was definitively concluded, he did not see his way to finally returning to Hindustan." This explanation was not satisfactory to General Wellesley, who was now brought with a large army from Mysore to watch the movements of the Mahratta chieftains.

The latter then proposed that their armies should retire to Burhanpore, at the same time that the British troops were withdrawn to their usual stations. This proposal being refused by the British Resident, a second was offered by the Mahratta chiefs. They asked the Resident to name a day on which both the Mahratta and British armies might withdraw to their respective stations. But even this just proposal, the Resident set his face against. Thirdly and lastly, they requested General Wellesley to fix a day himself on which both their and the British armies should begin to march, and also the hour at which the British troops should reach their stations, that they also might so regulate their marches as to arrive at their destination at the precise moment. In conclusion, they added most reasonably if this that their last proposal were rejected they could not retire to their kingdoms without injury to their honour and dignity. But General Wellesley was deaf to all such proposals, and hostilities, which involved the whole of this vast Indian Peninsula in a terrific contest, soon commenced. Be it said in all fairness that Lord Wellesley is personally liable for this most unjust war. To deliver down-trodden and miserable subjects from the yoke of native misrule was not the end the

Governor-General had in view, when he constrained the Peshwa to sign a treaty with the British Government, for the treaty expressly provided against any such interference on the part of the latter. It was his fond desire during waking hours and his dream during sleep to found upon the ruins of the Mahratta empire, a new Empire which should be the crowning glory of his ambitious labours in India.

No blame, whatsoever, attaches either to Sindia or the Rajah of Berar for this aggressive war. As has been just seen, the former gave repeated assurances of his friendly feelings towards the British Government; while the latter sincerely expressed "his solicitude to maintain the relations of friendship which had so long subsisted between the British Government and the State of Berar." When told to remove their armies across the Nerbudda, they justly said, "By the blessing of God, both armies were still on their own territory and no aggression or excesses had been committed." Still, to avoid misgivings and avert war, they were, as has been said above, good and gentle enough to ask the Resident to name a day on which their as well as the Company's armies would leave their present posts and proceed towards their respective stations. But General Wellesley gave no heed to their appeals. What, therefore, can be more evident from these facts than that nothing short of the total overthrow of these princes would satisfy the ambitious Governor. At last, seeing all pacific conduct on their part productive of nothing but disastrous consequences, they were forced to assume a menacing attitude to defend their honour,

The Mah-
ratta chiefs
not to blame
for this War.

their *prestige*, and the glory of their houses: It has justly been said by Mill, that "if the loss of independence is a loss sufficient to summon the most pacific sovereigns to arms, Daulat Rao Sindia and the Raja of Berar had that motive for offering resistance to the Treaty of Bassein."



PART III.

THE SECOND MAHRATTA WAR.

In this war with the Mahratta chiefs the English made very grand preparations. The Commander-in-Chief, Lord Lake, himself led the army in Hindusthan, and the troops in the Deccan were led by General Wellesley. The Mahrattas also made adequate preparations to defend themselves against the greatest English General.

Preparations of the English.

The fortress of Ahmednagar was the place where the first passage at arms between the English and the Mahrattas took place in this war. The place was considered impregnable, and was under the command of one of Sindia's killadars. General Wellesley at the head of an army of 7,000 infantry, 1,900 cavalry and 5,400 native horse, advanced towards the fortress and asked the killadar to surrender. The town was stormed and a battery of guns was opened against the fort. It was soon evacuated by the Mahrattas. The capture of this stronghold of Daulat Rao Sindia made the English masters of all the territories of Sindia south of the Godavery.

Capture of the fort of Ahmednagar.

General Wellesley now marched in the direction of Aurangabad. The confederate chiefs with their armies proceeded towards Hyderabad, the capital of the Nizam. They were, however, avoiding to come to close quarters. General Wellesley on the other hand was anxious for an open encounter with them.

Battle of Assaye.

He saw that it was the intention of the Mahratta chiefs to harass the English army by means of guerilla warfare, and he determined any how to bring them to close combat. It was at first arranged that General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson should march by separate routes to attack the enemy's camp, but General Wellesley, being misled by his guides, heard to his surprise that the Mahratta chiefs, with an army of 58,000 cavalry, about 18,000 infantry and about 100 artillery, were encamped about 6 miles from his station, on the plain of Assaye. The English army without any loss of time at once directed their attack against the Mahrattas. The latter opened a most destructive fire, but the English army advanced steadily to the front. The generalship of Wellesley won for him the day. He had certainly to fight against tremendous odds, and the loss of the English was very great.

General Wellesley thus writes to his brother, the Governor-General, in a letter, dated the 24th September 1803 from the camp at Assaye :

"I found the whole combined army of Sindia and the Rajah of Berar encamped on the bank of the Kaitna River, nearly on the ground which I had been informed that they occupied.....The enemy had altered the position of their infantry previous to our attack ; it was no longer, as at first, along the Kaitna ; but extended from that river across to the village of Assaye, upon the nullah, which was upon our right. We attacked them immediately, and the troops advanced under a very hot fire from cannon, the execution of which was terrible. The piquets of the

infantry and 74th regiment, which were on the right of the first and second lines, suffered particularly from the fire of the guns on the left of the enemy's position near Assaye. The enemy's cavalry also made an attempt to charge the 74th regiment, at the moment when they were most exposed to this fire, but they were cut up by the British cavalry, which moved on at that moment. At length the enemy's line gave way in all directions, and the British cavalry cut among the broken infantry; but some of their corps went off in good order, and a fire was kept up on our troops from many of the guns from which the enemy had been first driven, by individuals who had been passed by the line under the supposition that they were dead.

Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, with the British cavalry, charged one large body of infantry, which had retired and was formed again, in which operation he was killed; and some time elapsed before we could put an end to the straggling fire, which was kept up by individuals from the guns from which the enemy were driven. The enemy's cavalry also, which had been hovering round us throughout the action, were still near us. At length, when the last formed body of infantry gave way, the whole went off, and left in our hands 90 pieces of cannon.

The victory, which was certainly complete, has however cost us dear. Your Excellency will perceive by the enclosed return, that our loss in officers and men has been very great and, in that of Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell and other officers, whose names are therein included, greatly to be regretted.

I cannot write in too strong terms of the conduct of the troops; they advanced in the best order, and with the greatest steadiness, under a most destructive fire, against a body of infantry far superior in number, who appeared determined to contend with them to the last, and who were driven from their guns only by the bayonet; and notwithstanding the numbers of the enemy's cavalry, and the repeated demonstrations they made of an intention to charge, they were kept at a distance by our infantry".

When the Mahratta army retreated, the state of General Wellesley's troops hindered him from pursuing the victory. Fortunately Colonel Stevenson who could not join him before the end of the battle on account of unlooked-for obstacles thrown in his way reinforced him without loss of time. Wellesley now resolved upon disuniting the army of the confederate chiefs that had marched westwards along the banks of the Taptee. He sent intelligence to Colonel Stevenson to attack Burhanpur and Asseergurh which were owned by Sindia. No sooner had Wellesley's plan reached Sindia's ears than the two armies divided, Raghuji Bhonslay marching towards Chandore, and Sindia northward to defend the provinces of which he was threatened to be deprived.

Colonel Stevenson made a descent upon the city of Burhanpore which was abandoned on his arrival. He made himself master of the city and marched against the strong fort of Asseergurh considered as the key to the Deccan. After a tremendous fire for an hour, the garrison agreed to the terms presented by Colonel Stevenson. The result of this fight was

that the whole of Sindia's dominions in the Deccan went into the hands of the English.

Colonel Stevenson was instructed to continue his march as far as the fortress of Gowilghur which was in the possession of the Raja of Berar.

In the first week of November, Jeswant Rao Ghoreparay and another Brahmin came to the British camp seemingly without being vested with any pleni-potentiary powers by Sindia. General Wellesley was not at first disposed to negotiate with them as he considered that they were not empowered on behalf of their master to transact any business. After some time, on the presentation of a letter from Sindia vesting them with certain powers of representation, they were admitted as ambassadors. They prayed for an armistice for both the united Mahratta armies. The English General refused any cessation of hostilities with the Raja of Berar on the ground that the latter had not sent any ambassador. With regard to Sindia he said that he could enter into a settlement of all disputes with him, provided Sindia's army lay at a distance of 20 cosses from the British army. Wellesley was led to this step on the consideration that if hostilities went on without any remission, Sindia would check the movements of Colonel Stevenson, and if the English army were to pursue Sindia and his cavalry, they would be allured very far from their sources of supply and be thus prevented from carrying out their plans against the Raja of Berar. Besides, he feared the enemy might enter Guzerat, the defence of which was very insufficient.

Sindia
sends an am-
bassador to
Wellesley to
negotiate.

He now marched in the direction of the fort of Gowilghur to render assistance to Colonel Stevenson. Munno Bapu, brother of Raghuji Bhonslay, was encamped at a place not far from Elichpore, with a large army, and Sindia with his cavalry was loitering at a place 4 miles from Munno Bapu's encampment. Colonel Stevenson thinking it inadvisable to proceed any further halted for the approach of Wellesley's army. The Mahratta Commander retired on being apprised of this union of the two British armies. When however Wellesley made preparations for encampment, he saw the Mahratta army on the plains of Argaoon. He thought of attacking them immediately and advanced with his infantry in the van, and the Moghul and Mysore cavalry in his two sides. A raking fire was at first opened by the Mahratta artillery before which the Native infantry of the British line were confounded. The armies of Wellesley who had shown so much courage in the field of Assaye, were to a man, panic-struck and fled in confusion. Luckily, Wellesley himself was near and he succeeded in reviving their spirits and rallying them back to their position. After this, the British army advanced with regularity. Sindia's cavalry made a gallant charge upon the English regiment, but were driven back with great slaughter. There was a great confusion among the Mahratta troops and they left the field leaving 38 pieces of cannon which were taken possession of by the English.

After this victory, Wellesley marched in the direction of the fort of Gowilghur, situated on a very high hill in a chain of mountains lying between the

rivers Purna and Taptee. There were serious difficulties in the way of carrying stores and ammunitions. The British troops were divided into two corps, with the object of attacking the fort from two different directions. On the 12th December 1803, Colonel Stevenson raised two batteries in front of the north face of the fort. On the same night, the detachment under Wellesley raised a battery on the mountain towards the southern gate of the fort. The bravery of the Rajput chiefs who were in charge of the fort could not check the assailants. They had not the skill and judgment necessary for concerting a plan of defence. They at last abandoned the fort as lost. The Rajputs, like their heroic forefathers who fought against the early Moslem invaders, proclaimed the performance of the ceremoney of Jahar. For the last time in Indian History, the Rajput women entered the fire without flinching, and the men opened the gates, and sword in hand threw themselves upon the serried ranks of the enemy and were killed to a man.

From the gallant exploits of General Wellesley in the Deccan, it is necessary to turn our attention to the state of affairs in Hindusthan and to see what was taking place there under the guidance of the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Lake.

State of
affairs in
Hindusthan.

It was with serious apprehension that the English looked upon the attempt which the French were making of setting up a state on the banks of the Jumna. What they were apprehensive of was that Native troops were at this time being disciplined by European officers. We have seen that DeBoigne's

The French
State on the
Jumna.

Indian career became a great success. Having made himself master of a large fortune he retired to Europe in 1798, leaving his place to be filled up by Perron. The antecedents of Perron were not so glorious as that of his predecessor. He was a sailor when he came to India. His natural endowments however soon brought him into prominence. On succeeding to the supreme command of Sindia's army he lost no time in adding to and consolidating his own power. He possessed great influence in the Doab. When the Moghul Emperor, Shah Alum, and his capital, Delhi, had fallen into the hands of Sindia, Perron was appointed by the latter as Commandant of the Fortress of Delhi. Sindia being constantly in the Deccan, M. Perron was the virtual master of Delhi and the country around it.

This was the French State which caused the Marquis of Wellesley great anxiety and apprehension, and for the instant subversion of this State, Lord Lake proceeded under instructions from the Governor-General.

It was however the intention of the Governor-General to effect his object not only by carrying out a warlike policy but also by means of a policy not commendable to any man with just and righteous principles.

General Perron was entirely relied upon by Sindia. The latter was, as we have seen, busy with his affairs in the Deccan and he depended entirely upon the fidelity and the good sword of his French General for the management and protection of his territories in Hindusthan. The Governor-General now thought

of any how removing him from the service of Sindia. His instructions to Lord Lake embodied in a letter of his to the latter were as follows: "It would be highly desirable to detach M. Perron from Sindia's service, by pacific negotiation. M. Perron's inclination certainly is, to dispose of his power to a French purchaser; I should not be surprised if he were to be found ready to enter into terms with your Excellency; provided he could obtain sufficient security for his personal interests. I empower your Excellency to conclude any agreement for the security of M. Perron's personal interests and property, accompanied by any reasonable remuneration from the British Government, which shall induce him to deliver up the whole of his military resources and power, together with his territorial possession, and the person of the Moghul, and of the heir apparent, into your Excellency's hands. The same principle applies generally to M. Perron's European officers. And the proclamations with which I have furnished your Excellency will enable you to avail yourself of the first opportunity of offering propositions to those officers, or to the several corps under M. Perron's commands."

Lord Lake was to some extent successful in his attempt as Perron shewed his inclination to withdraw. Battle of Alighur. He set out from Cawnpur with a view to carry on military operations in the territories under the sway of Perron, entering them in the month of August, 1803. The head-quarter of Perron was at Alighur.

The garrison of Alighur were, however, not to be lured by any temptations that he held out, and they

were determined to resist to the last. Lord Lake was therefore obliged to take the fort by assault. It was a very strong place surrounded by a deep ditch and a fine glacis. Lieut-Colonel Monson led the attack. The garrison within the fort made a desperate resistance, but they were unsuccessful. Monson and 10 English officers were wounded. But the fort fell into the hands of the English. Perron came to an understanding with the English General. He quitted the service of Sindia, and retired with his family and fortune to Lucknow. His withdrawal from the scene at this critical time had the effect of damping the spirit of the Mahratta troops.

Having secured the fortress of Alighur, Lord Lake proceeded to Delhi and reached Sekundra on the 9th September 1803. On the 11th, when he had made an advance of 18 miles beyond Surajpur, he came to learn that a French officer, Louis Bourquin, who was one of the commanders under Perron, had come out of Delhi and crossed the Jumna availing himself of the darkness of the night with a view to oppose the main body of the English army under Lord Lake. Scarcely had the latter, wearied with long journey, pitched their tents, when their outposts were attacked by the troops of Bourquin. Though the army under his command was superior in number to that of Lord Lake, yet the latter ordered his army to advance. A heavy fire kept up by the enemy however made them fall back. The horse of the Commander-in-Chief was shot under him. He however was obliged to make recourse to a trick. He saw that the Mahrattas were stationed at a position

of vantage and it was necessary to draw them away from that position before it was possible for them to do anything. He therefore seemingly began to retreat. The Mahratta army thinking that the British troops were falling back, came out from their position in all the glory of a victory. When, however, the former had come out to some distance, the latter began to charge upon them and threw them into confusion. At last they took to their heels, leaving 68 pieces of cannon in the field of battle. Louis Bourquin and some other French officers surrendered themselves to the British General.

The next morning, Lord Lake encamped opposite the city of Delhi. This ancient city, once the seat of grandeur and glory, was only a miserable prison house for the representative of the house of Timur. The aged and blind Emperor, Shah Alum, over whose head eighty years of trouble and misery had passed, was now possessed of no power whatever. He received sometime back a letter from the Governor-General in which he was asked to place himself "under the protection of the British Government," and was told "that every demonstration of respect and attention would be paid towards His Majesty, on the part of that Government, and that an adequate provision would be made for the support of His Majesty, and of his family and household." In reply, the Emperor wrote to Lord Lake expressing his anxious wish to avail himself of the protection of the British Government. On the approach of Lord Lake the miserable monarch hailed him as his deliverer.

Its effect.

On receipt however of the news of the capture of Delhi, the Governor-General changed his tone. He wrote to the Commander-in-Chief directing him that only "so much regard should be paid to the comfort and convenience of His Majesty and the royal family as was consistent with the due security of their persons," *i.e.* in other words, as Mill says, their imprisonment. No territories were restored to him, not even those of which he was dispossessed by Sindia and which the English recovered from him. The unfortunate Emperor remained in the same state of thralldom with only a change in the persons having authority over him. The English henceforth became the *de facto* masters of the Empire.

Lord Lake left Lieut.-Colonel Ochterlony in the supreme command in Delhi, and himself marched against Agra on the 24th September, 1803. On the 2nd October he was reinforced at Mathura by troops from Futtehpur. On his arrival at Agra on the 4th October, he found it occupied by a large body of troops and defended by a strong fort, seven battalions of Sindia's army having been denied admittance into the fort lest they should claim a share of the riches it contained, were scattered about the town, occupying the Mosque and the adjacent ravines. Lake thought it prudent to dislodge them and attacked the town and the ravines simultaneously. While making an attempt to take possession of the guns of the Mahrattas, the troops employed in the ravines were exposed to a heavy fire of grapes and match-locks from the fort and suffered greatly in men and officers. The soldiers to the number of 2,500 after an

obstinate resistance agreed to transfer their services to the English. In the meantime, some of the Mahratta leaders offered to lay down their arms.

In consequence, the English-General ordered a cessation of fire for sometime and requested that a trustworthy person might be sent immediately with the terms of the treaty. The garrison of the fort however re-opened fire. The British army in their turn resumed firing. On the 17th October, when the Mahrattas perceived that the English would very likely succeed in making a breach, the garrison proposed to evacuate, on the English stipulating for the safety of their persons and private property. The fort was then easily taken.

The treasure found in the fort amounting to £280,000 was divided among the troops as prize money.

The resources at the command of Sindia were still sufficient to enable him to send from the Deccan an army of 17 well-trained batteries to recover Delhi from the English. While Lake was laying the siege of Agra, this army quartered themselves at a distance of about 30 miles from him. This detachment caused Lake great disquietude, and on the capture of Agra he set out in search of it. On account of the weather he could not, however, make great progress in his march. Lake urged on his soldiers to advance although he was under the necessity of leaving his heavy guns and baggage at Futtehpore. He advanced only with his cavalry at midnight. He found the enemy occupying a position with their right upon a stream, their left on the village of Laswari,

Battle of
Laswari.

and their front defended by artillery. Misled that they were in retreat, Lake determined to fall upon them immediately with the cavalry. Accordingly, he ordered the first brigade under Colonel Vandeleur to attack the left of the enemy. They broke through the line and penetrated into the village Laswari, from which the battle takes its name, but Colonel Vandeleur fell in the charge. A tremendous fire from the Mahratta artillery hewed down men and horses in large numbers. The General accordingly ordered them to withdraw. The other brigades, who had attacked them at other points, were constrained to retreat. The infantry and artillery left behind advanced in the meantime and the Mahrattas seeing Lake reinforced by them, sent a proposal to surrender their guns on certain conditions. Lake accepted the offer, "anxious," to use his own expression, "to prevent further effusion of blood." The Mahrattas shewed signs of indecision and Lake granted them an hour's time.

As the Mahrattas sent no information after the sanctioned time had passed, the General ordered the army to advance. As soon as they came in sight of the Mahratta army there was a brisk fire from both sides. The loss on the part of the British troops was great, but nothing daunted they steadily advanced. For a time, the Mahrattas held their ground very resolutely, only yielding when the bayonets were at their breast. Their valorous and highly disciplined conduct in the action was creditable to them. After an obstinate and desperate fight they were thrown into great confusion. Some of them surrendered to the English. The loss of the latter was also great.

This battle put an end to the dreams of power and independence cherished by Sindia.

Fighting, though on a smaller scale, was also going on in other parts of India. Colonel Woodlington in Guzerat, Colonel Powell in Bundelkund, Colonel Harcourt in Cattack and Colonel Murray in Broach (the only seaport of Sindia) succeeded in achieving brilliant victories over the Mahrattas.

Fighting
on a smaller
scale in other
quarters.

Daulat Rao Sindia, thus defeated by the English on all sides, and seeing his territories fall into the hands of the victors, one by one, now felt the necessity of endeavouring to retain to himself some portion of his territories and some degree of power by making peace with a nation destined to be masters of the whole of India. The Raja of Berar had already concluded a treaty with the English, and he was, therefore, obliged to make peace at all hazards without any loss of time.

Daulat Rao
thinks of
making peace
with the
English.

On the 30th December 1803, the treaty of Sirji Anjengaom was concluded between the English and Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindia. By this treaty, the latter ceded to the Company all the country between the Jumna and the Ganges, Broach and its dependencies in Guzerat, the fort and the territory of Ahmednagar, all his territories between the Adjunta Ghat and the Godavery, all territories lying north of the Rajput principalities of Jeypore, Jodhpur and Gohud, renounced all claims upon the Emperor Shah Alum, the Peshwa, the Nizam, the Gaekwar as well as the Rajas who had assisted the British. He also agreed not to keep in his service any Frenchman, or European, or American without the sanction of the

Treaty of
Sirji Anjen-
gaom.

British Government. The fort of Asseergurh, the city of Burhanpore, the forts of Powanghur and Gohud with the territories depending upon them, and certain lands in the vicinity of Ahmednagar were restored to Sindia. It was left optional to Daulat Rao to become a party to the subsidiary alliance with the reservation however that the British Government should maintain the troops without any further compensation from the Maharaja, either in money or in land.

Thus ended the Second Mahratta war. The Governor-General Lord Wellesley in his "notes relative to the peace concluded between the British Government and the confederate Mahratta chieftains" enumerates the benefits which the British Government in India derived from the system of subsidiary system introduced by him and from the success of this war :—

1. The reduction of the power and resources of Sindia and the Raja of Berar ; 2. The destruction of the French power ; 3. The security against its revival ; 4. The annexation of the British dominions of the territory occupied by Perron ; 5. The annexation of other territories in the Doab, and the command of the Jumna ; 6. The deliverance of the Empéror Shah Alum from the control of the French ; 7. The security and influence derived from the system of alliance with the petty States along the Jumna against the Mahrattas ; 8. The security and influence derived from the possession of Gwalior, and the subsidiary force established in Gohud ; 9. The means of defence derived from these same fountains against any other

enemy on the North-Western frontier ; 10. The advantages both in security and wealth derived from Katak ; 11. The advantages derived from the possession of Broach, which left Sindia no communication with the sea or with the transmarine enemies of the British Government ; 12. The security derived from Broach against the intrigues of the French with any Native State ; 13. The additional security bestowed upon the British interests in Guzerat by the possession of Broach, and the abolition of Sindia's claims on the Gaekwar ; 14. The revenue and commerce derived from Broach ; 15. The benefits bestowed upon the Peshwa and Nizam ; 16. The increased renown of the British nation, both for power and virtue ; 17. The "defensive and *subsidiary* alliance with Daulat Rao Sindia ; 18. The power of controlling the causes of dissension and contest among the Mahratta States ; the power of keeping them weak ; the power of preventing their combination with one another, or with the enemies of the British State ; 19. The security afforded to the Company and its allies from the turbulence of the Mahratta character and state.



PART IV.

THE LAST DAYS OF DAULAT RAO SINDIA.

THE treaty of Sirji Anjengaom was concluded rather hastily and was vague in its terms.

Though by this treaty, Daulat Rao Sindia did not become a party to the defensive alliance, still he thought that, sooner or later, he would have to make up his mind to agree to it; moreover, he thought that such an alliance might be formed with favourable conditions to himself at this time, when the British Government would only be too glad to bring him under their subsidiary treaty. The treaty of Burhanpore was then drawn up, by which Daulat Rao agreed to subscribe to the defensive alliance and to permit the cantoning, near his boundary, but within British territory, of a subsidiary force of 6,000 infantry.

It was understood at least by Daulat Rao, at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, that he would retain possession of Gwalior and Gohud. He was mortified on hearing that the Rana of Gohud would make a separate treaty with the English, and that he, —the Maharaja Gwalior,—would be deprived of the place from which the family derives its title. It is strange that he should not have been specifically given to understand before the conclusion of the treaty, the places and kingdoms he was to cede to the English, and everything affecting his vital interests

should have been done at his back. What grieved him more was, that Gohud over which he had absolute control, both by virtue of its being a gift from the Emperor as well as by right of conquest, should be thus made independent of him. As for Gwalior, no one can assert that Sindia ever thought that he would be deprived of its possession. The two great authorities on the subject are General Wellesley and Major Malcolm. It is the former who won for the Governor-General all the glories of his administration, and added feather to his cap, while the latter was the man whose knowledge of Central India was more than that of any other European, and we have on the assurance of both, that Daulat Rao was quite ignorant of the cession of Gwalior to the English. According to the former, Sindia had agreed to the treaty in the fullest confidence that he was to retain Gwalior, and General Wellesley thought that "he would sacrifice it, and every other frontier town ten times over to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith, and that the advantages and honour we had gained in the last war and peace must not be frittered away in arguments, drawn from the overstrained principles of the law of nations, which was not understood in India." Major Malcolm's pleadings on behalf of what seemed to him the just cause of Sindia was received with a reprimand from the Governor-General: "Major Malcolm's business is to obey my orders, and enforce my instructions; I will look after the public interests." The conduct of the Governor-General on this occasion, was, it seems, in keeping with his past conduct, and it was useless for the

experienced officials of the time to expostulate with him for all this, or try to make him understand, that such conduct with the Native Princes could not but fail to awake in their minds suspicion and deep dismay and deeper hatred.

What could Daulat Rao do? He must bow to the Imperial mandate of the Governor-General. Yield he must—otherwise another war, and the contingency of being deprived of a larger portion of the kingdom. And so he at last yielded though with a heavy heart, and received in open Durbar, on the 21st May, 1804, the list of treaties, to which he was required to submit.

It will thus be seen that Daulat Rao was not in the least satisfied with the conduct of the English, and most probably if he had the power, he would not have acceded to the terms.

It was about this time, that the indomitable Jeswant Rao Holkar was carrying on his adventures in Rajputana, and had hopelessly defeated the detachment of British troops under Colonel Monson. The news of this defeat spread like wildfire, and revived the drooping spirit of many malcontents who had, or who thought they had, any grounds of complaint against the British Government.

It was also at this time, that there was the unsuccessful attempt on the part of the English to seize the fort of Deig. No wonder therefore that some of the principal officers of Sindia should have tried to induce their chief to make an effort in conjunction with Holkar and the Raja of Bhurtpur, on some pretence or other, to break off the alliance and regain

his former position. The head of this party was the infamous Sirji Rao Ghatkay. There was, however, another party in the State of Gwalior, headed by the Prime-minister Bappoji. The latter thought and justly, that it was useless fighting with the English, that sooner or later the British lion is sure to triumph, and that it was impolitic to take a hasty step, simply because the English have received these temporary reverses of fortune. His wise counsels prevailed for a time, but he died soon after in the month of October 1804. We see that it was also at this time that Daulat Rao addressed a letter, dated the 18th October, 1804, giving vent to the feelings which had been rankling in his bosom, complaining of the conduct of the British Government, his treatment by them, and as the Governor-General said of it, "tending to implicate the justice and good faith of the British Government in its treatment towards that chieftain."

D a u l a t
Rao's letter
to the British
Government.

The chief grounds of complaint, set forth in that letter, were (1) that the British Government had not treated him fairly with regard to monetary transactions, and had not helped him with money for the subjugation of Holkar; (2) that with regard to Gwalior and Gohud, he has been unjustly deprived; (3) that the Raja of Jodhpur was included in the list of princes protected by engagements with the English, contrary to the wishes of the Raja himself; (4) that the lands which were to have been restored as the private property of Sindia, had not been given up, and pensions promised were not regularly paid; (5) that he was not properly protected from external aggression.

¹⁰ In the meantime, with an army of about 40,000 troops and Pindarees, Daulat Rao Sindia marched towards Burhanpore and plundered Sagore. At the same time, Sirji Rao, with a view to bring about an irreconcilable quarrel with the English and his son-in-law, plundered the British Residency. Daulat Rao, after halting for a short time in the neighbouring provinces, directed his march towards Bhurtpore, ostensibly for the purpose of bringing about a settlement between the English and the Jaut chief. But his amicable professions were soon understood by the English. It is also strange that Daulat Rao should have shewn such weakness at this time. The loss of Gwalior and Gohud was still rankling in his bosom, and he sometimes thought of taking advantage of the crisis and throw in his lot with Holkar, but his second thought made him think before taking any decisive step. Under these circumstances, he knew not what to do. The Governor-General and General Wellesley were also anxious that at this juncture there should be no rupture with Sindia, and told the latter to return to his capital. Sindia answered that his finances were such that it was difficult for him to do so, and asked for pecuniary assistance. General Wellesley wrote in support of his statement to the Governor-General, and Sindia, instead of marching towards Bhurtpore, retraced his steps.

Just at this time, Ghatkay marched with a large army towards Bhurtpore, but not with Sindia's knowledge or consent. But before his arrival to the scene of action, he saw, to his utter disappointment, that peace had been concluded between the English

and the Raja of Bhurtpore. Here he met with Holkar, and came back to the camp of Sindia at Sabulgar with Holkar, and plans were being devised to make another attempt against the English. But all the parties were exhausted, and they had nothing wherewith to carry on war. At last it was resolved by Sirji Rao that Ambaji Ingolia, who had the reputation of being a very wealthy man, was to be plundered, and, with this object, he was confined and subjected to the most exquisite tortures ; 55 lacs of rupees were thus extorted from the unhappy man, and with this sum preparations for a renewed fight were determined upon.

The Governor-General now thought of reducing the power of Sindia. He thought that "Sindia must not be permitted to retain the rights and privileges of an independent State ; nor any privileges to an extent that might, at a future time, enable him to injure the British or their allies, and that the British Government must secure the arrangement by establishing a direct control over the acts of his Government—experience having sufficiently manifested, that it was in vain to place any reliance on the faith, justice, sincerity, gratitude or honour of that chieftain." Lord Lake now moved towards the place where Sindia was stationed, and the latter retreated towards Kotah. At this time, Sindia came to his senses and removed his infamous father-in-law, and placed Ambaji on the *guddee* of the Prime minister. Better counsels now prevailed in the camp of Sindia, and the result was that Holkar and Sindia soon fell out among themselves.

The Governor-General thinks of reducing the power of Sindia.

Sindia removes Ghatkay and appoints Ambaji.

The meeting of Jeswant Rao Holkar, Daulat Rao Sindia, and Amir Khan justly produced in the minds of the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief, feelings of apprehension, and though they were at heart desirous of averting a war, still, by force of circumstances, they were obliged to be ready against any immediate attack by the confederate chiefs. Lord Lake wrote a letter on the 17th June to Daulat Rao, asking him to release the officiating Resident, Mr. Jenkins, who, it will be remembered, was, sometime ago, plundered and detained in custody of Sirji Rao, but who was treated with the utmost respect by the Maharaja himself. Daulat Rao, who had now freed himself from the yoke of Sirji Rao, now became alive of his real position, and wrote a letter to the Resident on the 27th June asking him to write to the Governor-General to waive his dismissal, "because it would give an appearance of enmity to the relations of the two States." Lord Wellesley was equally anxious for peace, and thought under the circumstances that it was proper to give up Gwalior and Gohud to Sindia, and conclude a peace with him. Just at this time, Lord Cornwallis succeeded Lord Wellesley, and arrived in Calcutta, on the 30th July. His arrival produced a total change in the policy of administering India.

Soon after his arrival in India, Lord Cornwallis, with a view to settle all disputes and to put a stop to further aggression, determined to proceed in person to the upper provinces, and, by means of policy of conciliation, restore confidence in the Native Princes who had, by the policy of aggrandisement and conquest

of Lord Wellesley and the Commander-in-Chief Lord Lake, arrayed themselves against the English, and who had thought that the latter were determined to subvert their power and independence. He marched in person to the North-Western Provinces, and, in the progress of his journey, he wrote a letter to Lord Lake, defining the policy he will pursue with regard to the various princes and specially with regard to Sindia and Holkar. In that despatch he distinctly states, "that the first and most important object of his attention was a satisfactory adjustment of all differences between the British Government and Daulat Rao Sindia." He also sent a letter to the General to be sent to the Maharaja (perhaps the last document upon which he affixed his signature) in which, with a view to restore confidence in his mind, and with a view to bring round the prince to his side, he describes the policy which he will pursue with regard to them all. He writes, "You cannot be ignorant of the general principles which governed my conduct towards all the States of Hindusthan and the Deccan, during the period of my former administration of the Company's affairs. It was the uniform maxim of my Government to cultivate the friendship and confidence of surrounding States, by abstaining from any encroachment upon their rights, privileges and independence, and from all interference whatever in their internal concerns and in their transactions with each other, and by promoting the adjustment of all dependent questions, upon principles of justice, equity and moderation, to refrain from the prosecution of any views of conquest or extension of dominion,

and to limit my attention to the internal prosperity of the Company's possessions, and to the happiness and tranquillity of the Company's subjects.....I have returned to this country with a resolution to regulate every act of my administration, by the same just and moderate principles. The States, which are disposed to remain upon terms of amity with the British Government, and to abstain from the prosecution of designs, injurious to its interests, will have no cause to apprehend any design on our part to establish over them any degree of control or to interfere in any manner in their internal concerns." The letter concluded by saying that as the British Resident was released, Lord Lake would open negotiations with him for restoring to him Gwalior and Gohud.

It must be mentioned in this place that the letter was not despatched to Sindia by Lord Lake as soon as it was written, or was intended by the Governor-General to have been despatched, but was detained by the Commander-in-Chief on the ground that if Sindia at once becomes aware of the policy of the Governor-General, he might not accede to any terms favourable to the British cause.

The Marquis of Cornwallis died before the letter which he had despatched was received by Lord Lake. Sir George Barlow, the senior member of the Governor-General's Council, an experienced Civilian, succeeded him as the supreme ruler of this vast Empire. He had long been in the country, and had gained much wisdom by experience. He justly considered that it was absolutely necessary, at this present juncture, to follow a pacific policy, that the English had already

gone too far in their career of conquest, and that they should, at least for the present, put a stop to further advance. Having this sound view in sight, he determined to follow implicitly the footsteps of his immediate predecessor. He described his policy as one "directed to the divesting ourselves of all right to the exercise of interference in the affairs of the native princes, where we possessed it almost to an unlimited extent by treaty, and to the withdrawing of all concern whatever in the affairs of every State beyond the Jumna. He considered this policy as one in conformity with the principles, laid down by Parliament with the orders of their honourable masters, and with his own convenience of expediency."

In the meantime, matters had taken a decidedly favourable turn in the Durbar of Sindia. The evil genius of Daulat Rao Sindia, his father-in-law, Sirji Rao Ghatkay had no more anything to do with the transactions of his Court. Sindia had enough of him. He had been the cause of much useless misunderstanding between the English and the Maharaja. Better counsels now prevailed in the camp of Sindia under the guidance of Ambaji Ingolia, and the latter was favourably disposed to an alliance with the English. Sindia himself now clearly perceived that such an alliance would, under the present circumstances, be productive of good. Such was the state of things when Munshi Kavel Nyne, an old and trusted friend of Sindia, but who was now a refugee at Delhi for fear of Ghatkay, was sent for by Colonel Malcolm with the concurrence of Lord Lake. It was settled that one of Kavel Nyne's relations should tell Sindia that

Better state
of things in
the court of
Sindia under
Ambaji Ingolia.

an amicable settlement could be come to with the English through his intervention. This was carried into effect. Sindia himself thought this a very good opportunity to mend all matters and bring about harmony between him and the English. Accordingly he sent proposals through Kavel Nyne. The Commander-in-Chief, however, in reply informed Sindia that so long as the British Resident was not released there could be no settlement of any dispute. Sindia gladly set him free. But this was not all. It must be remembered that the letter of Lord Cornwallis to Sindia was not yet sent to the latter, but was detained by Lord Lake, because he did not at all like the idea that Indian princes should ever come to know that the English were eager for peace, or that a pacific policy was henceforth to begin in the administration of the empire. He wanted to keep them always in awe of the British power, to terrify them with drawn swords, to make them, ever and anon, suppliants for favour at the hands of British officials. Such was the idea that always predominated in their minds, and from what followed, it is clear, beyond all doubt, that what we state is no exaggeration of facts. Colonel Malcolm, trained in the school of Lord Lake and Lord Wellesley, thought a military display just at this time as absolutely necessary, so that Sindia, in sight of an English army, might not waver, and that the English might conclude a treaty with advantage. A sum of 3 lacs of Rupees was with difficulty raised, and Lord Lake took the field in "grand style." Munshi Kavel Nyne was taken along with the army. The terms of the treaty were at length settled;

through the exertion and influence of the Munshi, and subsequently ratified by Sindia and signed on the 25th November, 1805. The principal provisions were that the river Chumbal was to form the northern boundary of Sindia's territory. Gwalior and Gohud, the places for which he had longed so much were restored to him, but he was told that they were given to him, not because he had any right to them, but because he was a friend and an ally of the English. He was to consider them as gift, pure and simple. Sindia was to pay 3 lacs of Rupees to the Rana of Gohud. The British Government bound itself not to make any treaties with Udeypore, Jodhpur, Kota or any of the chief tributary princes of Sindia in Malwa, Mewar or Marwar or to interfere in any arrangements he might make regarding them. The British Government was to cease paying any more any pension to the officers of Sindia, but it agreed to pay as pension 4 lacs of Rupees to Sindia personally, 2 lacs to his wife and a lac to his daughter. Sirji Rao Ghatkay was no more to have anything to do in the councils of the Gwalior Durbar, or to have any appointment under Sindia. The English further agreed not to return to Holkar any of his family possessions in the provinces of Malwa, which might have been taken possession of by Sindia. It was also stipulated that the English were not to interfere with either Holkar or Sindia with regard to any arrangements that they might make with regard to territories north of the Taptee and south of the Chumbal. Sindia on his part relinquished claims to the districts of Dholpur, Bari and Rajkerrah.

Conclusion
of a treaty
between Sin-
dia and the
English
through
Munshi Ka-
vel Nyne.

Such were the principal provisions of the treaty, concluded between the English and Sindia. The terms were fair, nay, they were liberal, and we are bound to admit that Sindia was a gainer from whatever point we might consider about the terms.

After the conclusion of the peace, for a long time, nothing of any importance happened in the Gwalior Durbar, nor do we find the Maharaja engaged in any wars outside his dominions. He had suffered much, he was in need of rest, and he eagerly embraced this opportunity not to mix any more with the politics of other States or chiefs. But the lawless soldiery who had made it their trade to live upon plunder could not be kept under control. Before the treaty they had a large field of action. The rich and fertile tracts on the banks of the Jumna had been prey to their incessant attacks. But now that they were bound, hand and foot, they fell back upon the devoted subjects of the Gwalior Raj. The troubles of the poor people knew no bounds, and the whole country was a scene of anarchy and woe. "Armies, accustomed to rapine and violence in extensive regions, were now," writes Captain Grant Duff, "confined to tracts comparatively small; the burden of their exactions became in many places intolerable, and districts, before cultivated and populous, were fast running to waste and *violence*." The result of all this was as might have been expected. The hapless people groaned under oppression, but they had no body to whom they could represent their grievances. The Maharaja had an empty exchequer, for he could not fleece the unhappy subjects twice over.

The result of all this, was, that after remaining for a long time aloof from all civil dissensions, his patience was tired, and he began to raise his head to see if there is any thing by which he might gain.

Like the Nizam and some other Governors of provinces, Dost Muhammad Khan founded the small kingdom of Bhopal during the latter part of the reign of the Emperor Aurangzeb. During the latter part of this century, Ghous Muhammad was the ruler of Bhopal, but the real power was wielded by Vizier Muhammad. He was a man of great ability and courage. Among the fendatory chiefs from whom Sindia levied or pretended to levy subsidy, Bhopal was one. It was now contemplated by Sindia and Bhonslay to partition the small kingdom, and with an army of 60,000 men the two Mahratta chiefs marched against Bhopal. For nine months the persevering Vizier defended the kingdom with unabated zeal and untiring energy against enormous odds. At last by death and desertion the Bhopal army was reduced to about 200 men, and the small principality was about to fall an easy prey to the Mahrattas, when providentially for Bhopal the Nagpore general, himself a Muhammedan, out of sympathy for his co-religionists, deserted Sindia. The latter, thinking discretion the better part of valour, and finding himself thus forsaken by his ally, left the field. In the year following, however, there was another attack by the combined forces, and the Bhopal minister applied for help to the British Government. Lord Hastings thought it a good opportunity for mixing in the politics of the Bhopal State, and instantly took up

The kingdom of Bhopal attacked by Sindia and Bhonslay.

Lord Hastings tries unsuccessfully to mix in the politics of Bhopal.

its cause without consulting with the authorities in England. The British Resident at Delhi was instructed to inform the confederate chiefs that inasmuch as the English had espoused the cause of Bhopal, they should forthwith withdraw from the territories of the Newab. Sindia, who, as we have stated before, considered the Newab of Bhopal as one of his own feudatories, openly said to the English that he had every right to interfere with the politics of Bhopal, and that the English should not interfere in such matters. Vizier Muhammad, who was at heart desirous of avoiding any alliance with the English, was also in the meantime trying to settle all disputes with Sindia, without the intervention or interference of any party. Lord Hastings being apprised of this became sorely indignant, and ordered the Resident not to give any audience to any envoy from Bhopal. But everything was set at rest by the arrival of a despatch from Leaden Hall Street, forbidding the Governor-General to do anything which might give umbrage to Sindia.

The principal event that will engage our attention at this time was the action taken by the British Government against the Pindarees. They were the rabble that followed the Mahrattas and shared with them in all their plunder. They were cemented by no bond of blood or religion, but all of them were actuated by a mercenary spirit. At the time of the dismemberment of the Muhammedan Empire, most men, both Hindu and Muhammedan, who had no means of earning their livelihood by any honourable means, followed the Mahrattas in their fortunes. They were more as camp followers of the Mahrattas

than a regular band of disciplined troops. To plunder was their sole vocation, never to fight. Huran, Burrin, Kareem and Chitoo are the most celebrated of the Pindaree leaders, and under their guidance the Pindarees followed their masters, the Mahrattas, in most of their plundering excursions. It was during the third battle of Paniput that the Pindarees first came prominently to notice, as useless encumbrances which had materially weakened the strength of the main body of the Mahratta troops. Gradually they got into the houses of Holkar and Sindia, and, under their protecting wings, they took shelter for a considerable number of years. They followed the banner of the chieftains of the two most powerful Mahratta houses and were known as Sindia Shahi and Holkar Shahi. Mr. Thornton thus describes them: "Active and enterprising almost beyond belief, and wicked to the full measure which the most ardent lover of horror can desire, their adventures and their crimes were undignified, by any of those nobler characteristics of our nature, which have shed a deceptive glory over actions of great atrocity, and averted from their perpetrators the penalty of unmitigated disgust. No redeeming virtue marked the character of the Pindaree. Even animal courage, often the sole ennobling quality of his profession, he possessed not." It was these people, for the subversion of whose power and for whose extirpation, the Governor-General Marquis of Hastings made preparations on a grand scale—perhaps the grandest ever made in India. The Court of Directors was, however, strenuously opposed at this time against

a policy of extending their dominions any further, but it was not their intention, as they expressly said, to “abstain from a vigorous exertion of military power, in vindication of the British name and in defence of subjects who look to us for protection.” Lord Hastings, with a wise prescience, clearly saw that his own preparations would be productive of but little benefit unaided by the Native Princes, if not by their active co-operation at least by their passive silence. With this view, he opened negotiations with the Native Princes. Sindia, as being one of the most powerful sovereigns, was one with whom negotiations were at once opened. The Peshwa Baji Rao II, who still entertained the vain hope of again establishing the pristine glory and power of his house, was trying to revive in the minds of the descendants of those who had, in days gone by, formed the powerful Mahratta confederacy, a patriotic spirit and make a common cause with the Pindarees. It is also said that the Governor-General had also suspicions that Daulat Rao had received 25 lacs of Rupees from the Peshwa as the price of his assisting the Pindarees and Amir Khan. The army of Sindia, whose sympathy was with the Pindarees, required instant curbing. Lord Hastings, who was apprised of the whole circumstances of the country and the real state of affairs, asked Sindia through the Resident to have his co-operation in the coming struggle, to place his troops under the management of the Governor-General and British commanders. He was also requested to admit temporarily a British garrison into the fortress of Hindia on the Nerbudda and into Asseergurh. Sindia, however,

was still irresolute and knew not what to do. The Governor-General, seeing that he was still wavering in mind, himself at the head of an army marched towards Gwalior. Seeing no other alternative left, he signed the treaty. The principal provisions of it were, (1) that the joint army of Sindia and the English were to attack the Pindarees at once, and the former is to exert all his power to seize the Pindaree leaders and make them over to the British Government; (2) that the territories in the possession of the Pindarees were to be wrested from them and to be taken possession of by the Maharaja, and also by the other princes to whom they belonged, provided they co-operated in putting the Pindarees down; (3) that the Maharaja is never to give any shelter to the Pindarees or freebooters of any class within his dominions, nor allow any of his officers to do so; (4) that the Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindia is the undisputed master of his own troops and resources, and that his troops are to act in concert with the British troops and officers in the suppression of the Pindarees, and that they are also to assist them in procuring supplies when acting within the territories of the Maharaja; (5) that the troops of the Maharaja who are to act jointly with the British troops are to receive payment from the British Government, and the Maharaja in return promised to give up his demands for three years, the payments by that Government to certain members of his family and to ministers of his Government, as well as the tribute to which he was entitled from the States of Jodhpur, Bundee and Kotah, and that these troops should march in a state of complete equipment; (6)

The Govern-
or-General
marched to-
wards Gwa-
lior and a
treaty is con-
cluded bet-
ween Sindia
and the
English.

that the army of Sindia should be stationed according to the directions of the British Government ; (7) that the Maharaja is not to increase his troops without the consent of the British Government, and that his officers are not to enlist any Pindaree or freebooter in the army ; (8) by this article the Maharaja, who had implicit confidence on the friendship and good faith of the British Government, agreed to place the fort of Hindia and Asseergurh under the care of the British Government, but that a killadar, with a body of 50 soldiers are to remain there on part of the Maharaja ; (9) that the British Government was absolved from the provisions of the treaty which restrained it from entering into alliance with the Rajas of Udeypore, Jodhpur, Kotah, Bundee, and other chief tributaries of the Gwalior Raj in Malwa, Mewar or Marwar, whereas the British Government promised in case of their forming an alliance with them to guarantee the payment of the tribute due to Sindia from those princes, and it was also stipulated that Sindia is on no account to interfere in the affairs of those States without the concurrence of the British Government ; (10) that “ if (which God forbid !) the British Government and the Maharaja shall be compelled to wage war with any other State, on account of such State attacking either of the contracting parties, or aiding or protecting the Pindarees or other freebooters, the British Government, having at heart the welfare of Daulat Rao Sindia, will, in the event of success, and of his Highness’ zealous performance of his engagements, make the most liberal arrangements for the consolidation and increase of

his territories." Sometime before this there was a boundary settlement between him and the English. He gave Ajmir and some other districts to the English for lands of equal value. It was at this time that the Peshwa, who was still relying upon his support and patriotism, wrote to him : "Your father, Mahadaji Sindia, agreeably to the orders of the Sircar, went to Delhi, was made a Vizier, acquired a high reputation. He served us with his heart and soul. When you became his successor, you entered into alliance with the English; thus you govern in Hindusthan, and thus you shew your gratitude. In thus serving us, it is befitting you to put bangles on your arms, and sit down like a woman. After my power is destroyed, is it possible that yours should stand?"

The Peshwa's
letter to Sin-
dia.

The letter made Sindia much distressed in mind. He heard the contents and remained silent, and then went to bed. He sent no answer.

It is not necessary, for the purposes of this history, to describe the war with the Pindarees or the treatment of the Peshwa by the British Government, and the defeat of the contingent of Holkar at Mehidpur. They will find their proper place in the history of the Holkar State. It is, however, necessary to say a few words, regarding the last scene of this chapter of events which led to the final subversion of the Mahratta power, and the total annihilation of the Mahratta confederacy. It will be remembered that by the treaty of November, Sindia agreed to give temporary possession of the fort of Asseergurh to the English, himself keeping a killadar and some troops within the fortress. The latter place, however, was

Offence
given to the
English by
the killadar
of Asseer-
gurh.

not taken possession of immediately after the conclusion of the treaty, inasmuch as the hands of the British Government were pressed in other quarters. Jeswant Rao Lar, the killadar of the fortress, however offended the dignity of the British Government by firing on a detachment of the Company's troops which were marching against the Peshwa, as well as by giving protection to some Pindaree leaders. The Governor-General who had no intention to occupy the fortress, made this matter known to the Maharaja, and the latter ordered that Jeswant Rao should give up the command of the fortress and come to Gwalior. The killadar however was heedless of the command of his master, and the British Government was determined to lay siege to it, and occupy it without further delay. Sindia, however, asked the Governor-General not to adopt such a course, but to punish Jeswant as he pleased. It was resolved at last that the fortress should be reduced, and Sindia himself was to furnish troops for the purpose.

Brigadier-General Doveton was entrusted with the command of the troops for the reduction of the fortress. It was after a considerable fight and hard struggle on both sides, that on the 5th April 1809 Jeswant Rao Lar expressed a wish to negotiate, and that on the 9th the English occupied the fortress.

Though the fortress of Asseergurh was taken possession of temporarily by the British Government, yet the Governor-General, thinking that the conduct of Sindia had been dubious, made up his mind not to give it up to that chief. Thus fell the important fortress of Asseergurh and with it the power of the

Mahrattas. "The Mahratta confederacy was dissolved, and, while some of its members were permitted to retain a contracted power, two main limits had been ruthlessly lopped away: the Peshwa was a prisoner, and the Raja of Nagpore, a homeless fugitive. The latter escaped from Asseergurh, in the disguise of a fakir to Berhampore. From thence he proceeded to Lahore where he took up his residence, receiving a trifling allowance from Runjit Singh."

From this time down to the period of his death, Daulat Rao Sindia did not mix in the politics of territories outside his dominions, but led a peaceful, uneventful life and was contented with his lot.

After a career, stormy and eventful, he breathed his last on the 21st March, 1827, at the comparatively early age of forty-eight. We cannot close the sketch of this life without quoting from a despatch of Major Stewart, Resident, Gwalior, dated the 22nd March, 1827, giving a touching and sympathetic description of the death of this man, and giving, in our opinion, a just estimate of his character. We only wish that all political officers were actuated by the same friendly feelings towards Native Princes as this gentleman was towards Daulat Rao. The Major says....."His Highness lay, or rather reclined, on a couch supported by pillows, and a number of female servants were in attendance around him. Behind a purdah, close to him, were Baiza Bai, Rookma Bai and Bala Bai, and their attendants. I was much shocked to observe the sad change that had taken place in the Maharaja's appearance, his arms and upper part of his body had become quite emaciated; his belly and lower

Death of
Daulat Rao
Sindia on the
21st March
1827.

Account
Given by the
Resident of
the death and
character of
Daulat Rao
Sindia.

extremities were greatly swelled. I went up to him, took his hand in mine, and leant over him, so as to hear what he might say. He remained silent for some time, apparently unable to speak. At last he said, in a distinct and audible voice, so as to be heard by every one present, and even I believe, behind the purdah, I wish you to do whatever you think proper. I replied, that everything should be arranged according to His Highness' wishes, and I added some words of consolation and said, I trusted by the blessing of God he would yet recover. He appeared affected, and said, 'By the sight of you, and your friendship,' but he could not finish the sentence. A long pause now ensued, and I at last said, 'Is there anything else that your Highness would wish to say to me.' He replied, I have a great deal to say to you. But after waiting a considerable time he could add no more. I then proposed to retire into another room for a short time, and to return when His Highness might revive a little, and be able to speak. This was agreed to by all present. When I was about to retire, I heard the voice of Baiza Bai suggesting that Dr. Panton should be sent for. I asked the Maharaja if it was his wish that that gentleman should be called, when his Highness made a faint sign of assent. I have been thus particular in giving the expressions used by the Maharaja on this occasion, as they were probably the last words he uttered. I had not retired above an hour to an upper apartment, when the screams of females announced that the Maharaja's life had fled.

"It would be difficult for me to give any adequate notion of the scene that ensued; the cries of women

and the lamentations of men, the uproar, and the tumult, were beyond all description.

“With reference to what I have stated in the last paragraph of my letter of the 20th instant, I immediately determined to remain at the palace, till the Maharaja's body should be carried to the funeral pile ; and a request to that effect was also made to me by Hindu Rao, and the principal persons present. It was very satisfactory to me to find, that though there was a great appearance of grief, there were none of the appearances that indicated an intended suttee.....When, therefore, I was informed that Baiza Bai had declared she would follow the Maharaja, I was certain that it would not be difficult to restrain her. For this purpose, however, I was called on to speak to the lady, with only a thin piece of cloth held up by two females between us.

“It is not necessary to detail all that was said on this occasion. I terminated the discussion by assuming the authority which the Maharaja's dying declaration had, I said, given me, and I desired that she would withdraw to her own apartments. She was at last dragged away by her female attendants. Shortly after, a memorandum, consisting of seven articles, was brought to me purporting to be the Maharaja's last will, but not bearing his signature, the principal of which were, the Maharaja's declared intention to adopt a son ; the appointment of Hindu Rao to be the Superintendent, and another person to be the Mookhtar. In case of the birth of a son, he is to be heir to the possessions ; ‘and,’ it is added, ‘that the adopted son shall be obedient to the orders

of the Maharaja and the Baiza Bai as long as they live.' For the fulfillment of all these intentions he appeals to the support of the British Government.

"It was a singular and melancholy sight to see the Maharaja dressed in his last apparel, adorned with jewels and pearls, seated in his palankeen with his face uncovered, as if still alive, accompanied by all his State elephants and led horses set out on this last procession. He was accompanied to the funeral pile by almost every man in camp, and the tears of the multitude shewed, that however deficient in many of the qualities of a good prince, he was neither a cruel nor a tyrannical sovereign. The Maharaja was, by no means, deficient in understanding, to which, indeed, he owed the salvation of his State amid the wreck of the Mahratta Empire. In conversation, the comparisons and illustrations he used were frequently very striking and happy. His temper was mild and gentle in the extreme, though his courage was never doubted. Whatever may have been the vices and crimes of his youth (and these I believe are more to be ascribed to evil counsellors than to himself), his latter years have been unmarked by any gross violation of morality. Apathy, and indolence were his besetting faults, which, through life, prevented him from ever executing the duties of a sovereign with efficiency. On the whole, when it is considered that he was raised to a sovereignty at that time, the most extensive in India, at the early age of fourteen, and that he was brought up from childhood amid the scenes of treachery and rapacity that characterise a Mahratta camp, it is easy to find an excuse for many

of the errors and vices of his reign. If, in any part of this despatch, I have transgressed the rules of official correspondence, I trust the occasion will plead my excuse. I should be insensible indeed, if I could, with feelings unmoved, report the death of a chief whom I have so long known, and with whom I may of late be said to have been on terms of intimacy. Nor is it the least affecting circumstance attending his death, that the last act of his life showed his unbounded confidence in the justice and generosity of the British Government."

The beginning of his life brings to us the memory of days gone by when the Muhammedan Empire was breathing its last gasp, when the Mahrattas were the arbiter of the destinies of the throne of Delhi, when the struggle for supremacy of this vast Indian continent was being fought out between the Mahrattas and the English. During the first ten years of his life, he was not only the ruler of the greater part Bundelkund and Malwa, but also of a large part of what is now included within the Lieutenant-Governorship of the North-Western Provinces. The principal sovereign States of Rajputana paid him tribute; the Peshwa, to a great degree, counted upon his support, and the Emperor of India and his capital were within his grasp. But the Second Mahratta War came and despoiled him of his power and a large portion of his territories. He lost in this way all the provinces lying between the Jumna and the Ganges by the English. Till his death he remained in possession of the States which he had in 1805.

CHAPTER V.

JANKOJI SINDIA.

DAULAT RAO SINDIA, died in March 1827, without leaving any issue. In spite of the advice repeatedly offered by the Resident, he had delayed taking any steps for the adoption of a successor, till a short time before his death he sent for the children of some distant relations that he might select an heir from among them. His death taking place soon after, the right of adoption devolved upon his widow Baiza Bai, the daughter of the infamous Sirji Rao Ghatkay, who, in accordance with what was believed to be the last wishes of Daulat Rao, and with the consent of the British Government, adopted Mugat Rao, a boy of eleven years. The ceremony of adoption took place with great *eclat* on June 17th, 1827. Mugat Rao was married to the grand-daughter of Daulat Rao by Baiza Bai and placed on the *musnud* with the title of Ali Jah Jankoji Rao Sindia.

The Regency was entrusted to Baiza Bai. This ambitious and unscrupulous woman, the worthy daughter of an infamous father, was ardently desirous of acting as Regent not only during the minority of the young Maharaja, but throughout her whole life. With this view, she, soon after her accession to the Regency, pressed upon the British Government the conclusion of a new treaty, whereby her right, to hold the Regency during the whole of her life

would be expressly recognized. Such, she declared, was the wish of the late Maharaja. But though the British Government refused to gratify her wish, and though in the year 1830, it insisted on her using the Maharaja's seal in all official communications, it did not actively interpose its authority to defeat the artful policy which the Bai had adopted to gain her end.

The Bai kept her ward devoid of all education, and in profound ignorance of State affairs. She did her best to make him utterly unfit to conduct the future government of the country, and subjected him to galling restraints. Her policy was to dwarf the growth of his mind, to nip in the bud the native spirit of self-reliance, to keep him in utter ignorance of the world, and to fill his mind with a sort of vague and indefinite fear of her, that in future he might not shake off her thralldom, and take the Government in his own hands. As she was a woman of great strength of character, she might have gained an easy victory over the youth, and inexperience of her weak-minded ward; but that she did not know how to conduct herself with good sense and moderation. She was naturally violent and overbearing in her temper, and these unpleasant traits in her character were not now certainly softened by the absolute power which she enjoyed. She began to treat her ward with an insolence, which soon became intolerable even to his pacific and modest nature. The petty, vexatious, restraints which were constantly put upon him, at length tired his patience. Baiza Bai might have maintained her power by a proper management of the young Maharaja, and by seasoning

Harsh treatment of the young Maharajah by Baiza Bai.

insolence with a modicum of kindness, but pure unmitigated harshness was fatal to her authority. Unable to bear his thralldom any longer, the young Maharaja fled from his palace, and took refuge with the Resident, (October 1832). By whose efforts a temporary reconciliation was effected, but the reconciliation was but a hollow one, as the seeds of dissension remained as fruitful as before.

In December 1832, the Governor-General Lord William Bentinck paid a visit to Gwalior. This visit was one of great political importance both to the Maharaja and Baiza Bai. Both parties made strenuous efforts to secure his favour and countenance. But the Governor-General's heart was impervious to the sweet voices of adulation. Neither the views of Baiza Bai nor the plaintive suggestions of the Maharaja met with his approval and support. Neither would the Governor-General listen to the pretensions of Baiza Bai to keep the regency in her hands during her entire lifetime, nor did he see fit to pronounce himself in favour of the wishes of the Maharaja to deprive Baiza Bai of the authority vested in her and to assume in person the government of the realm. The utmost that the Governor-General could promise him was that the British Government would guarantee his future right as ruler of Gwalior, and prevent Baiza Bai making any new adoption in prejudice to that right. Lord Bentinck left matters *in statu quo*. Although his policy of strict neutrality and non-intervention was dictated by the noblest of motives, a desire not to bring into undue prominence the controlling power he possessed at suzerain, it

was somewhat ill-timed. It satisfied nobody. It did not help the Gwalior State to get out of the imbroglio into which its affairs had fallen in consequence of the disputes among its rulers.

Within seven months of the departure of Lord Bentinck from Gwalior, the young Maharaja again left his palace and took refuge with the Resident. This incident was the signal for a general outbreak against the administration of Baiza Bai. This lady had by her violent and overbearing temper and by the arbitrary character of her rule, brought upon her the fiercest hatred of all classes of her subjects. The seeds of disaffection were sown broadcast. On the day after the departure of the young Maharaja from the palace, the troops of the State broke out into a general mutiny against the authority of Baiza Bai and shouted for Jankoji Sindia. The tables were now turned, and the Regent was in her turn obliged to seek refuge at the Residency. She was soon after compelled to retire from the Gwalior territories. The authority of the young Maharaja was firmly established, and he was acknowledged by the British Government.

Baiza Bai's
power over-
thrown.

The flight
of Jankoji
was the signal
for a general
insurrection.

A striking example of the policy of non-intervention which at this time guided the British Government in its dealings with the Native States is furnished by its attitude towards these important events which took place in Gwalior. These events were regarded by the Supreme Government neither with joy nor with regret. It neither condoled with the ex-regent for her fall from power, nor congratulated the youthful Maharaja on his assumption of sovereignty. It even

Policy of
non-interven-
tion adopted
at this time
by the British
Government.

went out of its way to record its utter indifference as to whether the Maharaja or the Bai was at the head of affairs in Gwalior so long as the internal order and external relations of that State suffered no disturbance. The Resident was censured for taking part in the late revolution by calling out the contingent in support of the Maharaja's authority ; and it was ruled that the *raison d'être* of the contingent was the suppression of robbers and the expulsion of foreign foes, not the making and unmaking of sovereigns at Gwalior. Baiza Bai, who had taken refuge in British territories, was, it is true, forbidden to make her asylum the centre of intrigues and machinations against the authority of the Maharaja, but no restraints were laid on her returning, if she liked, to Gwalior, and there trying all fair and legitimate means of regaining her lost power.

The Bai remained for a long time in British territories, taking advantage of every opportunity to annoy the actual rulers of Gwalior. She had a vast sum of money, Rs. 3,700,000 at her command which she applied for the purpose of gratifying her malice at the expense of the Gwalior State and its rulers. She carried on incessant intrigues, fomented the disorders of the Gwalior State, and left no stone unturned to undermine the authority of the Maharaja. At last, however, finding from repeated failures of her plans, that there was no chance of gaining her end, she ceased to meddle in the politics of Gwalior, and applied for, and obtained permission to return to that city, and lived there till her death in 1862.

The rule of Jankoji Sindia was very weak and utterly unsuited to the times in which he lived. A ruler of great strength of character was needed at that time in Gwalior to restrain the factions of the State, and curb the turbulence of the soldiery who were in a state of chronic mutiny. Jankoji Sindia was not the man for the occasion. He had not sufficient iron in his constitution. He was not a fit pilot for the vessel of State in those times, perhaps not in any time. He let it drift with the tide of circumstances. Had he chosen a fit man for the post of minister, the mischief which his weakness and imbecility did to the State might have been to a great extent averted. But the minister on whom his choice fell, and who retained the post during the whole period of his reign was no better than he, as deficient in all the essential qualities of a ruler as his minister. This was the Maharaja's maternal uncle Mama Sahab. The inevitable consequence of such a state of things—of incompetency, installed in high place—was that "the Court was one constant scene of feuds and struggles for power among the nobles ; the army was in a chronic state of mutiny."* The only redeeming feature of this miserable administration was that it contrived to remain at peace with its neighbours. In the midst of internal disorders of all kinds, the external relations of the State suffered no change. The Maharaja was especially anxious for the preservation of peace with the British Government.

Jankoji
Sindia as
ruler.

Mama Sahab
as prime
minister.

He zealously seconded the efforts of the British Government to suppress *thuggee* and highway robbery,

* Aitchison.

and made arrangements for the trial and punishment of the convicts and offenders, who might escape from the territories of the British Government, and take refuge within his own dominions. In 1838, when Ambassadors, charged with messages, came from Nepal—messages, which were considered hostile to the British Government,—he arrested them and sent them back. In 1839, he gave up to the Resident an envoy whom Dost Muhammed, the ruler of Cabul, had sent to his Court. Such repeated and signal exhibitions of loyalty and friendship to the British Government had their reward. In spite of the outrageous extent in which disorders prevailed in the State, the British Government did not interpose its sovereign authority to curb them. It never interfered, during the Maharaja's lifetime in any other way than that of friendly advice, in the affairs of the State. It did not act towards it as it had done towards Mysore. It did not lay the strong hand of power on the disorders of the State, thus overriding the authority of the Maharaja. So long as the Maharaja lived, the Gwalior State had nothing to fear from that strong love for order and tranquillity, for the redress of the wrongs of oppressed subjects which has actuated the British Government to meddle sometimes in the affairs of Native States.

In 1840, Jankoji was highly delighted to receive a visit from the then Governor-General, the Earl of Auckland. In Oriental Courts, a factitious and exaggerated value is attached to such visits from high personages.

The most important event of this reign was the reform of the contingent. By the 4th Article of the Treaty of 1817, it had been fixed at 5,000 horse. After the connection of the Pindaree war it had been reduced to 2,000 horse. In 1820, the funds for the support of the contingent stood as follows:—

Reform
the contin-
gent.

Pension of Baiza Bai from the British

Government	Rs.	200,000
Tributes from the Rajput States	„	347,500
Revenues of the districts in Saugor	„	55,000
„ „ „ Khandesh	„	90,000
TOTAL Rs.		<u>677,500</u>

After the flight of Baiza Bai from Gwalior, the revenues from her jagheer were no longer available for the payment of the contingent, as her connection with the State had ceased. Moreover, the districts of Khandesh were soon after restored to Sindia, on condition of his paying instead the sum of Rs. 66,928 a year which was equivalent to the net revenues from them. In accordance with these arrangements, the contingent was reorganized on a reduced scale, necessitated by the reduction of the funds allotted to its payment.


Exchange
of some of
Sindia's dis-
tricts for
British terri-
tory.

The Gwalior Durbar was however required to maintain intact the settlement which the British Government had made with the Bheels in Khandesh and to take every measure to preclude the possibility of any depredations being made by these marauders on the surrounding districts. The Durbar was plainly told that should they be found unequal to the task of maintaining order among these Bheels, the

management of these Khandesh pergunnahs would again be taken in hand by the British Government to be restored no more.

In 1831, Sindia's districts of Deore, Gourjhawe, Chawarpatha, Jhindookhera and Nahirmon were exchanged for the British pergunnah of Eastern Shujawalpore. The revenues of Sindia's districts amounted to Rs. 87,305, while those of Shujawalpore were Rs. 90,939. The payment of Rs. 3,634, the difference, was, therefore, to be made to the British Government by the Gwalior Durbar. Rajan Khan, the brother of the celebrated Pindaree leader Cheetu, had received a grant of land in the pergunnah of Shujawalpore, and the Gwalior Durbar was required by the British Government to respect his rights and those of his descendants. Similar guarantee was extended to three other jagheers. Even up to the present day all disputes regarding the succession to Rajan Khan's jagheer are decided by the British Government. So that Sindia may be said to possess only a qualified sovereignty in this pergunnah of Shujawalpore.

Jankoji Sindia died in February 7th, 1843.



CHAPTER VI.

JAYAJI RAO SINDIA.

JANKOJI SINDIA, like his two predecessors, left no issue. His widow Tara Bai, a girl of twelve years, adopted with the consent of the great nobles and the approval of the British Government, Bhaghirat Rao, a distant relation, then a boy of eight years of age. He was installed on the *guddee* with the title of Maharaja Alija Jayaji Rao Sindia. As the Maharaja was very young and as the Queen Dowager had no advantage over her son in point of age, it was necessary to appoint a Regent from outside the Royal family. Mama Saheb, the maternal uncle and chief minister of the late king, was elected Regent by the assembled chiefs. He appeared to be a person possessed of great influence and certainly attached to British interests. His appointment as Regent, therefore, met with the approval of the British Government.

In a previous report to the British Government about two years ago, the Resident had said that the influence of Mama Saheb was bound up with the life of the reigning sovereign, and that it would vanish on the death of his master. This prediction was verified to the letter. It soon appeared that the power of the Saheb had been buried in the same grave with his late master. For three months, indeed from his accession to the Regency, affairs went on with tolerable smoothness. A battalion of troops, under Iswari Singh, revolted, but the revolt was soon quelled, and

Tara Bai
adopts Bhaghirat Rao,
and the latter
is installed
with the title
of Alija
Jayaji Rao
Sindia.

Decline of
Mama Sa-
heb's power.

perfect quiet prevailed. But it was not a permanent quiet ; it was the ominous calm that heralds a storm. The far-off murmur of the coming storm was soon audible, and it soon burst with appalling fury, overturning not only the fabric of Mama Saheb's power, but also shaking to its foundation the entire political structure of the State.

And, indeed, the circumstances were such as gave little promise of the continuance of tranquillity. A weak and incapable Regent at the head of affairs, an ambitious young widow, occupying the exalted position of mother and natural guardian of the minor sovereign, and susceptible of all those Court influences which even a strong-minded ruler finds it difficult to resist, intriguing factions hankering after power and void of all scruples, an army in a State of chronic mutiny—the presence of all these anarchic elements was certainly ill-calculated to preserve peace for any length of time.

There was in the palace a woman named Morenji or Nurunji who possessed great influence over the young Maharani, Tara Bai. She became a tool in the hands of an ambitious and unprincipled man named Dada Khasjee Walla whom Mama Saheb had appointed Comptroller of the household, but who now wished to subvert the authority of his patron and build his own power upon its ruins. The woman Morenji being won over by this infamous Dada, began to poison the mind of her mistress the Maharani against the Regent, to whisper artful insinuations in her credulous ear, and to flatter her natural love of power. Her proceedings were soon suspected and

she was removed from the palace. But although she was removed, the Dada carried on his intrigues with all his old energy, though with great secrecy. On one occasion, when openly taxed by the Regent with ingratitude and disloyalty, he had the insolence to demand enquiry into his conduct. The Dada was not content with merely sapping the influence of the Regent in the Court. He entered on a more dangerous course. By large bribes and larger promises, he secured the support of a considerable body of soldiers. He likewise alienated most of the nobles from the cause of Mama Saheb.

On the 18th May the Resident received the intelligence that it was the wish of the Maharani that the Maharaja should be married to the daughter of Mama Saheb. The nuptial ceremony took place on the following day with great pomp. Considering that it was an open secret at the time that the Regent was intensely disliked by the Maharani, this gracious wish of her was more than could be explained. To raise the man whom she disliked with her whole heart, and the subversion of whose power was the object of her heart, to the exalted position of father-in-law to the sovereign, was a course of conduct which it is extremely difficult to explain. But even more surprising intelligence awaited the Resident. On the 21st, the Maharani summoned to her presence all the chiefs in camp except Mama Saheb, and the result of the deliberation of this council appeared in the form of a message to the Resident, complaining of the conduct of the Regent and expressing a firm resolve to remove him. All the remonstrances of the Resident

Marriage of
the Young
Maharaja
with the
daughter of
Mama Saheb
and the dis-
missal of the
latter by the
Maharani,

were of no avail. Mama Saheb received this order of dismissal and fled from Gwalior.

"It would be vain," says Thornton, "to enquire at length into the motives of the actors in the extraordinary course of events which raised Mama Saheb apparently to the summit of uncontrollable power only for the purpose of immediately precipitating him headlong into ruin and disgrace." It is impossible at this distance of time to untie this tangled skein of intrigues. It would be equally difficult to find its parallel in all the annals of Court intrigues.

Colonel Malleon is of opinion that "from subsequent events it appeared that she had been made to believe that the Mama Saheb, whose daughter had been married to the Maharaja, intended entirely to supersede her authority." But this explanation is far from satisfactory. The marriage took place on the 19th, on the 21st the dismissal of the Regent was decided upon. Surely, it cannot be believed that within a single day, the 20th October, the insinuations of the courtiers were sufficient to fill her with such strong suspicions, amounting almost to a moral certainty, of Mama Saheb's designs, as to lead her incontinently to dismiss him from power. Surely, if she had any such suspicion, she must have entertained it from a long time past. But, on the other hand, if she had entertained such suspicion from a long time, it is surely impossible to account for her strange conduct in procuring the marriage between the Maharaja and his daughter. The considerations which throw light on one part of her conduct make the other part inexplicable.

The Resident apparently wished to restore Mama Saheb by force of arms. He said, "I do not think it possible to restore the Mama Saheb to power by remonstrance only." But the Governor-General held, and we think rightly, that the removal of a Minister like Mama Saheb, who, as he said, "had proved himself quite unfit to manage men or women," and who though attached to British interests, possessed no energy or genius, should not independently of other grounds, be made the occasion of a military interposition. If such conduct were to be sharply punished, the lot of a Native State under British sway would simply be intolerable: The Governor-General rightly resolved that he would not interfere in the affairs of the Gwalior State, save in the way of remonstrances, so long as the new virtual minister, Dada Khasji Walla, maintained a continuity of policy and did not enter upon a course of conduct in consistent with the preservation of public peace and the paramount sovereignty of the British Government. He thought that a change of men, unless accompanied by a change of measures, could not justify the British Government in resorting to military force. He, therefore, contented himself with authoritatively announcing that "the Gwalior State would be held responsible for all such interruptions of the public peace as might arise out of the maladministration of its dominions."

The Dada, however, did not rest satisfied with displacing the Mama Saheb. He entered upon a course of measures which the British Government could not tolerate with any regard to its dignity.

The attitude of the Governor-General.

Violent measures adopted by Dada Khasji Walla to please the soldiery.

Perhaps he was not so much to blame. He was obliged to adopt these highly injudicious measures by the peculiar position in which he found himself. Raised to power chiefly by the favour of the soldiery, he must needs keep them in good humour if he wished to maintain his power. The army, an overgrown undisciplined rabble of 40,000 men had been massed together at the capital, and conscious of their strength, they laughed the civil power to scorn. The stirring traditions of the days of Mahadaji had inflamed them with an ardent desire for military glory. The remembrance of the crushing defeats sustained during the second Mahratta war, far from damping their ardour, served only to fire them with a new zeal for wiping out the memory of those disgraces. Moreover, the lawless depredations in which these soldiers had formerly indulged on the territories of the neighbouring States, having been checked by the strong hand of British power, they were eager to seize every opportunity to subvert this power and to bring back the old halcyon days of unrestrained slaughter and pillage. Dada Khasji, in order to curry favour with the troops, found it necessary to flatter those hopes and aspirations. And this could not but of itself bring him into courses of action deeply resented by the British Government. He dismissed from the army occasionally with insult and ignominy, all those officers who were favourable to the maintenance of amity with the British power, replacing them by those men who were hostile to that power, and some of whom had, for that reason, been expelled from Gwalior by the late Maharaja at the request of the

Resident. Many of these dismissed officers were Europeans and Eurasians, a circumstance which served to deepen the colour of hostility to British rule, which already tinged the conduct of the Dada. Large masses of troops were likewise concentrated at Gwalior. A demonstration was made for an attack on Scrouge, in the territories of the Nawab of Tonk, where Mama Saheb resided at this time. All these violent measures necessitated the direct interference of the British Government. Lord Ellenborough thought that any further toleration of these violent proceedings would compromise the dignity of the British Government as paramount power of India, and be tantamount to a virtual surrender of that proud position. The presence, too, of vast masses of mutinous soldiers within the territories of the Gwalior State was a standing menace against the tranquillity of the neighbouring States. The existence of this mutinous army was especially to be dreaded at a time when, in the words of the Governor-General, there was "within three marches of the Sutlej, an army of 70,000 men, confident in its own strength, proud of its various successes against its neighbours, desirous of war and of plunder, and under no discipline or control."

Accordingly, about the middle of August, the Commander-in-Chief Sir Hugh Gough was ordered to form a camp at Cawnpore on the evening of the 15th October, and further orders were issued to the effect that an army of exercise, consisting of not less than 12 battalions of infantry with a due proportion of cavalry and artillery, should be assembled on the banks of the Jumna.

The English army ordered to assemble on the banks of the Jumna.

In the meantime, the Resident Mr. Spiers had been replaced by Colonel Sleeman, in whose talents the Governor-General reposed implicit confidence. He had sent to the Governor-General a report, in which he painted the character of Dada Khasji Walla in the blackest colours and declared him to be the root of all mischief. He wrote:—"The Khasji occupies the palace with them, (*i.e.* Tara Bai and the young Maharaja) and never ventures outside the door, night or day. Whenever danger threatens him, he conceals himself in the most secret of the female apartments, from which issue the orders by which the State is governed." Surely, it is absurd to think that such an arrant coward should have made so much stir in the world, and been the cause of a mighty war entailing great sufferings on a large body of men.

The Resident was afterwards removed from Gwalior as a mark of the displeasure with which the British Government viewed the proceedings there.

Though the Resident was withdrawn from Gwalior, yet communications still went on between him and the Maharani. From Dholpore, the Resident wrote to the Maharani in reply to a letter wherein she had invited his return and expressed her earnest desire for the restoration of cordial relations between the two Governments, that the banishment of Dada Khasji Walla was the indispensable preliminary of what she professed to desire. This letter fell into the hands of Khasji Walla, who concealed its contents from the Maharani. When this fact came to the notice of the Governor-General, it evoked expressions of strong indignation. It was declared "to be

an offence of a most criminal character against the State of Gwalior, amounting to a supercession of the Maharani's authority, and the transference of all power in an unlawful manner to himself."

The Governor-General now proceeded in person to the vicinity of the Gwalior State, but before his departure thither he penned an elaborate minute stating his views on the question. In this he pointed out the necessity of a paramount power in India, and said that the British Government was that paramount power, and that it was incumbent on it to maintain that position. "To maintain unimpaired the position we now hold, is a duty, not to ourselves alone, but to humanity. The adoption of new views of policy, weakness under the name of moderation and pusillanimity under that of forbearance, would not avert from our own subjects, and from our own territories, the evils we let loose upon India; and the only result of false measures would be to remove the scene of a contest, altogether inevitable, from Gwalior to Allahabad; there to be carried on with diminished force, a disheartened army, and a disaffected people." From the latter part of the quotation it appears that the Governor-General had little hopes of a peaceful settlement of the dispute with Gwalior. Some remarks, not very happy, regarding the Maharajah, are made in this minute. He is declared to be a boy of poor extraction and altogether uneducated, not "descended from any one of the Family of Sindia who has possessed sovereign authority, but from a remote ancestor of those by whom the sovereignty was acquired." It is also alleged in the minute that "the

The Governor-General's minute on the state of affairs in Gwalior.

prince was elected by the Zenana and the chiefs of the army for their sole benefit, not for that of the people." After such a formidable prelude one would expect to find a sentence expressive of a determination on the part of the British Government to dispossess the youthful prince of his throne. But the reader, to his agreeable surprise, finds no such thing—rather the contrary. "On the decease of the late Maharaja," the minute continues, "the British Government readily acknowledged the succession of the present Maharaja. He was the member of the Family of Sindia, nearest to the deceased sovereign by blood." As Mr. Thronton humorously remarks, "here then after the turns and doublings of the preceding sentences, we arrive at a conclusion to which certainly they cannot be regarded as a preparation." In the minute the Maharaja is described as altogether devoid of education. But this remark is made with far too great a latitude. In a previous report from Colonel Spiers, Resident at Gwalior, it has been stated with regard to the Maharaja that in Mahratta literature "he had made as much progress as boys of his age generally do." Lord Ellenborough could not expect a boy of eight or nine years to be possessed of profound erudition. The phenomenon of a child-scholar like Goethe or Mill is of rare occurrence in any age or country.

Then follows an enumeration of the violent proceedings at Gwalior, beginning with the expulsion of the Regent. Great stress has been laid upon the events in the Punjab after the death of Runjit Singh, which are said to have materially affected

the course of policy that was adopted in dealing with the Gwalior State. It has even been hinted that, but for these events at Lahore, coercive measures would not have been necessary. "Still under ordinary circumstances, we might perhaps have waited upon time, and have abstained from the immediate adoption of measures of coercion, expecting the restoration of our influence at Gwalior, from the disunion manifest among the chiefs, and the usual vicissitudes of an Indian Court. But the events which have recently occurred at Lahore will not permit the resort to a policy, suited only to a state of general tranquillity in India." The Governor-General however thought that it would be sufficient to demand merely the banishment of Dada Khasji Walla. As for the other objects of his policy, namely, the establishment of an efficient Government at Gwalior and the reduction of the already overgrown army, he thought he should be able to accomplish them without difficulty when the sinister influence of the Dada should be withdrawn.

In the meantime affairs at Gwalior seemed approaching to a crisis. There were in the army as well as in the State, two parties—one conservative, which was favourable to the maintenance of friendly relations with the British Government, and which sought to restore the policy of the late Maharaja's reign. The other party was revolutionary, and wished to assert the independence of the State, to cut off all connexion with the British Government and to bring back the traditions of the days of Mahadaji Sindia and Daulat Rao. The members of this party might have commanded our sympathy and respect, had they been

Critical
state of affairs
in Gwalior.

actuated by a lofty patriotism. But no, they were impelled merely by a spirit of restless activity. They passionately desired to revive the memory of Mahratta and Pindaree oppression. They hated the British Government, not because it had deprived the fatherland of its independence, but because it had rendered it impossible for them to indulge their predatory instincts. Had they been actuated by a spirit of patriotism, although we might not have sympathised with their aims, as being neither feasible nor wholesome in that state of India, we would assuredly have applauded their conduct and wept over their fall. But no, they were impelled not by patriotism but by quite unworthy motives. Their restlessness and desire of change differ as much from true patriotism as Vauxhall does from Heaven.

The reader is of course aware that at the head of this party of Revolution was Dada Khasji Walla. But his leadership meant merely a passive acquiescence in whatever his irrepressible followers chose to do and have.

Now, at the time to which the course of the narrative has led us, the conservative party, after enforced silence for a long time, began to make itself heard. They succeeded after a severe struggle, in seizing Dada Khasji Walla. But the Durbar was unwilling to surrender him into the hands of the British Government. The Governor-General, however, issued a declaration to the effect that unless Dada were given up the British army would at once commence its march upon Gwalior. This declaration at first produced no effect, the Maharani querulously replied

that this demand of the British Government that a prisoner of the Gwalior State should be surrendered into its hands, was an altogether novel one, and could not be justified by precedent. But we are inclined to think that the demand was not at all unreasonable. What guarantee was there that Dada Khasji Walla would, if confined within the territories of the Gwalior State, be prevented from ever after interfering in its affairs ? Was it not very probable on the contrary, that within a short time he would recover his old predominance ? The major part of the army was attached to his cause ; the Maharani was favourably disposed towards him, the chiefs of the conservative party, who had assumed a temporary supremacy, might soon be under the wheels of fortune ; and the sun of Dadaji's ascendancy might, after a temporary eclipse, again shine with all its former lustre. Under such circumstances, and in the face of such well-grounded apprehensions, the Governor-General's demand of Dada's surrender was not at all unjustifiable.

Finding the Gwalior Durbar quite loath to surrender Dada, and mere threats of military interposition ineffective in overcoming their unwillingness, the Governor-General, on the 11th December, resolved to set his army in motion. On the following day he wrote a letter to the Maharani declaring his intention. The advance of the British troops towards the Gwalior territories produced the desired effect. Dada Khasji Walla was immediately surrendered and sent under a strong guard to Gwalior.

The Governor-General resolves to march towards Gwalior and the surrender of the Dada by the Gwalior Durbar.

By this time the views of the Governor-General had undergone some changes. Two months ago he had been of opinion that the removal of Dada Khasji Walla from the Gwalior cabinet would be sufficient. He had besides had some ulterior objects, namely, the establishment of a strong Government at Gwalior and the reduction of its overgrown army. He had indeed thought that the removal of Dada from the Gwalior cabinet would enable him to accomplish those objects, and that his sinister influence alone thwarted them. But now the Governor-General was not content with the mere surrender of Dada and the removal of his influence. He now came to the conclusion that the sore in the body politic of the Gwalior State was more deep-seated than he had at first imagined, that the removal of only one person from it would not set things right; and that a thorough change in men and measures became imperative. Perhaps, also, the Governor-General thought that the removal of a single individual was a result quite insignificant and out of all proportion to the vast expenses and trouble which had been incurred in assembling his army and setting it in motion. The readiness, too, with which the Gwalior Durbar had surrendered Dada on the first movement of the British army, betokened, on their part, a fear of British prowess, which might be taken advantage of to extort from them concessions of far greater importance. Accordingly, the Governor-General informed the Maharani that the "movement of the British armies could not be arrested until the Governor-General had full security for the future maintenance of tranquillity upon the common frontier;

nor until there should be established at Gwalior a Government, willing and able to coerce its own subjects, and to maintain permanently the relations of amity with the British Government and its allies."

The Governor-General continued to advance at the head of his army, declaring to the Durbar his wish to settle matters at a personal interview with the Maharaja and Tara Bai. But here a disagreement arose between the Governor-General and the Durbar about a preliminary point. The Governor-General declared his determination to cross the Chumbal and hold the proposed interview at a place within the Gwalior territories. The Durbar, however, earnestly entreated him to alter his resolution. They told him that his crossing the river, (which was the boundary of the Gwalior dominions), before he had a meeting with the Maharaja, "would be a breach of all precedent, and eternally disgrace the Maharaja and the Government of India." They declared their conviction that "if the British army crossed the frontier before the meeting with the Maharaja, the troops of Gwalior, who were already in a state of utmost alarm, would believe that the Governor-General was coming, not as a friend, but with a hostile purpose, that the most serious consequences depended upon the passing of the British army across the frontier before the meeting between the Governor-General and the Maharaja." They even implored him with joined hands to reconsider the matter. Colonel Sleeman, the Resident, likewise wrote to the Governor-General that if the Chumbal were crossed without a previous interview with the Maharaja, it would be impossible to

The Governor-General's determination to cross the Chumbal.

avert a collision with the Gwalior troops. He wrote, "the soldiers talk largely to my people of the army crossing the Chumbal as a hostile movement on the part of our Government." But neither the entreaties and representations of the Durbar, nor the warning of the Resident, could alter the fixed resolution of the Governor-General. He did not pay any heed to them. The utmost he would concede was that he would not advance far after crossing the Chumbal, but that the meeting should take place at Hingona, the first stage beyond the Chumbal. The 26th December was fixed as the day of interview.

It is impossible to justify this strange obstinacy on the part of the Governor-General. Surely, if the crossing of the Chumbal was viewed by the Gwalior people with the utmost repugnance, he should have remained on the British side of the Chumbal to receive the visit of the Maharaja. If the Governor-General wished to bring about a peaceful settlement of matters, he should not have taken a step so well calculated to wound the feelings of the Gwalior people and to rouse their bitter resentment. He would not have suffered a loss of dignity by receiving the visit of the Maharaja on this side of the Chumbal. By taking this step, the Governor-General threw away the only chance of a peaceful settlement of matters at issue. There was a strong conservative party in the State, who, at this time, had the upperhand, and were in favour of maintaining terms of amity with the British Government. And it is at least possible that by their means as well as by the moral influence of the dread of British prowess in which the soldiers

and political parties of Gwalior stood, the Governor-General might have been able to secure his ends without having recourse to force. But the crossing of the Chumbal removed all chances, if ever there were any, of a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Such a gross affront to royal dignity could not but be bitterly resented even by the conservative party. We accordingly find that Bapu Seetalolia Deshmook, who had all along been in favour of maintaining cordial relations with the British Government, and who had gone over to the British camp to negotiate terms of reconciliation, left it on the 25th, soon after the head-quarter of the British army had crossed the Chumbal, went to Gwalior, and assumed the command of a division destined to fight with the British. The few staunch supporters of British interests who still remained in the State hung down their heads in shame. They could no longer urge on the Gwalior Durbar and Gwalior troops the necessity of bowing to the irresistible might of the British Government for fear of being branded as cowards and traitors to their country. The crossing of the Chumbal filled the friends of Dada Khasji Walla with exultation and those of the British Government with shame and sorrow. War became inevitable. The more we think on it the more the conviction grows upon us that the crossing of the Chumbal was the proximate cause of the war, and that without it, the war might in all probability, have been averted. The conservative elements in the State were powerful and might with the aid of the British influence, judiciously exercised, have prevailed over the anarchic elements. But these are vain conjectures.

The 26th of December glided by ; but the Maharani and Maharaja did not arrive at the British camp. Meanwhile, the war party had gained a decided ascendancy in the Durbar. The soldiery were clamorous for war. And on the 29th the British army was fired on by the Gwalior troops. The two battles of Maharajpore and Puniar, fought on the same day, ended in the total defeat of Sindia's army. They performed prodigies of valour and inflicted considerable loss on the British troops. But European discipline, as usual, prevailed in the end, and the valour of the Gwalior troops stood them in little stead.

The Gwalior State now lay at the mercy of the Governor-General, whose policy in dealing with the State was in every way admirable, and worthy of imitation by all statesmen. It was, as Colonel Malleon says, "a masterpiece of policy." It breathed a highly laudable spirit of generosity. It is surprising to find the perpetrator of one of the blackest of political crimes in the records of British India, *viz.*, the conquest of Sindh, dealing with Gwalior in such a generous spirit.

The treaty which restored peace to the Gwalior State consisted of 12 articles. Territories were to be ceded to the British Government yielding an annual revenue of 18 lacs of the Company's Rupees for the maintenance of a contingent force. Other lands were also to be ceded for the payment of the debts of the State to the British Government, and to indemnify that Government for the expenses of the recent war. The British Government should "exert as heretofore its influence and good offices for maintaining the just

territorial rights of the Maharaja, and the subjects of the State of Sindia at present existing in the neighbouring and other Natives States." The Government during the minority of the Maharaja should be carried on by a Council of Regency, which "should act upon the advice of the British Resident in all matters whereon such advice should be offered."

No change should be made in the *personnel* of the Government "without the consent of the British Resident acting under the express authority of the Governor-General." The military force of the State should not at any time in future exceed 9,000 men, of whom not more than 3,000 should be infantry, with twelve field guns, twenty other guns and two hundred gunners.

Thus it will be seen that the British Government acted with great disinterestedness in its dealings with the Gwalior State which was entirely at its mercy. It waived the right of conquest. It did not even take advantage of its helplessness to extort large cessions of territories. And it had its reward. In the dark days of the mutiny, the Maharaja Jayaji Rao Sindia never wavered in his loyalty to the British Government. He refused to listen to the siren voice of ambition, to the dangerous counsels of many courtiers, to the urgent entreaties of the leaders of the mutiny and to the clamorous threats of his unruly army, and preserved his loyalty untarnished even at the imminent risk of his life and crown.

From 1843 to the period of the mutiny, the history of the Gwalior State is a history of peace, prosperity, and progress. On the 19th January, 1853, the

Sir Dinkar
Rao as prime-
minister.

Maharaja attained his majority and soon after assumed the administration. A Brahmin named Dinkar Rao, (now the celebrated Sir Dinkar Rao, K. C. S. I.,) one of the ablest Native statesmen of this century, became the prime minister, about the year 1853. Under his able rule the State made large strides in progress and prosperity. He carried out large schemes of reform in all branches of the administration. He cleared the jungle of vexatious privileges, speculation, bribery and official oppression which had before covered the whole field of the internal Government of the State. He introduced new and improved methods of collecting the land revenues, and lightened the burden of taxation upon the tillers of the soil. He protected the poor from the oppression of the rich, and provided for a strict and impartial administration of justice. His rule diffused happiness and contentment among all classes of the people, except those whose oppressive privileges he now touched upon and who chafed under a Government which repressed their lawlessness with a high hand to which they had heretofore been strangers. This great and able minister was engaged in this useful work when the storm of the Sepoy mutiny ruffled the tranquil surface of Gwalior politics.

From the beginning of the mutiny, Maharaja Jayaji Rao Sindia was true to the British Government. He sent his own bodyguard to Agra, and they gave very great assistance to the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces. He then expressed his readiness to place his own contingent of Sepoys at the service of the Paramount

Power. But unfortunately his own troops caught the contagion of revolt. It spread like wild fire in different parts of Hindusthan. Agra, Delhi, Cawnpur, Lucknow, were all within the grasp of the mutineers. Even many of the British officers at Gwalior were massacred. The mutineers with loud clamours asked the Maharaja to lead them against the English at Agra. But he swerved not a jot from the path of loyalty. True as steel, there was not a stauncher ally of the English in all Central India than the Maharaja of Gwalior. His utmost efforts to keep his troops from joining the mutineers were unsuccessful. The mutineers under Tantia Topee entered Gwalior and they were hailed with joy by the troops of the Maharaja. For the very safety of his life, he and his minister were forced to flee to Agra. On the 17th June 1858, Sir Hugh Rose (afterwards Lord Strathnairn) and his gallant troops occupied Gwalior and established the Maharaja in his palace. The fort of Gwalior was also occupied by the British troops.

For the very valuable services rendered by the Maharaja a treaty was concluded by him and the British Government, dated the 12th December 1860; by which lands yielding an income of three lacs of rupees were restored to him. He also received a *sunnud* from Lord Canning, dated the 11th March 1862, conferring upon him the right of adoption. Permission was also given to him to raise his infantry from 3,000 to 5,000 men, and his guns from 32 to 36. He was also made a Knight Grand Commandar of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India. He was also made sometime after a G. C. B.

Treaty concluded with the British Government subsequent to the mutiny.

After the mutiny, the Maharaja was engaged in concluding several treaties with the British Government, by which he ceded to and also received from the British Government lands some of which were adjacent to his territories. Of these, the cession of ten villages within the Hyderabad territories to the British Government which in turn were ceded to the Nizam's Government by the latter are the most important. The family of Sindia still held suzerainty over these places. "Sindia consented to cede these villages to the British Government on condition of receiving from it an equivalent in lands bordering on his territory north of the Nerbudda, while the British Government were to transfer the ten villages by a separate exchange to the Nizam receiving in lieu of them an equivalent in Hyderabad villages on the Bombay frontier."

After Sir Dinkar Rao had left the service of the Maharaja, Ballaji Chimnaje was appointed Prime-minister. On the retirement of the latter, Gunput Rao Kharkay has been appointed in his place. The entire management of State affairs was however in the hands of the Maharaja. Every department of the State had his personal supervision.

In the Commission which sat to try Mulhar Rao Gaekwar, Jayaji Rao Sindia was one of the members.

He was appointed an Honorary General of the British army during the Imperial Assemblage.

The restitution of the fort of Gwalior by Lord Dufferin in 1885 to the Maharaja came as an agreeable surprise upon the people of India. It was occupied, as has been said above, by the British troops

during the time of the mutiny, and Lord Canning promised to restore to him the fort when this could be done with safety. As however it was considered politic to maintain the cantonment of Morar, it was also considered expedient that the Gwalior fort should be garrisoned by British troops. Eventually, the Maharaja agreed to give up, though unwillingly, his right to the fort on condition of receiving an increase of 12 guns to his artillery, and on condition that his flag should fly on the ramparts of the fort, that he should be saluted from its guns, and that if at any time the British Government should withdraw from its occupation, he should be allowed to occupy it with his own troops.

The Maharaja, however, did not give up all idea of being the possessor of the fort some day or other. The question of its restitution came up before Lord Mayo, but for some reason or other it was shelved. The fortress has a commanding position, and it overlooks every building in old and new Gwalior and the Maharaja's palaces. It is, therefore, but reasonable to suppose that the Maharaja should have cast a longing, lingering look of affection upon a place with which had been associated the glories of his House. And need we say that it was meet justice on the part of the British Government to have restored the fort to him for his unswerving loyalty and staunch support to the Paramount Power.

On the 2nd December, 1885, Lord Dufferin in durbar in the Gwalior palace, surrendered to the Maharaja the fortress, and on the 10th March 1886, the keys of the fortress were given over to the Maharaja's officials.

The following are the most important conditions of the agreement entered into by the British Government with Jayaji Rao Sindia.

“The British Government cedes to Maharaja Sindia the cantonment of Morar, which at the present time is British territory, with all its valuable barracks and buildings, of an estimated value of half a million sterling, and restores to him the fortress of Gwalior, with its barracks, buildings and fortifications. In return for these concessions the Maharaja pays to the British Government the sum of 15 lacs of Rupees, being the estimated expenditure on the fortress and cedes to it in full sovereignty the town and fort of Jhansi, situated some 70 miles South-east of his capital. He also engages to raise no question in connexion with those conditions of former treaties and engagements under which the Government, in consideration of districts assigned, is bound to maintain a certain number of troops within *Gwalior territory* to be used in upholding his authority, should this be threatened by open revolt.”

“The Maharaja is further allowed to raise 3,000 additional infantry to fulfil his new engagements, but engages to raise no more regular cavalry than he at present possesses, viz., four regiments amounting to 2,000 sabres, while under Treaty arrangements he might have maintained twelve.”

Maharaja Jayaji Rao Sindia died at the age of 52 on the 20th June 1886, after a protracted illness, at the Jai Bilas Palace. He possessed some of the qualities of a great ruler. Energy, perseverance,

practical wisdom, he possessed in an eminent degree. His frank, straightforward manner and readiness to listen to both sides of a question made him an impartial ruler. He had at heart the welfare of his subjects. As an instance of this we may cite that when in 1868 there was a great scarcity in Central India, and the people of Gwalior were on the verge of famine, with an energy all his own, he mounted his horse and with a handful of followers rode through the Pergunnah round Gwalior, and after observing the scenes of distress with his own eyes, he called on all ranks to subscribe, to feed the people for six months. Soobahs and officials were addressed, and His Highness headed the list with a donation of Rs. 4,000 in each Soobah.

The administration of His Highness suffers in no way by a comparison with the neighbouring British Provinces. Complaints were seldom heard. Though jealous of any interference in the internal administration of his state, yet the relations which existed between His Highness and the British Government had been always of a most cordial nature. High English political officers have always testified to the sincere desire always evinced by the Maharaja to act in a friendly manner to the British Government and its officers.

He was however a Mahratta to the backbone. He was desirous of maintaining intact the glories and the grandeur of the Sindia family. He was simple and unostentatious in habits and life. His great delight was in manœuvring his troops; and the armies trained under his guidance attained a high degree of efficiency.

CHAPTER VII.

Madhoji Rao Sindia.

JAYAJI RAO SINDIA has left behind him a son, Madhoji Rao Sindia, who was born on the 20th October 1876. "He is," says Colonel Bannerman, the Resident at Gwalior, "a remarkably nice boy of good physique and pleasant appearance, he is of an intelligent disposition and good manners and has already shown great aptitude for study." His succession was formally acknowledged by the Government of India in letter No. 2336-1, dated the 8th July 1886, from the Foreign Secretary, and he was installed under the orders of His Excellency the Viceroy by Sir Lepel Griffin, Agent to the Governor-General, on the 3rd July 1886.

We fervently hope that the young Maharaja will tread in the footsteps of his illustrious father, that he will avail himself of the benefits of English education and western culture, and that under the guidance of his able Counsellors and Sirdars he will, when vested with full powers by the Paramount Power, try to promote the welfare of his subjects.



CHAPTER VIII.

THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION OF GWALIOR.

GWALIOR, like the other Native States, is, in matters of internal Government, principally a monarchy of an unlimited character. The Maharaja has an absolute authority in all affairs, but this absolute authority is sometimes turned to the best advantage of the people. The people, too, have no room for grumbling at the assumption of uncontrollable authority by their chief, when they see that the chief in whatever he does has one grand object in view—the good of his people. Moreover, from time out of mind the Hindu people lived under the fostering and fatherly care of their chiefs, and had all the time left for their private occupations.

Form
Government

Though Gwalior resembles all the other States in the autocratic principle of Government, the administration of the country is far superior to that of many other Native States. And there are good reasons for this difference. The last Maharaja took a lively interest in the affairs of the State, and did not, as other chiefs are found generally to do, pass his time in hunting and festivities, leaving the management of the State to his ministers. Politics and organisation of his country occupied his time and thoughts. "The Court of Gwalior," says the traveller Rousselet, "does not offer the same attractions to the traveller as those of Baroda and Oodeypoor.....One is somewhat disappointed at the absence

of pomp and display on coming from Oodeypoor and Jeypore."

Though all the Native States are more or less autocratic, the system of representation is not altogether unknown. Relics of ancient elective institutions are found in the Panchayet. It would be a matter of great satisfaction if Local Self-Government and municipal institutions which have been introduced in the neighbouring British Provinces and also in some of the Native States as Mysore, were also introduced here.

While the late Maharaja was alive, he expressed his wishes to the Viceroy that after his death and during the minority of his son, the administration of the country might be carried on by a Council of Regency. After his death, the Representative of the Queen-Empress gave effect to the last wishes of His Highness; and the State is now under the administration of a Council of Regency, presided over by Rao Rajah Sir Gunpat Rao Khurkey who was for 23 years Dewan and Karbari to the late Maharaja Jayaji Rao Sindia.

The Viceroy gave his assent to the appointment of the following sardars and officials of the State as Members of the Council of Regency :—

1. Bapu Sahib Jadov, maternal grandfather of the present Maharaja (in charge of the household).
2. Babu Sahib Sitoley, son-in-law of the late Maharaja (in charge of treasury).
3. Appa Sahib Angria, a powerful jagirdar and noble (in charge of irregular troops).
4. General Bapu Sahib Awar (Commander-in-Chief).
5. Santaji Rao Temak, an old official of the State (in charge of Revenue Department).
6. Rai Bahadur Anandi Parshad, an old official of the State (in charge of Public Works Department).
7. Sahibzada Gholam Ahmed Khan, late Subah of Esagarh (in charge of Police and Educational Department.)

(b) The salary of the President of the Council was fixed at Rs. 4,000 per mensem, and that of each of the Members at Rs. 2,000. Rao Bahadur Ram Chunder Vithal was selected as Secretary to the Council of Regency.

(c) The powers and functions of the Council of Regency were defined and laid down by the Agent to the Governor-General.

(d) Briefly the arrangement provides for the carrying out of all administrative measures with the knowledge and approval of the Resident, whose duty it is to advise and control the action of the Council of Regency, and to suggest measures for the improvement of the Administration.

(e) The Council meet twice a week on appointed days, and dispose of such work as may be brought before them. A copy of the proceedings of each meeting of the Council is forwarded to the Resident, and by him to the Agent to the Governor-General.

The young Maharaja is excellent in health and exquisitely handsome in appearance. He is very intelligent and well-behaved, and gives much promise and has already shown his great inclination for study.

Training and
Education of
the young
Maharaja.

The first and by far the most important act done by the British Government after the management of the State fell into its hands was to provide means for the Maharaja's education and training, so that, on the attainment of majority, he may discharge the important duties which will devolve upon him as the ruler of a great State. With this view his education has been placed under the supervision of Dr. Crofts and Rai Bahadur Dharam Narain, C. I. E. and others, and it is a matter of satisfaction to note that their efforts in this direction have already begun to bear fruit.

Since the appointment of a Council of Regency several changes have been introduced into the administration of the State of which the following are the most important.

It was observed that the combination of judicial, revenue and police functions in the Subahs of districts, proved entirely a failure. The police officers were to no purpose—dacoity and violent crime were prevalent

The Admini-
stration of
the State.

throughout the State, life and property were not secure. In judicial matters, too, more than 50,000 cases were pending for decision. The revenue department also suffered in the same way. For these reasons the judicial and police functions were taken away from district officers who were entrusted solely with the revenue functions, so that they might devote their undivided attention to that one branch of administration alone. The system of collecting the revenue by leasing should be done away with, and taxes ought to be collected direct by the servants of the State.

Mr. Srinivas Rao, who had distinguished himself

- * 1 Chief Justice.
- 2 Prant Judges.
- 1 Assistant Prant Judge.
- 2 Sadar Amins.
- 2 Munsiffs, Small Cause Courts.
- 2 City Magistrates.
- 15 Magistrates, 1st Class and Sadar Amins.
- 68 Munsiffs, 1st Class, and Magistrates, 2nd Class.
- 52 Munsiffs, 2nd Class, and Magistrates, 3rd Class.
- 2 Magistrates, 3rd Class.

TOTAL .. 142

in the Indore State, was chosen as Chief Justice. A regular system of Courts, civil and criminal, presided over by an organised body of Judges has

been established throughout the State. On the margin is a list of the newly organized Courts of Justice. Most of these appointments have been filled up, the whole cost amounting to Rs. 3,60,000 per annum. Great care has been taken in the selection of well-trained officers for the administration of justice, and we may well hope that after the due time taken by the new scheme to develop itself, it will be found to be in every way superior to the old system.

The provisions of the Extradition Act are working well.

The Police force, too, has been reorganised in the course of the year. Munshi Pirbhu Lal has been

appointed Inspector-General of Police. Under him there are three Deputy Inspectors-General, one for each of the three prants of Gird Gwalior, Malwa, Esagarh, and fourteen District Superintendents of Police, with complements of Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors. The Police force is to consist of 11,000 men divided into 14 divisions of district police with a certain number of Kotwalis and Thannah.

	Rs.	As.
1 Inspector-General at Rs. 800 per mensem	9,600	0
14 District Superintendents at Rs. 200 each per mensem	33,600	0
13 Assistant District Superintendents at Rs. 100 each per mensem	15,600	0
60 Sub-Inspectors, at Rs. 1,840 per mensem	22,080	0
22 Girai Officers at Rs. 550 per mensem	6,600	0
4 Kotwals at Rs. 250 per mensem	3,000	0
28 Thanadars at Rs. 795 per mensem	9,540	0
153 Jemadars and Daffadars at Rs. 1,912-8 per mensem	22,950	0
770 Chamlal Ghat Constables at Rs. 4,451-8 per mensem	53,418	0
8,613 Other constables at Rs. 40,887 per mensem	4,90,644	7
8 Office Establishment at Rs. 89 per mensem	960	0
11 Detective expenses at Rs. 241 per mensem	2,892	0
TOTAL	6,70,884	7

The Resident at Gwalior lately occupied himself in discovering the amount of treasure which His Highness had accumulated in secret vaults in various palaces. The total amount thus brought to light was, Rs, 6,05,01,885-10-10 besides a large amount roughly estimated at one million sterling, of gold and jewels. The Council of Regency determined to invest $3\frac{1}{2}$ crores of the savings of the State in a loan to the Government of India for the public service. The loan bears interest at 4 per cent. per annum.

State Treasury.

The balance of the loan of fifty lakhs, borrowed by the late Maharaja from the British Government

Re-payment of 50 lakhs.

in 1878, has been adjusted in full by the Council of Regency, and paid into the Agra Treasury on the 14th February 1887.

The following is a statement of the income and expenditure of the State for the last official year :—

Income under different headings.	Amount.	Expenditure under different headings.	Amount.
	RS. A. P.		RS. A. P.
1 Land Revenue	92,07,711 1 4	1 Civil charges	14,36,686 3 7
2 Balance recovered	2,02,957 8 8	2 Revenue remissions	9,43,958 12 10
3 Sayer receipts	12,82,916 6 8	3 Miscellaneous expenditure.	3,35,245 9 9
4 Sewaj jama	6,16,421 0 3	4 Military	28,52,820 11 0
		5 His Highness's household expenses.	13,15,116 11 0
		6 Paid to Government of India on account of buildings in Gwalior Fortress.	16,17,187 8 0
GRAND TOTAL	1,12,05,006 0 11	GRAND TOTAL	85,41,015 8 0

* Besides the above the State is now in annual receipt of Rs.1,400,000 from the Government of India on account of interest.

The following statement shows the number of distribution of the British troops in the Gwalior Territory :—

	CAVALRY.				ARTILLERY.		INFANTRY.			
	EUROPEAN.		NATIVE.		EUROPEAN.		EUROPEAN.		NATIVE.	
	Number.	Strength.	Number.	Strength.	Number.	Strength.	Number.	Strength.	Number.	Strength.
TROOPS OF THE LINE.										
Gwalior District	1	112
Sipri
TOTAL	1	112
LOCAL CORPS.										
Central India Horse at Goona	1	626
TOTAL	1	626
GRAND TOTAL	1	626	1	112

The working of the Dispensaries within the Gwalior territory is shown below :—

Dispensaries
in Gwalior
State.

LOCALITY.	Admission.	Number of Deaths.	Number of Vaccinations.	Cost.	REMARKS.
UNDER BRITISH SUPERVISION.					
Lashkar Dispensary	4,312	1	...	2,739 2 7	
Goona "	4 349	22	866	1,881 9 7	
Bhilsa "	7,060	45	2,016	844 8 1	
TOTAL ...	16,221	74	2,882	5,465 4 3	
NOT UNDER BRITISH SUPERVISION.					
Sipri Dispensary	831	8	...	485 0 6	
Jawad "	5,452	17	5	1,500 0 0	
Neemuch Dispensary	2 397	11	...	576 0 0	
TOTAL ...	8,660	36	5	2,561 0 6	
GRAND TOTAL ...	24,881	110	2,887	8,026 4 9	

33,420 covers were despatched and 38,241 received during the last year. The cash receipts were Rs. 76,729-5-10, and the expenditure amounted to Rs. 76,343-2-4. The money orders issued by the Gwalior Post Office during the last year amounted to Rs. 43,726-8, whilst Rs. 27,536-10-0 were paid for orders drawn. The Commission realised on money orders issued amounted to Rs. 500-12. The deposits during the last year in the Post Office Savings Bank amounted to Rs. 6,078-0-6, and Rs. 4,524-3-3 were withdrawn.

Postal Department.

The Maharaja keeps up an Educational establishment of one Director of State Education, two Inspectors of Schools, and a number of teachers for the Laskar College; there are two or more masters

Education.

for each of the ninety-three schools. About 600 boys are being educated at the College, fifty of whom learn English and the names of about 3,500 children are on the rolls of the district schools.

April is looked on as the commencement of the agricultural year. In the month, the peasants begin to prepare the fields for the first (Kharif) crops sown in June (usually with a drill plough) and for the most part reaped in September; in November and December the second (rabbi) crops, such as poppy and sugar-cane, are sown. The latter takes a whole year to ripen; but most of the other seed, put in the ground at this time, ripens in three or four months. The implements of agriculture employed are the *hal* or drill-plough; the *bakhar* or hoe-plough; the *nagar*, a heavy plough, the *patta* or *henga*, a harrow; the *mai* or *palila*, a heavy beam for breaking clods; the *hansiya*, a sickle; the *khurpi* or hoe, and the *kulhari* or hatchet.

The cultivators, generally speaking, are both skilful and industrious; and would, with tolerable assessments, be a well-to-do class. But in Gwalior as well as in many other States, the rents practically fluctuate with the season. The nominal assessments represent rents that cannot be actually realised, and remissions are everywhere made of necessity, being greater or less, according as the crops are good or bad. Thus an equable strain on the cultivator is maintained.

The population of the North-Eastern part of the territory is of a mixed kind comprising, besides the ruling order of the Mahrattas, Bundelas, Jats, and Rajputs with some less distinctively defined

divisions of Hindus and Muhammedans. In no part of Gwalior do the Mahrattas form any large proportion of the inhabitants. In the greater part of the southern and south-western parts, comprising a portion of Malwa, a very considerable section of the population is Hindu. There is perhaps no part of India where the tribes of Brahmans are so various and their numbers so great. Rajputs exist in large numbers. The Muhammedan population is estimated at about a twentieth of the whole. Including the transfers to Sindia under the treaty of 1860, the territories of Gwalior were, in 1875, estimated to contain a population of about 2,500,000 persons.

“Order and prosperity are now established in Gwalior, along with the other States of the Central India Agency, on a firm and broad basis. The ravages of war and plunder are being everywhere obliterated. Long deserted villages are once more peopled, great tracts of country, laid waste by Mahratta and Pindari hordes, are now covered with waving corn, the centres of trade and industry are again brimming with life ; thugs and dacoits have been swept off the old highways ; while new roads and lines of railway make the great pulse of commerce beat with an invigorated systole and diastole. Chiefs, bad and good, active and indolent, succeed one another, doing and undoing, changing, and neglecting ; but the people see and feel behind the vicissitudes of local rule, a power exerted upon comparatively unchanging principles, that is ever checking the evil and promoting the good, and bringing order and shape out of anarchy and confusion.”

General
Remarks.

APPENDIX A.

GWALIOR, ITS GEOGRAPHY AND ARCHEOLOGY.

"Gwalior.—Native State in political relationship with the Central India Agency and the Government of India, the hereditary dominions of the great Marhattá chief, Sindia. The State consists of several detached Districts; the principal one being bounded on the north-east by the Chambal, dividing it from the British Districts of Agra and Etáwah; on the east by Bundelkhand and Sagar (Saugor) District; on the south by the States of Bhopál and Dhar; on the west by those of Rájgarh, Jhaláwar and Kotah; and on the north-west by the Chambal, which separates it from Karauli (Kerowlee) and Dholpur in Rájputána. Previous to 1860, the Maharájá Sindia possessed territories south of the Narbadá (Nerbudda); but in that year and 1861, these were exchanged for lands of equal value on the Sind and Betwa rivers. The extreme points of the Gwalior territory lie between $22^{\circ} 8'$ and $26^{\circ} 50'$ N. lat., and between $74^{\circ} 45'$ and $79^{\circ} 21'$ E. long. The area of the whole State comprises 33,119 square miles, comprehending part of the ancient Province of Agra, and most of Málwá.

The extreme north-eastern part of Gwalior, adjoining Agra, is generally level, of no great fertility, and much cut up by deep precipitous ravines in the vicinity of the streams. A little farther south, in the vicinity of the town of Gwalior, the surface rises. The country is dotted over with small isolated hills, which start abruptly out of the level plain. One of them is the celebrated fortress of GWALIOR. The geological formation of these rocky eminences is a fine-grained sandstone, disposed in horizontal strata, and yielding an excellent building stone, for which purpose it can be hewn in slabs of great length and breadth. The other tract of Gwalior State, comprising a large portion of MALWA, is a plateau, having an average elevation of about 1,500 feet, though there are some points rising greatly above that height, as in the instance of Shaizgarh in the Mandu range, which is 2,628 feet above the sea. The general slope of the plateau is very gentle from the Mandu range towards the north or north-east, as indicated by the course of numerous streams flowing in those directions to the Chambal. The Mandu range, running east and west, forms the southern boundary of the plateau, sloping gently northwards towards it, and dipping precipitously southwards towards the Narbadá. The State is watered by numerous rivers. The NARBADA, flowing west, forms the boundary of the southern part of the State. But by far the greater portion of the drainage of the territory is discharged into the CHAMBAL, which, receiving the waters of several minor tributaries, flows along the north-west frontier, separating Gwalior from Jáipur (Jeypore), Karauli (Kerowlee), and Dholpur. Subsequently turning south-east, it forms the north-eastern boundary towards Agra and Etáwah, and joins the Jumna in the latter District. The Sind flows parallel to the Chambal, but farther to the east, and finally falls into the Jumna a short distance below the confluence of the Chahíbal with that river. The Kuwári, Asar, Sankh, and other lesser streams take their rise in the north of the State, and, after flowing in an easterly

or north-easterly direction, fall into the Sind on its left bank. The south-western portion of Gwalior is noted for its abundant production of the Málwá opium of commerce. Other products—wheat, gram, pulses of various kinds, *joár* (*Holcus sorghum*), *bájra* (*Holcus spicatus*), *múg* (*Phaseolus mungo*), maize, rice, linseed and other oil-seeds, garlic, turmeric, ginger, sugar cane, indigo, *áal* (*Morinda multiflora*) yielding a fine red dye. Tobacco of excellent quality, but in no great quantity, is raised in the vicinity of Bhilsá. Cotton is largely grown.

BURHANPUR is the site of a considerable manufacture of fine cottons and silks, and rich brocades. CHANDERI was formerly noted for its cotton fabrics, but the manufacture has decayed since the introduction of English piece-goods. Iron ore is raised and smelted in many places.

The imports consists principally of British woollens, cottons, silks, cutlery, Cashmere shawls, pearls from the Persian Gulf, Ceylon diamonds, and agates from Bundlekhand, gold, silver, mercury, copper, lead, and zinc. Opium is the principal export, sent to the coast by way of Bombay. Cotton is also largely sent to Bombay, and to the towns on the Jumna and Ganges. The remaining exports of any importance are tobacco, dyes, and iron. The Indore and Ajmere narrow-gauge railway, now (1878) in course of construction, will pass through the west of Gwalior State; while a railway on the broad gauge, to connect Gwalior town with Agra, is approaching completion.*

In the dry and hot seasons the climate is not unhealthy, but during the rainy season fevers prevail, especially in the north. The range of the thermometer is unusually small, except during the latter part of the year, when great and sudden changes often take place. The cool season comprises the period between the beginning of November and the end of February; the hot season succeeds, and continues to the middle of June, when the periodical rains set in, and last to the close of September, the average fall being about 50 inches. In 1875, the rainfall was only 19·6 inches. During the sultry season the hot winds are comparatively mild, and of short duration, though the thermometer sometimes rises to nearly 100° during the day; but the nights are invariably cool and refreshing.

Wild animals comprises the tiger, leopard, bear, wolf, hyæna, wild dog, jackal, fox, ounce, lynx, badger, ichneumon, civet, otter, rat, bat, mouse, wild hog, *núgaur* or blue bull, and various kinds of antelope, deer of several species, wild buffalo, ape, monkey, squirrel, porcupine, and hare. Of birds, there are the vulture, eagle, hawks of various kinds, kite, buzzard, owl, hornbill (*Buceros*), raven, crow, daws and pies, parrot, jay, cuckoo, humming-bird, wild goose, wild duck, pelican, cormorant, spoon-bill, stork, crane, heron, adjutant, curlew, snipe, bustard, floriken, peafowl, pheasant, partridge, quail, pigeon, dove, and sparrow. The rivers abound in fish, especially of the carp kind. Of snakes, there are the boa, water-snake, cobra, black spotted snake, spectacled snake, yellow-clouded snake, whip-snake, and leaping snake. The *magar* or round blunt snouted crocodile infests some of the rivers.

Gwalior.—The capital of GWALIOR STATE, and fortress residence of the Mahārāja Sindia; situated in lat. 26° 13' 0" N., and long. 78° 12' 0" E., 65 miles south from Agra, and 277 north-west of Allahabad. No new materials are available in the Foreign Office, Calcutta,

* The railways spoken of here have been completed.

for this article ; and I have therefore to compile it partly from Thornton (1862) and Fergusson (*History of Indian Architecture*, 1876). Gwalior city has a threefold interest. First, as a very ancient seat of Jain worship ; second, for its example of palaco architecture of the best Hindu period (1486-1516) ; third, as the fortress capital of one of the greatest native chiefs of India. A considerable British force is posted in its immediate neighbourhood ; but this aspect will be treated of in a separate article on the MORAR Cantonments. The fort of Gwalior stands on an isolated rock of ochreous sandstone formation, capped at places with basalt. The face of the fort is perpendicular, and where the rock is naturally less precipitous it has been scarped, and in some portions the upper parts overhang the lower. Its greatest length from north-east to south-west is a mile and a-half, and the greatest breadth, 300 yards. The rock at the northern end attains its maximum height of 342 feet. On its eastern side are sculptured several colossal figures in bold relief. A rampart, accessible by a steep road, and farther up by huge steps cut out of the rock, surrounds the fort. This vast staircase, the principal entrance of which is known as the 'Elephant's Gate', from the figure of that animal being sculptured above it, is protected on the outer side by a massive stone wall, and is swept by guns. The citadel stands at the north-eastern corner of the enclosure, and presents a very picturesque appearance. The old town of Gwalior, which is of considerable size, but irregularly built, and extremely dirty, lies at the eastern base of the rock. It contains the tomb of Muhammad Ghaus, which was erected during the early part of Akbar's reign. Fergusson thus describes the building :—'It is a square measuring 100 feet each way, exclusive of the hexagonal towers, which are attached to the angles. The chamber of the tomb itself is a hall 43 feet square, with the angles cut off by pointed arches, so as to form an octagon, on which the dome rests. Around this square building is a gallery, 20 feet wide between the piers, enclosed on all sides by a screen of the most exquisite tracery in pierced stonework, with a projecting porch on each face.'

Jain Remains—There are two remarkable Hindu temples in Gwalior. 'One,' says Mr. Fergusson, 'known as the Sas Báhu, is understood to be a Jain erection, and seems to be so designated and dedicated to Panmanáth, the sixth Tirthankar. General Cunningham doubts this ascription, in consequence of the walls being adorned with bas-reliefs, belonging certainly to the Vaishnav and Siva sects: This temple was finished apparently in A.D. 1093, and, though dreadfully ruined, is still a most picturesque fragment. What remains is the cruciform porch of a temple which, when complete, measured 100 feet from front to rear, and 63 feet across the arms of the porch. Of the sanctuary, with its *sikra*, nothing is left but the foundation ; but the porch, which is three storeys in height, is constructively entire, though its details—and principally those of its roof—are very much shattered. An older Jain temple is described by General Cunningham ; but as it was used as a mosque it is more likely that it is a Muhammadan building, although made up of Jain details.' Another temple in the fortress of Gwalior is called the *Teli-ka-Mandir* or 'Oilman's Temple.' It is 60 feet square, with a portico on the east projecting about 11 feet, and terminates in a ridge of about 30 feet in extent. 'The building,' says Mr. Fergusson, 'was originally dedicated to Vishnu, but afterwards converted to the worship of Siva. There is no inscription or any tradition from which its date can be gathered, but on the whole I am inclined to place it in the 10th or 11th century.'

The most striking part of the Jain remains at Gwalior is a series of caves or rock-cut sculptures which are excavated in the rock on all sides, and amount, when taken together, to hardly less than a hundred, great and small. Most of them are mere niches to contain statues, though some are cells that may have been originally intended for residences. One curious fact regarding them is, that, according to inscriptions, they were all excavated within the short period of about thirty-three years, between A.D. 1441 and A.D. 1474. Some of the figures are of colossal size; one, for instance, is 57 feet high, which is greater than any other in the north of India.

Hindu Palace-Architecture.—The palace built by Mán Sinh (A.D. 1486-1516) forms the most remarkable and interesting example of early Hindu work in India. Its external dimensions, according to Mr. Ferguson, are 300 feet by 100 feet; and on the east side it is 100 feet high, having two underground storeys looking over the country. On all its faces the flat surface is relieved by tall towers of singularly pleasing design, crowned by cupolas covered with domes of gilt copper when Bábar saw them in 1527. Mán Sinh's successor, Vikramāditya, added another palace, of even greater extent, to this one in 1516; and Jahángir and Sháh Jahán added palaces to these two,—the whole making up a group of edifices unequalled for picturesqueness and interest by anything of their class that exist in Central India. Among the apartments in the palace was one called the *Báradúri*, supported on 12 columns, and 45 feet square, with a stone roof, which was one of the most beautiful apartments of its class anywhere to be found. It was, besides, singularly interesting from the expedients to which the Hindu architect was forced to resort to imitate the vaults of the Moslems. They had not then learned to copy them, as they did at the end of that century at Bindrában (Brindaban) and elsewhere under the guidance of the tolerant Akbar. Of the buildings, however, which so excited the admiration of the Emperor Bábar, probably little now remains. The Moslems added to the palaces of the Hindus, and spared their temples and the statues of the Jains.

Rock Fortress.—According to Wilford, the fort of Gwalior was built in 773 by Surya Sen, the Rájá of the neighbouring country. In 1023, it was unsuccessfully besieged by Mahmúd of Ghazní; in 1196, Gwalior was captured by Mahmúd Ghori; in 1211, it was lost by the Musalmáns, but recovered in 1231, after a blockade of a year by Shams-ud-din Altamsh, the Slave King of Delhi. Narsinh Rái, a Hindu chief, taking advantage of the trouble produced by the invasion of Tamerlane in 1398, seized Gwalior, which was not regained by the Musalmáns until 1519, under Ibrálim Lodi, the Pathán monarch of Delhi. In 1526, Bábar took the fortress by stratagem; and in 1543, after the expulsion of his son Humáyun, it fell into the hands of his rival, Sher Sháh; but after the re-establishment of Humáyun, Gwalior was, in 1556, recovered by his successor Akbar, who made it a state prison for captives of rank. In the dismemberment of the Delhi Empire, Gwalior was seized by the Ját Ráná of Gohad. Subsequently it was garrisoned by Sindia."—*Hunter's Imperial Gazetteer of India.*

APPENDIX B.

TREATIES AND ENGAGEMENTS.

No. XCIV.

Translation of a copy of the Treaty entered into by Mobarus-ul-Moulek, Iftiker-ul-Doulah, Colonel Muir, Bahadoor Mohahut Jung, on the part of the English East India Company; and the Maharajah Saheb Souhadar Madho Rao Sindia, Bahadoor, on his part, 1781.

The Nawab, Amaud-ul-Dowla, Telledut Jung Hastings, Bahadoor, Governor-General of Bengal, &c., having obtained full authority from the Governor-General of Bengal, &c., grants full powers to Colonel Muir, above-named, to negotiate a peace between Maharajah Saheb Souhadar, Madho Rao Sindia, Bahadoor, and the English Company, in such manner, that whatever shall be agreed to by the Colonel, on the part of the Company, the Governor-General and Council shall also agree to and confirm: Colonel Muir, and the Maharajah Saheb are both desirous of a peace and have determined upon and agreed to a peace on the following conditions, viz :—

First.—That having mutually resolved upon a peace and firm alliance they shall respectively observe their agreements for ever.

Secondly.—That within the term of eight days from the time of the confirmation of the Treaty, they shall, at one time, march of their respective armies. Colonel Muir, with his, shall return towards the country of Nawab Vizier-ul-Mulmalick, and the Maharajah, with his army, shall return to his own country.

Thirdly.—That should it be deemed advisable, the Maharajah shall endeavour to effect a peace between the English and Hyder Ally Cawn; also a peace between the English and the Peishwa. Should this peace be effected it is well; otherwise the English have the choice to do as they shall judge proper, and the Maharajah shall not assist or oppose either party.

Fourthly.—That whatever country of the Maharajah's shall have been taken possession of by the Company, on this side the Jumna, Colonel Muir shall restore; and the Maharajah shall agree not to molest or disturb the country of Lokindar Rana Chatter Sing, Bahadoor, Deleer Jung, nor the fort of Gwalior, which is at present in his possession, so long as the Rana Saheb, observes his Treaty with the English; nor the country of Mhy-put Rum Sing, Juggunder, Bahadoor, which is at present in the possession of the Rana.

Fifthly.—That the Maharajah shall bring Raja Ram Chunder Rajah Chundrey and place him on the Raj, in the presence of the Colonel, and shall demand nothing of him. And whatever of his country (except that which shall have been in the possession of the Peishwa for a long time) has been taken from him by Raje Dhur Dewan, in rebellion, the Maharajah shall cause the said Dhur to restore, and he shall depose the said Dhur.

Confirmed, according to the above written conditions, with the seal and signature of Colonel Muir, on the part of the Company; and with the seal and signature of Maharajah Saheb Madho Rao Sindia, on his own part this 13th October 1781 or 24th Shawal, 1195 Hegira.

No. CXV.

Grant of the Fort, town and pergunnah of Baroach to Maharajah Soubadar Madho Rao Sindia, dated the 6th June 1782.

To all whom these presents shall concern.

Whereas the Honourable English East India Company have long been in the quiet and undisturbed possession of the fort, town, and pergunnah of Baroach, which they hold by right of conquest from the Mogul Government: and whereas it was stipulated by the 4th Article of the "Treaty of Poorundur," dated 1st March 1776, "that the Peishwa and Muratha State do agree to give to the English Company for ever all right and title to their entire share of the city and pergunnah of Baroach, as full and complete as ever they collected from the Moguls or otherwise, without retaining claim of elonth, or any other demand whatever, so that the English Company shall possess it without participation or claim of any kind;" And whereas the said Article is accordingly declared to be continued in full force and effect by the 3rd Article of the Treaty concluded at Salpi, the 17th of May 1782; We, the Governor-General and Council for affairs of the British nation in India, do, of our own free will and accord, and on behalf of the Honourable Company, in testimony of the sense which we entertain of the generous conduct manifested by Maharajah Soubadar Madho Rao Sindia to the Government of Bombay, at Wurgaon, and of his humane treatment and release of the English gentlemen who had been delivered as hostages on that occasion, grant and make over unto the said Maharajah Soubadar Madho Rao Sindia, all right, title, and possession in the said fort, town, and pergunnah of Baroach, whether obtained from the Moguls or from the Murathas, including both shares, in the same manner, and to the full extent in which the Honourable Company ever did or might hold and exercise the same, either by their own right or in virtue of the above stipulations.

Given under our hands and the seal of the Honourable Company, at Fort William, the 6th day of June in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-two.

L. S.

(Sd.)

WARREN HASTINGS.

"

EDWARD WHEELER.

"

J. MACPHERSON.

Translation of an Agreement from Sindia, granting to the English the exclusive privilege of Trade in the City and Pergunnah of Baroach, dated 21st March 1783.

This is to certify, that as the Governor-General and Council have of their own free will and accord, and on behalf of the Company, conferred upon me their entire right to the two shares of the fort, city, and pergunnah of Baroach, I have therefore accepted of the same, and will retain them always in my own possession. And I hereby agree that the English shall carry on trade as usual in the said city and pergunnah and no improper molestation shall be offered to them; and also, I will not permit any other European nation excepting the English to trade in any shape in the said city and pergunnah.

Written on the seventeenth of Rubee-oos-sanee, of the year one thousand one hundred and ninety-seven of the Hegira, corresponding with the twenty-first day of March one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three of the Christian era.

No. XCVI.

Treaty with Maharajah Madho Rao Sindia, relative to the Honourable East India Company's Trade at Baroach, dated the 30th September, 1785.

Whereas a Sunnud, bearing date the seventeenth day of Rubees of the year one thousand one hundred and ninety-seven of the Hegira, corresponding with the twenty-first day of March, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three of the Christian era, was granted by Maharajah Soubadar Madho Rao Sindia, declaring that the English should carry on trade as usual in the city and pergunnah of Baroach, and that no improper molestation should be offered to them, the said Sunnud specifying also that no European nation excepting the English should be permitted to trade in any shape in the said city and pergunnah, and whereas, in the said Sunnud, the particulars of the duties, &c., to be taken and the settlement of concerns of trade were omitted, and doubts have arisen on these subjects, which Maharajah Soubadar Madho Rao Sindia is willing to remove: For this purpose, and to support the English trade in the city and pergunnah of Baroach, we, the Governor-General and Council of Fort William in Bengal, appointed by the King and Parliament of Great Britain to direct and control all political affairs of the Honourable East India Company in India, on the one part, and Maharajah Madho Rao Sindia, Bahadoor, on the other part, agree to the following Treaty containing seven Articles, and bind ourselves and successors to the full and invariable observance of them.

Article 1.

Maharajah Soubadar Madho Rao Sindia, Bahadoor, agrees that in every year in which the English Company carry on trade in the district of Baroach, the duties thereon shall be taken according to the Treaty with the Nawab of Baroach, in the year one thousand seven hundred and sixty-four, that is to say, on the cotton which is purchased from Baroach, on every candy of Surat weight, one and a half Rupees and four felloos shall be paid and the duty on other articles which are imported or exported by the Company shall be one rupee eight annas for every hundred Rupees, and besides these established articles of the Company's trade whatever other articles come from English individuals shall be subject to a duty of six rupees in every hundred thereon, conformably to the usage which existed when the Company had possession of Baroach. The Governor-General and Council agree that the English shall not unite any Hindustanee in their trade, and that in case of such partnership, such duties shall be paid thereon as are paid upon the commerce of the merchants wearing turbans. The Governor-General and Council consent that the duties stipulated to be paid upon the Company's trade shall be paid by the Company's Resident at Baroach, to the Amil of that district.

Article 2.

It has been the old established custom, on the wreck of any ship, vessel, or boats within any of the ports in the neighbourhood of Baroach, that the owner of the port should take possession of the goods, but as at this time a firm friendship exists between the Government of the English Company and Maharajah Soubadar Madho Rao Sindia, Bahadoor, the Governor-General and Council have requested that the goods of the ships, vessels, and boats of the English that may be wrecked in the river of Baroach, may be released, and Maharajah Soubadar Madho Rao Sindia, Bahadoor, agrees for the sake of friendship, that when any ship, vessel, or boat, belonging to the English shall be wrecked in the river Nerhudda which belongs to the District of Baroach, and the Amil of Baroach may save any goods which bear the mark of the English, the Amil shall deliver all such goods to the Company's Resident at Baroach, who shall reimburse the amount expended in saving and keeping them.

Article 3.

Some disputes having arisen between the English and subjects of the Maharajah belonging to the fort of Baroach, in respect to the time of passing into the fort and out of it, it is now agreed, and the Maharajah has directed, that at the times when it is customary that the gate should remain open the people belonging to the Amil of Baroach shall not prevent the going and coming of the English or their dependants, but that the gate shall be shut at the appointed hour and none of the English or their dependants shall have any right to enter the fort, or go out of it, after that time. The English are not then to desire that the gate may be opened for them, not even to give intelligence of the arrival of any ship that may come into the port at night.

Article 4.

Maharajah Soubadar Madho Rao Sindia, Bahadoor, engages that the servants of the English factory, and their household attendants, and the tradesmen such as carpenters or smiths, or porters who work in the Company's factory and do not work anywhere, but in the factory, shall be under the protection of the Resident at Baroach, and the Amil of Baroach shall in no manner molest them for duties or customs, &c., and when any crime committed, or supposed to have been committed, by any such persons, shall be discovered, the Amil of Baroach shall send notice to the Company's Resident, that he may examine and pass judgment upon such persons, or the Company's Resident shall send back such persons to the Amil, that whatever is proper in the case may be done by him; and the Governor-General and Council agree that when any tradesmen, &c., working in the Company's factory, shall go into the town of Baroach, and work also with other merchants and townsmen, the Amil of Baroach shall take the duties for such tradesmen, &c, according to the practice now in use with respect to the persons not working for the English only. For the sake of obviating any disputes that might occur on this point, the Company's Resident at Baroach shall prepare a list of the servants of the factory, with their descriptions and stations and deliver it to the Amil.

Article 5.

The Governor-General and Council agree that the Company's Resident at Baroach shall not afford protection to any person of the town who may fly from the Amil and resort to the Resident for it, but shall, conformably to friendship, deliver of such person to the Amil.

Article 6.

It is agreed that the Resident at Baroach shall not entertain more sepoys than the number necessary for the protection of the English property in the factory, which number has been fixed at fifty men. It is also agreed that the English in future shall not beat the drum in the factory, as is the custom in the Company's districts. Such persons as may be in the train or sowaree of the Resident may have distinguishing badges, but are not to carry muskets.

Article 7.

Maharajah Soubadar Madho Rao Sindia, Bahadoor, engages in respect to the debts recently incurred by the inhabitants of Baroach to the Company's subject, or such as may be incurred in future and not duly paid, that the Amil of Baroach shall examine the claim in the Kutcheree of his own Adawlut, and enforce the payment of whatever may be proved to be just; and in respect to the debts which were owing from the inhabitants of Baroach to the Company's subjects at the time when Baroach was given to Madhjee Sindia, the Amil shall ascertain whatever may be due, and if the debtor be in good circumstances, he shall force him to pay

immediately ; if not in good circumstances, he shall fix on proper periods of payment by instalment, and oblige the observance of them.

The parties mutually swear, according to their respective faiths, to abide by this agreement.

Dated the twenty-fifth day of Zilkad, one thousand one hundred and ninety nine of the Hegira, corresponding with the thirtieth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-five.

Seal of the
Honourable
Company.

(Sd.) JOHN MACPHERSON.
" R. SLOPER.
" JOHN STAPLES.
" CHARLES STUART.

Signed by Maharajah Sindia on the 7th of Rubee-ool-Awul in the year one thousand two hundred of the Hegira at Bureana.

Sindia's
Seal.

ADDITIONAL ARTICLE TO THE FOREGOING TREATY, DATED THE 9TH JANUARY, 1786.

Whereas in the first Article of the Treaty concluded between the Honourable Company and Maharajah Soubadar Madho Rao Sindia, relative to the trade and other matters of the town and pergunnah of Baroach, it is specified that in every year in which the English Company carry on trade in the district of Baroach, the duties thereon shall be taken according to the Treaty with the Nawab of Baroach, in one thousand seven hundred and sixty-four, that is to say, on the cotton which is purchased from Baroach, on every candy of Surat weight, one and a half Rupee and four felloos shall be paid, and the duty on other articles, which are imported or exported by the Company, shall be one Rupee eight annas for every hundred Rupees. And whereas the extent of the Company's trade at Baroach, in respect to the weight of cotton and the amount of piece goods, was not exactly known to either of the parties, and the specification of the same was required by Maharajah Soubadar Madho Rao Sindia, the Governor-General and Council of Bengal, in compliance with the wishes of Maharajah Soubadar Madho Rao Sindia, having written to the Governor and Council of Bombay on this subject, and ascertained the annual trade of the Honourable Company at Baroach to consist of eight hundred candies of cotton of Surat weight, and piece goods to the amount of one lakh and fifty thousand Rupees, prime cost ; it is therefore mutually agreed to, that for every candy of cotton to the amount of eight hundred candies the Honourable Company shall pay a duty of one and a half Rupee and four felloos ; and for piece goods to the amount of one lakh and fifty thousand Rupees, prime cost, a duty shall be taken of one Rupee eight annas for every hundred Rupees ; and that if ever a greater quantity of cotton or piece goods than what is here specified shall be purchased on account of the Honourable Company, they shall pay the same duty for such excess as has been settled with regard to English individuals.

Signed by Maharajah Sindia, at Bursana, on the 7th of Rubee-ool-Awul, in the year 1200 of the Hegira, corresponding with the 9th of January, 1786.

Sindia's
Seal.

No. XCVII.

TREATY of PEACE and FRIENDSHIP with DAULAT RAO SINDIA.

Treaty of Peace between the Honourable English East India Company, and their allies, on the one part, and the Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia, on the other; settled by Major-General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley, on the part of the Honourable Company and their allies, and by Eetul Mahadeo, Moonshree Kavel Nyn, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah Ameer-ool-Omrah, and Narroo Hurry, on the part of the Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia, who have each communicated to the other their full powers.

Article 1.

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable Company and their allies on the one part, and the Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia, on the other.

Article 2.

The Maharajah cedes to the Honourable Company and their allies, in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories, and rights in the Doab, or country situated between the Jumna and Ganges, and all his forts, territories, rights and interests in the countries which are to the northward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypore and Jodhpore, and of the Rana of Gohud, of which territories, &c., a detailed list is given in the accompanying Schedule. Such countries formerly in the possession of the Maharajah, situated between Jeypore and Jodhpore, and to the southward of the former, are to belong to the Maharajah.

Article 3.

The Maharajah likewise cedes to the Honourable Company and their allies, in perpetual sovereignty, the fort of Baroach and territory depending thereon, and the fort of Ahmednuggur and territory depending thereon; excepting those lands which it is agreed, by the eighth Article of this Treaty, that the Maharajah is to retain.

Article 4.

The Maharajah likewise cedes to the Honourable Company and their allies, all the territories which belonged to him previous to the breaking out of the war, which are situated to the southward of the hills called the Ajunttee Hills, including the fort and district of Jalnapore, the town and district of Gandapore, and all other districts between that range of hills and the river Godavery.

Article 5.

The Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia, for himself, his heirs, and successors, hereby renounces all the claim to the forts, territories, rights, and interests, ceded by the second, third, and fourth Articles; and all claims of every description, upon the British Government and their allies, the Soubadar of the Deccan, the Peishwa and Anund Rao Guicowar.

Article 6.

The fort of Asseerghur, the city of Boorhanpore, the forts of Powanghur and Dahud, and the territories in Kandesh and Guzerat, depending on these forts, shall be restored to the Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia.

Article 7.

Whereas the Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia has represented that his family have long held in enaam, as a gift from the Kings of Hindustan, the districts of Dholepore, Baree, and Rajah-Kerrah, which are situated to the northward of the countries of the Rajahs of Jeypore and Jodhpore, and of the Rana of Gohud, and that lands in Hindustan, ceded by the second Article of this Treaty to the Honourable Company and their allies, are held in jaghire by persons of the family of the late Madhaji Sindia and others by principle sirdars in his service, all of whom would suffer distress if deprived of the advantages they enjoy in those countries: It is agreed, that the Maharajah shall continue to hold and enjoy in enaam the lands of Dholepore, Baree, and Rajah-Kerrah, and that Bala Baye Shaib, and Munsoor Shaib, Moonshie Kavel Nyn, Boognee Jundah, Amrajee Jadhoo, and Wirdah Charie, shall continue to hold their lands in jaghire under the protection of the Honourable Company. And, further, in order that no individual may incur loss or suffer distress in consequence of this arrangement, it is agreed that the Honourable Company shall either pay pensions or grant lands in jaghire, according to the option of the British Government, to certain other sirdars and others, to be named by the Maharajah, provided that the total amount of the sums paid, or jaghires granted or held, does not exceed seventeen lakhs of rupees per annum, including the annual value of the lands, which it is agreed by this Article that Bala Baye Shaib, Munsoor Shaib, Moonshie Kavel Nyn, Boogaji Jundah, Amrajee Jadhoo, and Wirdah Charie, are to continue to hold; and provided that no troops in the service of the Maharajah are to be introduced into Dholepore, Baree, and Rajah-Kerrah, or the other lands held in jaghire, under the pretence of collecting the revenue, or any other pretence whatever.

Article 8.

Whereas the Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia has represented that his family have long held in enaam certain lands, villages, &c., in the territories of Rao Pandit Pundhann, viz. :—

Chomargoondce pergunnah.
Jangaum.
Ranjingaum.
Half of the Seogaum pergunnah.
Six villages in UMBER pergunnah.
Five villages in Pytun "
" " Niwaz "
" " Kurla "

Six villages in Poona pergunnah.
Two villages in Wahy "
Six villages in Patutood "
Five villages in Pandipeergaum
pergunnah.
Five villages in Pagood pergunnah.
Two villages in Parnyra "

which have lately been taken possession of by the British Government and their allies; it is agreed, that those lands and villages shall be restored to him, provided that no troops shall ever be introduced into those lands and villages under pretence of collecting the revenues or any other pretence whatever.

Article 9.

Certain Treaties have been made by the British Government with Rajahs and others, heretofore feudatories of the Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia. These Treaties are to be confirmed; and the Maharajah hereby renounces all claim upon the persons with whom such Treaties have been made, and declares them to be independent of his government and authority, provided that none of the territories belonging to the Maharajah, situated to the southward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypore and

Jodhpore and the Rana of Gohud, of which the revenues have been collected by him or his Amildars, or have been applicable, as Surinjamee, to the payment of his troops, are granted away by such Treaties. Lists of the persons with whom such Treaties have been made, will be given to the Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia, when this Treaty will be ratified by His Excellency the Governor-General.

Article 10:

No person whatever is hereafter to be molested on account of the part which he may have taken in the present war.

Article 11.

It is agreed that the rights of His Highness the Peishwa to certain lands in Malwa and elsewhere shall be established as heretofore ; and in case any difference should arise respecting those rights, it is agreed that the Honourable Company shall mediate, arbitrate, and decide, according to the principles of justice, between His Highness and the Maharajah, and whatever shall be thus decided will be agreed to by both parties, and will be carried into execution.

Article 12.

The Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia hereby renounces all claims upon His Majesty Shah Alum, and engages, on his part, to interfere no further in the affairs of His Majesty.

Article 13.

The Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia engages never to take or retain in his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American power, the Government of which may be at war with the British Government, or any British subject, whether European or native of India, without the consent of the British Government.

Article 14.

In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the Governments it is agreed that accredited ministers from each shall reside at the court of the other.

Article 15.

The Honourable Company being bound by Treaties of general defensive alliance with His Highness the Soubadar of the Deccan and His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun, to which the Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia is desirous of acceding, he is to be admitted to the benefits thereof ; and the Honourable Company, with a view to the future security of the Maharajah's territories, engage, in the event of his agreeing to the Treaty above-mentioned, in two months to furnish him with a force consisting of six battalions of infantry, with their complement of ordnance and artillery, and usual equipments of military stores, &c., and the expense of this force is to be defrayed out of the revenues of the lands ceded by the second, third, and fourth Articles. But it is agreed, that in case it should suit the interests of the Maharajah's government to decline to enter into the Treaty above-mentioned, such refusal shall not affect any of the other stipulations of this Treaty of Peace, which are in every respect, to be binding on the contracting parties, their heirs and successors.

Article 16.

This Treaty is to be ratified by the Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia in eight days from this time, and the ratification is to be delivered to Major-General Wellesley.

Major-General Wellesley engages that it shall be ratified by His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, and the ratification shall be delivered to the Maharajah in three months or sooner, if possible.

The orders for the cession of the territories shall be delivered to Major-General Wellesley at the same time with the ratification of the Treaty of Peace; but the forts of Asseerghur, Powanghur, and Dohud, are not to be delivered up till accounts will have been received that the territories ceded have been evacuated by the Maharajah's officers and troops.

Done in Camp at Surjee Anjengaum, this 30th of December 1803, answering to the 5th Ramzaun, 1213 Fuzalee.

(Sd.) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
 " BETUL MAHADEO.
 " KAVEL NYN.
 " JESWUNT RAO GOORPARAH.
 " NARROO HURRY.

Ratified by the Governor-General in Council, 13th February, 1804.

Ratified by His Highness the Nizam, on 28th April, 1804.

Ratified by the Peishwa, on 14th May, 1804.

MEMORANNDUM* of the Jaidads belonging to the AMILS of ZUFUR YAB KHAN, the son of SUMROO,

In the Doab.

Pergunnah of Plum	1,39,665
Do. Boorhana	1,48,646
Do. Beernaba	1,32,755
Do. Amilpore Byrat	1,00,875
Do. Jharu Sama	50,000
Do. Sirdhana	2,07,750
Do. Jeewur Juhungeerpoor	1,42,000
Do. Kootana	1,32,300
Do. Doghal Gaon	12,400
Do. Noorpoora	9,425

Belonging to Ajeet Sing and Hera Sing Jat to the west of the River Jumna.

Pergunnah of Furreedabad	1,26,500
Do. Foujdarry Delhy	6,000

Lands under the Khalsa Mootsuddees, to the west of the River Jumna.

Pergunnah of Boodhopoor	6,000
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Belonging to Mirza Akbur Shah, the heir apparent, to the west of the River Jumna.

Pergunnah of Kote Kasim	40,000
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The Zemindaree of Runjeet Sing in the Doab.

Hoosyna Gunj and Panee Gaon	6,000
To the west of the River Jumna	13,23,370

* There is no Schedule attached to the original Treaty, but this memorandum, which is attached to a copy of the Treaty in the Foreign Office, is supposed to be the Schedule referred to in Article 2.

Belonging to Madho Rowkutree.

Villages in the Doab	5,000
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Belonging to Madho Rao Phalkia.

In the Doab	2,25,843
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Belonging to Satwajee Phalkia.

In the Doab	84,938
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Kutoba Bysakh.

To the west of the Jumna	73,284
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Baboojee Sindia, to the west of the Jumna.

Paniput	99,478
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Monguthla	50,000
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Govurdhun	10,000
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Goolab Bae Kudum.

8 Mahals in the Doab	1,30,251
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Gungadhur Bugaram.

2 Mahals in the Doab	1,22,568
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Yeswunt Rao Sindia and Raghojee Kudum, 2 Mahals to the west of the Jumna.

Narnoul and Kathee	1,64,000
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Lands assigned to the Post Master.

In the Doab	33,750
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Goordut Sing.

In the Doab, Mahal Jhunjena...	36,554
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Bhag Sing.

In the Doab	57,968
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Seth Sing Seik.

Karnal, to the west of the River Jumna...	14,000
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Ahmud Ali Khan.

In the Doab	57,000
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Nijabut Ali Khan, in the Doab.

Pergunnah of Wanlut	22,000
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Do. Phoognar	20,000
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Do. Doornee	7,000
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Do. Sala Khera	7,000
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Surmust Khan.

In the Doab	62,000
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Fyz Talub Khan, to the west of the Jumna.

Pergunnah of Ruhtook	2,93,208
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Mahomed Ali Khan.

In the Doab	32,000
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Urub Ali Khan.

In the Doab	18,932
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Resumed Jaghires, &c., in the Doab, and to the west of the Jumna belonging to General Perron.

Pergunnah of Noojhil, to the west of the River Jumna	1,15,000
Duties collected at the Ghaut of Shahadwa, opposite to Agra	5,248
Duties collected at the Bhookur	60,300
Niloha	14,850
Keerapore	1,67,000
Bhoomas	8,200
Jubelee	4,650

Talookas in the Doab.

Tooksan	15,000
Bucha	15,000
Bajapore	18,000
Duties collected at Hunseergunge	36,047

To the west of the Jumna.

Soosa	20,000
Badurgur and Hasengur	25,000
Bahora	20,400

The Soobah of Suharunpoor.

Huwelee Suharunpoor	51,627
Meliapore	9,900
Sooltanpoor	25,600
Nanoobad	15,200
Badowlee	32,605
Nameta	17,791
Teeturwara	10,070
Sukrar Khera	10,202
Subes, &c.	25,000
Lands belonging to Buhrmund Khan	3,100
Puhur Khera	48,000
Gunga Daspore	36,000
Moglearpore	3,200
Ubet, in part	5,493
Bhajepoor	10,000
Bursud and Fureedpoor	35,000
Roulapoor, &c.	89,901
The fair and jaghire of Huridwar	50,000

Under George Thomas, on the right of the Jumna.

Pergunnah of Jhijur	1,51,930
Beree and Mudao	76,505
Badlee	62,982
Lahoree and Pathora	15,000

Belonging to Shah Nizam-ood-deen, in the Doab.

Seamlee	38,000
Chephoollee	53,000
Islamabad	33,000
Tehar	25,000
Buwara	56,223
Bhoosoonra	32,000

Belonging to Mr. John Baptiste, to the west of the River Jumna.

Rewaree	1,41,200
Tijara	44,349
Tawuro	35,000
Patodee	38,374
Wawul	28,610
Ferozepoor Jhilka	19,864
Talooka of Sursum...	15,000

Designed for the expenses of His Majesty's Establishment.

Balput, in the Doab	1,72,425
Barun, in the Doab	1,04,895
Phoot and Siawa	1,75,235
Pruchitgur	77,200
Sonee, Julalabad, in the Doab...	1,90,201
Hawelee Palum, in the Kusba of Delhi	1,89,533
Rahulee Goojur, in the Doab	1,08,896
Surwa and Khurkanda, in the Doab	64,434
Secunderabad, ditto	75,625
Shikarpoor, to the west of the Jumna	25,300
Khasra, in the Doab	72,064
Kirawuhan, in the Doab	32,700
Nujeebgur, to the west of the Jumna	1,10,763
Duttianee	4,000
Kiver	20,000
Mint of the City of Delhi	26,000
From the Office of Kurroree	1,25,601
Taxes from the shop-keepers of Delhi	17,000
Duties from the Mahals of the City	40,000
From the collection of Export Duties	1,500
Houses in Delhi, &c., becoming the property of the Crown from the death of persons without heirs	4,900

Runjeet Sing Jat.

Kama	} to the west of the River Jumna	...	1,00,000
Kawuree			
Paharee			

Amildarees under the charge of Bamun Kunde Rao, to the west of the River Jumna.

Kanor	53,918
Rutteea Mundawur	29,756
Ismaelpoor	8,337
Neemrara	12,001
Kor Pootlee	40,042
Dadenee	53,001
Surae Saba Chund	1,401
Bijwara	2,500
Khodana	7,500
Goonalee Nahurjal	26,641

Under the charge of Krisnaje Appa, the Port of Kishengur.

Bundara	1,324
Bhumbora	17,238
Khyrthul	1,712
Doorngur	2,500
Hoorsoollee	10,000
Futtehabad	8,000
Turrufpoor	7,000
Ambajee Ingilia, Mutra, and the customs collected in Noojgeel	55,000

MEMORANDUM of the Mahals in Hindoostan formerly belonging to
GENERAL DOUBOINGNE.

In the Doab.

Kol	1,70,000
Ungrolee	3,01,500
Dobhye	60,000
Koorja	1,40,000
Danpoor	5,000
Jellalore	2,15,000
Khuleelgunge	62,500
Khundolee	87,088
Gur Moktesur	70,000
Jewur	84,000
Math	1,41,500
Firozabad	4,00,176
Sadabad	2,02,088
Hassur	1,40,000
Chundosee	85,000
Khijr	1,15,000
Shikarpoor	41,500
Umbur and Kumalpoor	57,894
Seepoo	40,000
Roha	45,000
Aar	18,000
Byrampoor	31,000
Hatras	1,88,000
Moorsan	1,20,000
Biswa	12,000
Mahabun	21,424
Mewat	1,41,617

To the west of the River Jumna.

Pergunnah of Pulwul	2,72,375
Noop	1,05,687
Nudeem	45,725
Sohana	1,20,000
Sakras	15,634
Nownabee Ohor	60,053
Horul	77,820
Hutteen	1,78,258
Buhadecmut Jehandawur	1,56,500

Under Rajah Ambajee Ingliā, to the west of the River Jumna.

Pergunnah of Futeemabad	1,24,175
" Uchuneree	1,30,000
Furroo	12,600
Koosee	1,98,553
Sergur	28,989
Husungur	1,50,000
Goryee	25,315

In the Doab.

Pergunnah of Duriapoor	15,000
Maheria	30,000
Meruth	2,03,855
Dasna	1,90,680
Baroolee	27,000
Hasian	55,000

Under Colonels George and John Hessian, to the west of the River Jumna.

Collections of the Customs and Mint at Agra	...	82,500
Pergunnah of Kurara	...	79,697
" Surhudee	...	36,001
" Jugner	...	45,238
" Nalpoora	...	1,20,145
" Khyragur	...	70,135
" Herawulee	...	72,778
" Futtehpoor Sikree	...	80,734
" Iradutnagur	...	60,000
" Shumsabad	...	1,12,104
" Lohmundnee	...	1,36,425
" Norsing	...	60,205

Talookas in the Doab belonging to the same persons in Suharunpoor.

Gungoo	...	30,000
Jara and Gunget	...	13,550
Poorchupar	...	34,892
Lukhnouttee	...	15,000
Gunnoor	...	6,932
Chappte Kheree	...	7,000
Sumalia	...	6,642
Shikarpoor Khooddee	...	61,883
Kuttowlee	...	80,917
Kandla	...	47,641
Sonput	...	39,348
Gohana	...	1,16,329

No. XCVIII.

TREATY OF ALLIANCE WITH DAULAT RAO
SINDIA, 1804.

Treaty of alliance and mutual defence between the Honourable the English East India Company and the Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia Bahadoor, and his children, heirs and successors, settled by Major John Malcolm, on the part of the Honourable Company and by Bapoo Eetul Punt and Moonshee Kavel Nyn, on the part of the Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia, after having communicated to each other their full powers, the said John Malcolm being deputed to the Court of Daulat Rao Sindia by Major-General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley; the Honourable Major-General aforesaid being vested with full powers and authority from his Excellency the most Noble Richard Marquis Wellesley, Knight of the Most Illustrious Order of Saint Patrick, one of His Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, appointed by the Honourable Court of Directors of the said Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies.

Whereas, by the blessing of God, the relations of friendship and union have been happily established between the Government of the Honourable Company and that of the Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia Bahadoor by a recent Treaty of Peace, the two Governments aforesaid, adverting to the complexion of the times, have now determined, with a view to the preservation of peace and tranquillity, to enter into this Treaty of general defensive alliance for the reciprocal protection of their respective territories, together with those of their several allies and dependants, against unprovoked aggression and encroachments of all or any enemies whatever.

Article 1.

The friendship and union established by the former Treaty between the two States shall be promoted and increased by this Treaty, and shall be perpetual: the friends and enemies of either State shall be the friends and enemies of both, and their mutual interests shall hereafter be inseparable.

Article 2.

If any person or State whatever shall commit any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against either of the contracting parties, and, after due representation, shall refuse to enter into amicable explanation, or shall deny the just satisfaction or indemnity which the contracting parties shall have required, when the contracting parties will proceed to concert and prosecute such further measures as the case shall appear to demand. For the more distinct explanation of the true intent and effect of this Article, the Governor-General in Council in behalf of the Honourable Company, hereby declares that the British Government will never permit any power or State whatever to commit with impunity any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against the rights and territories of the Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia, but will, at all times, in compliance with the requisition of the Maharajah, maintain and defend the same, when such requisition is made, in the like manner as the rights and territories of the Honourable Company are now maintained and defended.

Article 3.

With a view to fulfil this Treaty of mutual defence, the Maharajah agrees to receive, and the Honourable East India Company to furnish, a subsidiary force of not less than six thousand regular infantry, with the usual proportion of artillery, and with the proper equipment of warlike stores and ammunition. This force is to be stationed at such place near the frontier of Daulat Rao Sindia as may hereafter be deemed most eligible by the British Government, and it will be held in readiness at such station to proceed as soon as possible for the execution of any service on which it is liable to be employed by the condition of this Treaty.

Article 4.

And it is further agreed that in conformity to the stipulation of the fifteenth Article of the Treaty of Peace, concluded by Major-General Wellesley, on the part of the Honourable Company, and by Bapoo Eetl Moonshee Kavel Nyn, &c., on the part of the Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia that all charges and expenses of the six battalions above-mentioned, and of their ordnance, artillery, military stores, and equipment shall be defrayed by the Honourable Company out of the produce of the revenues of the territories ceded by the Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia to the said Company, by the second, third, and fourth Articles of the aforementioned Treaty of Peace, which territories are specified in a statement annexed to that Treaty.

Article 5.

Grain and all other articles of consumption, and provisions, and all sorts of material for wearing apparel, together with the necessary number of cattle, horses, and camels, required for the use of the subsidiary force shall whenever the aforesaid force is within the territories of the Maharajah, in consequence of his requisition, be entirely exempt from duties; and whenever any further force of the Honourable Company shall, in consequence of war with any other State, be in the dominions of the Maharajah, they shall, in like manner as the subsidiary force, be exempt from all duties upon the aforesaid Articles of necessary use and consumption, and it is also agreed, that whenever any part of the army of the Maharajah is in the territories of the Honourable Company, for purposes connected with the fulfilment

of this Treaty, that no duties on grain, camels, wearing apparel, &c., as stated above, which the party of the army of the said Maharajah may require, shall be collected : and it is further agreed, that the Officers of the respective Governments, while they are in the fulfilment of the Articles of this Treaty, either with the army or in the territories of the other, shall be treated with that respect and consideration which is due to their rank and station.

Article 6.

The subsidiary force will, at all times, be ready, on the requisition of the Maharajah, to execute services of importance, such as the care of the person of the Maharajah, his heirs and successors, the protection of the country from attack and invasion, the overawing and chastisement of rebels or exciters of disturbance in the Maharajah's dominions ; but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions.

Article 7.

Whereas it is agreed in the thirteenth Article of the Treaty of Peace that the Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia shall never take or retain in his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American power, the Government of which may be at war with Great Britain, or any British subject whatever, European or Native of India, without the consent of the British Government, the Maharajah now further engages that he will hereafter never employ in his service, or permit to reside in his dominions, any European or American whatever, without the consent and acquiescence of the British Government ; the said British Government, on its part, engaging, that it never will employ or permit to reside in its dominions, any person subject of the Maharajah or others, who shall hereafter be guilty of crimes or of hostility against the person or government of the aforesaid Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia.

Article 8.

As, by the present Treaty, the union and friendship of the two States is so firmly cemented, that they may be considered as one and the same, the Maharajah engages neither to commence nor to pursue in future any negotiation with any principal States or powers, without giving previous notice and entering into mutual consultation with the Honourable East India Company's Government ; and the Honourable Company's Government, on their part, declare, that they will have no manner of concern with any of the Maharajah's relations, dependants, military chiefs, or servants, with respect to whom the Maharajah is absolute : and that they will, on no occasion, ever afford encouragement, support, or protection, to any of the Maharajah's relations, dependants, chiefs, or servants, who may eventually act in opposition to the Maharajah's authority, but, on the contrary at the requisition of the Maharajah, they will aid and assist to punish and reduce all such offenders to obedience, and it is further agreed that no officer of the Honourable Company shall ever interfere in the internal affairs of the Maharajah's government.

Article 9.

As the chief object and design of the present defensive alliance is the security and protection of the dominions of the contracting parties, and their allies and dependants, from all attack whatsoever, the Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia engages never to commit any act of hostility or aggression against any State or Chief, in alliance with the Honourable Company, or against any other principal State or power : and in the event of differences arising, whatever adjustment the Company's Government, weighing matters in the scale of truth and justice, may determine, shall meet his full approbation and acquiescence.

Article 10.

The contracting parties will employ all practicable means of conciliation to prevent the calamity of war, and for that purpose will, at all times, be ready to enter into amicable explanations with other principal States or powers, and to cultivate and improve the general relations of peace and amity with all the principal powers of India, according to the true spirit and tenor of this Treaty; but if a war should unfortunately break out between the contracting parties and any other State or power whatever, then the Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia Bahadoor engages that the English force, consisting of six battalions with their guns, &c., joined by a detachment of his army, consisting of six thousand of the Maharajah's infantry and ten thousand of his Pagah and Sillahdar Cavalry, which force the Maharajah engages always to keep ready, shall be immediately put in motion for the purpose of opposing the enemy, and the Maharajah also engages to employ every further effort for the purpose of bringing into the field the whole force which he may be able to supply from his dominions, with a view to the effectual prosecution and speedy termination of the said war. The Honourable Company, in the same manner, engage, on their part (on such event occurring), to employ in active operations against the enemy as large a force as the service may require, over and above the said subsidiary force.

Article 11.

Whenever war shall appear probable the Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia engages to collect as many Binjaries as possible, and to store as much grain as may be practicable in the frontier garrisons. The Company's Government also, with a view to the effectual prosecutions of the war, engages to adopt similar measures in their frontier garrisons.

Article 12.

The contracting parties entertain no views of conquests or extension of their respective dominions, nor any intention of proceeding to hostilities against any State or principal power, unless in the case of unjust and unprovoked aggression, and after the failure of their joint endeavours to obtain reasonable satisfaction, through the channel of pacific negotiation, according to this tenor of the preceding Treaty. If contrary to the spirit and object of this defensive Treaty, war with any State should hereafter appear unavoidable (which God avert), the contracting parties will proceed to adjust the rule of partition of all such advantages and acquisitions as may eventually result from the success of their united arms. It is declared that in the event of war and of a consequent partition of conquests between the contracting parties, the shares of each Government shall be equal, in the division of any united arms, provided be acquired by the successful exertions of their territory which may that each of the contracting parties shall have faithfully fulfilled all the stipulations of this Treaty.

Article 13.

The interests of the contracting parties being identified by this defensive alliance, it is agreed that the Honourable Company's Government shall be at liberty to employ the whole or any part of the subsidiary force established by the Treaty in the quelling of any disturbances which may arise within their territories or in the performance of any other service which may be required by the said Honourable Company's Government, provided such service shall not interfere with any other duties, on which the said subsidiary force is liable to be employed under the conditions of this Treaty. And if disturbances shall at any time break out in any part of the Maharajah's dominions which lays contiguous to the frontier of the Honourable Company, and to which it might be inconvenient to

detach any proportion of the subsidiary force the British Government, like manner, if required by Daulat Rao Sindia shall direct such of the Company's troops as may be most conveniently stationed for the purpose, to assist in quelling the said disturbances within the Maharajah's dominions ; and if disturbances shall at any time break out in any part of the dominions of the British Government which lay contiguous to the frontier of the Maharajah, the Maharajah, if required by the British Government, shall direct such of his troops as may be most conveniently stationed for the purpose to assist in quelling the said disturbances within the dominions of the British Government.

Article 14.

In order to strengthen and confirm the friendship established between the two States, it is agreed that neither of the two contracting parties shall enter into any alliance or have any concern with the tributaries or Chiefs of the other, and in order to support the independent authority of both Governments, it is agreed and declared, that hereafter neither of the contracting parties will give protection or countenance to the rebellious tributaries and subjects of the other, but they will use their utmost endeavours for the apprehension of such rebels, in order that they may be brought to punishment.

Article 15.

The Honourable Company agreed to exert this influence to maintain the observance of such usages on matters of form and ceremony, and other customs as shall appear to have been fixed on all points of intercourse and communication between the Peishwa and his ancestors, and the Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia and his ancestors ; and the English Government also agree to recognize the rights of Daulat Rao Sindia to all possessions he holds, whether by written Sunnuds, or by grants, or by the unwritten authority of the Peishwa, according to former usage, provided such Sunnuds, do not interfere with the faithful fulfilment of the Treaty of Peace ; and provided also that in all cases where disputes may arise, on the subject of possessions held by unwritten authority, the Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia agrees to refer it to the arbitration of the said British Government, who will decide, with reference to former usage, on the principles of truth and justice. The English Government further agrees to use its endeavour to prevent any acts which have been done by Daulat Rao Sindia, or his ancestors, under the authority reposed in him or them by the Peishwa or his ancestors from being subverted provided their being supported is strictly consistent with the preservation of the honour and dignity of His Highness the Peishwa, and of the stipulations of the Treaty of Peace.

Article 16.

This Treaty, consisting of sixteen Articles, being this day settled by Major Malcolm, on the part of the Honourable Company, and by Eetul Punt and Moonshee Kavel Nyn, on the part of Daulat Rao Sindia, Major Malcolm has delivered one copy thereof, in Persian and Mahratta and English signed, and sealed by himself, to the said Maharajah who, on his part, has also delivered one copy of the same duly executed by himself : and Major Malcolm by virtue of a special authority given him in that behalf, by Major-General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley, (himself vested with full powers as before stated) hereby declares the said Treaty to be in full force from the date, hereof, and engages that a copy of the same from the Governor-General in Council, in every respect a counterpart of that executed by himself, shall be delivered to the Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia, in the space of two months and ten days, and on the delivery of such copy, the Treaty executed by Major Malcolm shall be returned.

Done at Boorhanpoor, the 27th February, Anno Domini 1804 or
14th Feecadla, Anno Hegira, 1218.

Company's
Seal.

(Sd.) WELLESLEY.

Ratified by the Governor-General in Council, 23rd March 1804.

(Sd.) G. H. BARLOW.

G. UNK.

No. XCIX.

TREATY WITH DAULAT RAO SINDIA WITH THE DECLARATORY ARTICLE ANNEXED 1805.

Definitive Treaty of Amity and alliance between the Honourable English East India Company and the Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia Bahadoor, and his children, heirs and successors.

Whereas various doubts and misunderstandings have arisen respecting the clear meaning and interpretation of parts of the Treaty of Peace concluded between the British Government and Daulat Rao Sindia, at Surjee Anjengaum on the 30th December 1803, with a view of doing away all such doubts, and of preventing the recurrence in future of any misunderstanding, this definitive Treaty of Amity and alliance is concluded between the two States, by Lieutenant-Colonel John Malcolm, acting under the immediate direction and superintendence of the Right Honourable General Gerard Lake, Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's and the Honourable Company's Forces, &c., &c., &c. and vested with full powers and authority from the Honourable Sir George Hilary Barlow, Baronet, appointed by the Honourable Court of Directors of the said Company to control and direct all their affairs in the East Indies, and Moonshce Kavel Nyn, vested with full powers and authority, on the part of the said Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia.

Article 1.

Every part of the Treaty of Peace concluded by General Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., at Surjee Anjengaum, except what may be altered by this engagement, is to remain binding upon the two States.

Article 2.

The Honourable Company can never acknowledge that Daulat Rao Sindia has any claim or right, grounded on the Treaty of Surjee Anjengaum, to possess the fort of Gwalior or the territories of Gohud; but, from considerations of friendship, it agrees to cede to the Maharajah that fortress, and such parts of the territory of Gohud as are described in the accompanying Schedule.

Article 3.

As a compensation for this cession, and to remunerate the English Government for the Annual expense incurred in supporting the Rana of Gohud, Daulat Rao Sindia agrees, on his own part and that of his Sirdars, to relinquish, after the 1st of January 1806, all right and claim whatever to the pensions of fifteen lakhs of Rupees granted to several of the chief officers of his State, by the seventh Article of the aforesaid Treaty of Surjee Anjengaum.

Article 4.

The Honourable Company agree to pay to Daulat Rao Sindia the arrears due upon the pensions granted by the Seventh Article of the Treaty of Peace as above-mentioned, up to the 31st of December 1805, and also the balance due upon the revenues of Dholepore, Rajah-Kerrah, and

Baree up to the same date making deductions on the following heads :—

- 1st.—Pensions forfeited by Bappo Sindia and Sudasheo Rao, by acts of hostility towards the British Government, to be stopped from the date of their hostility.
- 2nd.—Plunder of the British Residency.
- 3rd.—Cash advanced by Mr. Jenkins to parties of the Maharajah's troops.
- 4th.—Charges of collection, &c., for the provinces of Dholepore Baree, and Rajah-Kerrah.

Article 5.

With a view of preventing any misunderstanding relating to their respective possessions on the quarter of Hindustan, it is agreed that the river Chumbal shall form the boundary between the two States, from the city of Kotah to the west, to the limits of the territories of Gohud to the east, and within that extent of the course of the Chumbal, Daulat Rao Sindia shall have no claim or right to any rule, tribute, revenue, or possessions on its north bank; and the Honourable Company shall have no claim or right to any rule, tribute, revenues, or possessions on the south bank of that river. The talooks of Bhadek and Sooseperarah, which are on the banks of the Jumna, will, however, remain in possession of the Honourable Company.

Article 6.

By the fifth Article of this Treaty, which makes the river Chumbal the boundary of the two States, from the city of Kotah to the west to the limits of the territories of Gohud to the east, the Maharajah resigns all pretensions and claims to any tribute from the Rajah of Boondee or any other, on the north bank of the Chumbal, within the afore-mentioned limits; also to the countries of Tank Ramporah, Bahraungaum, Zemeidah, &c., and to the districts of Dholepore, Rajah-Kerrah, and Baree, all which remain in the possession of the Honourable Company.

Article 7.

The Honourable Company, on consideration of the benefits derived from the Article which makes the Chumbal the boundary between the two States, and from friendship to the Maharajah, agree to grant him, personally and exclusively, the annual sum of four lakhs of Rupees, to be paid by quarterly instalments, through the Resident at the Durbar; and the Honourable Company also agree to assign, within their territories in Hindustan, a jaghire (to be holden on the same footing as that enjoyed by Balla Bai) amounting to a revenue of two lakhs of Rupees per annum, to Baiza Bai, the wife of Daulat Rao Sindia, and a jaghire, amounting to the sum of one lakh of Rupees per annum, to Chumna Bai, the daughter of that Chief.

Article 8.

The Honourable Company engage to enter into no Treaty with the Rajahs of Oudeypore and Jodhpore, and Kotah or other Chiefs, tributaries of Daulat Rao Sindia, situated in Malwa, Meywar, or Marwar, and in no shape whatever to interfere with the settlement which Sindia may make with those Chiefs.

Article 9.

The Honourable Company are now engaged in a war with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and using every exertion for his reduction; but should they hereafter make a peace, or enter into any agreement with that Chief, they engage not to restore to him, or desire to be restored to him, any of the possessions of the family of Holkar in the province of Malwa, lying between the river Tapti and Chumbal, which may have been taken by

Daulat Rao Sindia nor will the Honourable Company interfere in any manner whatever in the disposal of those provinces; and they will consider Daulat Rao Sindia at full liberty to make such arrangement as he chooses with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, or with any other branch of the Holkar family, respecting the claims of that family to tribute from the Rajahs or others, or to any possessions situated to the north of the river Tapti and to the south of the river Chumbal: but it is clearly to be understood, that as the Company's Government agrees not to concern itself with the arrangements which Sindia may make with the family of Holkar, respecting their claims or hereditary possessions, situated between the Tapti and the Chumbal, that Government will not take part in any dispute or war which may be the result or consequence of such arrangement or settlement.

Article 10.

As Serjee Rao Ghaultka has acted in a manner calculated to disturb the friendship between the two States, the Maharajah agrees never to admit that chief to share in his councils, or to hold any public employment under his Government.

Article 11.

This Treaty, consisting of eleven Articles, has been this day settled by Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, acting under directions of the Right Honourable Lord Lake, on the part of the Honourable Company, and by Moonshee Kavel Nyn, on the part of Daulat Rao Sindia, Lieutenant-Colonel John Malcolm has delivered one copy thereof, in Persian and English, signed and sealed by himself, to the said Moonshee Kavel Nyn, to be forwarded to the Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia, and has received from the said Moonshee Kavel Nyn a counterpart of the said Treaty signed and sealed by the said Moonshee. Lieutenant-Colonel John Malcolm engages that a copy of the said Treaty, ratified by the Honourable the Governor-General, in every respect a counterpart of the Treaty now executed by himself, shall be delivered to Moonshee Kavel Nyn to be forwarded to the Maharajah within the period of one month from this date, and on the delivery of such copy to the Maharajah the Treaty executed by Lieutenant-Colonel John Malcolm, under the immediate direction of the Right Honourable Lord Lake shall be returned; and Moonshee Kavel Nyn in like manner, engages, that another copy of the said Treaty, ratified by the Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia, in every respect a counterpart of the Treaty now executed by himself, shall be delivered to Lieutenant-Colonel John Malcolm, to be forwarded to the Honourable the Governor-General, within the period of one month from this date; and on the delivery of such copy to the Honourable the Governor-General the Treaty executed by Moonshee Kavel Nyn, by virtue of the full powers and authority vested in him as above-mentioned, shall also be returned.

Done at Mustafapoor, this 22nd day of November, Anno Domini 1805, or 29th of Shuban, in the year of the Hegira, 1220.

(Sd.) JOHN MALCOLM.

„ KAVEL NYN.

Declaratory Articles annexed to the Treaty concluded between the Right Honourable Lord Lake, on the part of the Honourable Company and Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia; on the 22nd November 1805.

Whereas objections have arisen to the terms of the fifth, sixth, and seventh Articles of the aforesaid Treaty, it is hereby agreed and declared, that in lieu of those three Articles, the two following shall be substituted.

Article 1.

With a view to prevent any misunderstanding relating to the respective possessions of the Honourable Company, and Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia in the quarter of Hindustan, the Maharajah hereby agrees to cede to the Honourable Company all the territory north of the river Chumbal which was ceded to the Maharajah by the seventh Article of the Treaty of Surjee Anjengnaum, that is to say, the whole of the districts of Dholepore, Barce, and Rajah-Kerrah, and the Honourable Company shall have no claim or right to any rule, tribute, revenues or possessions on the South bank of that river. The talooks of Bhadek and Sooseperarah, which are on the banks of the Jumna, will, however, remain in the possession of the Honourable Company.

Article 2.

The Honorable Company, from friendship to the Maharajah, agrees to grant to him personally and exclusively, the annual sum of four lakhs of Rupees to be paid by quarterly instalments, through the Resident at the Durbar. And the Honourable Company also agree to assign, within their territories in Hindustan, a jaghire (to be holden on the same footing as that enjoyed by Balla Bai) amounting to a revenue of two lakhs of Rupees per annum, to Baiza Bai, the wife of Daulat Rao Sindia, and a jaghire, amounting to one lakh of Rupees per annum, to Chamma Bai, the daughter of that Chief.

Done at Allahabad, this 3rd day of December, 1805.

(Sd.) G. H. BARLOW.

Separate Schedule of Districts, pertaining to Gwalior and Gohud, which are ceded to the Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia on the part of the British Government. The Fortresses of Gohud and Gwalior, 44 Mahals, viz.—

The fortresses of Gohud and
Gwalior.
Guree-Gwalior.
Antry, &c., 5 Mahals
Antry.
Chemuk.
Bunwar.
Salpe.
Jitters.
Allahapoor.
Sawmoolie.
Pahurgur, &c., belonging to Sakur-
waree, both Zemindari and
Khalsa Talook of Chittawar.
Pergunnah of Bhind and its
fortresses.
Pergunnah of Athere.
Talooka of Pohpey.
" " Oomree.
" " Bullaweh.
" " Aba.
" " Jugnee.
Seray Choolah.
Dhoondree,
Auhoon.
Nourabad.
Atoora.
Bahadurpoor.

Bulhertec.
Kurwas.
Girdé Gohud.
Bahut.
Talooka of Sookulbaree.
" " Aban.
Indurkhee.
Bundere.
Thoda.
Sahur &c. belonging to
Kurewakur.
Zemindary, 6 pergunnahs.
Sahur.
Bampoora.
Gopalpoor.
Khugeesees.
Gohound.
Nabaskhera.
Gujesra.
Kutowlee.
Sawun Kalan.
Pergunnah of Moh.
" " Kutwa.
Deogur.

(A TRUE COPY.)

(Sd.) N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Secretary to Government.

No. C.

TREATY of CONCERT and ALLIANCE with DAULAT RAO SINDIA, dated the 5th November 1817.

Treaty of concert and alliance between the Honourable the English East India Company and Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia, Bahadoor, and his children, heirs and successors, settled on the part of the Honourable Company by Captain Robert Close, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him by His Excellency the Most Noble Francis, Marquis of Hastings, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, one of His Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Governor-General, appointed by the Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies, Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's and the Honourable Company's forces, &c., &c., &c. and on the part of His Highness Daulat Rao Sindia, by Ram Chundru Bhaskur, duly empowered by His Highness to that effect.

Whereas the British Government and Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia Bahadoor, are mutually actuated by a desire to suppress the predatory power of the Pindarees, and to destroy and prevent the revival of the predatory system in every part of India; the following Articles have been agreed on for the purpose of giving effect to the mutual wishes of the two States:

Article 1.

The contracting parties engage to employ the forces of their respective Governments and of their allies and dependants in prosecuting operations against the Pindarees and any other bodies of associated freebooters; to expel them from their haunts, and to adopt the most effectual measures to disperse and prevent them from re-assembling. With this view the forces of the two Governments and their respective allies will immediately attack the Pindarees and their associates, according to a concerted plan of operations, and will not desist until the objects of this engagement are entirely accomplished. The Maharajah further agrees to employ his utmost efforts to seize the persons of the Pindaree leaders and their families, and deliver them up to the British Government.

Article 2.

The Pindaree hordes having established themselves in the territories of the Maharajah and other neighbouring States, it is hereby agreed that, on their expulsion, such of the lands occupied by them as heretofore belonged to the Maharajah, shall be immediately resumed by His Highness, who engages never to re-admit them to possession. Such of the lands now occupied by the Pindarees as belong to other States shall be restored to their rightful proprietors, provided they shall have exerted themselves to the extent required in expelling the Pindarees, and shall engage never to re-admit them, or in any way to connect themselves with those freebooters. Those lands shall otherwise be delivered over to Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia, and be held by him on the same conditions.

Article 3.

Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia hereby engages never to re-admit the Pindarees or any other predatory bodies into his territories, or in any manner to give them the smallest countenance or support, or to permit his officers to do so; on the contrary, His Highness promises to issue the most positive orders to all his officers, civil and military, and to enforce them, by the severest penalties, to employ their utmost efforts to expel or destroy any bodies of plunderers who may attempt to take refuge in His Highness' territories. All officers disregarding His Highness' orders are to be considered and dealt with as rebels to the Maharajah and enemies of the British Government.

Article 4.

Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia is the undisputed master of his own troops and resources. With a view, however, to the more effectual accomplishment of the objects of this Treaty, His Highness agrees that the divisions of his troops (which, taken together, shall amount to 5,000 horse) employed in active operations against the Pindarees or other freebooters, shall act in concert with the British troops and in conformity to the plan that may be counselled by the officer commanding the British divisions, with which His Highness' troops may be appointed to act in concert. With the same view it is agreed that a British officer shall be stationed with each division of the Maharajah's troops, to be the channel of communication between them and the British Commanding Officer; and to forward the other purposes of their conjoint operations, His Highness engages that all his officers, civil and military, shall afford every degree of support and assistance in their power, in procuring supplies or otherwise to the British troops operating in his territory; and any failure in this respect shall subject the offending party to be considered and treated as a rebel to His Highness and an enemy of the British Government.

Article 5.

Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia engages that the divisions appointed to act in concert with the British troops shall be maintained in a state of complete equipment, both men and horses, and regularly paid. In order to provide effectually for the latter object in such a manner as shall prevent all future discussion or dispute, His Highness consents to renounce for the next three years, the payments now made by the British Government to him, as well as to certain members of his family and ministers of his Government, and that those sums shall be disbursed towards the payment of His Highness' troops through the British officers stationed with them: and the British Government agrees at the conclusion of the war, and after His Highness' troops shall have received what may be due to them, to pay any balance that may remain to His Highness. With the same view, the Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia likewise consents to relinquish in the fullest manner to the British Government, for a period of two years, the tribute which he is entitled to receive from the States of Jodhpore, Boondee and Kotah.

Article 6.

It is agreed that the troops of Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, shall occupy, during the war, such positions as shall be designated by the British Government, and shall not change them without the express concurrence of that Government, any unconverted movements being calculated to derange the joint operations of the forces of the two States and to give advantage to the enemy. It is also agreed, in order to ensure the due execution of the stipulation contained in this Article that the British Government shall be at liberty to station an officer in each of the divisions of the Maharajah's army above-mentioned.

Article 7.

The force that will be put in motion by the British Government, and that actually in the service of Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia, being fully sufficient to chastise the Pindarees and effect the objects of the present Treaty, His Highness agrees, in order to prevent the possibility of collusion between his officers and the Pindarees, not to augment his forces during the war, without the concurrence of the British Government. His Highness expressly engages to prohibit his officers from admitting into the ranks of his army, or otherwise harbouring or protecting the Pindarees, or other freebooters; and all persons neglecting or disobeying these orders, are to be considered and treated as rebels to His Highness and enemies of the British Government.

Article 8.

With a view to the more effectual prosecution of the joint operations of the two Governments and to the facility and security of the communications of the British troops with their supplies, the Maharajah, reposing entire confidence in the friendship and good faith of the British Government, agrees that British garrisons shall be admitted into the forts of Hindia and Asseergurh, and shall be charged with the care and defence of those forts during the war, and shall have the liberty of establishing depots within them. The flag of Danlat Rao Sindia shall, however, continue to fly in the fort of Asseergurh, and His Highness shall be at liberty to station a killadar with a personal guard of fifty men, in the said fort; but it is clearly understood that the actual command of that place as well as of Hindia, and the disposal of the warlike stores that may be found in those forts shall be vested exclusively in the British Commanding Officers. Any part of those stores that may be damaged or expended, while the forts in question are occupied by the British troops, shall be accounted for, and the value made good to His Highness. For the more effectual performance of this stipulation, inventories shall be taken by officers, on the part of both Governments at the time of the occupation of the forts by the British Government. The present garrisons (with the exception above stated in regard to Asseergurh) shall move out of the forts. The Maharajah will thenceforward have no further concern with the Sehandees of the garrisons, but His Highness' other troops, including the Pangah, &c., shall encamp at such places as may be prescribed by the British officers in conformity to the provisions of the 6th Article. The territories depending on the forts above-mentioned will continue to be managed by the officers of the Maharajah, who will receive every support from the British Government and its officers. The whole or such portion of the revenues as may be necessary, shall be appropriated to the payment of the Maharajah's troops acting in concert with the British divisions, as stipulated in the 5th Article; and a faithful account of the whole shall be rendered to His Highness after the conclusion of the war. The two forts above-mentioned and the territories dependent on them, will be restored to the Maharajah as soon as the operations against the Pindarees or their confederates shall be brought to a termination in the same condition in which they may be delivered up to the British Government. All private property will be respected, and the inhabitants of the towns or villages depending on the forts, will enjoy the protection of the British Government or be permitted to depart with their property, if they think proper.

Article 9.

The main object of the contracting parties being to prevent for ever the revival of the predatory system in any form, and both Governments being satisfied that to accomplish this wise and just end it may be necessary for the British Government to form engagements of friendship and alliance with the several States of Hindustan, the 8th Article of the Treaty of the 22nd November 1805, by which the British Government is restrained from entering into Treaties with certain Chiefs therein specified, is hereby abrogated and annulled; and it is declared that the British Government shall be at full liberty to form engagements with the States of Oudeypore, Jodhpore, and Kotah, and with the State of Boondee, and other substantive States on the left bank of the Chumbul. Nothing in this Article shall, however, be construed to give the British Government a right to interfere with States or Chiefs in Malwa or Guzerat, clearly and indisputably dependent on, or tributary to, the Maharajah: and it is agreed that His Highness, authority over those States or Chiefs shall continue on the same footing as it has been heretofore. The British Government further agrees and promises, in the event of its forming any engagements with the above-mentioned States of Oudeypore, Jodhpore, Kotah, and Boondee, or with any others on the left bank of the Chumbul, to secure to Daulat Rao

Sindia his ascertained tribute and to guarantee the same in perpetuity to be paid through the British Government ; and Daulat Rao Sindia engages, on his part, on no account or pretence whatever, to interfere in any shape in the affairs of those States without the concurrence of the British Government.

Article 10.

If (which God forbid!) the British Government and the Maharajah shall be compelled to wage war with any other State, on account of such State attacking either of the contracting parties or aiding or protecting the Pindarees or other freebooters, the British Government, having at heart the welfare of Daulat Rao Sindia, will, in the event of success, and of His Highness' zealous performance of his engagements ; make the most liberal arrangements for the consolidation and increase of his territories.

Article 11.

Such parts of the Treaty of Surjee Anjengaum, and of the Treaty concluded on the 22nd of November 1805, as are not affected by the provisions of the present engagement, remain in full force, and are mutually binding on the contracting parties.

Article 12.

This Treaty, consisting of twelve Articles, having this day been concluded, subject to the ratification of the Governor-General and Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia, Captain Close engages to procure the ratification of the Governor-General in five days from this date, or sooner if possible, and Ram Chundru Bhaskur engages to obtain His Highness' ratification before sunset this evening.

Done at Gwalior, this 5th day of November, in the year of our Lord 1817, corresponding with the 24th day of Zilhuj, 1232 of the Hegira, and with the 11th Ashwin Vud, in the year 1218 of the Arabic era.

Seal of Daulat Rao Sindia.

(Sd.)

ROBT. CLOSE.

"

RAM CHUNDRU BHASKUR.

Ratified by the Governor-General in Camp, near Nuddee-ka-Gong on the 6th of November 1817.

No. CI.

ENGAGEMENT between the HONOURABLE the ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY and MAHARAJAH ALI JAH DAULAT RAO SINDIA BAHADOOR, dated the 25th June, 1888.

Whereas by the 14th Article of the Treaty of Poona concluded on the 13th of June 1817, all the rights and territories of His Highness Rao Pundit Pradhan in Malwa were ceded to the Honourable East India Company, and whereas some of those territories are contiguous to and intermixed with those of Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia, it has therefore been agreed for the mutual convenience of both States, that certain exchanges of territory should take place, and the British Government hereby transfers to Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia, his heirs and successors, all its rights and claims to the districts and territories mentioned in the annexed Schedule, No. 1 ; and Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia, for himself, his heirs and successors, hereby transfers to the British Government all his rights and claims of every description to the places mentioned in the accompanying Schedule No. 2.

Moreover, the British Government having resolved to restore to Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao the fort and territory of Jawud, &c. the Maharajah on his part engages, on his recovering that district, to establish such an administration there as shall afford security for the peace of the country and the prevention of the revival of the predatory system. The Maharajah further engages to recall Jeswant Rao Bhao, for whose future conduct the Maharajah will be responsible and will require him to reside at a distance from Jawud, on a provision to be assigned him by the Maharajah either in jaghire or in any other manner His Highness may prefer.

It is further stipulated, that in the event of Hindia and Asseergurh being restored by the British Government to the Maharajah, previous to the entire cessation of operations against the Pindarees, &c., the Maharajah engages that in lieu of the revenues of those districts, which by Treaty have been set aside for the payment of the contingent to be employed against the Pindarees, a third year's tribute on the States of Kotah and Jodhpore shall, in the event of its being required, be assigned for that purpose.

In witness whereof Maharajah Ali Jah Daulat Rao Sindia has hereunto affixed his seal, and Captain Josiah Stewart engages to obtain and deliver to Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia, without delay, a counterpart of this engagement, with the ratification of the most Noble the Governor-General.

Done at Gwalior, this twenty-fifth day of June in the year of our Lord 1818, corresponding with the twentieth day of Shaban 1233 of the Hegira, and with the 7th of Jesht Vud, in the year 1219 of the Arabic era.

(Sd.) J. STEWART, *Acting Resident.*

MEMORANDUM.—This engagement was ratified by His Excellency the Governor-General, on the river near Dinapore, on the 9th July 1818.

SCHEDULE NO. 1.

Statement of cessions made by the British Government to Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia.

Talookas.	In what District.	REVENUE AT THE HIGHEST ESTIMATE.	
		Total of each.	Total.
<i>Lands of the Vinchoorkur.</i>		Rs.	Rs.
Raee	Gwalior ...	2,10,000	
Susarem	Ditto ...		
Sisaree	Ditto ...		
Simree	Ditto ...		
Mehagaon	Ditto ...		
Jukhoda	Ditto ...		
Powaya	Ditto ...		
Pulacha	Ditto ...		
Butterwas and Mustoora.	Nurwar ...		
Arown	Gwalior ...		
Chandpoor	Ditto ...		
Punyar	Ditto ...		
Khurya	Ditto ...		
Gurajur and 3 villages	Ditto ...		
Raee Rajgur	Nurwar ...		
Carried forward	2,10 000

SCHEDULE NO. 1—(continued.)

Talookas.	In what District.	REVENUE AT THE HIGHEST ESTIMATE.	
		Total of each.	Total.
		Rs.	Rs.
Brought forward	2,10,000
<i>Lands of the Vinchoorkur.</i>			
Kurhowul ...	Nurwar ...	10,000	
Bamore ...	Ditto ...	8,000	
Share of Cherus and Digdowleah.	Ditto ...	1,500	
Kuduyo ...	Aheerwara ...	85,000	
Utcheekhera ...	Ditto ...		
Billakhera ...	Ditto ...		
Budurhutta and Bamsolee...	Subbulgurh ...	17,000	
Koolhowlee ...	Ditto ...		
Bampoor ...	Ditto ...		
Jolvahargur ...	Ditto ...		
Sewye ...	Ditto ...		1,16,500
<i>Lands of the Jadhows.</i>			
Sippree ...	South of Nurwar ...	25,000	
Kolarus ...	Ditto ...	24,000	
Jirree ...	Ditto ...	27,000	
Gazeegur and Gaswanee ...	Ditto ...	13,000	
Oomedgur ...	Ditto ...	1,000	
<i>Lands of Raja Bahadoor.</i>			90,000
Toomun ...	In Aheerwara ...		
Puchar ...	Ditto ...	25,000	
Runode ...	Ditto ...	35,000	
Peeprye ...	Ditto ...	25,000	
Kutehuar ...	Ditto ...	65,000	
Ramser ...	Ditto ...	20,000	
That part of Shujawulpore, west of the Neewuz.	} Ditto ...	27,000	
		{ Revenue not known.	1,97,000
<i>Lands of the Oreekur.</i>			
Malhargur		
Mungowlee ...	Malwa ...	10,000	
Bhorasso ...	Ditto ...	12,000	
Kunjee ...	Ditto ...	15,000	
Teeconda ...	Ditto ...	10,000	
Dhamad and Bagrode ...	Ditto ...	20,000	
Nya, Surace ...	Aheerwara ...	60,000	
Aggur ...	Sondwara ...	75,000	
<i>Lands of the Nygonghur.</i>			2,02,000
Dewry ...	Near Saugor ...	50,000	
Goorjama ...	Ditto ...	25,000	
Narmhow ...	Between Saugor and Bhopal.	35,000	
Chourpart ...	Near the Nerbudda	3,000	
			1,13,000
Carried forward	9,28,500

SCHEDULE No. 1—(concluded.)

Talookas.	In what District.	REVENUE AT THE HIGHEST ESTIMATE.	
		Total of each.	Total.
Brought forward	Rs.	Rs.
Lands of the Nyggonghur.	9,25,500
Taindeo Khaltia ...	Near the Nerbudda	20,000	
Balla Behut and Suhrace ...	In Abeerwara ...	75,000	
Oonarsce ...	Near Seronge ...	50,000	
			1,42,000
Grand Total, Rs.	10,73,500

Governor-General's
small Seal.

(Sd.) HASTINGS.

J. ADAM.

Secretary to the Governor-General.

By the Governor-General.

SCHEDULE No. 2.

Statement of cessions made by Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia to the British Government.

District of Ajmere.	Original Revenue.			Additional Revenue.			Total of each.			TOTAL.		
	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.
Huwalce Ajmere ..	86,482	12	6	20,000	0	0	1,16,482	12	6			
Ramsar and Erenuggur ..	81,000	0	0	25,000	0	0	76,000	0	0			
Dhenoy ..	81,035	0	0	25,000	0	0	76,035	0	0			
Lokundee ..	40,259	6	0	20,000	0	0	60,259	6	0			
Sawar ..	2,600	0	0	1,000	0	0	3,600	0	0			
Phoolpah ..	2,000	0	0	2,000	0	0			
Mukada ..	14,033	0	0	7,000	0	0	21,033	0	0			
Kharwah ..	2,900	0	0	1,500	0	0	4,400	0	0			
Customs, Duties, Fines, &c., ..	44,191	6	6	44,191	6	6			
Revenue collected under the name of Bhoom Baba and Buttal Baba, Rs. 25,000 every second year ..	12,500	0	0	12,500	0	0			
Ditto, for Nath Khasree Ghogree and Aumeena, &c.	38,567	7	0			
Ditto, ditto, Khawaza Sahab and Mirza Sahab	48,958	0	0			
Ditto, ditto, Kynavasee Appa Sahab's Ohutree (Tomb)	3,000	0	0			
Ditto, ditto, Dhurum Dess and Keerut Mull	1,500	0	0			
Bondee Tribute, one-fourth of the Revenue.										5,05,484	0	0
Kusha Boondee. ..	10,000	0	0	10,000	0	0			
Burrodoah ..	8,500	0	0	8,500	0	0			
Ekharlohecha ..	10,000	0	0	10,000	0	0			
Bnssee ..	6,000	0	0	6,000	0	0			
Kauprun ..	4,000	0	0	4,000	0	0			
										38,500	0	0
Carried forward			5,43,984	0	0

SCHEDULE NO. 2.—(Concluded).

	Original Revenue.			Additional Revenue.			Total of each.			TOTAL.		
	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.
Brought forward			5,43,984	0	0
Collections from the following Mahals.												
Gunnowly ..	24,000	0	0			24,000	0	0			
Boordun ..	21,000	0	0			21,000	0	0			
Kurwar Summadhee ..	25,000	0	0			25,000	0	0			
New Talooka Footgaown ..	8,000	0	0			8,000	0	0			
Baug ..	100	0	0			100	0	0			
Nuwal Gaown ..	0,000	0	0			0,000	0	0	81,100	0	0
Revenue of the Orceelah, &c.												
Kusba Orceelah ..	4,000	0	0			4,000	0	0			
Jumaida ..	2,500	0	0			2,500	0	0			
Moreka ..	2,000	0	0			2,000	0	0			
Guira ..	1,000	0	0			1,000	0	0			
Oeecha ..	1,000	0	0			1,000	0	0			
Balodee ..	800	0	0			800	0	0			
Booglee and Burgowlee ..	3,000	0	0			3,000	0	0			
Goorha ..	6,000	0	0			6,000	0	0			
Numeecha Kerala ..	1,500	0	0			1,500	0	0			
Jumadee ..	800	0	0			800	0	0	22,600	0	0
Pergunnah of Huttanah in Moywar, (Revenue not known) Islamnugger,										50,000	0	0
GRAND TOTAL, Rs-										7,00,681	0	0

Governor-
General's
small Seal.

(Sd.) HASTINGS.

" J. ADAM.

By the Governor-General. Secretary to the Governor-General.

No. CII.

ENGAGEMENT between the BRITISH GOVERNMENT and the MAHARAJAH DAULAT RAO SINDIA, dated the 6th February 1820.

Whereas the Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia agrees to give up for three years the annual payments made by the British Government to himself and certain other persons of his Court, and also the tribute to which he was entitled from the Rajpoot States (for three years) for the purpose of maintaining a body of Auxiliary Horse, and whereas the whole of that amount has already been paid by the British Government to the Maharajah's troops, and a considerable balance remains due to the British Government; it has now been agreed between the Maharajah and the British Government that the body of Auxiliary Horse to be maintained by His Highness shall be reduced, so that the above-mentioned funds, namely, the annual payments formerly made to the Maharajah and his family and ministers, together with the tribute due from the Rajpoot States, may be fully adequate to the payment of the force.

It is further agreed that for the liquidation of the debt incurred by the Maharajah to the British Government for the payments already made to the Auxiliary Horse, as well as for the expenses of those Horse until the funds appropriated for their maintenance become available, the following Districts shall be made over from the commencement of the year 1877 Sumbut, to the British Government, viz:—

IN KANDEISH.

1. The Pergunnah of Yawul.
2. Ditto Ohupra.
3. Ditto Paehora.
4. Ditto Lohara, 12 villages,

5. Possessions in Gurra Kota and Maltoun intermixed with those of the British Government, together with the fort of Gurra Kota.

And whereas all the above-mentioned districts are intermixed with the possessions of the British Government, it is further agreed that after the liquidation of the debt due by the Maharajah, the British Government shall either restore those districts to His Highness or continue to hold them, paying a fair rent for them, or grant to His Highness other lands of equal value, in lieu of them, which may be more conveniently situated, whichever mode may appear best to the British Government.

Done at Gwalior, this sixth day of February, in the year of our Lord 1820, corresponding with 20th day of Rubee-oos-sanee 1235 of the Hegira, and with 7th Magh Vud Suptumee 1220 of the Arabic era.

(Sd.) J. STEWART,
Acting Resident.

Daulat Rao
Sindia's seal.

(Sd.) HASTINGS.
" J. ADAM.
" J. E. COLBROOKE.

The Governor-General's
small seal.

Ratified by His Excellency the Governor-General in Council, this 22nd day of April A.D. 1820.

(Sd.) C. T. METCALFE,
Secretary.

No. CIII.

TRANSLATION of an AGREEMENT between the BRITISH GOVERNMENT and the MAHARAJAH DAULAT RAO SINDIA regarding the NIMAR DISTRICTS.

Whereas by an arrangement formerly effected by Major-General Sir John Malcolm, it was agreed that the Maharajah Daulat Rao Sindia should pay annually the sum of Rupees four thousands and thirty-eight towards the support of certain Grassia chiefs in Nimar, which contribution not having been paid for upwards of four years, a debt has consequently accumulated to near Rupees twenty thousand, and whereas the pergunnahs of Dhurgaon, Burwe, Sylanee, Poonassa and Kandwa, which adjoin certain provinces belonging to the British Government in Nimar are now so desolate that the Maharajah does not receive the proper revenue of them, and in consequence of the disorders which prevail in them, great inconvenience is occasioned to the adjacent districts of the British Government in that quarter; therefore, in order to remove those inconveniences and to provide for the payment of the debt before-mentioned, as well as to secure the punctual discharge for the future of the annual contribution above-noticed of Rupees four thousand and thirty-eight, it is hereby agreed by the Maharajah that the aforesaid pergunnahs, including their dependencies shall (with the exception of certain long established rights or charitable grants as Nankar Pudarick and Dhermdow) remain in the possession of the Honourable Company.

The British Government consents that, after deducting the amount of the debt mentioned in the preceding Article, and after deducting the annual contribution of Rupees four thousand and thirty-eight, together with the expenses of management, the whole remaining revenue to be collected from the districts above-mentioned shall be paid annually to the Maharajah for ever; and as the expenses of management cannot now be correctly ascertained, it is likewise agreed that whatever sum those expenses may amount to during the first year that the pergunnahs aforesaid remain in the possession of the British Government, the same amount shall be considered for ever afterwards the fixed and permanent annual charge on that account.

And whereas certain Grassia Chiefs in Malwa are by former agreement entitled to receive from the Maharajah's Government certain Tanka dues in the payment of which difficulties have been sometimes made by the Maharajah's officers, it is hereby agreed by both Governments that as long as those payments shall be faithfully and regularly discharged, the Grassia Chiefs shall continue to receive them from the Maharajah's Kamavisdars, but if at any time the Maharajah's officers hesitate to make the payments in question, it is understood that the British Government shall be at liberty to discharge them and to add the amount of those payments to the deductions already agreed to be made from the revenue of the districts above-mentioned.

Done at Gwalior, this 10th day of November 1823, corresponding with the 6th of Rubee-al-awal, in the year 1239 of the Hegira, and with the 8th of Kartick (Shoodh), in the year 1880 Sumbut, or 1224 of the Arabic era.

In the year Seor Sun, Araba Assecreen, in the month of Mohurram and on the 25th day, corresponding with A. D. 1824, I request that in the district of Nimar, the under-mentioned mahals may be received from the charge of Kamavisdars and transferred in Kamavish (Khalsa) to the charge of the English:—

- | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Kundwac pergunnah. | 4. Sylanee pergunnah. |
| 2. Burwae. " | 5. Dhungoon Mosa. |
| 3. Poonassa. " | |

These five mahals are transferred from the aforesaid years in Kamavish in order that they may be restored to prosperity and re-peopled. Whatever may be collected shall be paid into the Sircar's treasury, year by year; this is exclusive of the Domallagaon, the Padaruk Zumeen, which must be continued according to custom. When the mahals are restored to prosperity, and shall have reached their Kumal Juma, they must be shown (in Mahrattas "Anoon dakwac.")

In the year Kumus, Assecreen, Moatcein-wo-Aluf, and the 22nd of the month of Juffer A. D., 1825, the Government of the Company having stated that certain mahals are not prosperous, but on the contrary very much depopulated, and requested that they might be transferred to its management to be restored to prosperity; for this reason the following mahals are transferred:—

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Assore excepting Hussainpoora
Surbaugh, Soodeepoora. | 6. Deore pergunnah, including the
Talookas of Tendokerra, Nar-
mon, the pergunnahs of Gower,
Jakur and Sowlate. |
| 2. Bangurh pergunnah. | 7. Peemplode pergunnah. |
| 3. Moode pergunah. | |
| 4. Belora Talooka. | |
| 5. Attode " | |

The above seven mahals are from the above-mentioned years transferred to the Company according to its request for the purpose of being restored to prosperity. When they shall have reached their Kumal Juma they shall be shown (in Mahrattas "Anoon dakwunee.") After the Malmuskoor (this includes Sebundee, Nemnook, Durukdar, &c. shall have been settled, the remainder of the collections, as in other mahals, according to the Kistbundee, shall be paid into the Sircar's treasury, always excluding Duorundae, Wurchasun, Paduruke, Zumeen and Gaon Domale, Natkhasgec, Amcene, &c., which must be continued according to custom.

No. CIV.

TREATY between the BRITISH GOVERNMENT and the MAHARAJAH JYAJEE RAO SINDIA, dated the 13th January 1844.

Treaty between the Honourable English East India Company and Maharajah Ali Jah Jyajee Rao Sindia Bahadoor, and his children, heirs

and successors, settled on the part of the Honourable Company by Frederick Currie, Esquire and Lieutenant-Colonel William Henry Sleeman; by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in them by the Right Honourable Edward, Lord Ellenborough, one of Her Britannic Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council, Governor-General, appointed by the Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies, and on the part of his Highness Jyajee Rao Sindia by Rao Ram Rao Phalki Bahadoor Shumshera Jung, Deo Rao Jadhav Mama Saheb, Dubeer-ood-Dowlah, Moonshee Rajah Bulwunt Rao Bahadoor, Oodajee Rao Ghatgia Moolajee and Narayan Rao Bhao Yumajee, Potnavees, the Sirdars nominated to conduct the affairs of the Government during his Highness' minority.

Article 1.

Every part of the Treaty of Peace concluded by General Sir Arthur Wellesley K.B., at Surjee Anjengam, on the 30th December 1803, and of the Treaty of alliance and mutual defence, settled by Major John Malcolm at Boorhanpoor, on the 27th February 1804, and of the definitive Treaty of amity and alliance, with the declaratory Article annexed, concluded by Lieutenant-Colonel John Malcolm at Mostafapoor, on the 22nd November 1805, and of the Treaty concluded between Captain Robert Close, on the part of the British Government, and Maharajah Ali Jah Daulut Rao Sindia, on the 5th November 1817, as well as every part of all other Treaties and engagements between the two States, which may be now in force, except in so far as may be altered by this engagement, is to remain binding upon the two Governments,

Article 2.

Whereas the late Maharajah Junkojee Rao Sindia engaged to defray all the charges of a force, to be commanded by British officers, and constantly stationed within His Highness' territories, for the protection thereof and the preservation of good order therein, and the cost of such force hitherto has been about Company's Rupees 5,00,000 per annum, and the revenues and receipts set apart and assigned for the maintaining of the said force, together with other revenues now received by the British Government on His Highness' account, amount to the sum of about Company's Rupees 5,46,000; and whereas it is expedient to increase the amount of such force and to make permanent provision for defraying the charge thereof, it is therefore agreed between the British Government and His Highness the Maharajah Jyajee Rao Sindia, that in addition to all the revenues and other receipts already set apart for the purpose of maintaining the said force, or received by the British Government on His Highness' account, the revenue of the districts enumerated and territory described in the Schedule A. to this Treaty shall be appropriated to the maintenance of such force.

Article 3.

It is further agreed that if the revenues of the districts so enumerated and described in such Schedule A., together with the revenues and payments mentioned in the foregoing Article as set apart for the payment of the said force, or heretofore received on His Highness' account, shall, after defraying thereout all the charges of civil administration, exceed the sum of Company's Rupees eighteen lakhs, the surplus shall be paid over to His Highness Maharajah Jyajee Rao Sindia; and if the said revenues and receipts shall fall short of Company's Rupees eighteen lakhs per annum, the deficiency shall be made good by His Highness.

Article 4.

And it is further agreed, for the better securing of the due payment of the revenues of such districts enumerated and described in Schedule A., and for the better preserving of good order within the same, that the civil administration thereof shall be conducted by the British Government, in the same manner in which the civil administration of the other

districts belonging to the Maharajah, of which the revenues are similarly assigned, is conducted by the British Government for His Highness.

Article 5.

And whereas there is now due to the British Government the sum of ten lakhs of Rupees, more or less, as may hereafter appear on examination of the accounts, on the score of charges of the contingent force, and a further sum of one lakh, on account of advances made to Her Highness Baiza Bai, and on other accounts, and the charges of the present armament of the British Government may be estimated at ten lakhs (after deducting therefrom the expense of furnishing to His Highness six thousand men, with artillery and stores, free of cost to His Highness, under the provisions of the Treaty of Boorhanpoor), and a further expenditure of five lakhs will be incurred by the British Government in affording compensation for losses sustained during, and in consequence of the late hostilities and in other charges connected therewith; it is further agreed, that His Highness shall pay to the British Government the sum of twenty-six lakhs of Rupees within fourteen days from the date of this Treaty, and in default thereof, that the revenues of the several districts enumerated in Schedule B., attached to this Treaty, shall, together with the civil administration of such districts, be made over to the British Government until such time as the said sum of twenty-six lakhs of Company's Rupees shall have been paid, together with interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum upon the same.

Article 6.

And whereas the British Government is bound by Treaty to protect the person of His Highness the Maharajah, his heirs and successors, and to protect his dominions from foreign invasion, and to quell serious disturbances therein, and the army now maintained by His Highness is of unnecessary amount, embarrassing to His Highness' Government and the cause of disquietude to neighbouring States, it is therefore further agreed that the military force of all arms hereafter to be maintained by His Highness, exclusive of the contingent above provided for, shall at no time exceed nine thousand men, of whom not more than three thousand shall be infantry with twelve field guns and two hundred gunners, with twenty other guns; and His Highness the Maharajah engages to take immediate measures for the reduction of his army within the number above specified, and the British Government engages on its part to assist His Highness therein, should such aid appear to be required.

Article 7.

It is further agreed that His Highness will discharge all pay due to the troops disbanded, and also give a gratuity of three months' pay to such of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the corps disbanded, as may not be re-enlisted in the contingent or in any new corps formed by His Highness.

Article 8.

And inasmuch as it is expedient to provide for the due administration of the Government during the minority of His Highness the Maharajah, which minority shall be considered to terminate when His Highness shall have attained the full age of 18 years, and not sooner, that is on the 5th Magh Vud Sumbut 1909, or 19th day of January A. D. 1853, it is further agreed that during such minority the persons entrusted with the administration of the government shall act upon the advice of the British Resident in all matters whereon such advice shall be offered, and no change shall be made in the persons entrusted with the administration without the consent of the British Resident acting under the express authority of the Governor-General.

Article 9.

And it is agreed that the following persons shall, in the first instance, constitute the Council of Regency, and that the first named person shall be President of the same. Rao Ram Rao Phalkia Bahadoor, Shumsher Jung ; Deo Rao Jadhaw Mama Saheh ; Duheer-ood-Dowlah Moonshee Rajah Bulwunt Rao Bahadoor ; Oodajee Rao Ghatgia ; Moolajee ; and Narayun Rao Bhao Yumajee Potnuvees.

Article 10.

And inasmuch as it is fitting that Her Highness Tara Bai should have a suitable provision now made for the maintenance of her court, it is further agreed that the sum of Rupees three lakhs shall be annually set apart for that purpose, and be at Her Highness' sole disposal.

Article 11.

And it is further agreed that the British Government shall, as heretofore, exert its influence and good offices for maintaining the just territorial rights of the Maharajah and the subjects of the State of Sindia at present existing in the neighbouring and other Native States.

Article 12.

This Treaty, consisting of twelve Articles has been this day settled by Frederick Currie, Esquire, and Lieutenant-Colonel William Henry Sleeman, acting under the directions of the Right Honourable Edward Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General, on the part of the British Government and by Rao Ram Rao Phalkia Bahadoor, Shumsher Jung ; Deo Rao Jadhaw, Mama Saheh, Duheer-ood-Dowlah Moonshee Rajah Bulwunt Rao Bahadoor ; Oodaji Rao Ghatgia ; Moolajee ; and Narayun Rao Bhao Yumajee Potnuvees, on the part of the Maharajah Jyajee Rao Sindia, and the said Treaty has been this day ratified by the seal of the Right Honourable Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General, and by that of His Highness Maharajah Jyajee Rao Sindia.

Done at Gwalior, this thirteenth day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-four, corresponding with 22nd Zilhuj 1259 Hegira, and ratified the same date.

Seal of
Maharajah
AliJah Jyajee
Rao Sindia,
Bahadoor.

Seal of the
Governor-
General.

(Sd.) ELLENBOROUGH.

" F. CURRIE.

" W. H. SLEEMAN.

Seal of
Ram Rao
Phalkia
Bahadoor.

(Sd.) RAM RAO PHALKIA BAHADOOR.

" SHUMSHER JUNG.

Seal of
Moonshee
Rajah Bulwunt
Rao Bahadoor.

(Sd.) MOONSHEE RAJA

BULWUNT RAO.

" DEO RAO BHAOO JADHOW.

Seal of
Oodajee Rao
Ghatgia.

" OODAJEE RAO GHATGIA.

" NARAYUN RAO BHAOO,

" MOOLAJEE.

Schedule A.

Schedule A. referred to in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty of Gwalior, being the enumeration of Districts, with their estimated present net revenues and description of territory, assigned by His Highness Jyaje Rao Sindia for the maintenance of the increased contingent force mentioned in the said Treaty, in addition to the revenues heretofore assigned, and payments heretofore received by the British Government on the part of His Highness.

Bhandheree	Rs. 1,80,000
Chanderee "	81,000
Gur Mhow	2,400
Mhow Mchonee	37,000
Jawud	2,29,000
Jcerun	37,000
Indorkce	37,000
Gungapore, &c.	16,000
Yawul Chopra	97,000
Sitwas Nimawar	35,000
Kutchwagurh	2,27,500
Ruttungur "	1,60,000
Hindia Horda	1,29,000
Manpoor	2,000
Chur Thana	800
Nodha	30,000
Total Rs.				13,00,700

And any other pergunnahs, districts, or lands whatsoever, belonging to His Highness not above specified* which may be situated on the right bank of the river Sindh, from its embouchure in the Jumna to the point at which it leaves the ghauts near Kninwah (save and except the fort of Nnrwur with the lands immediately surrounding the same, 38 villages yielding Rs. 14,000, and Lebwa, Jaghire of Bulwunt Rao, yielding Rs. 2,000, and Bhengong, Jaghire of Bhao Potnuvees, yielding Rs. 2,000, the two last to be transferred hereafter, at the pleasure of the British Government, an equivalent being given for them in some other of the transferred districts, by mutual agreement) and from that point all such other pergunnahs, districts, and lands as may be situated below the submit of the ghauts.

It is to be understood that all religious endowments and grants of a similar character *bonâ fide* existing at this date, and excluded from the rent-roll of the several districts, are to be respected and maintained, and that the assumption of the management of the new territories by the British Government does not involve the abolition of the "Suzerainete" of the Maharajah, or of the proprietary rights of the inhabitants thereof.

(Sd.) F. CURRIE.
 " W. H. SLEEMAN
 and

THE GWALIOR NEGOCIATORS.

N.B.—In addition to the lands above enumerated, the British Government receives, as assignment for the former contingent, and on other accounts, sums to the amount of about Rs. 5,46,900 making the total aggregate receipts for the whole contingent force, Rs. 18,47,600.

(Sd.) F. CURRIE.
 " W. H. SLEEMAN
 and

THE GWALIOR NEGOCIATORS.

* Such as Gondia, near Indurgur yielding Rs. 30,000
 Mehdek " 2,200
 Pachore and Chundory " 250

Schedule B.

Schedule B. referred to in Article 5 of the Treaty of Gwalior, being an enumeration of the districts to be held and managed by the British Government till the debt due by the Gwalior State, mentioned in the said Article, is discharged.

Shujawulpore	Rs.	2,55,000
Shahjehanpore	"	2,00,000
Ecsagur	"	3,00,000

(Sd.) F. CURRIE.

" W. H. SLEEMAN
and

THE GWALIOR NEGOCIATORS.

No. CV.

ADOPTION SUNNUD granted to MAHARAJAH ALI JAH JYAJEE RAO SINDIA, Gwalior.

Her Majesty being desirous that the Governments of the several Princes and Chiefs of India who now govern their own territories should be perpetuated, and that the representation and dignity of their houses should be continued; I hereby, in fulfilment of this desire, repeat to you the assurance which I communicated to you in the Agra Durbar in December 1859, that on failure of lineal heirs, the adoption by yourself and future rulers of your State of a successor according to the rules and traditions of your family will be recognized and confirmed. Be assured that nothing shall disturb the engagement thus made to you so long as your house is loyal to the crown and faithful to the conditions of the Treaties, grants or engagements which record its obligations to the British Government.

11th March 1862.

(Sd.) CANNING.

No. CVI.

Treaty between the British Government on the one part, and Maharajah Ali Jah Jyajee Rao Sindia Bahadoor, and his children, heirs and successors, on the other part, settled on the part of the British Government, by Colonel Sir Richmond Campbell Shakespear, K. T. and C. B., Agent to the Governor-General in Central India, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him by His Excellency the Right Honourable Charles John Earl Canning, G. C. B., Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and one of Her Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council. and on the part of His Highness Jyajee Rao Sindia by Jugdeo Rao Mohorkur, Commander-in-Chief, and Balajee Chinnajee, Durbar Dewan, nominated by His Highness to conduct this negotiation.

Whereas a Treaty was concluded on 13th day of January A.D. 1844, corresponding with 22nd Zilhedj 1259 Hegira, between the Honourable East India Company and Maharajah Ali Jah Jynjee Rao Sindia; and

Whereas, in execution of the declared intention of the British Government to give to the Maharajah, in acknowledgment of services, rendered by His Highness in 1857 and 1858, territory yielding a gross yearly revenue of three lakhs of Company's Rupees, it has become expedient to restore a portion of the districts assigned to the British Government by the above-mentioned Treaty; and

Whereas it will be to the advantage of both contracting parties that other portions of the said Assigned Districts be restored to the Maharajah in exchange for the possessions of His Highness, situated

in the Bombay Presidency, and to the south of the river Nerbudda; and elsewhere; and

Whereas it has been found inconvenient that the sovereignty of the Assigned Districts should remain with the Maharajah, while their civil administration and management remain with the British Government, and

Whereas it has been declared on the part of the British Government that if the revenue and receipts of the Assigned Districts should fall short of 18 lakhs of Company's Rupees per annum, the deficiency shall not be claimed from the Maharajah, and by the above declaration the provisions of Article 3 have been abrogated; and

Whereas with reference to the sixth Article, it has been declared that the military force in the Maharajah's service may, with certain limits, be increased; and

Whereas the fifth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth Articles of the above-mentioned Treaty relate to matters of a temporary nature, and have been fulfilled, or are no longer applicable to the existing relations between the two governments;

Therefore it is agreed by the contracting parties that the Treaty of the 13th January, 1844, shall be abrogated, and that in its place the following Articles shall be substituted:—

Article 1.

All Treaties and engagements between the two Governments, previous to that of the 13th of January, 1844, shall, except in so far as they may be altered by this present engagement, remain binding upon the two Governments.

Article 2.

The British Government restores to the Maharajah from the Assigned Districts now in its possession territory yielding a gross revenue of three lakhs of Company's Rupees per annum, as a free gift and willing acknowledgment of His Highness' services during the years, A. D., 1857 and 1858.

Article 3.

The Maharajah transfers to the British Government in full sovereignty the whole of His Highness' possessions in the Punj mahals, and to the south of the river Nerbudda, also pergunnah Kunjea on the Betwa river, on the following conditions:—

1st.—That for the lands transferred by His Highness, the British Government shall give in exchange, lands of equal value, calculated on both sides, on the present gross revenue.

2nd.—That, in lieu of all tributes and perquisites now derived by the Maharajah from the lands to be transferred by His Highness, the British Government shall for the future pay to the Maharajah from the British Treasury at Gwalior an equivalent in Company's Rupees, calculated at the average rate of *hatta* which has prevailed during the last six months.

3rd.—That each government shall respect the conditions of existing leases until their expiry, and that in order that this may be made clear to all concerned, each Government shall give to its new subjects leases for the same terms of years, and on the same conditions as those which they at present enjoy.

4th.—That each government shall give to its new subjects "Sunnuds" in perpetuity, for the rent-free lands, the jaghires, the perquisites, and the hereditary claims, (*i.e.* "Huks" and "Wattuns,") which they enjoy at present under the other government.

Article 4.

On the same terms and conditions as those specified in the foregoing Article, the Maharajah Sindia transfers to the British Government the

whole of His Highness' present rights and interests in both lands and perquisites in the districts of :—

1st.—Ahmednuggur.

2nd.—Kandeish.

3rd.—Poonah.

4th.—Sattara.

5th.—Sholapoor.

6th.—Pergunnah Beri in zillahs Agra and Muttra.

7th.—His jaghire in zillah Ajmere.

The hereditary Kusha and Dhakillah villages named below are especially excluded from the above transfer, and will remain, as hitherto, in the possession of the Maharajah, and continue with His Highness on the same terms as heretofore.

NAMES OF VILLAGES.

1. Kusha Sirigonda, including Velso and Bbingaon.
2. Village Jangaon.
3. „ Pepulgaon.
4. „ Ghosepooree.
5. „ Deoolgaon.
6. „ Kunnari Khair.
7. „ Kusba Patas.

Article 5.

On the terms and conditions specified in Article 3, the British Government transfers to the Maharajah Sindia, in full sovereignty, the city and fort of Jhansi and lands in their vicinity and on the Pahooj, equal in value to those transferred by the Maharajah under Articles 3 and 4.

Article 6.

When the calculations based upon the above conditions shall have been completed, the two governments will exchange "letters of transfer" for all the districts which are included in the above propositions, and it is mutually agreed that this exchange of "letters of transfer" shall on no account be delayed beyond 1st May, 1861, and that each government shall enjoy the rubbee kist now on the ground.

Article 7.

On the completion of the above arrangements, the Maharajah Sindia will transfer to the British Government the full sovereignty of all the Assigned Districts which shall then remain in its possession.

Article 8.

With reference to Article 7, the British Government engages to keep in the place of the late contingent force, a "subsidiary force" constantly stationed within His Highness the Maharajah's territories, the whole expense of which shall not be less than (16) sixteen lakhs of Company's Rupees per annum.

Article 9.

The military force of all arms hereafter to be maintained by His Highness shall at no time exceed,—

Artillery	36 Guns with 360 Gunners.
Infantry	5,000 Drilled Soldiers.
Cavalry	6,000 Sowars.

Article 10.

This Treaty consisting of ten Articles, signed by Colonel Sir Richmond Campbell Shakspear, K.T. and C.B., on the part of His Excellency the

Right Honourable Charles John Earl Canning, G.C.B., Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and by Jugdeo Rao Mohurkur and Balajee Chinnajee on the part of Maharajah Ali Jah Jyajee Rao Sindia Bahadoor, shall be ratified, and the ratification shall be exchanged at Benares within ten days of the date of signature.

Signed at Benares this twelfth day of December, A.D. 1860.

(Sd.) R. C. SHAKESPEAR, *Colonel, Agent,
Governor-General for Central India.*

(Sd.) CANNING.

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Camp, at Benares on the 12th December, 1860.

(Sd.) A. R. YOUNG,
Offg. Secretary to the Government of India.

TRANSLATION of a KHUREETA from the MAHARAJAH SINDIA to the GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S AGENT for CENTRAL INDIA, dated 9th August, 1861.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS,—States that Article 4 of the Treaty of 12th December, 1860, secured to His Highness the continued possession, as, heretofore, of seven villages and two muzrahs in Jamgaon in the Deccan, but His Highness, consequent on the increased friendship between the two governments, and for their mutual benefit, has now consented to the transfer to the British Government, in exchange, of these his hereditary villages, as above; and has received equivalents for them on the Pahooj: he therefore requests him (the Governor-General's Agent) to apply to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council, to cancel that part of Article 4 of the said Treaty which refers to the villages in question.

TRANSLATION of a KHUREETA from the AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL for CENTRAL INDIA, to HIS HIGHNESS the MAHARAJAH SINDIA, dated 14th October 1861.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS,—I have submitted to His Excellency the Viceroy your Highness' Khureeta to me of date 9th August, 1861, and I am directed to inform you that your request has been acceded to, that that part of Article 4 of the Treaty of 12th December, 1860, which specially reserved to your Highness the seven hereditary villages and two muzrahs in Jamgaon in the Deccan, may be cancelled, your Highness having received equivalents for them on the Pahooj.

2. The Governor-General has decided that the best mode of complying with your Highness' request will be to append to the copy of the Treaty, which is in Calcutta, and to the copy which is with your Highness, copies of your Highness' Khureeta to me, and this my reply with the English translation of each of them in the margin. I therefore forward the above-mentioned papers which I beg your Highness will direct to be appended to the Treaty of 12th December, 1860.

Engagement executed by Maharajah Ali Jah Jyajee Rao Sindia under Article 7 of the Treaty of 12th December, 1860, transferring to the British Government the full sovereignty of the districts assigned for the maintenance of the Gwalior Contingent in 1844, remaining with the said Government on the completion of the territorial exchange arrangements provided for by the above-named Treaty.

Whereas under Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty, dated 13th January, 1844, between Maharajah Ali Jah Jyjee Rao Sindia and the British Government, certain districts and receipts enumerated and described in Schedule A, appended to the said Treaty, and of which a copy is appended to this deed, were assigned for the maintenance of the Gwalior Contingent :

And whereas certain of these districts, or portions thereof, as detailed in Schedule B, appended hereto, have recently been restored to Maharajah Sindia under the operation of Articles 2 and 5 of the Treaty, dated 12th December, 1860, subsequently entered into between His Highness and the British Government, and the said Maharajah has engaged by Article 7 of the latter Treaty on the completion of the arrangements provided for therein, to transfer to the British Government the full sovereignty of all the Assigned Districts which shall then remain in its possession :

And whereas the arrangements so provided for have now been completed, and the Assigned Districts and receipts described in Schedule C, appended hereto, remain in the possession of the British Government :

Therefore Maharajah Ali Jah Jyjee Rao Sindia hereby transfers to the British Government the full sovereignty of the districts so enumerated in Schedule C, viz :—

1. Sindia's two-third shares of Keshory Patun				Number of villages unknown.	
Bhandhere	80	villages,
Kuehwaghur	160	"
Chandeyree	380	"
5. Hindia Hurdah	762	"
Sutwas Nimawur	214	"
Char Thannah	4	"
Manpoor	28	"
Yawul Chopra	272	"
10. Nimar Mahals	761	"
Possessions in Ruthgurrh	113	"
" Maltoun	78	"
13. " Gurra Kotah	77	"

The receipts from the tributes described in the said Schedule, amounting to Rupees 3,70,692-14-6, British Currency, continuing to be assigned to the British Government on the same conditions as heretofore.

Signature of	Signature of	Signature of
MAHARAJAH ALI JAH. BALAJEE CHIMNAJEE, GUNPUT RAO KHURKAY,		
JYAJEE RAO SINDIA	Durbar Dewan.	Naib Dewan

gent; the portions of the same restored to Maharajah Sindia under the
sovereignty of which has to be transferred to the said Government by

C.						
No.	Remaining with the British Government to be transferred in full sovereignty under Article 7 of the Treaty of 1860.				REMARKS.	
	Khalsa.	Quit-rent.	Rent-free.	Total.	Present gross value.	
					Rs. As. P.	Rs. As. P.
....	69	..	11	80	59,208 0 0	
....	160	160	* 1,14,720 8 0	1,73,028 8 0
....	377	..	8	380	94,908 15 6	91,908 15 6
the Nec- t is in- except two-third total Pa- to Boon- es 80,000 which re- the British	† unknown.	80,000 0 0
	727	..	35	762	97,397 4 0	
	\$ 134	58	42	231	31,625 8 0	
	4	4	1,197 6 8	
	27	..	1	28	4,400 11 11	1,30,120 2 8
	267	..	6	272	2,16,617 6 9	4,400 11 11
	675	7	79	761	1,38,199 4 0	6,08,975 12 10
	113	113	31,678 4 0	1,38,199 4 0
	78	78	21,422 0 0	
	77	77	36,654 8 0	
						89,754 12 0
remain- British to be in full	2,708	62	176	2,946	9,26,929 12 10
....	39,176 0 0	
31	10,279 0 0	
..	97,200 0 0	
le	1,08,550 0 0	
no	34,387 12 0	
..	21,100 2 6	
at						3,70,692 14 6
00						12,97,622 11 4
t					Deduct reve- nues of Char Thannah ..	800 0 0
Do						12,96,822 11 4

(Sd.) R. J. MEADE,
Agent to the Governor-General
for Central India.

No. CVII.

Treaty between the British Government on the one part, and Maharajah Ali Jah Jyajee Rao Sindia, Bahadoor, and his children, heirs, and successors, on the other part; settled on the part of the British Government by Major-General H. D. Daly, C.B., Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Central India, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him by His Excellency the Right Honourable Richard Southwell Bourke, Earl of Mayo, Viscount Mayo of Mony-crower, Baron Naas of Naas, Knight of the Illustrious Order of St. Patrick, Grand Master of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Member of the Privy Council of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, M.A., D.C.L., Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and on the part of His Highness Jyajee Rao Sindia by Dada Gunput Rao Khurkay, Dewan of Gwalior, nominated by His Highness to conduct to this negotiation.

Whereas under the arrangements concluded with the Gwalior State by the Treaty ratified at Benares on 12th December, 1860, there remained due to the Gwalior State on the part of the British Government an annual payment of Rs. 4,658-1-9 as per Schedule A.;

And whereas it is desirable to cede to the Gwalior State lands yielding a land revenue to that amount;

And whereas for reasons of State and for the advantage of both contracting parties it is desirable to effect certain exchanges of territory between the contracting parties:

The following articles are hereby agreed on:—

Article I.

His Highness the Maharajah of Gwalior cedes in full sovereignty to the British Government the lands now included within the limits of the British Cantonment at Morar, with all his rights and interests therein.

Article II.

His Highness the Maharajah of Gwalior cedes to the British Government, his rights and interests of every description in the villages named in the Schedule B, annexed to this Treaty.

Article III.

His Highness the Maharajah of Gwalior transfers to the British Government his rights and interests in the village of Sirusgaonkata in the Seroor Talooka of the Poona Collectorate, which are estimated to be of the present value of Rs. 452-9-4 per annum.

Article IV.

In consideration of these cessions, and with a view to extinguish the annual payment of Rs. 4,658-1-9 referred to in the preamble of this Treaty, the British Government cedes to the Gwalior State in full sovereignty, to be held on the same tenure as the rest of the Maharajah's dominions, the villages named in Schedule C, attached to this Treaty: and the Maharajah of Gwalior accepts the villages, named in Schedule C. in full satisfaction of all claims under the aforesaid Treaty of 1860, and of the cessions made to the British Government under Articles I, II, and III preceding.

Article V.

The British Government having made a land settlement in the villages ceded under Article IV. preceding, the Maharajah of Gwalior engages to respect and maintain all rights recorded at that settlement; and the Maharajah further engages to respect and maintain all sunnuds for jaghires or rent-free grants within the said villages which have been granted by the British Government or admitted by the British Government to be valid.

Article VI.

The British Government, at the request of the Maharajah and in proof of friendship, engages to grant to Dada Gunput Rao Khurkay, the Dewan of Gwalior, the village of Aney in the Poona Collectorate as a perpetual jaghire to be held under conditions specified in a sunnud to be granted by the Bombay Government, the equivalent of the revenue of the jaghire, Rs. 2,602-13 per annum having been deducted in estimating the value of the territories ceded in exchange to the Maharajah under Article IV. of this Treaty.

This Treaty consisting of six Articles, has been concluded by Major-General Henry D. Daly, C.B., on the part of his Excellency the Right Honourable Richard Southwell Bourke, Earl of Mayo, K.P., G.M.S.I., P.C., &c., Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and by Dada Gunput Rao Khurkay on the part of Maharajah Ali Jah Jyajee Rao Sindia, Bahadoor; and it is hereby agreed that a copy of this Treaty duly ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, shall be delivered to the Maharajah on or before the day of 1871.

Signed at Gwalior this second day of December 1871.

Seal.

Signature of the Dewan.

Seal.

(Sd.) H. D. DALY, *Major-General,*
Agent, G.-G., Central India.

Seal.

Signature of the Maharajah.

Seal.

(Sd.) MAYO.

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Calcutta, on the 25th day of December 1871.

(Sd.) C. U. AITCHISON,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.

Schedule A., showing the annual payment due by the British Government to the Gwalior State under Treaty of 12th December, 1860.

Total gross revenue of lands transferred by Sindia to the British Government (letter from Agent, Governor-General, Central India, No. 30-147, dated 17th June 1864)	Rs. 7,00,702 5 5
Value of money payments to be credited to the Maharajah	„ 20,233 11 2
Total	Rs. 7,20,936 0 7

Total gross revenue of lands transferred by the British Government to the Maharajah	Rs. 6,95,708 4 7
Value of money payments to be credited to the British Government	„ 20,243 12 6
	7,15,952 1 1
Balance due to Sindia, Rs.	4,983 15 6

DEDUCT—

On account of Bulwundee, Budrooka and Kotar (letter of Collector of Ahmednuggur No. 1564, dated 6th September 1867)	Rs. 181 14 0	
Compensation to Barote, Gumul, &c., in Punch Mahals (letter of Agent, Punch Mahals, No. 103, dated 10th February 1863)	„ 143 15 9	
		325 13 9
Net annual balance due to Sindia, Rs.	4,658 1 9	

*Schedule B., being list of villages mentioned in Article II.
of this Treaty.*

Kusba Gunsangwee.	Mouza Beerkeengaon.
Mouza Ooncheygao.	„ Waheegaon.
„ Peepulgaon.	„ Dhorekeengaon.
„ Bhudaila.	„ Rahatgaon.
„ Pathurwalla.	„ Kurkeengaon.

Schedule C., being list of villages mentioned in Article IV.

<i>District.</i>	<i>Mouza.</i>	<i>Revenue.</i>		
		<i>Rs.</i>	<i>a.</i>	<i>p.</i>
Bhandere	Burrenda Havalee	...	652	0 0
	Baranah	...	899	0 0
	Dullepppoora	...	435	0 0
	Attereeckhera	...	77	0 0
	Dhumna	...	870	0 0
	Seersaee	...	2,229	0 0
	Piaolee	...	1,697	0 0
	Astout	...	1,761	0 0
	Niehrolee	...	288	0 0
	Piprowakhas	...	3,897	0 0
	Mooreea	...	1,475	0 0
	Moosturra	...	1,337	0 0
	Suleterrah	...	2,814	0 0
	Saintoul	...	1,354	0 0
	Dulputpoor	...	1,838	0 0
	Total	...	21,623	0 0
Mote	Ajeetpora	...	478	0 0
	Bairich	...	1,929	0 0
	Bureholae	...	2,231	0 0
	Sooklare	...	438	0 0
	Keolaree	...	784	0 0
	Total	...	5,860	0 0
GRAND TOTAL		...	27,483	0 0

No. CVIII.

TRANSLATION of a KHUREETA from HIS HIGHNESS MAHARAJAH SINDIA, K.S.I. to the address of HIS EXCELLENCY the RIGHT HONORABLE SIR JOHN LAWRENCE, G.C.B., K.S.I., VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA, dated 29th March 1864.

AFTER THE USUAL COMPLIMENTS.—Your friend has become aware that your Excellency would wish to continue the occupation of the fortress of Gwalior by a British garrison in the event of the maintenance of the Morar cantonment as the Head Quarters of the subsidiary force, and that, with reference to intimation given to your sincere friend by Lords Canning and Elgin, the late Viceroys and Governors-General, that the fort should be made over to your affectionate friend, notwithstanding these assurances, it is the free wish of my heart, and I hereby convey my written and formal consent to the occupation of the fort of Gwalior by British troops as long as the Government of India may deem such to be advisable on the condition that my flag continues to fly from the ramparts, and I am saluted from its guns according to established custom.

That should the Government of India at any time and for any reason or cause decide on withdrawing the garrison of British troops, in such case the fort would be occupied by myself in such force as is deemed sufficient for its security.

That with reference to this subject, I have requested Major Meade, Agent, Governor-General, and Major Hutchinson, the Political Agent, to submit certain requests to your Excellency, which I hope may meet with favourable consideration.

May I always be considered a well-wisher, and occasionally be favored with accounts of your Excellency's welfare.

To the MAHARAJAH of GWALIOR.

MY HONOURED AND VALUED FRIEND,—I have received with pleasure your Highness' friendly letter, dated 29th March 1864, conveying, on certain conditions, your written and formal consent to the occupation of the fort of Gwalior by British troops as long as the Government of India may deem such to be advisable.

I agree to these conditions, viz., *1st*, that your Highness' flag shall continue to fly from the ramparts of the fort, and that your Highness will be saluted from its guns according to established custom; *2nd*, that if the Government of India should at any time and for any reason or cause decide on withdrawing the garrison of British troops from the fort, in such case the fort will be occupied by our Highness' troops in such force as may be deemed sufficient for its security.

In consideration of your Highness having consented to the above arrangement and of the friendship which the British Government entertains for you, I, provided it be decided to retain the British troops at Morar, will agree to modify the ninth Article of the Treaty concluded with your Highness on 12th December 1860, so far as to increase the number of guns which your Highness is permitted to possess, from thirty-six (36), which is the number fixed in Article nine of the above Treaty, to forty-eight (48).

FORT WILLIAM :

Your Highness' Sincere friend,

The 12th April 1864.

(Sd.) J. LAWRENCE.

No. CIX.

To the MAHARAJAH of GWALIOR.

MR HONoured AND VALUED FRIEND,—I regret that it has not been in my power to convey to you sooner a definite decision on the subject of the fort of Gwalior. As I have now resolved to maintain a cantonment at Morar, and definitely to accept your Highness' offer of the retention of the fort of Gwalior by British troops, I hasten to fulfil the promise made to you in my letter of 12th April, and to inform you that I consent to modify the ninth Article of the Treaty concluded at Benares on 12th December 1860, which shall in future be read as follows :—

Article 9.

tions, provided that no lands within Railway limits are taken up by any traders or rent-payers for the purposes of building shops and carrying on trade to the injury of the interests of the Durbar by the withholding payments of taxes by such parties on the ground of their residing within those limits. And provided also that all buildings, such as godowns, dhurmsalas, &c., erected outside the Railway limits shall be entered under Durbar jurisdiction.

2. Full civil and criminal jurisdiction over the lands required for the Railway, its works and bridges, rests entirely with the British Government.

3. Holkar remits all transit duty on the "through" traffic of the Railway.

refuge within Railway limits, may be found within such limits; but if such persons shall have passed on and escaped into British territories, their surrender must depend on the circumstances of the case and the pleasure of the British Government.

2. Government will not hold the Durbar responsible for offences committed within Railway limits, unless those offences are traced to subjects of the Durbar.

3. Still retaining the right to exercise its discretion in particular cases, Government, as a general rule, will not object to deliver to Holkar for punishment Durbar subjects who may have been convicted and sentenced by Government officers for offences committed within Railway limits.

No. CXII.

HIS HIGHNESS MAHARAJAH SINDIA'S RAILWAY LOAN ENGAGEMENT,
dated Bombay, 19th November, 1872.

His Excellency the Viceroy in Council has accepted the offer of Maharajah Sindia of 75 lakhs of Rupees ($\frac{3}{4}$ th of a million sterling) at 4 per cent. interest to himself and his heirs for ever from the Government of India for the construction of a Railway between Gwalior and Agra.

2. The entire jurisdiction over the line and all matters connected with its construction, direction, and management to be with the Government of India.

3. His Highness the Maharajah Sindia will give all reasonable assistance in respect to materials required for construction and maintenance, charging no dues of any sort, whether in transit through Gwalior territory or procured from it.

4. One set of carriages 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, will be at the Maharajah's disposal on all occasions of his travelling on the line free of all charge.

(Sd.) H. D. DALY, *Major-General,*
Agent, Governor-General for Central India.

(Sd.) DADA KIRKEY,
Dewan of Gwalior.

In amendment of the 1st paragraph, one million and a half ($1\frac{1}{2}$ crore Rupees*) to be substituted for '75 lakhs', and after "Gwalior and Agra" to be entered "and Indore and Neemuch."

* Five instalments—
1873 38 lakhs
1874 37 "
1875 25 "
1876 25 "
1877 25 "

(Sd.) H. D. DALY, *Major-General,*
Agent, Governor-General for
Central India.

MORAR:
The 11th June, 1873. }

(Sd.) DADA KIRKEY.

Read and explained by me to the Maharajah Sindia in the presence of his Dewan, who signed it yesterday by order of His Highness.

MORAR, }
The 12th June, 1873. } (Sd.) H. D. DALY, Major-General,
Agent, Governor-General for Central India.

Aitchison Treaties and engagements.

"The Maharajah of Gwalior is entitled permanently to a salute of 19 guns in British territory, but to a salute of 21 guns in his own territory. Maharajah Jyajee Rao Sindia enjoyed a personal salute of 21 guns in British territory also."

END OF VOL. I.